Homeowners May Impeach the ORPTS Residential Assessment Ratio in SCAR: RPTL 1218 Does Not Bar Standing

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standing to challenge equalization rates under RPTL 1218 (municipal-only)

The court reaffirmed the settled principle that individual taxpayers lack standing to challenge equalization rates via RPTL 1218, relying on the following authorities:

• Matter of Town of Rye v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs. (10 NY3d 793): emphasized the statute’s explicit limitation—review is available only “upon application of the county, city, town or village for which the rate or rates were established,” excluding property owners.
• Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs. (5 NY3d 36) and Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Off. of Real Prop. Servs. (21 AD3d 1116): reinforced that “relating to” in RPTL 1218 is broad for what determinations are covered (e.g., segment rates), but narrow for who may sue (municipalities).
• Matter of West End Neighborhood Taxpayers, Inc. v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs. (39 AD3d 764): another confirmation that taxpayers do not have RPTL 1218 standing.
• Matter of Town of Yorktown v State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs. (275 AD2d 789): used for defining equalization rate and its governmental/apportionment function.

Importantly, Yeung does not disturb those holdings. Instead, it limits their reach to the context they were made for: direct judicial review of State equalization determinations under RPTL article 12.

2. The “class ratios are a subset of equalization rates” line—and why it did not control SCAR

The hearing officer and Supreme Court treated Matter of Fair Assessment Comm., LLC v New York State Off. of Real Prop. Servs. (65 AD3d 1143) as dispositive, because that case held that RPTL 1218 also governs challenges to class ratios (a “species or subset” of equalization rates in special assessing units), and therefore taxpayers lack standing.

The Second Department carefully distinguished Matter of Fair Assessment Comm., LLC v New York State Off. of Real Prop. Servs.: in Fair Assessment the petitioners used CPLR article 78 to seek review of a countywide ratio determination (the class one ratio for Nassau County). Yeung, by contrast, involved homeowners offering ratio evidence in their own SCAR hearings to prove unequal assessment. The court’s key move is to separate:

• a direct attack on a State-issued ratio (which is governed by RPTL 1218 standing rules), from
• an evidentiary impeachment of the RAR within SCAR (which is governed by RPTL 732’s “best evidence” mandate).

3. The SCAR statutory purpose and flexible evidentiary regime

Several cases were used to situate SCAR as a remedial, homeowner-friendly system with simplified procedure:

• Matter of Town of New Castle v Kaufmann (72 NY2d 684): SCAR was enacted to provide an efficient, inexpensive alternative; the opinion quotes this authority for avoiding literal/narrow constructions that would frustrate SCAR’s objectives.
• Matter of Yee v Town of Orangetown (76 AD3d 104) and Matter of Meirowitz v Board of Assessors (53 AD3d 549): confirm hearing officers have discretion to consider varied sources and are not bound by strict rules, but must do substantial justice.
• Matter of Klein v Department of Assessment (149 AD3d 935): highlights the de novo nature of SCAR fact-and-law determinations and the limited CPLR article 78 review standard.
• Matter of Leone v Board of Assessors (100 AD3d 635): noted as a prior Second Department SCAR decision where the standing-to-challenge-RAR issue was raised but not reached, underscoring that Yeung fills a gap at the appellate level.
• Matter of Manouel v Board of Assessors (25 NY3d 46): invoked with Kaufmann for the proposition that overly narrow interpretations should be avoided when they undermine the Legislature’s expedited-review design.

4. How unequal-assessment claims work in SCAR (RAR as the “measuring tool”)

The court relied on SCAR unequal-assessment case law to explain why ratio evidence is central:

• Matter of Pace v Assessor of Town of Islip (252 AD2d 88): provides the core operational description of the RAR and the standard calculation—full market value multiplied by RAR to test inequality.
• Matter of Silverman v Town of Huntington (160 AD3d 752) and Matter of Greenfield v Town of Babylon Dept. of Assessment (76 AD3d 1071): reinforce the burden and structure of unequal-assessment proof (market value plus the appropriate percentage-of-value metric).

5. Article 78 review standard for SCAR determinations

The court applied standard “rational basis / arbitrary and capricious” review:

• Matter of DeSousa v Town of Babylon (170 AD3d 1172) and Matter of Gershon v Nassau County Assessment Review Commn. (29 AD3d 909): confirm that an error of law or refusal to consider relevant evidence can render a SCAR determination arbitrary and capricious.

6. The split in trial-level practice (and the Costigan pivot)

Yeung expressly addressed inconsistent trial-court determinations and used the two Costigan decisions as a microcosm:

• Matter of Costigan v Assessor of the Vil. of Garden City (2021 NY Slip Op 33929[U]): initially accepted the “no standing to challenge RAR in SCAR” theory by reading Fair Assessment broadly.
• Matter of Costigan v Assessor of the Vil. of Garden City (2022 NY Slip Op 34587[U]): on reargument, reversed course and held that RPTL 1218 does not control SCAR evidentiary questions.

