Heightened Possessory Interests in Cell Phones and the Duty of Diligent Warrant Pursuit After Exigent Seizure

I. Introduction

People of Michigan v. Ansen William Evans (Mich Sup Ct, March 6, 2026) arises from a digital-evidence seizure in a child-sexual-abuse-material prosecution. The defendant, Ansen William Evans, was charged with possession of child sexually abusive material under MCL 750.145c(4) after police seized his cell phone without a warrant and later obtained a warrant to search its contents.

The key constitutional question implicated by the litigation was whether the warrantless seizure of a cell phone—supported by probable cause and asserted exigency—was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution, and whether the delay in obtaining the search warrant could render the continued seizure unreasonable.

Procedurally, the Michigan Supreme Court did not decide the merits; it denied leave to appeal. Justice Welch concurred separately to underscore a developing principle: because cell phones are essential to modern life, the possessory interest in them is strong, and law enforcement must act diligently to obtain a warrant; unnecessary delay weighs toward unreasonableness.

II. Summary of the Opinion (Order and Concurrence)

The Court entered an order denying leave to appeal “because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.”

Welch, J. (concurring) agreed with denying leave given the issues presented, but wrote separately to emphasize:

  • Individuals have a strong possessory interest in their cell phones under US Const, Am IV and Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
  • Even if an initial warrantless seizure is justified by exigency, it may become unconstitutional if the government does not diligently pursue a warrant.
  • A “temporary” deprivation of a phone can still be significant because phones function as “minicomputers” and as the infrastructure of daily life (communication, banking, access, authentication, medical monitoring, transportation).
  • Accordingly, officers should not retain a phone “any longer than absolutely necessary.”

III. Factual and Procedural Background

Evans contacted the Michigan State Police to report blackmail arising from an online relationship. During the interaction, he admitted the person had sent him explicit photographs; police later determined the “woman” was a minor. Concerned Evans might delete evidence, the trooper seized the cell phone without a warrant. Evans refused consent to search; the trooper stated a warrant would be obtained before searching the phone’s data, placed the device in a Faraday bag, and attended to other matters. Five days later, on the trooper’s next shift, police obtained a warrant and discovered large quantities of child sexually abusive material.

Evans moved to suppress. The trial court denied suppression, finding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the seizure. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion: People v Evans, ___ Mich App ___ (May 8, 2025) (Docket No. 371021). The Supreme Court denied leave; Justice Hood did not participate due to prior panel participation.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Defining “Seizure” and the Fourth Amendment’s Reasonableness Framework

The concurrence roots its analysis in federal and state constitutional text and foundational Fourth Amendment doctrine:

  • United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984): provides the baseline definition that a property seizure occurs when there is “meaningful interference” with possessory interests. Justice Welch uses Jacobsen to frame that taking a phone—especially from a non-custodial person—directly interferes with a core possessory interest.
  • People v Hammerlund, 504 Mich 442 (2019): reiterates that the “touchstone” is reasonableness. This anchors the concurrence in Michigan’s adoption of the standard Fourth Amendment balancing approach.

2. Permissible Exigent Seizure Pending a Warrant—But With Limits

  • United States v Place, 462 US 696 (1983): Place supplies the doctrinal engine for the concurrence. It recognizes that, when police have probable cause to believe a “container” holds contraband or evidence, they may seize it pending a warrant if exigencies demand. Critically, Place also provides the balancing test and highlights that the seizure’s “brevity” and the police’s diligent pursuit of the investigation are central to reasonableness.
  • Segura v United States, 468 US 796 (1984): supports the proposition that an initially justified seizure may become unreasonable due to its duration.
  • United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984) (again): cited for the same duration/ongoing reasonableness point.

3. Diligence and Delay: Comparative Federal Appellate Guidance

Justice Welch’s concurrence collects federal appellate decisions as practical benchmarks for “diligent pursuit”:

  • United States v Morgan, 713 F Appx 829 (CA 11, 2017): 17-day delay was reasonable where an agent began drafting the warrant the first day after seizure and reassigned tasks when leaving town. The case illustrates that diligence can mitigate longer timelines if the government actively works the case.
  • United States v Pratt, 915 F3d 266 (CA 4, 2019): 31-day delay was unreasonable where the only explanation was deciding which state to seek a warrant in—suggesting that administrative indecision is not a compelling justification.
  • United States v Mitchell, 565 F3d 1347 (CA 11, 2009): 21-day delay was unreasonable where the agent neither applied for a warrant nor passed the matter to another officer before leaving for training—underscoring that resource constraints and scheduling do not excuse inaction.

