Hulsey v. Build Art, LLC: Rule 54(b) Certification Improper When Identical, Factually Intertwined Claims Against Related Defendants Remain Pending

1. Introduction

In Hulsey v. Build Art, LLC (Ala. Apr. 17, 2026), Shirley R. Hulsey sued Build Art, LLC (the builder) and Yellow Hammer Capital Management, LLC (the adjacent-lot owner/developer) after construction on the neighboring property allegedly altered drainage, caused surface-water runoff, silt and debris to enter her yard, and contributed to structural damage to her home. The operative dispute arose from construction activities on “lot 22,” which sat at a higher elevation and sloped toward Hulsey’s lot.

Although the merits included claims such as trespass, nuisance, negligence, wantonness, emotional distress, and an asserted violation of the common-law right concerning surface-water flow (citing Sargent v. Lambert Construction Co.), the Alabama Supreme Court did not reach those issues. Instead, the appeal turned on a procedural and jurisdictional question: whether the circuit court’s summary judgment for Build Art—while the same claims remained pending against Yellow Hammer—was properly certified as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the order appealed from was not a final judgment, notwithstanding the trial court’s Rule 54(b) certification. The Court held that the claims against Build Art and Yellow Hammer were closely intertwined—arising from the same operative facts and involving a close relationship between the entities—so separate adjudication would be duplicative, waste judicial resources, and risk inconsistent results. Consequently, the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the Build Art summary judgment as final.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 2004)
    The Court relied on Dzwonkowski for two core propositions: (i) a trial court cannot create appellate jurisdiction through Rule 54(b) if the order is not “final” in the sense required for appeal; and (ii) Rule 54(b) certifications are disfavored and should be reserved for exceptional cases. This case supplied the controlling framework for scrutinizing the certification rather than accepting it at face value.
  • Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So. 2d 299 (Ala.1978)
    Quoted through Dzwonkowski, Robinson anchors the jurisdictional principle that a Rule 54(b) direction cannot transform a nonfinal judgment into a final one for purposes of appeal.
  • Hammock v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 So. 3d 939 (Ala. 2008)
    Cited for the Court’s obligation to dismiss when it determines the appealed order is not final, even if certified under Rule 54(b). This underscores that finality is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite.
  • Harlan Home Builders, Inc. v. Hayslip, 58 So. 3d 102 (Ala. 2010)
    Reinforces that improper certification means the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction. The opinion uses it to illustrate the practical consequence of an invalid certification: the appeal must be dismissed.
  • State v. Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d 720 (Ala. 2002) and Baker v. Bennett, 644 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1994)
    These cases are invoked to reiterate the policy that Rule 54(b) certifications “should be entered only in exceptional cases” and not as a routine path to immediate appeal.
  • Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. 1987)
    Appears twice in the analysis chain: (i) as authority, via Baker, for the “exceptional cases” caution; and (ii) as the source (via Clarke-Mobile) of the “closely intertwined” test—i.e., certification is improper when separate adjudication poses an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results.
  • Goldome Credit Corp. v. Player, 869 So. 2d 1146 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), Harper Sales Co. v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 742 So. 2d 190 (Ala. Civ. App.1999), and Brown v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
    Cited in the string quotation emphasizing that “appellate review in a piecemeal fashion is not favored,” supporting the Court’s policy-based reluctance to bless partial appeals.
  • Clarke-Mobile Counties Gas Dist. v. Prior Energy Corp., 834 So. 2d 88 (Ala. 2002)
    Supplies the articulation of the “closely intertwined” limitation on Rule 54(b) certification, warning against separate adjudications that could yield inconsistent results.
  • Schlarb v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418 (Ala. 2006)
    The Court used Schlarb as a direct template: it collects the disfavor of Rule 54(b) certifications and reiterates the intertwined-claims constraint. The Court also quoted Schlarb for the black-letter rule that a nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal.
  • Scott v. Advanced Pharm. Consultants, Inc., 84 F.4th 952 (11th Cir. 2023)
    Although not controlling Alabama authority, the Court cited this federal appellate decision as persuasive support for the practical problems created by certifying finality when identical counts are resolved as to one defendant but left pending as to another: duplication, wasted judicial resources, and inconsistent rulings across appeals.
  • Sargent v. Lambert Construction Co., 378 So. 2d 1153 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)
    This case was cited in the pleadings (not analyzed on the merits) as a source for Alabama’s common-law approach to surface-water drainage disputes. Its presence confirms that substantive drainage-law questions were in the case, but the Supreme Court’s disposition prevented any appellate development of that doctrine here.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in a jurisdiction-first sequence typical of appellate finality review:

