Healey/Wise v. State of Missouri: Compactness Under Mo. Const. art. III, §45 Is a Totality-of-the-Evidence Inquiry; Statistical Metrics and Historical Map Comparisons Are Proper, and “Communities of Interest” Are Not Dispositive

1. Introduction

In Healey v. State of Missouri and Wise v. State of Missouri (consolidated on appeal), two groups of Missouri residents challenged the legislature’s 2025 congressional redistricting plan (“2025 Map”), enacted through HB 1 after the State had already adopted a 2022 plan (“2022 Map”). The residents sought declaratory and injunctive relief, principally alleging the 2025 Map violated the Missouri Constitution’s only provision directly governing congressional redistricting—article III, section 45—because the districts were not “as compact” as required. The Wise plaintiffs also asserted the plan violated the “contiguous” and “nearly equal population” requirements based on an asserted duplication of a voting tabulation district (“VTD”), KC 811.

After a four-day bench trial, the Jackson County Circuit Court entered judgment for the State and other respondents (and an intervenor, the Missouri Republican State Committee), finding plaintiffs failed to carry their heavy burden to prove HB 1’s map “clearly and undoubtedly” violated article III, section 45. The Supreme Court of Missouri (en banc) affirmed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

On compactness, the Court upheld the trial court’s findings that the challenged districts—especially districts 4, 5, and 6 in the Kansas City area—performed as well as or better than prior Missouri maps (including maps previously upheld) under multiple accepted compactness measures, reduced county/municipality splits, and fit within Missouri’s historical compactness range.

On the KC 811 claim, the Court accepted the trial court’s finding that there were two distinct VTDs referred to as “KC 811,” such that the plan did not place a single VTD into two districts and no evidence supported contiguity or equal-population violations.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Pearson v. Koster, 359 S.W.3d 35 (Mo. banc 2012) (Pearson I)
  The Court used Pearson I for the governing constitutional posture: redistricting is “predominantly political,” courts decide legality (not prudence), and compactness/contiguity/population equality are the “paramount” constitutional objectives under article III, section 45. The opinion also leaned on Pearson I for the “as may be” realism—that perfection is impossible when multiple districts must interlock.
• Pearson v. Koster, 367 S.W.3d 36 (Mo. banc 2012) (Pearson II)
  This is the opinion’s central doctrinal anchor. It supplies:
  • The definition of compactness as “closely united territory,” not mere aesthetics.
  • The “totality of the evidence” framework and treatment of compactness as a mixed question of law and fact.
  • The burden: a map is presumed constitutional; challengers must prove it “clearly and undoubtedly” violates the constitution.
  • The “minimal and practical deviations” structure—departures may be tolerable if explained by other constitutional requirements or recognized traditional factors (e.g., political subdivision boundaries, density, natural boundaries, historical lines).
  In Healey/Wise, Pearson II is used both to validate statistical measures as relevant (but not alone decisive) and to justify considering historical maps—including maps upheld in Pearson II—as part of the compactness inquiry.
• Johnson v. State, 366 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. banc 2012)
  The Court relied on Johnson to reaffirm that historical boundary lines may be considered and to frame how challengers can use alternative maps—i.e., to objectively show greater compactness is feasible without disrupting recognized factors. The Court also cited Johnson in addressing (and largely sidelining) “communities of interest” as not a required Missouri factor.
• Faatz v. Ashcroft, 685 S.W.3d 388 (Mo. banc 2024)
  This case reinforced the statutory-analogy: a congressional map is reviewed like a statute—presumed constitutional, with doubts resolved in favor of validity. It also supported deference to trial-court factfinding under substantial-evidence/weight-of-the-evidence review.
• State ex rel. Teichman v. Carnahan, 357 S.W.3d 601 (Mo. banc 2012)
  Cited for the judiciary’s limited role: determine whether constitutional (and federal) requirements were followed, not whether the map is wise or politically fair.
• Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019)
  Used to contextualize why the challengers did not bring partisan-gerrymandering claims: federal courts treat partisan gerrymandering as a nonjusticiable political question absent manageable standards.
• Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. banc 2009)
  Cited for de novo review of constitutional interpretation—helping separate legal meaning (de novo) from factual application (deferential).
• People Not Politicians v. Hoskins, No. WD88795, 2026 WL 1175290 (Mo. App. W.D. Apr. 30, 2026)
  Not controlling, but cited by the challengers for a more qualitative, connectivity-based compactness lens (travel, commerce, transportation). The Supreme Court avoided deciding whether that framing must be considered, concluding the trial court considered the proffered “communities of interest” evidence anyway.
• Luther v. Hoskins, 730 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. banc 2026)
  Mentioned to clarify that a different challenge (whether the legislature could enact a new map after 2022) was resolved elsewhere and dismissed here—narrowing this case to the article III, section 45 merits.
• Maggard v. State, No. SC101581, --- S.W.3d --- (May 12, 2026)
  Not substantive to compactness, but cited to note referendum litigation about HB 1’s effective date was unresolved; the Court confined itself to the map’s constitutionality as drawn.
• Pearson II, Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189 (Mo. banc 2014), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 744 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. banc 1988)
  These authorities structured appellate review: deference to credibility determinations; “substantial evidence” and “weight of the evidence” standards; and the principle that a defendant (here, the State) need not prove anything when the plaintiff bears the constitutional burden.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Article III, §45 is Mandatory—but Bounded by “As May Be” and Judicial Deference

