Illinois Minimum Wage Law Overtime: No Portal-to-Portal “Preliminary Activities” Exclusion and No General “Benefit of the Employer” Limitation

Case: Lisa Johnson v. Amazon.com Services LLC (7th Cir. June 9, 2026)

1. Introduction

This Seventh Circuit decision concerns whether Illinois overtime law requires compensation for time Illinois warehouse employees spent in mandatory, pre-shift COVID-19 screenings during the pandemic. Plaintiffs Lisa Johnson and Gale Miller Anderson, on behalf of a putative class of Amazon hourly warehouse workers, alleged that Amazon required them to undergo screenings before clocking in, taking approximately 10–15 minutes per shift, which could add up to about an hour of uncompensated time per week—often pushing total time beyond 40 hours.

The central legal issues were (1) whether § 4a(1) of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS 105/4a(1), incorporates the federal Portal-to-Portal Act’s exclusion for “preliminary” activities, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2), and (2) even if not, whether a federal “benefit of the employer” concept limits what counts as compensable “work” under the IMWL.

The district court dismissed the IMWL overtime claim by treating the screenings as non-compensable “preliminary” activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit certified the incorporation question to the Illinois Supreme Court, which answered that the IMWL does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Seventh Circuit then addressed whether a distinct federal “benefit” test should nevertheless be read into Illinois law and rejected that approach as well.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded. Guided by the Illinois Supreme Court’s answer in Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2026 IL 132016, the court held that:

  • The IMWL does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act’s exclusion for preliminary or postliminary activities.
  • The court declined to graft onto the IMWL a broad federal “benefit of the employer” limitation derived from federal FLSA case law.
  • The claim’s scope is governed by IMWL § 4a(1) and the Illinois Department of Labor (“IDOL”) definition of “hours worked,” particularly 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 210.110.

The result is procedural but consequential: plaintiffs’ IMWL overtime claim survives dismissal, and the district court must proceed under Illinois standards rather than federal Portal-to-Portal or generalized federal “benefit” limitations.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The certification posture and reliance on state-law clarification

The panel’s decision is anchored in the certified-question process. In Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 142 F.4th 932, 944 (7th Cir. 2025), the Seventh Circuit certified whether IMWL § 4a incorporates the Portal-to-Portal Act exclusion. The Illinois Supreme Court’s response in Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2026 IL 132016 supplied the controlling state-law interpretation: no such incorporation exists, and IDOL’s “hours worked” definition affirmatively points in the opposite direction by including “all time” employees are required to be on the employer’s premises.

The Seventh Circuit invoked St. Augustine Sch. v. Underly, 21 F.4th 446 to frame its role after a state supreme court answers a certified question: the federal court “apply[ies] the instructions of the state supreme court to the facts.”

B. District court decision under a federal preliminary-activities framework

The decision below, Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 23 C 685, 2023 WL 8475658 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2023), treated the screenings as non-compensable “preliminary” activity by reading IMWL overtime alongside the Portal-to-Portal Act. That reasoning was undone by Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2026 IL 132016, which held the IMWL contains no statutory or regulatory hook incorporating the federal exclusion.

C. Federal “benefit of the employer” lineage—identified and rejected as a general IMWL limit

Amazon sought to salvage dismissal by invoking Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Loc. No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944), which defined “work” under the FLSA as exertion “controlled or required by the employer” and “pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.”

The panel also discussed Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), noting that IDOL’s “hours worked” definition “generally mirrors” Anderson’s formulation of time employees are required to be on premises/on duty, but does not import Anderson’s separate endorsement (via Tennessee Coal) of a broad “benefit of the employer” limitation.

D. Statutory interpretation canons and Illinois interpretive rules

To justify refusing to add federal limitations not expressed in Illinois text, the court relied on interpretive principles from:

  • Moore v. Chicago Park Dist., 978 N.E.2d 1050 (Ill. 2012) (legislative intent from plain language; courts do not depart from unambiguous text).
  • Hines v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 2006) (courts may not “annex” new provisions or read in unexpressed limitations).
  • Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (and quoted United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1972)): where a legislature includes language in one section but omits it in another, omission is presumed intentional.
  • Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (courts should not read into a statute words the legislature “left out”).

These authorities supported the panel’s core move: treat the IMWL and IDOL regulations as an independent state scheme rather than a receptacle for federal Portal-to-Portal and generalized federal FLSA glosses.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The IMWL does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act exclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s holding begins with the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion in Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2026 IL 132016: there is “no mention or reference” to the Portal-to-Portal Act or preliminary/postliminary activities in IMWL § 4a or elsewhere in the IMWL, and IDOL’s “hours worked” regulation contains no Portal-to-Portal exclusion and instead includes “all time” employees are required to be on the premises.

Thus, the district court’s Portal-to-Portal-based noncompensability premise could not stand as a matter of Illinois law.

