Rule 56(d) “Good Cause” Requires Diligent Discovery, and Mixed-Case Retaliation Fails Absent Proof of Pretext for Each Proffered Ground

1. Introduction

Case: Hernandez v. Blanche, No. 24-1482 (1st Cir. July 7, 2026).
Parties: Casandra Ann Hernández (DEA employee; appellant) vs. Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General (appellee).
Setting: A federal employee “mixed case” arising from Hernández’s removal from the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) following workplace conflict, EEO activity, and an Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) investigation.

The appeal presented two clusters of issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by rejecting Hernández’s request for additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d); and (2) whether summary judgment was properly entered against her on (a) Title VII retaliation and (b) her CSRA/MSPB challenge to the removal (insubordination and penalty reasonableness). The First Circuit affirmed across the board.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Rule 56(d): No abuse of discretion in denying further discovery. Hernández failed to show “good cause” because she had a full and fair opportunity to pursue discovery earlier but waited roughly fifteen months after being invited to meet-and-confer and then moved to compel only after discovery closed and dispositive deadlines loomed.
  • CSRA/MSPB (nondiscrimination issues): The MSPB’s finding of insubordination was supported by “substantial evidence.” The court declined to disturb the MSPB’s credibility determinations and factual findings.
  • Title VII retaliation: Even assuming a prima facie case, Hernández failed to produce evidence that the government’s stated reasons (insubordination and lack of candor) were a pretext for retaliation. Notably, the MSPB’s refusal to sustain the “lack of candor” charge did not, by itself, prevent the agency from relying on that charge as a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason absent evidence of pretext.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Summary judgment posture and reuse of prior-case factual findings

  • President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. and Rivera-Aponte v. Gomez Bus Line, Inc. supplied the familiar summary judgment lens: view facts and reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.
  • Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti supported using undisputed facts and “supportable findings” from earlier, related litigation—especially relevant because Hernández had previously appealed similar factual disputes in Hernández v. Wilkinson.

B. Rule 56(d) standards and the “escape hatch” doctrine

  • Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co.) framed Rule 56(d) as a procedural “escape hatch,” not an entitlement.
  • Hicks v. Johnson, Reid v. New Hampshire, and In re PHC, Inc. S’holder Litig. emphasized Rule 56(d)’s protective function—while also underscoring that the movant must satisfy specific showings.
  • Vélez v. Awning Windows, Inc. and Resolution Tr. Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., Inc. provided the operative elements: inability to present essential facts, plausible basis that facts exist and can be obtained within a reasonable time, and a demonstration of how they would affect summary judgment.
  • In re PHC, Inc. S’holder Litig. supplied the “five-factor” framing—“authoritativeness, timeliness, good cause, utility, and materiality”—which the panel treated as the organizing structure for review.
  • Rios v. Centerra Grp. LLC supported denying Rule 56(d) relief where diligence/good cause is lacking, including failures connected to meet-and-confer obligations.
  • Reyes-Pérez v. State Ins. Fund Corp. reinforced district-court latitude to enforce local rules, including discovery motion prerequisites.
  • Carmona v. Toledo was cited for the proposition that a party need not take “heroic measures” against a recalcitrant opponent—yet the court found Hernández’s timeline and lack of diligence dispositive.
  • In re Stericycle Sec. Litig. (quoting Kuttner v. Zaruba) was used as a cautionary note: if a court changes course based on a local rule after initially excusing compliance, it should explain the shift. Here, the First Circuit found the district court’s denial sustainable regardless, because “good cause” was absent.