The Court treated article III, section 45 as an objective mandate—districts must be contiguous, compact, and nearly equal in population—but emphasized that the text itself (“as may be”) incorporates practical limits. This “as may be” language, as developed in Pearson I and Pearson II, legitimizes some flexibility because:

• multiple districts must fit together within state boundaries;
• population equality and compactness interact (optimizing one can degrade the other); and
• traditional districting considerations can affect boundaries even if not listed as stand-alone constitutional requirements.

Appellate review, moreover, is intentionally constrained: courts decide legality and apply strong presumptions of constitutionality, particularly when the trial court has made detailed credibility and factual findings after live testimony.

2) Compactness: A Totality-of-the-Evidence, Mixed Law-and-Fact Determination

The Court reaffirmed (and operationalized) compactness as “closely united territory,” not a beauty contest based on outline shape alone. Two methodological moves are particularly important:

• Statistical measures are relevant but not dispositive. The Court rejected the argument that the trial court relied “exclusively” on shape metrics; it held that using measures like Reock and Polsby-Popper is permissible as part of the totality.
• District-specific review may include plan-wide context. While each district must satisfy compactness, the Court accepted that plan-wide evidence (averages, overall splits, interlocking boundaries) can be probative because district lines are interdependent.

3) Historical Benchmarking is Not Only Allowed—It is Especially Persuasive Where Prior Plans Were Upheld

A key practical takeaway is the Court’s endorsement of comparing challenged districts to historically enacted maps, including those previously upheld (e.g., the 2012 Map upheld in Pearson II). The trial court found (and the Supreme Court accepted) that districts 4, 5, and 6 in the 2025 Map were generally more compact than their 2012 counterparts on commonly used metrics, and that the 2025 Map reduced county and municipality splits relative to 2022.

This benchmarking functionally creates a “historical range” approach: a plan that performs within or better than historically accepted Missouri maps is unlikely—absent other compelling proof—to “clearly and undoubtedly” violate compactness.

4) “Communities of Interest” Evidence: Considered, But Not a Constitutional Override

The challengers’ qualitative case emphasized Kansas City community cohesion and criticized dividing the metro area among districts 4, 5, and 6. The Court’s resolution is pragmatic: even assuming such evidence may be considered, it is not dispositive, and courts will not choose among competing “community” narratives where the map otherwise satisfies constitutional metrics and traditional criteria. The Court also emphasized that the 2025 Map removed some community splits (e.g., unifying Clay County/Northland), undercutting a one-directional “community fragmentation” story.