B. The court refuses to graft a general “benefit of the employer” test onto IMWL overtime

Amazon’s alternative argument was that, even absent Portal-to-Portal incorporation, the screenings were not “work” because they were not pursued “necessarily and primarily” for Amazon’s benefit (a Tennessee Coal concept).

The Seventh Circuit declined to import that test as a broad, threshold limitation on “hours worked” for three interlocking textual/regulatory reasons:

  1. Silence in the core texts: IMWL § 4a(1) requires overtime pay for “employment in excess of” 40 hours, and IDOL’s general “hours worked” definition (56 Ill. Admin. Code § 210.110) contains no across-the-board “benefit of the employer” qualifier. Under Illinois interpretive rules (Moore; Hines), courts cannot add such a limitation.
  2. Targeted inclusion implies broader exclusion: IDOL did use “predominantly for the benefit of the employer” language in two specified contexts: meal periods/on-call time away from the premises, and certain travel time. By including the concept there but not in the general “on premises/on duty” definition, the omission is treated as intentional (Russello).
  3. Selective federal cross-references: IDOL sometimes references the FLSA/USDOL regulations in defining certain terms, and references 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.33–785.41 for travel time—yet does not reference federal law to limit the general “hours worked” definition. This selective referencing, emphasized by the Illinois Supreme Court in Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2026 IL 132016, reinforced the conclusion that Illinois did not adopt wholesale federal compensation-limiting doctrines.

The court also treated IDOL’s choice to mirror part of Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (premises/on-duty framing), without adopting the broader Tennessee Coal “benefit” limitation endorsed in Anderson, as further evidence that Illinois’s scheme is deliberately independent.

C. Practical consequence for this litigation

By rejecting both Portal-to-Portal incorporation and a generalized “benefit” limiter, the panel left the plaintiffs’ claim to be evaluated under: (i) IMWL § 4a(1)’s overtime requirement, and (ii) IDOL’s “hours worked” definition, including “all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer’s premises.” Mandatory, pre-shift screenings on Amazon’s premises and under Amazon’s control therefore plausibly qualify as compensable “hours worked,” at least at the pleading stage.

3.3. Impact

  • State-law independence from federal wage exclusions: The decision confirms that IMWL overtime claims cannot be defeated simply by invoking federal Portal-to-Portal concepts absent express Illinois adoption. This likely broadens the set of pre- and post-shift activities that may be compensable under Illinois law compared with federal FLSA baselines.
  • Regulatory text (IDOL) becomes the central battleground: Future IMWL disputes will turn heavily on 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 210.110’s “hours worked” language (and any Illinois-specific amendments), rather than on federal “preliminary activity” case law.
  • Limits on importing federal “work” gloss: The refusal to import a broad Tennessee Coal “benefit” test signals skepticism toward arguments that federal doctrines should apply in Illinois merely because they exist under the FLSA.
  • Broader exposure for mandated on-premises time: Employers requiring on-site tasks before clock-in—health screenings, security checks, equipment issuance, line-queueing under employer control—face heightened IMWL overtime risk, particularly where the time is regular and measurable.
  • Class action viability: Because the opinion keeps the claim alive past dismissal, it supports the viability of class theories where employers maintain uniform pre-shift requirements and timekeeping policies.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2))
A federal statute that narrows compensable time under the FLSA by excluding certain “preliminary” or “postliminary” activities occurring before or after the main work activity. This case holds that Illinois’s IMWL overtime statute does not automatically adopt that federal exclusion.
“Hours worked” under 56 Ill. Admin. Code § 210.110
An Illinois regulation defining compensable time broadly to include all time an employee is required to be on duty, on the employer’s premises, or at a prescribed workplace, plus additional time the employee is required or permitted to work.
“Benefit of the employer” test (from Tennessee Coal)
A federal concept asking whether an activity is pursued “necessarily and primarily” for the employer’s benefit. The Seventh Circuit declined to read this as a general limitation into the IMWL, especially where IDOL used “benefit” language only in specific subtopics (like certain travel or meal/on-call situations).
Certified question
A procedure where a federal court asks a state supreme court to resolve an unsettled issue of state law. Here, the Illinois Supreme Court’s answer controlled whether the IMWL includes federal Portal-to-Portal exclusions.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision, implementing Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 2026 IL 132016, establishes a clear Illinois overtime rule: IMWL § 4a(1) does not incorporate the Portal-to-Portal Act’s preliminary-activities exclusion, and courts should not add a broad federal “benefit of the employer” limitation absent textual or regulatory grounding in Illinois law. The case returns to the district court with plaintiffs’ IMWL overtime theory intact, and with “hours worked” to be assessed primarily through the IMWL and IDOL’s Illinois-specific regulatory definition rather than federal compensation-exclusion doctrines.