Implicit-Agreement Proof and No Constructive Amendment from Isolated “Substantive Offense” Misstatements in § 1956(h) Conspiracy Trials

Introduction

In United States v. Christopher Lopez (3d Cir. Jan. 22, 2026) (not precedential), the Third Circuit affirmed the money-laundering conspiracy conviction of Christopher Lopez, the owner of a used car dealership, arising from an undercover “sting” purchase of a vehicle with cash represented to be drug proceeds. Lopez and his employee/co-defendant Mike Torres sold a high-value car to undercover agents after the purported buyer repeatedly stated he was a cocaine trafficker and wanted to keep the purchase “off the papers” by placing the vehicle in another person’s name.

The appeal presented two principal issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Lopez and Torres agreed to commit the object offense (concealment money laundering) as required for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and (2) whether the indictment was constructively amended because of occasional misstatements at trial and arguments that allegedly blurred the line between the substantive offense and conspiracy.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit held that the District Court did not err in denying Lopez’s motion for judgment of acquittal and did not plainly err in denying a new trial. The court concluded:

  • A rational jury could find an implicit agreement between Lopez and Torres to conduct a transaction designed to conceal the true purchaser/ownership and the source of cash represented as drug proceeds, satisfying § 1956(h) (conspiracy) with the object offense under § 1956(a)(3)(B).
  • No constructive amendment occurred despite two isolated trial references mistakenly describing the charge as the substantive money laundering offense rather than conspiracy, because the trial record and the instructions—read as a whole—repeatedly and accurately framed the charge as conspiracy and set out the correct elements.
  • The willful blindness instruction was properly confined to knowledge of the conspiracy’s object and aligned with Third Circuit law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence / Rule 29 Framework

  • United States v. Rivera, 74 F.4th 134, 137 (3d Cir. 2023): Provided the governing sufficiency formulation—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the conviction stands if any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Carbo, 572 F.3d 112, 113 (3d Cir. 2009): Recognized that Rule 29 rulings are ordinarily reviewed de novo, anchoring the baseline standard the panel uses even when applying plain-error review to an unpreserved theory.
  • United States v. Navarro, 145 F.3d 580, 584-85 (3d Cir. 1998): Supplied the four-part plain-error framework. The panel used Navarro to structure review because Lopez’s appellate theories were not preserved below.
  • United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 356 (3d Cir. 2022); United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002): These cases collectively support the Third Circuit approach that, for the “error” prong of plain error, the court asks whether the district court would have erred under the standard that would have applied had the issue been preserved (here, de novo sufficiency review).
  • United States v. Williams, 974 F.3d 320, 362 (3d Cir. 2020): Used to deem Lopez’s “agreement” sufficiency challenge unpreserved because his Rule 29 motion raised a different sufficiency theory; specific arguments omitted below are forfeited on appeal. This highlights an important procedural lesson: Rule 29 motions should enumerate all distinct insufficiency grounds (agreement, intent, knowledge, etc.), not just one.

2. What Conspiracy Requires (and How the Object Offense Shapes the Agreement)

  • United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 115-16 (3d Cir. 2023): Central to the court’s analysis. Fallon supplies the proposition that the conspiratorial agreement must be one that, if completed, would satisfy the elements of the underlying substantive offense; and that conspirators must join knowing the unlawful purpose (including the object’s mens rea). Lopez applies Fallon to explain why proof of agreement necessarily incorporates proof that the defendant shared the aim to engage in concealment laundering.
  • United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir. 1994): Cited for the requirement that conspiracy includes an intent to achieve the conspiratorial goal; it supports rejecting Lopez’s suggestion that mere participation in a sale is enough unless tied to the specific concealment objective.
  • United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010): Reinforces that agreement, knowledge, and intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence and inferred from related facts and circumstances. Lopez uses Boria to validate the Government’s reliance on recorded statements, conduct during the transaction, and the paperwork structure as proof of an implicit agreement.
  • United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 432 (3d Cir. 2013): Important for the boundary of appellate review: the existence of alternative innocent inferences does not permit overturning a jury verdict if a rational guilty inference exists. The panel uses this to reject Lopez’s “poor supervision” narrative as a competing inference the jury was free to disbelieve.