  1. Rule 54(b) is an exception, not the norm. The Court reiterated that certifications should be rare and are disfavored because they invite piecemeal appeals.
  2. Finality is jurisdictional. Even with a Rule 54(b) certification, the appellate court must independently assess whether the judgment is sufficiently final to support an appeal.
  3. Intertwined-claims test controls. The crucial inquiry was whether the adjudicated claims (against Build Art) and the unadjudicated claims (against Yellow Hammer) were “so closely intertwined” that separate adjudication creates an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results.
  4. Application to these facts. The Court emphasized (i) the relationship between Yellow Hammer and Build Art (Build Art was owned by Yellow Hammer and Minges), and (ii) the nature of the claims—arising from the same construction project and alleged drainage alterations. Because the same operative facts and overlapping theories remained pending against Yellow Hammer, reviewing the Build Art summary judgment immediately would be duplicative and could lead to inconsistent outcomes.
  5. Result: certification exceeded discretion; appeal dismissed. With no proper final judgment, the Court lacked jurisdiction, requiring dismissal rather than a merits decision.

3.3. Impact

  • Stricter gatekeeping of partial appeals in multi-defendant tort cases. Where plaintiffs assert the same fact-dependent tort and property-damage claims against a developer and its affiliated builder, Hulsey signals that Rule 54(b) certification will be especially vulnerable.
  • Practical litigation consequence: merits delays. Even if a defendant obtains summary judgment, immediate appeal may be unavailable if identical or closely related claims remain pending against another defendant. Parties should anticipate completing trial-court proceedings (or obtaining a truly separable judgment) before appellate review.
  • Reduced risk of inconsistent outcomes. The opinion reinforces the institutional preference for one coherent appeal after all intertwined claims are resolved, minimizing the chance that the appellate court or trial court reaches inconsistent conclusions about the same construction project and alleged conduct.
  • Persuasive alignment with federal efficiency concerns. By citing Scott v. Advanced Pharm. Consultants, Inc., the Court highlighted that the inefficiencies and inconsistency risks of fragmented appeals are recognized across jurisdictions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Summary judgment: A ruling entered without a trial when the court concludes there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
  • Final judgment: A decision that fully resolves all claims against all parties, leaving nothing for the trial court to do except execute the judgment.
  • Rule 54(b) certification: A mechanism allowing a trial court, in limited circumstances, to make an order “final” as to fewer than all claims or parties so that an immediate appeal can proceed. It is not appropriate when the remaining claims are tightly connected to the resolved claims.
  • “Closely intertwined” claims: Claims sharing the same core facts and legal questions such that deciding them in separate phases risks inconsistent rulings (e.g., one defendant is exonerated on an issue that remains central against another).
  • Piecemeal appeals: Multiple appeals in the same case at different times, which courts discourage because they increase cost, delay, and the chance of conflicting decisions.
  • Suggestion of death / substitution (procedural background): When a party dies, the death is noted on the record, and a proper substitute must be made within required time limits; otherwise claims can be dismissed as to the deceased party.

5. Conclusion

Hulsey v. Build Art, LLC is a jurisdictional decision that reinforces a practical rule for Alabama civil practice: when identical or factually interdependent claims remain pending against a related defendant, a summary judgment for one defendant generally is not suitable for Rule 54(b) final-judgment certification. The Supreme Court’s dismissal—without reaching the surface-water and property-damage merits—emphasizes that parties must secure a truly final judgment (or a genuinely severable order) before obtaining appellate review, particularly in multi-defendant construction and development disputes.