Highway-Defect Notice Under MCL 691.1404(1): “Exact Location” Does Not Mean Street Address, GPS, or Technical Precision (Welch, J., dissenting)

I. Introduction

Nancy Dentamaro Seguna v City of Detroit (Mich Sup Ct, July 2, 2026) arises from a trip-and-fall injury in Detroit’s Eastern Market. Plaintiff Nancy Seguna alleged she fell on an “uneven cement/roadway” while crossing Alfred Street near “Shed 5.” She served a notice of intent within 120 days, as required for claims proceeding under the governmental highway exception.

The key dispute was whether the notice satisfied MCL 691.1404(1), which requires a claimant to “specify the exact location and nature of the defect.” The trial court found the notice sufficient and denied the City’s governmental-immunity-based summary disposition motion. In a split, unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the notice insufficiently specific as to both location and defect type. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, while Justice Welch dissented, arguing the Court of Appeals improperly added extra-statutory requirements.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Michigan Supreme Court issued an order denying leave to appeal, leaving the Court of Appeals’ reversal in place. WELCH, J. (dissenting) would have peremptorily reversed and remanded, concluding:

  • MCL 691.1404(1) does not require a street address, GPS coordinates, cardinal directions, or technical/engineering terminology.
  • In context, “Alfred Street near Shed 5 of the Eastern Market” adequately anchors a real-world location using the area’s common reference system (shed numbers).
  • Describing the defect as “uneven cement/roadway” sufficiently states the defect’s nature for investigative and remedial purposes.
  • The Court of Appeals’ approach risks transforming notice into “gatekeeping,” contrary to the notice statute’s purpose.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109 (1999)

The dissent draws from Maiden v Rozwood for the procedural framework governing motions under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (immunity granted by law): courts accept the complaint’s allegations as true unless contradicted by documentation, and review is de novo. This matters because the City sought summary disposition on immunity/notice grounds, and the sufficiency of notice is treated as a threshold bar to recovery.

2. Thurman v Pontiac, 295 Mich App 381 (2012)

Thurman v Pontiac is cited for a strict evidentiary boundary: courts assessing notice sufficiency may not rely on information received outside the statutory notice period. This principle supported the Court of Appeals’ refusal to consider photographs provided after 120 days. Justice Welch did not dispute this rule; rather, she argued the timely notice itself was already sufficient, making post-period supplementation unnecessary.

3. Madbak v Farmington Hills, 349 Mich App 561 (2024), quoting Plunkett v Dep't of Transp, 286 Mich App 168 (2009)

The dissent’s core interpretive move relies on the purpose-based statement in Madbak v Farmington Hills, quoting Plunkett v Dep't of Transp: notice exists to (1) permit investigation while “fresh,” and (2) enable prompt repair before others are injured. The dissent emphasizes the companion idea that notice requirements should be construed liberally so ordinary citizens are not trapped by technicalities. That purposive lens is used to critique the Court of Appeals’ demand for granular locational narrowing and a more technical taxonomy of roadway defects.

B. Legal Reasoning

The dispute turns on statutory interpretation and practical application of MCL 691.1404(1) within the highway exception (MCL 691.1402) to governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability act. Justice Welch’s dissent reasons that:

  1. “Exact location” is contextual, not hyper-technical. In Eastern Market, shed identifiers function like addresses. A notice tied to “Alfred Street near Shed 5” provides a stable landmark and a workable search area, particularly where pedestrian crossings concentrate investigative attention.
  2. “Nature of the defect” does not require engineering classification. “Uneven cement/roadway” informs the City that the surface was not level or smooth, that the material was cement, and that the defect was in the roadway (not the sidewalk). The dissent views this as sufficient to trigger a targeted inspection.
  3. Courts should not add extra-statutory requirements. The dissent’s central critique is that demanding a streetlight reference, cardinal direction, or an enumerated defect type (“pothole,” “divot,” etc.) reads additional conditions into the statute and converts a functional notice regime into a barrier to suit.

C. Impact

Formally, the Supreme Court’s denial of leave creates no new binding precedent, and the Court of Appeals decision is unpublished, limiting its precedential force. Practically, however, the litigation signal is significant:

  • Near-term risk for claimants: governmental defendants may press for heightened specificity—especially where the described area spans even a short block— and argue “uneven” is too generic absent a defect category.
  • Counterweight for plaintiffs: Justice Welch’s dissent (along with Judge Maldonado’s Court of Appeals dissent described in the order) provides a ready blueprint for arguing that contextual landmarks and lay descriptions satisfy the statute’s investigative purpose.
  • Doctrinal pressure point: the case underscores a recurring tension in highway-defect notice law—purpose-driven “reasonable heads-up” versus textual insistence on “exact location”—and increases the likelihood of future Supreme Court engagement when a published split or repeated conflict emerges.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Governmental immunity: the baseline rule that government entities are generally shielded from tort liability when performing governmental functions.
  • Highway exception (MCL 691.1402): a limited opening that allows suit for injuries caused by failure to keep highways reasonably safe.
  • Notice requirement (MCL 691.1404(1)): a pre-suit condition; timely notice must include the “exact location and nature” of the defect, the injury, and known witnesses, so the government can investigate and fix the problem quickly.
  • Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7): a procedural mechanism to dismiss a case when a legal immunity applies, often decided early and reviewed without deference on appeal (de novo).
  • Peremptory reversal: an appellate court’s immediate reversal without full briefing/argument when the error is viewed as clear.

V. Conclusion

Although the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave, Justice Welch’s dissent articulates a clear principle: courts should not transform MCL 691.1404(1)’s “exact location and nature” requirement into a demand for street-address precision, GPS-style pinpointing, or technical defect nomenclature. The dissent frames notice as a practical tool—meant to enable prompt investigation and repair—not a technical trap for injured citizens describing hazards in ordinary language and locally meaningful landmarks.