C. Mixed-case route, standards of review, and MSPB deference

  • Kloeckner v. Solis and Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. anchored the CSRA/MSPB framework and the “mixed case” concept (serious personnel action plus discrimination/retaliation allegations).
  • Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs. supplied the key bifurcated review rule: de novo for discrimination/retaliation; deferential administrative review for nondiscrimination issues under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c).
  • Crowe v. Wormuth confirmed that retaliation can be part of a mixed case and reiterated standards on appeal (administrative record review for nondiscrimination claims; de novo review of summary judgment on discrimination/retaliation).
  • Kelliher v. Veneman and Atieh v. Riordan were used to describe the nature of “arbitrary and capricious” style review: courts ensure reasonableness and rationality rather than substituting judgment.
  • Visiting Nurse Ass’n Gregoria Auffant, Inc. v. Thompson (quoting Richardson v. Perales) defined “substantial evidence.”
  • Agyei v. Holder (as quoted in Atieh v. Riordan) framed the deference to agency factfinding unless compelled to conclude otherwise.

D. Title VII retaliation framework and pretext

  • Serrano-Colon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. stated the prima facie elements for retaliation and the burden-shifting structure.
  • Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green supplied the classic burden-shifting framework, including the employer’s “low hurdle” to articulate a legitimate reason.
  • Che v. MBTA (quoting Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club) clarified that pretext has no “mechanical formula,” but demands evidence of retaliatory motive.
  • Harrington v. Aggregate Indus.-Ne. Reg., Inc. (as quoted in Serrano-Colon) emphasized the need for “sufficient evidence” that retaliation was the real reason.
  • Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. (quoting Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology) reinforced that Title VII does not eliminate employer authority to enforce neutral workplace rules requiring cooperation and obedience to lawful orders.
  • Mariani-Colon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. ex rel. Chertoff and Orta-Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Química P.R., Inc. were cited as examples of legitimate, nonretaliatory grounds for discharge tied to attendance/leave and compliance failures.
  • Critically, Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs. was also relied upon for the proposition that a charge not sustained by the MSPB may still constitute a legitimate justification unless the employee produces evidence undermining the employer’s reliance on it.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Rule 56(d): “Good cause” as the decisive gatekeeping requirement

The court treated “good cause” as dispositive. Although Hernández satisfied “authoritativeness” and “timeliness” by filing promptly after summary judgment with a statement under penalty of perjury, she failed the diligence component of “good cause.”

The panel’s reasoning was practical and sequence-driven:

  • Hernández sought personnel/complaint records (SF-50s; EEO complaints; OIG complaints) and had been requesting them since early 2022.
  • The government objected but offered to meet-and-confer as early as March 2022.
  • Hernández did not pursue the meet-and-confer, did not timely convert the impasse into motion practice, and waited until June 2023—after discovery closed and close to dispositive deadlines—to move to compel.
  • Under Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti, when a party “has had a full and fair opportunity” earlier but “has forgone that opportunity,” there will “seldom” be good cause for Rule 56(d) relief.

Separately, the district court’s reliance on Local Rule 26(b) and Rule 37(a)(1) meet-and-confer certification requirements supplied an additional, independent reason to deny discovery-related relief. On appeal, the First Circuit emphasized the district court’s “broad latitude” to enforce such rules (Reyes-Pérez v. State Ins. Fund Corp.), while ultimately resting affirmance primarily on lack of good cause.

B. MSPB insubordination finding: substantial-evidence deference and credibility

On the CSRA nondiscrimination aspect, the court applied the substantial-evidence standard to the MSPB record (per Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.). The MSPB’s core findings were:

  • Hernández received instructions to communicate directly with her supervisor (Joseph) by phone or in person about absences/leave.
  • She willfully refused to follow those instructions, including by attempting to communicate through third parties.
  • Her testimony was internally inconsistent, undercutting her narrative that she did not receive directives.

The First Circuit stressed traditional appellate restraint regarding credibility determinations and found the record adequate for a “reasonable mind” to accept the MSPB’s conclusion (Visiting Nurse Ass’n Gregoria Auffant, Inc. v. Thompson; Richardson v. Perales).

