“Illegal Act” in Iowa Code § 710.10(4) Is Not Limited to Sexual Conduct; Uniform Instruction Need Not Narrow the Intended Illegality

I. Introduction

State v. Brown arose from an encounter between a thirteen-year-old girl (“Diya,” pseudonym) and Rodney Dee Brown, a seventy-one-year-old man, at a neighborhood supermarket and adjoining parking lot. Diya testified that Brown stared at her, followed her through the store, repeatedly approached her in checkout lines, obtained her name, and then—while she was leaving in tears and shaking—pulled his vehicle alongside her and offered her a ride. A jury convicted Brown of attempting to entice a minor under Iowa Code section 710.10(4) (2023).

On appeal, Brown challenged (1) the adequacy of the marshaling instruction’s use of the statutory phrase “illegal act” without further definition (arguing it should have been narrowed to an “illegal sexual act”), and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence that he acted with the specific intent to commit an illegal act when he offered the ride.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the jury instruction tracking section 710.10(4)’s “illegal act” language did not misstate the law by failing to limit “illegal act” to sexual conduct. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Brown acted with the requisite specific intent, relying on Diya’s testimony about Brown’s persistent pursuit and on Brown’s post-incident statements captured on police bodycam.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and instruction methodology

• State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Bynum, 937 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 2020)): The court invoked these cases for the tiered review framework—errors at law for refusals to give required instructions, abuse of discretion for discretionary instructions—and for the principle that instructions are assessed “as a whole.” In Brown, because the claim was that the instruction misstated the law (by not narrowing “illegal act”), the court treated the question as legal error review.
• State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237 (Iowa 2018): Cited (via Davis) for the holistic approach to reading instructions, supporting the court’s refusal to isolate a single term absent a genuine misstatement of statutory law.

2. Uniform jury instructions and when courts depart

• State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1997), overruled on other grounds by, Alcala v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)): These authorities support the institutional preference that trial courts “generally adhere” to uniform instructions. In Brown, the challenged marshaling instruction followed the uniform enticement instruction, reinforcing the presumption of correctness unless the uniform instruction conflicts with the statute.
• State v. McMullin, 421 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1988): The court cited McMullin for the caveat that uniform instructions, though usually approved, can still be “faulty.” This framed the court’s willingness to scrutinize the instruction—while ultimately concluding there was no legal fault because the statute itself does not restrict “illegal act” to sexual acts.

3. Issue preservation and limits on appellate argument

• State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848 (Iowa 2021); Martins v. Dull (In re Est. of Dull), 303 N.W.2d 402 (Iowa 1981), superseded on other grounds by court rule, Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1), as recognized in, Antolik v. McMahon, 744 N.W.2d 82 (Iowa 2007): These cases policed the boundary of what the court would consider. Brown attempted at oral argument to pivot to a broader “define illegal act” claim, but the court reiterated it addresses issues framed in the briefs.
• Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7 (2025) (per curium) (quoting Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020)): Cited for the proposition that courts do not “bat” for parties by creating arguments the litigant did not properly develop—supporting the court’s refusal to supply a legal rationale for additional definitional instructions when Brown had not properly briefed that contention.

4. Sufficiency of evidence and proof of specific intent

• State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 2020); State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653 (Iowa 2017); State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 2005): These cases supplied the familiar sufficiency lens: deference to the verdict, “substantial evidence” as what could convince a rational factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt, and viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State with reasonable inferences.
• State v. Manning, 26 N.W.3d 385 (Iowa 2025) (quoting State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50 (Iowa 2021)); State v. Radeke, 444 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 1989): These authorities grounded the court’s approach to specific intent as typically proven circumstantially—through a defendant’s conduct and surrounding circumstances rather than direct admissions.

5. Concurrence’s instructional concerns and analogous lines of cases (not adopted by the majority)

Justice Mansfield concurred in the judgment but criticized the instruction’s failure to define or specify the “illegal act,” analogizing to other contexts where juries are told the particular illegality at issue:

• State v. Cunningham, 463 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990): Cited for the core purpose of instructions—explaining the applicable law so jurors can apply it to the facts—supporting the concurrence’s discomfort with asking jurors to “sift the law.”
• State v. Ellison, 985 N.W.2d 473 (Iowa 2023); State v. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d 504 (Iowa 2024): Stand-your-ground cases invoked to show Iowa courts often specify the alleged “illegal activity” rather than leave the term undefined.
• State v. Mesch, 574 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1997); State v. Austin, 80 N.W. 303 (Iowa 1899), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Wagoner, 74 N.W.2d 246 (Iowa 1956): Burglary-intent jurisprudence requiring the State to specify the intended felony and requiring the court to instruct on its elements—used by the concurrence to argue similar discipline should apply to “illegal act” in enticement cases.
• State v. Holtz, No. 15-1058, 2016 WL 4036112 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2016); State v. Washpun, No. 03-0963, 2004 WL 1898470 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004): Cited to illustrate that not every illegality qualifies as an act “upon” another (as in Holtz), and that specifying candidate illegal acts in enticement instructions can be workable in practice (as in Washpun).