5) The “Minimal and Practical Deviations” Step is Not Reached Unless a Departure is Shown

The Court clarified the sequence: if challengers fail to prove a departure from compactness principles in the first place, the trial court need not separately decide whether deviations were “minimal and practical,” nor must it justify boundaries using enumerated factors. In other words, the “justification” phase is contingent on clearing a threshold showing of non-compactness.

6) Alternative Maps: Relevant, But Not a Substitute for Proving Unconstitutionality

The Court accepted the general proposition (from Johnson) that alternative maps can demonstrate feasible improvements and rebut claims that challenged lines were needed to satisfy other constraints. But it upheld the trial court’s decision to give the plaintiffs’ alternatives limited weight where:

• the alternatives were not considered by the legislature;
• they focused heavily on Kansas City without controlling for statewide tradeoffs; and
• the existence of “better” maps does not establish that the enacted map is unconstitutional.

7) Contiguity and Equal Population: Assertions Require Evidence, and Textual Ambiguity Alone Did Not Carry the Burden

On KC 811, the Court accepted the trial court’s factual determination that there were two separate VTDs labeled “KC 811,” each assigned to a different district. Importantly, the Court did not treat a naming duplication as an automatic constitutional defect; it placed the onus on challengers to prove a real-world contiguity or equal-population violation. The trial court found the Wise plaintiffs offered no such evidence, and the Supreme Court deferred under the applicable standards.

C. Impact

• Higher practical barrier to compactness challenges. By approving robust reliance on multiple compactness indices plus historical comparisons, the Court strengthens the State’s defensive position when a plan performs at or above prior upheld plans.
• Trial-level factfinding becomes decisive. The opinion underscores that appellate courts will rarely disturb bench-trial determinations on compactness because they are fact-heavy and credibility-dependent (weight/substantial-evidence deference).
• “Communities of interest” arguments remain secondary. Even if admissible and considered, they are unlikely to override quantitative performance, reduced splits, density considerations, and historical acceptability—especially where the dispute is essentially over which communities to keep together.
• Alternative maps must be methodologically comprehensive. Plaintiffs will need alternatives that address statewide constraints and the Pearson II factor set, not just metro-area coherence, to meaningfully contest “as may be” compliance.
• Administrative-implementation theories need proof. Claims that a map will be misapplied by election authorities (or creates operational defects) must be supported by evidence of an actual constitutional violation, not merely speculative confusion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Compactness” (Mo. Const. art. III, §45): Not just a district that “looks nice.” Missouri defines it as “closely united territory.” Shape matters, but so do practical districting realities and traditional redistricting considerations.
• “As may be”: Constitutional recognition that perfect compactness and perfect population equality cannot always be achieved simultaneously; some practical flexibility is built in.
• Mixed question of law and fact: The court decides the meaning of the constitutional words (law) independently (de novo), but decides whether a particular map meets that meaning based on evidence (fact) with deference to the trial judge.
• Compactness metrics (examples used in the case):
  • Reock: compares district area to the area of the smallest circle that can cover the district.
  • Polsby-Popper: compares the district to a circle with the same perimeter (penalizes jagged boundaries).
  • Convex Hull: compares district area to the area of the smallest convex shape enclosing it (penalizes indentations).
  • Schwartzberg: compares the perimeter of the district to a circle of equal area (higher values mean less compact).
  • IKIWISI (“I know it when I see it”): a perception-based score derived from human evaluations of district shapes.
• “Substantial evidence” / “weight of the evidence”: Appellate courts do not re-try the case. They ask whether there was enough credible evidence to support the trial court, and they rarely overturn credibility-driven findings.

5. Conclusion

Healey/Wise v. State of Missouri is a reaffirmation—with practical clarifications—of Missouri’s article III, section 45 framework: challengers bear a heavy burden to prove a congressional map is unconstitutionally non-compact, and courts evaluate compactness through a totality-of-the-evidence approach that may properly include multiple quantitative measures, traditional redistricting considerations, and comparisons to historical maps (including previously upheld plans). Qualitative “communities of interest” arguments may be heard but will not convert a policy disagreement into a constitutional violation. Finally, alleged contiguity and population-equality defects must be proven with evidence of actual constitutional noncompliance, not conjecture about administrative implementation.