Immunity Survives Internal Court-Assignment Errors: Judges Retain Judicial Immunity and Prosecutors Retain Absolute Immunity for Advocacy in Contempt Proceedings

Precedents Cited

1) Framework for Judicial Immunity

The court relied on Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa. to apply a two-step judicial-immunity test: (i) whether the act is judicial (as opposed to nonjudicial) and (ii) if judicial, whether it was taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa. itself draws on the Supreme Court’s articulation in Mireles v. Waco—the key source for the “nonjudicial acts” and “complete absence of all jurisdiction” exceptions.

The opinion further invoked Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa. to emphasize the crucial distinction between acts in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction” (no immunity) and acts merely “in excess of jurisdiction” (immunity applies). Figueroa v. Blackburn was cited consistently with this principle, reinforcing that errors in how a judge exercises jurisdiction do not necessarily negate jurisdiction itself.

2) Jurisdiction of Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas

To rebut White’s “assignment order equals no jurisdiction” theory, the court pointed to the legislature’s broad grant of jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas, referencing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a), and citing Commonwealth v. Bethea for the breadth of common-pleas jurisdiction. The Administrative Order was treated as an internal case-assignment mechanism rather than a jurisdiction-conferring (or jurisdiction-stripping) source of authority.

3) Framework for Prosecutorial Absolute Immunity

For Walsh, the court relied on Odd v. Malone for the “presumption” that prosecutors ordinarily receive qualified immunity and must show they acted as the state’s advocate to obtain absolute immunity. The court also drew from Giuffre v. Bissell (quoted through Odd v. Malone) for the classic line that absolute immunity applies to actions “intimately associated with the judicial phases of litigation,” but not to purely administrative or investigatory acts.

The functional, conduct-specific methodology was taken from Roberts v. Lau (quoting Fogle v. Sokol): identify the conduct challenged and then classify the function it served (prosecutorial/advocative vs. administrative/investigative). Applying this, the court characterized subpoenaing, examining a witness at a hearing, and litigating a contempt petition as core advocacy.

4) Standard of Review and Appellate Framing

Although not central to the immunity holdings, the court cited Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp. for the plenary standard of review of a Rule 12 dismissal, reinforcing that the panel considered the immunity questions de novo.

Legal Reasoning

A) Judicial Immunity: Internal Assignment Orders vs. “Clear Absence of All Jurisdiction”

White largely conceded (or did not successfully dispute) that presiding over contempt is a judicial act, so the decisive question became jurisdiction. His theory was that the Washington County Administrative Order assigned criminal trials and motions to other judges and thus deprived Judge DiSalle of authority to act at all.

The Third Circuit rejected that reframing of an internal administrative protocol into a jurisdictional limitation. Grounding jurisdiction in state law (as opposed to local assignment practice), the court treated the alleged deviation from the Administrative Order as a procedural or administrative irregularity. Under Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., such an error—even if real—would be an act in excess of jurisdiction, not in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Because immunity is defeated only by the latter, judicial immunity barred the claims.

Importantly, the opinion signals that plaintiffs cannot evade judicial immunity by relabeling court-assignment problems as jurisdictional defects where state law still vests the court (and its judges) with general subject-matter jurisdiction.

B) Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity: Contempt Litigation as Advocacy

The court next applied the functional test to Walsh’s conduct: subpoenaing White, questioning him at a preliminary hearing, filing a contempt petition, and presenting evidence at the contempt hearing. Each step was characterized as part of advocacy in judicial proceedings—classic “judicial phase” conduct.

White’s best argument relied on Odd v. Malone, where prosecutors lost absolute immunity for failing to notify the court of case continuances/dismissals, despite a judicial directive—conduct deemed “primarily administrative” and requiring no advocacy. The Third Circuit distinguished Odd v. Malone by emphasizing that Walsh’s challenged acts were adversarial and litigation-oriented (securing testimony and pursuing contempt as an enforcement mechanism in court).

Even assuming Walsh violated the Administrative Order by choosing Judge DiSalle as the judge to whom he presented the petition, the court treated the selection and prosecution of the contempt matter as part of the prosecutorial function, not as non-advocative court-administration. Thus, absolute immunity attached.

C) Reversal of the Contempt Order Did Not Defeat Immunity

The opinion notes that the Pennsylvania Superior Court ultimately reversed the contempt order, but that fact did not alter the immunity analysis. Judicial and prosecutorial immunities are designed to protect the function, not the outcome: immunity can apply even when the underlying decision is later deemed erroneous.

Impact

Although labeled “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision offers a clear roadmap within existing Third Circuit doctrine:

• Judicial immunity remains robust against attacks premised on internal assignment or administrative orders. Unless a plaintiff can show a judge acted without any arguable subject-matter jurisdiction, assignment irregularities are unlikely to pierce immunity.
• Prosecutorial absolute immunity continues to extend to in-court and litigation-adjacent enforcement actions, including contempt proceedings tied to witness testimony, even where the prosecutor is alleged to have violated internal procedural directives.
• The decision further limits the reach of the “administrative conduct” carve-out recognized in Odd v. Malone, confining it to genuinely non-advocative, compliance/notification-type obligations rather than adversarial filings and presentations.

Practically, future civil-rights plaintiffs challenging contempt proceedings will face steep barriers where the complained-of acts are judicial rulings and prosecutorial filings in court, even if the proceeding was later overturned or procedurally irregular.