Illinois Overtime Under the Minimum Wage Law Does Not Incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act’s Preliminary/Postliminary Exclusion

1. Introduction

Johnson v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 2026 IL 132016 (Ill. Mar. 19, 2026), arose from a pandemic-era workplace policy at Amazon’s Illinois warehouses. In March 2020, Amazon required hourly, nonexempt warehouse employees to complete mandatory preshift COVID-19 screenings (temperature checks and symptom questions) before they could clock in. Employees alleged the screenings typically took 10–15 minutes (sometimes longer) and were unpaid.

The plaintiffs brought a class action asserting unpaid overtime under both federal and Illinois law, but on appeal they pursued only the Illinois overtime claim under section 4a of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (820 ILCS 105/4a (West 2020)). The core interpretive issue was whether Illinois overtime law implicitly adopts the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA) exclusion for time spent in activities “preliminary or postliminary” to principal work activities (29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) (2018)).

Because Illinois precedent did not squarely decide this, the Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court: Does section 4a of Illinois’s Minimum Wage Law incorporate the PPA’s preliminary/postliminary exclusion? The Illinois Supreme Court answered: No.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Illinois Supreme Court held that section 4a of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law does not incorporate the PPA’s exclusion for preliminary or postliminary activities. The court’s decision rested on:

  • The statutory text of section 4a, which includes a general overtime rule and enumerated exceptions, but does not mention the PPA or a preliminary/postliminary carveout.
  • The Illinois Department of Labor (IDOL) regulation defining “hours worked” as including “all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer’s premises” (56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.110 (eff. Nov. 15, 1996)), a definition the court found inconsistent with importing a PPA-style exclusion.
  • A reaffirmation of Illinois statutory interpretation principles: courts may not add exceptions to an unambiguous statute or use legislative history to create ambiguity.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC, 2016 IL 120526

The court cited Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC to explain a procedural point: when answering a certified question, it accepts the underlying facts as framed by the certifying court. Here, that meant adopting the Seventh Circuit’s factual summary of Amazon’s screening practice and the pleaded time impact. This framing narrowed the Illinois Supreme Court’s task to pure statutory interpretation, rather than factual disputes about the screenings.

Lavery v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2025 IL 130033

Lavery v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation supplied the court’s interpretive methodology: (1) the goal is to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent at enactment; (2) the best indicator is the statute’s plain language; and (3) courts must not read into a statute “exceptions, limitations, or conditions” that conflict with express language. This precedent was pivotal because Amazon’s position effectively required adding a major compensability limitation (the PPA exclusion) that the Illinois statute does not state.

Prazen v. Shoop, 2013 IL 115035

The court relied on Prazen v. Shoop for the separation-of-powers constraint that courts “can neither restrict nor enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute.” This directly rebutted Amazon’s argument that similarity between Illinois’s general overtime clause and the FLSA justified interpreting Illinois law as fully coextensive with federal overtime—including federal exclusions Illinois did not enact.

Mercado v. S&C Electric Co., 2025 IL 129526

Mercado v. S&C Electric Co. was cited for the more limited proposition that federal authority can be persuasive when Illinois provisions are parallel to the FLSA. The court used this to draw a line: Illinois courts may look to federal interpretations when the texts truly align, but not where adopting federal doctrine would create exceptions absent from Illinois text. In this case, section 4a contains the general overtime rule but not the PPA’s preliminary/postliminary exclusion—so the relevant parts are not parallel.

People v. Grayer, 2023 IL 128871

People v. Grayer supported the court’s refusal to rely on legislative history. The court emphasized that legislative history may be consulted only when the statutory language is ambiguous. Because the court found section 4a unambiguous—particularly in light of its enumerated exceptions and IDOL’s “hours worked” definition—Amazon’s history-based arguments could not override the text.

Chagoya v. City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 607

The opinion noted that some federal courts had previously applied the PPA to Illinois Wage Law claims, and cited Chagoya v. City of Chicago (specifically its footnote) as an example where the Seventh Circuit assumed PPA applicability based on the parties’ agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court implicitly treated such federal decisions as nonbinding and, where they rest on assumption or convenience rather than Illinois statutory analysis, as weak predictors of Illinois law.

Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 23 C 685, 2023 WL 8475658

The district court decision (Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC) had dismissed the Illinois claim largely because the federal claim failed under the PPA and because courts often look to FLSA authority for guidance. The Illinois Supreme Court’s answer rejects that “lockstep” approach when the Illinois statute and regulations do not contain the same exclusionary structure as federal law.