3. Constructive Amendment and Instructional Context

  • United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 248 (3d Cir. 2007): Establishes that a constructive amendment warrants a new trial. Lopez invokes McKee as the remedy rule, then holds no amendment occurred.
  • United States v. Scarfo, 41 F.4th 136, 193 (3d Cir. 2022): Reiterates the constitutional principle that courts cannot formally or constructively expand an indictment to include new charges. The panel uses Scarfo to frame the seriousness of the claim while concluding the record did not cross that line.
  • United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1973): Provides the classic definition: constructive amendment occurs when the defendant is convicted of an offense whose elements differ from what the indictment charged.
  • United States v. Cammarata, 145 F.4th 345, 360 (3d Cir. 2025): Cited to note that preserved constructive-amendment claims receive plenary review; Lopez uses it as a benchmark while applying plain-error review due to forfeiture.
  • United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 157 (3d Cir. 2006): Supplies the “read the instructions as a whole” doctrine. The panel relies on Flores to hold that isolated misstatements do not amount to constructive amendment where the overall charge correctly describes conspiracy and its elements.

4. Willful Blindness / Deliberate Ignorance

  • United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 258 (3d Cir. 2000): Supports the propriety of deliberate-ignorance instructions, emphasizing that “deliberate ignorance cannot become a safe harbor for culpable conduct.” Lopez relies on Wert-Ruiz to uphold the instruction and to reject the argument that it diluted the agreement requirement.

Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency: Agreement to Conceal Can Be Inferred from Coordinated Conduct

The opinion’s core sufficiency holding is that the jury could rationally infer an agreement between Lopez and Torres to commit the object offense—concealment money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B)—from how they jointly executed the transaction. The court emphasized several evidentiary pillars:

  • Repeated “drug proceeds” representations: The undercover buyer expressly said he was “pushing cocaine” and needed a cash purchase, and later reiterated the “hustling” narrative directly to Lopez. The panel treats these statements as supporting knowledge that the funds were represented as drug proceeds (the sting feature of § 1956(a)(3)).
  • “No forms / not in my name” + the dealership’s accommodation: The buyer said he did not want anything in his name and did not want “government forms”; Lopez responded “we’ll make it work,” and the purchase was structured so the buyer was absent from the paperwork.
  • Allocation of roles consistent with a shared plan: Torres handled the sales interaction and paperwork mechanics; Lopez, as owner, approved/participated, and signed title documents transferring the car to the undercover partner (Ulrikson). The panel viewed this “working in tandem” as circumstantial evidence of a common purpose rather than parallel, uncoordinated acts.
  • Concealment effect as probative of concealment intent: The transaction’s “effect” was to hide the identity of the true purchaser and how he paid—an outcome consistent with intent to conceal the nature/source/ownership of represented proceeds. The panel treated this structured result as supporting an inference of conspiratorial agreement.

Importantly, the panel rejected the defense framing that this was merely negligent oversight. Under United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, the fact that the record could support multiple inferences does not undermine the verdict if the guilty inference is rational. Under United States v. Boria, the absence of direct proof of an explicit “we agree” conversation does not defeat conspiracy; implicit agreement can be inferred from the defendants’ coordinated actions and context.

2. Plain Error Did Not Help Lopez Because There Was No Underlying Error

Because Lopez’s “agreement” insufficiency theory was unpreserved, the court applied United States v. Navarro plain-error review. But the panel’s method matters: for the first prong (whether there was an error at all), it evaluated sufficiency de novo under United States v. Adair and related cases. Having found the evidence sufficient, the court stopped the plain-error analysis at prong one.