The Second Department aligned itself with the latter approach, also noting similar trial-level decisions (e.g., Matter of Donin v Assessor of the Inc. Vil. of Freeport, 2025 NY Slip Op 31286[U]; Matter of Agosh v Town of Cicero Bd. of Assessment Review, 150 Misc 2d 756; Katz v Assessor of Vil. of Southampton, 131 Misc 2d 552) and acknowledging contrary outcomes (e.g., Matter of Sandie v Assessor of the Vil. of Rockville Ctr.; Matter of Kiernan v Assessor of the Vil. of Rockville Ctr.; Matter of Zhang v Assessor of the Vil. of Great Neck Estates; Matter of Keller v Assessor of the Vil. of Garden City).

7. Statutory interpretation methodology

The opinion grounded its reading in mainstream textualism/intent analysis:

• Matter of 160 E. 84th St. Assoc. LLC v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal (43 NY3d 275)
• Kuzmich v 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC (34 NY3d 84)
• Matter of Hoffmann v New York State Ind. Redistricting Commn. (41 NY3d 341)
• Matter of Sherrill v O'Brien (188 NY 185)

These cases did not supply property-tax doctrine; rather, they supported the court’s insistence that the “starting point” is statutory text (here, the limits of RPTL 1218 and the breadth of RPTL 732(2)).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Two different statutory “projects”: statewide rate review vs. individualized SCAR justice

Yeung’s central interpretive move is structural. The court treats RPTL 1218 and RPTL 732 as serving different institutional purposes:

• RPTL 1218 (article 12) creates a narrow right of review for governmental entities to challenge statewide/municipal equalization determinations because those rates affect intergovernmental allocation of taxes and aid.
• RPTL 732(2) (SCAR) creates an informal, homeowner-accessible forum where the hearing officer must do “substantial justice” and consider the “best evidence” presented, without rigid evidentiary constraints.

From that, the court concludes that importing RPTL 1218’s standing limitations into SCAR would be a category error: it would convert a statute that channels who can sue the State over statewide rate-making into a rule limiting what evidence a homeowner can present in an individualized assessment dispute.

2. Textual cues in RPTL 732(2): “may include, but shall not be limited to”

The court relied heavily on the Legislature’s expansive phrasing in RPTL 732(2). While the statute lists items such as the equalization rate and the RAR, it explicitly states that evidence “may include, but shall not be limited to” those items. Yeung treats this as a deliberate rejection of an exhaustive list, consistent with SCAR’s remedial and informal design.

Equally important is what the SCAR statute does not say: it contains no express prohibition against challenging or impeaching the RAR, and no cross-reference importing RPTL 1218 standing rules.

3. “Collateral attack” in SCAR is not a forbidden end-run around RPTL 1218

The Supreme Court reasoned that allowing RAR impeachment in SCAR would permit an impermissible collateral attack on State action. Yeung rejects that framing by narrowing what is at stake in SCAR:

• The homeowner’s challenge affects only the measuring tool used to decide that homeowner’s unequal-assessment claim.
• It does not alter the RAR for other taxpayers, other municipalities, counties, or future years.
• It does not function as precedent-setting judicial review of ORPTS rate-making.

In other words, SCAR ratio evidence operates “in a vacuum,” confined to the adjudication of an individual dispute.

4. Administrative-law consequence: refusal to consider relevant evidence based on an error of law

Under CPLR 7803(3), a SCAR determination must have a rational basis and not be affected by an error of law. The hearing officer expressly declined to consider the petitioners’ ratio study because of the standing misconception. Yeung treats that refusal as dispositive: it rendered the denials arbitrary and capricious, requiring annulment and remittal.

C. Impact

1. A clarified appellate rule for SCAR practice

Yeung supplies a clear appellate answer to a question that had produced inconsistent trial-court outcomes: homeowners in SCAR have standing to challenge the RAR within the SCAR evidentiary framework. This is likely to standardize Nassau County (and Second Department) SCAR hearings where RAR disputes are common, particularly in high-value residential markets with contested assessment-level claims.

2. Greater viability of unequal-assessment claims

Unequal-assessment claims often turn on the applicable ratio. If hearing officers were required to treat the State-published RAR as effectively unassailable, homeowners would have diminished ability to prove inequality—especially where homeowners contend the RAR is distorted by data or methodology. Yeung prevents the unequal-assessment remedy from becoming illusory in cases where the RAR may be disputed with competent proof.

3. Administrative discipline in SCAR hearings

The decision reinforces that SCAR hearing officers must actually weigh proffered “best evidence” and cannot shortcut adjudication by treating standing doctrines from a different statutory scheme as dispositive. Expect more detailed SCAR findings addressing (i) whether a taxpayer’s ratio study is credible and (ii) why the hearing officer accepts or rejects it.

4. Limits preserved: no backdoor statewide rate litigation

Yeung preserves RPTL 1218’s municipal-only standing for direct challenges to State equalization determinations. The homeowner’s “win” is procedural and evidentiary inside SCAR—not a pathway to obtain a judicial decree changing the RAR for everyone.