Johnson v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 142 F.4th 932

The Seventh Circuit’s certification decision (Johnson v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 142 F.4th 932) provided the question, factual summary, and a detailed survey showing tension between (a) the Illinois text and IDOL regulations and (b) federal case practice treating the PPA as applicable to Illinois overtime. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately resolved that tension in favor of Illinois statutory and regulatory text.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Section 4a’s structure: rule plus enumerated exceptions.
    Section 4a(1) states the general overtime rule (time-and-a-half for hours over 40). Section 4a(2) lists 10 exceptions; several explicitly incorporate FLSA provisions or USDOL regulations by reference (820 ILCS 105/4a(2)(D), (E), (F), (J)). The court treated this selective incorporation as meaningful: where the legislature wanted federal concepts imported, it said so; the absence of a PPA reference indicates no incorporation.
  2. No PPA language in the statute.
    The court emphasized that there is “no mention or reference” to the PPA or to preliminary/postliminary activities anywhere in section 4a or elsewhere in the Wage Law. Given the Wage Law’s enumerated exceptions, importing an additional, unstated exclusion would violate Illinois interpretive rules.
  3. IDOL’s “hours worked” definition affirmatively points the other way.
    Under 56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.110, “hours worked” includes “all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer’s premises.” The court viewed this definition as inconsistent with a PPA-style carveout that would remove certain time on the premises from compensation. Critically, the court highlighted that IDOL referenced PPA-related federal regulations for travel time (29 C.F.R. 785.33—785.41) but did not adopt federal preliminary/postliminary exclusions, reinforcing the inference of intentional omission.
  4. “Guidance” is not “adoption.”
    Although 56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.120 allows the Director to refer to USDOL regulations and interpretations “for guidance,” the court stressed that nothing requires IDOL to adopt them. Nor does the Wage Law authorize federal regulations to override IDOL’s definitions promulgated under the General Assembly’s delegation in section 10.
  5. Federal “patterning” arguments cannot override unambiguous Illinois text.
    Amazon argued that because section 4a(1) resembles FLSA section 207(a)(1), Illinois overtime should be interpreted coextensively with federal overtime. The court rejected this because similarity in the general rule does not import federal exceptions—especially where Illinois adopted a different exceptions scheme and empowered IDOL to define “hours worked.”
  6. Legislative history is unavailable absent ambiguity.
    Once the court found the text unambiguous, People v. Grayer foreclosed using legislative history to create an implied PPA exclusion.

3.3. Impact

The opinion establishes a clear interpretive rule for Illinois wage-and-hour litigation: Illinois overtime under section 4a is not automatically coextensive with federal overtime doctrine where federal limitations are not enacted in Illinois text or adopted in IDOL regulations.

Likely practical and doctrinal effects include:

  • Expanded potential compensability of mandatory preshift/onsite time under Illinois law.
    Activities that federal law may treat as noncompensable “preliminary” or “postliminary” could remain compensable in Illinois if they fall within IDOL’s “hours worked” definition—especially where employees are required to be on the employer’s premises. (The court did not decide whether the screenings are compensable on the merits; it answered only the incorporation question. But the ruling removes a major defense.)
  • More divergence between Illinois overtime claims and FLSA overtime claims.
    Employers may face situations where time is not payable under the FLSA/PPA framework but is payable under Illinois law, increasing compliance complexity and litigation risk.
  • Re-centering IDOL regulations as the operational definition of “hours worked.”
    The decision underscores that IDOL’s promulgated definitions matter and will not be displaced by federal interpretive doctrines unless Illinois law expressly incorporates them.
  • Limits on federal-court “lockstep” assumptions when predicting Illinois law.
    The court’s answer undermines the line of federal district court decisions that treated the Wage Law claim as rising or falling with the FLSA/PPA analysis, and it casts doubt on approaches grounded in convenience, party agreement, or generalized “FLSA guidance” rather than Illinois text.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Portal-to-Portal Act (PPA)
A federal law that limits compensable time under the FLSA by excluding certain time spent in activities before or after the main work (i.e., “preliminary or postliminary” activities), unless another rule makes them compensable.
Preliminary / Postliminary Activities
Tasks that occur before or after an employee’s principal job duties (for example, certain screenings, waiting, walking, or preparatory tasks). Under federal law, some such time may be excluded. This case holds Illinois overtime law does not automatically import that exclusion.
Certified Question
A procedure where a federal appellate court asks a state supreme court to answer a determinative question of state law lacking clear state precedent, to ensure state law is interpreted by the state’s highest court.
Statutory “Plain Meaning”
The interpretive principle that courts start (and often end) with the ordinary meaning of the statutory text; they do not add terms or exceptions the legislature did not include.
Administrative Regulations (IDOL)
Rules adopted by the Illinois Department of Labor under authority delegated by the legislature. Here, IDOL’s definition of “hours worked” is central and was treated as consistent with the statute and controlling for administration of the Wage Law.

5. Conclusion

Johnson v. Amazon.com Services, LLC sets a decisive Illinois rule: section 4a of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law does not incorporate the federal PPA’s preliminary/postliminary exclusion. The court grounded this in (1) the Wage Law’s text and enumerated exceptions, (2) the General Assembly’s delegation to IDOL to define “hours worked,” and (3) IDOL’s definition capturing time employees are required to be on the employer’s premises.

The broader significance is methodological as much as substantive: Illinois courts will treat federal wage-and-hour doctrine as persuasive only where statutory provisions truly run in parallel, and they will not “import” federal exclusions into Illinois law absent clear legislative or regulatory adoption.