The majority did not reach these concerns because Brown’s preserved and briefed jury-instruction argument was narrower: that “illegal act” must be an “illegal sex act.” On that question, the majority held the law is otherwise.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory interpretation: “illegal act” is broader than “illegal sex act”

The court’s central move was textual and structural. Section 710.10(4) criminalizes attempting to entice a person reasonably believed to be under sixteen “with the intent to commit an illegal act upon” that minor. The statute then adds a specific consequence rule: a person convicted under subsection (4) is not subject to chapter 692A registration “unless the finder of fact determines that the illegal act was sexually motivated.”

From this, the court reasoned that the legislature contemplated illegal acts under subsection (4) that are not sexually motivated—otherwise the “sexually motivated” carveout would be surplusage. The court also contrasted subsection (4) with subsection (2), which separately criminalizes enticement with intent to commit an illegal sex act. That statutory pairing reinforced that subsection (4) is not limited to sex crimes.

2. Application to the instruction: no misstatement of law by tracking statutory language

Because the statute itself uses “illegal act” without limiting language, an instruction that mirrors that term does not misstate the offense elements. The district court therefore did not commit legal error by declining Brown’s request to specify a particular crime or to narrow the element to sexual illegality.

3. Sufficiency: circumstantial evidence supported specific intent to commit an illegal act “upon” the minor

The court treated the relevant “enticement” as Brown’s attempt in the parking lot to get Diya into his vehicle. It then considered the surrounding conduct (following her, repeated approaches despite avoidance, and escalation to a ride offer) together with Brown’s post-contact statements (calling her a “pretty young girl,” asserting she looked “eighteen,” acknowledging inappropriateness if she were thirteen, and contradicting Diya’s account). Under the Crawford/Tipton standard, a rational jury could infer the requisite specific intent.

Notably, the court did not require the State to prove which particular intended illegal act was in Brown’s mind; it was enough that the jury could infer an intent to commit some illegal act upon Diya. In a footnote, the court observed the facts could support inferences of intent to commit crimes such as assault (Iowa Code section 708.1), kidnapping (Iowa Code section 710.1), or stalking (Iowa Code section 708.11).

C. Impact

• Clarified scope of § 710.10(4): The decision cements that prosecutions under § 710.10(4) are not confined to sexually motivated enticement. This is significant because parties may have argued (as Brown did) that “enticement” statutes necessarily imply sexual predation; the court rejected that categorical narrowing.
• Charging and proof strategy: Prosecutors may proceed under § 710.10(4) where evidence supports intent to commit a nonsexual illegal act “upon” a minor (e.g., assault, kidnapping, stalking), without having to prove sexual motivation.
• Registration consequences remain cabined: The opinion highlights the statutory mechanism that separates conviction under subsection (4) from sex-offender registration unless the factfinder determines sexual motivation—an important safeguard given subsection (4)’s breadth.
• Open question flagged by the concurrence: Although not resolved as a holding, Justice Mansfield’s concurrence invites future litigation on whether, apart from narrowing to sex crimes, due process or instruction doctrine may require specifying the “illegal act” (or at least defining it as a criminal act committed “upon” another) to prevent jury speculation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Marshaling instruction”: The checklist of elements the State must prove for conviction.
• “Specific intent”: A heightened mental-state requirement: the defendant must act with the purpose to bring about a particular unlawful objective (here, to commit an illegal act upon the minor), not merely act voluntarily.
• “Substantial evidence” review: On appeal, courts do not re-try the case; they ask whether a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the State’s favor.
• “Sexually motivated” finding under § 710.10(4): A separate factual determination that affects sex-offender-registration consequences; it is not an element that must exist for guilt under subsection (4).
• “Upon” another: As highlighted in the concurrence (citing State v. Holtz), the intended “illegal act” must be something committed against a person, not merely illegality done in the minor’s presence.

V. Conclusion

State v. Brown establishes a clear interpretive rule: Iowa Code § 710.10(4)’s “illegal act” element is not limited to sexual illegality, and jury instructions tracking the statutory language do not misstate the law for failing to impose that narrowing gloss. The court also reaffirmed that specific intent may be proven circumstantially and found the evidence sufficient under deferential review standards. While a concurrence warned that leaving “illegal act” undefined may invite jury speculation, the binding holding resolves the narrower question presented: subsection (4) reaches attempted enticement undertaken with intent to commit any illegal act upon the minor, whether sexual or nonsexual, with sexual motivation relevant chiefly to registration consequences and to charging decisions under subsection (2).