4. Cell Phones as Distinct Objects: Privacy and Possession

  • Riley v California, 573 US 373 (2014): although Riley is principally a search case, the concurrence draws from its recognition that phones implicate privacy concerns “far beyond” wallets or packs. Justice Welch extends the logic to seizure, arguing that the phone’s centrality to modern life also elevates the possessory interest.
  • People v Carson, ___ Mich ___ (July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 166923): cited for the Michigan Supreme Court’s admonition that in cell-phone searches “we must jealously guard” Fourth Amendment requirements. Justice Welch uses Carson to support a similarly protective stance in the seizure context.
  • United States v Sykes, 65 F4th 867 (CA 6, 2024): cited to note that possessory interests may be diminished when the defendant is in custody; delay may be more tolerable where the person would not have had access to the phone anyway.

5. The Court of Appeals Decision Under Review

The concurrence references People v Evans, ___ Mich App ___ (May 8, 2025) (Docket No. 371021), which treated the five-day delay as not unreasonable and emphasized “temporary” deprivation. Justice Welch does not reject the result on the record and posture presented, but cautions that the “temporary deprivation” framing can understate modern harms.

B. Legal Reasoning

The concurrence’s reasoning proceeds in a structured Fourth Amendment manner:

  1. Identify the protected interest. Cell phones are “effects/possessions,” and seizing them meaningfully interferes with possessory interests (Jacobsen).
  2. Apply the reasonableness touchstone. Reasonableness is not a categorical rule; it is determined by balancing the intrusion against governmental interests (Hammerlund; Place).
  3. Accept (for this posture) that exigency may justify initial seizure. Where probable cause exists and there is a risk of destruction of evidence, an initial warrantless seizure pending a warrant may be permissible (Place).
  4. Emphasize that duration is constitutionally relevant. Even if the beginning is lawful, the continuing interference can become unreasonable if it lasts too long or is not diligently pursued (Segura; Jacobsen).
  5. Elevate the possessory intrusion unique to phones. Building on Riley and Carson, Justice Welch articulates an important refinement: because phones are essential infrastructure (communication, emergency access, banking, authentication, transportation, medical monitoring), the possessory intrusion from their seizure can be unusually severe even without a search.
  6. State an operational constraint on police conduct. When police have a phone, they must “act diligently” in pursuing a warrant; “unnecessary delay” weighs toward unreasonableness. The concurrence signals that courts should scrutinize police explanations for delay and consider whether resources or delegation could have reduced the deprivation.

Notably, Justice Welch does not hold the five-day delay unconstitutional on this record, emphasizing that the defendant did not directly challenge the duration or diligence. The concurrence therefore functions as guidance and warning rather than a merits reversal.

C. Impact

Although an order denying leave does not create a merits holding, Justice Welch’s concurrence is likely to influence Michigan practice in at least four ways:

  • Suppression litigation focus on “seizure duration.” Defense counsel may more frequently challenge not just whether exigency justified taking the phone, but whether police pursued the warrant with adequate diligence, using federal analogs (Morgan, Pratt, Mitchell) as measuring tools.
  • Higher scrutiny of “temporary deprivation” rationales. Courts may be less receptive to arguments that a seizure is minor simply because it is temporary, particularly for non-custodial defendants whose daily life depends on phone access.
  • Operational policing changes. Agencies may adopt policies emphasizing same-day warrant drafting, supervisor review, off-shift handoffs, and documented efforts to obtain judicial authorization quickly (to demonstrate diligence under Place).
  • Doctrinal development: possessory interests in digital devices. The concurrence pushes Michigan law toward recognizing that phones are not merely “containers” of evidence (a privacy concept) but also keys to participation in modern society (a possessory concept). Future cases may articulate more concrete timeframes, presumptions, or factors specific to phone seizures.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Probable cause: a reasonable basis to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the item or place.
  • Exigent circumstances: urgent conditions that make it impractical to get a warrant first (e.g., imminent destruction of evidence).
  • Seizure vs. search: a seizure is taking or meaningfully interfering with property; a search is examining contents. Police may sometimes be allowed to seize an item temporarily to preserve evidence while seeking a warrant to search it.
  • Possessory interest: the interest in keeping and using your property. With phones, that interest is amplified because the device enables essential activities (communication, banking, authentication, transportation, medical monitoring).
  • Faraday bag: a shielding bag that blocks radio signals to prevent remote wiping of phone data (as noted with reference to Riley).
  • Diligent pursuit: acting promptly and reasonably to minimize the time property is held without judicial authorization— including drafting the warrant quickly, delegating tasks, and avoiding avoidable administrative delay.

VI. Conclusion

People of Michigan v. Ansen William Evans ends procedurally with a denial of leave, but Justice Welch’s concurrence articulates an important modern Fourth Amendment/Michigan constitutional emphasis: cell phones carry uniquely strong possessory interests, and even where exigency allows an initial warrantless seizure, police must move diligently to obtain a warrant. The concurrence signals that in future cases, unnecessary delays in securing warrants for seized phones may tip the balance toward a finding of constitutional unreasonableness—especially for non-custodial individuals for whom a phone is a gateway to ordinary life.