3. Constructive Amendment: Isolated Misstatements Did Not Change the Charged Elements

Lopez’s constructive-amendment claim depended on the idea that the jury may have believed it could convict him of the substantive laundering offense without finding an agreement. The court rejected that theory for several reasons:

  • Record-wide consistency with conspiracy: Although there were two isolated incorrect references to the substantive offense, the trial “on many more occasions” properly described the charge as conspiracy and discussed its elements.
  • Instructions read as a whole: Under United States v. Flores, a single misstatement does not control if the charge overall correctly explains the law. The panel concluded the jury was repeatedly oriented to the conspiracy framework.
  • Closings did not eliminate the agreement element: The Government’s remark that it need not prove an “explicit” agreement was not, in the panel’s view, a statement that no agreement was required—only that agreement could be implicit, which is consistent with conspiracy law.
  • Willful blindness instruction stayed in its lane: The instruction addressed knowledge of the conspiracy’s existence/object, not the elimination of agreement. The panel found it consistent with United States v. Wert-Ruiz.

Applying the definition from United States v. Bryan and the principle from United States v. Scarfo, the court held that nothing in the trial altered the indictment’s elements or permitted conviction for a different crime; therefore, there was no constructive amendment and no basis for a new trial under United States v. McKee.

Impact

Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion is a clear application of existing Third Circuit doctrine with practical implications for § 1956(h) prosecutions and trial practice:

  • Conspiracy proof in “cash purchase + nominee paperwork” cases: The decision underscores that juries may infer an agreement to conceal from coordinated steps that place assets in another’s name while accepting cash represented as criminal proceeds—especially where defendants affirmatively accommodate “not in my name” requests.
  • Trial-error resilience where the “theory of the case” remains consistent: Isolated mislabeling of the charge as a substantive offense, without a broader shift in elements presented to the jury, is unlikely to constitute constructive amendment when the instructions and trial record repeatedly articulate the correct offense.
  • Preservation discipline for Rule 29 motions: By invoking United States v. Williams, the opinion signals that defendants must raise each distinct insufficiency theory at trial—or face forfeiture and plain-error review on appeal.
  • Willful blindness remains a viable tool: The opinion confirms that deliberate-ignorance instructions can be used to address defendants who structure transactions to avoid confirming illicit facts, so long as the instruction does not substitute for proof of agreement and is tied to knowledge.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h))
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit a crime, plus willful participation. The Government does not need to show a written contract or explicit “we agree” statement; agreement can be inferred from coordinated conduct.
“Sting” Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B))
This provision covers transactions involving property “represented” by law enforcement to be criminal proceeds. The crime focuses on the defendant’s intent to conceal the nature, source, ownership, or control of the represented proceeds, even if the money is not truly illegal.
Concealment
Concealment means structuring a transaction to hide who really owns, controls, or is benefiting from assets, or to disguise where funds came from. Using a nominee purchaser (placing title/registration in someone else’s name) can be evidence of concealment intent, depending on context.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal, the question is not whether the judges would have voted to convict, but whether any rational jury could have done so when viewing the evidence in the Government’s favor.
Plain Error Review
If a defendant did not properly raise an issue in the district court, the appellate court will reverse only for a clear and outcome-affecting error. If there was no underlying legal error, the claim fails immediately.
Constructive Amendment
The Constitution requires that a defendant be tried only for charges returned by the grand jury. A constructive amendment happens when what the jury is allowed to convict on differs in essential elements from what the indictment charged—effectively adding or changing the crime midstream.
Willful Blindness / Deliberate Ignorance
A defendant cannot avoid liability by intentionally refusing to learn facts (e.g., “I didn’t ask because I didn’t want to know”). The instruction permits jurors to find knowledge when the defendant deliberately avoided confirming what was highly likely.

Conclusion

United States v. Christopher Lopez affirms two recurring principles in federal criminal litigation. First, a § 1956(h) money-laundering conspiracy agreement may be proven through circumstantial evidence and inferred from coordinated conduct designed to conceal ownership and the source of represented criminal proceeds—even absent direct evidence of an explicit pact. Second, isolated trial misstatements that momentarily blur “conspiracy” and the “substantive offense” do not amount to a constructive amendment when the indictment’s theory and the jury instructions—read as a whole—consistently present the correct elements, and when willful blindness is used to address knowledge rather than to eliminate the agreement requirement.