C. Title VII retaliation: pretext must be shown against the employer’s articulated grounds

Even assuming a prima facie case (protected activity, adverse action, causal connection), the decision turned on the final step of the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green framework: whether the stated reasons were a sham.

The employer’s reasons were insubordination and lack of candor. Hernández’s principal rejoinder—MSPB rejected lack of candor—did not carry the day. The court relied on Sher v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs. to hold that an employer may still point to a charge as a legitimate justification even if the MSPB did not sustain it, unless the employee supplies evidence that the employer’s reliance was itself pretextual.

As to insubordination, the court found Hernández’s showing amounted to disagreement with the agency’s conclusions, not evidence of retaliatory motive. The court emphasized that Title VII does not prevent enforcement of neutral obedience/cooperation rules (Kinzer v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.; Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology), and it treated the “hostile work environment” justification for disobeying communications directives as unsupported by record evidence.

3.3. Impact

  • Rule 56(d) practice in the First Circuit: The opinion reinforces that Rule 56(d) is not a cure for strategic or dilatory discovery conduct. Where the record shows (i) early awareness of the dispute, (ii) an opportunity to confer, and (iii) delay until after discovery closes, “good cause” will likely fail—making denial of Rule 56(d) relief affirmable even if other procedural skirmishes occurred.
  • Local rule compliance matters: Motions to compel, sanctions motions, and Rule 56(d) requests are vulnerable when they omit meet-and-confer certifications required by Local Rule 26(b) and Rule 37(a)(1). The decision signals that courts may treat such omissions as more than technical defects, especially when coupled with a weak diligence record.
  • Mixed-case litigation discipline: The opinion offers a clear roadmap of the bifurcated review structure in CSRA mixed cases and underscores that appellants must tailor arguments to the correct standard (substantial evidence/arbitrary-capricious for nondiscrimination issues vs. de novo for Title VII).
  • Pretext burden clarified: The decision reinforces that it is not enough to undermine one alleged ground (e.g., MSPB not sustaining lack of candor). If another ground (e.g., insubordination) is supported and unrebutted as pretextual, retaliation claims will fail at summary judgment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 56(d)
A procedure allowing the nonmoving party to request more time for discovery when it cannot yet present facts essential to oppose summary judgment. It requires specifics (what facts, why unavailable, why they likely exist, and how they would change the outcome) and—critically—diligence (“good cause”).
Meet-and-confer requirement (Local Rule 26(b) / Rule 37(a)(1))
Before asking the court to intervene in a discovery dispute, the moving party must attempt in good faith to resolve it with the other side and certify that effort in the motion. Courts can deny discovery motions that lack this certification.
CSRA / MSPB / “mixed case”
The CSRA governs many federal employment disputes. The MSPB reviews serious personnel actions (like removals). A “mixed case” combines a challenge to a serious personnel action with allegations of discrimination or retaliation (e.g., under Title VII).
Standards of review in mixed cases
Discrimination/retaliation claims are reviewed de novo (fresh). Other issues (like whether misconduct occurred) are reviewed deferentially under administrative-law standards and generally upheld if supported by “substantial evidence.”
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting / pretext
If a plaintiff makes an initial showing of retaliation, the employer must articulate a legitimate reason. The plaintiff must then show that reason is a cover—i.e., a “pretext”—and that retaliation was the real motive.

5. Conclusion

Hernandez v. Blanche is a discipline-and-diligence decision. It teaches that Rule 56(d) relief hinges on timely, diligent pursuit of discovery and a concrete showing of need—particularly where the opposing party offered to meet-and-confer and the movant waited until after discovery closed. On the merits, the opinion reaffirms the mixed-case framework: deference to MSPB factfinding on nondiscrimination issues, and stringent proof requirements for Title VII pretext. Even in a record with protected activity and workplace conflict, a federal employee’s retaliation claim will not survive summary judgment without evidence that the agency’s stated grounds—especially substantiated insubordination—were a sham for retaliation.