Haysbert v. Outback: No Third-Party Standing to Appeal Counsel’s Pro Hac Vice Revocation; Anderson Governs Added Rule 37 Sanctions Beyond Automatic Exclusion

1. Introduction

This premises-liability negligence case arose after Dr. Joann Wright Haysbert slipped and fell inside an Outback Steakhouse in Chesapeake, Virginia, allegedly sustaining a traumatic brain injury and cognitive impairments. The litigation was procedurally unusual: an initial federal jury trial ended in a mistrial amid repeated misconduct by plaintiff’s pro hac vice counsel (her son), followed by revocation of that counsel’s pro hac vice admission. Dr. Haysbert later obtained a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but the district court imposed stringent “carry-over” conditions limiting further discovery and prohibiting supplementation of expert designations/exhibits if the case were refiled.

When the case returned for a second trial, the district court excluded a late-disclosed supplemental expert report and, as an additional sanction, precluded the expert from testifying. During jury selection, Outback used a peremptory strike against the only remaining Black veniremember, prompting a Batson v. Kentucky challenge.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed across the board, but on distinct grounds: (i) it held it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the pro hac vice due-process claim because Dr. Haysbert lacked standing to assert her attorney’s constitutional rights; (ii) it upheld the expert preclusion sanction under Rule 37 and the Anderson factors; and (iii) it found no clear error in rejecting the Batson challenge.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The decision is most precedential on two procedural points: (1) a litigant cannot obtain appellate review of a pro hac vice revocation by styling the issue as the attorney’s due-process injury unless the litigant satisfies the requirements for third-party standing; and (2) when a court imposes an additional discovery sanction beyond Rule 37(c)(1)’s automatic exclusion, the controlling Fourth Circuit framework is the four factors in Anderson, not the five-factor test from Southern States Rack and Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., which applies to the automatic exclusion question.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standing / Jurisdiction

• Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U.S. 658 (2019): invoked for the burden rule—when standing is challenged, the party invoking jurisdiction must explain how standing’s elements are met.
• Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975): supplied the baseline principle that a party generally may assert only her own legal rights, not those of third parties.
• Maryland Shall Issue Inc. v. Hogan, 971 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2020), and Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004): provided the doctrinal gateway for third-party standing under limited circumstances.
• Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 14 F.4th 276 (4th Cir. 2021), and Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health Inc., 313 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2002): articulated the Fourth Circuit’s three-part test for third-party standing (injury-in-fact, close relationship, hindrance to the third party).
• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998): emphasized that Article III jurisdiction (including standing) must be established before reaching merits.
• West Virginia CWP Fund v. Stacy, 671 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2011): used to reject a new constitutional theory raised for the first time at oral argument (waiver/forfeiture).

These authorities shaped the court’s decision to stop at the jurisdictional threshold: even if Dr. Haysbert could claim an injury related to choice of counsel, she did not argue (in briefing) and did not substantiate the “close relationship” and “hindrance” prongs necessary to litigate her attorney’s due-process rights.

B. Discovery Sanctions: Rule 26(e), Rule 37(c)(1), and Added Sanctions

• Anderson v. Foundation for Advancement of American Indians, 155 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 1998): governed the decision to impose additional sanctions beyond the automatic exclusion sanction; provided the four-factor test (bad faith, prejudice, deterrence, lesser sanctions).
• Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 56 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977): cited within Anderson as the source of the sanction-factor framework.
• Southern States Rack and Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2003): distinguished as governing the automatic preclusion sanction analysis under Rule 37(c)(1), not the separate question of additional sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1)(C).
• Smith v. Devine, 126 F.4th 331 (4th Cir. 2025): reinforced district court discretion to manage discovery and impose sanctions.

The opinion clarifies a doctrinal “sorting”: when the issue is whether untimely disclosure triggers Rule 37(c)(1)’s automatic exclusion (absent substantial justification/harmlessness), Southern States is the familiar analytic lens; when the court goes further and imposes an extra sanction under Rule 37(c)(1)(C)—here, precluding an expert’s testimony—Anderson is the controlling framework.

C. Batson / Peremptory Strikes / Clear-Error Review

• Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986): established the three-step burden-shifting framework (prima facie case; race-neutral reason; showing of pretext/purposeful discrimination).
• Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991): extended Batson to civil litigants.
• Pitchford v. Cain, 146 S. Ct. 1345 (2026): cited for the modern articulation of the three-step framework.
• United States v. Parada, 134 F.4th 188 (4th Cir. 2025): described step three and the challenger’s burden to prove the proffered reason is not the true reason.
• Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019), and Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016): framed the ultimate inquiry—whether the strike was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent; discussed comparative juror analysis and deference to trial courts.
• Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995): reiterated that the ultimate burden of persuasion never shifts from the opponent of the strike.
• Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003): addressed comparator methodology (no “cookie cutter” identity requirement) and credibility assessment (demeanor, plausibility, trial strategy).
• United States v. Chaudhri, 134 F.4th 166 (4th Cir. 2025): supplied the clear-error definition and noted age can be an acceptable race-neutral trial strategy.
• Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): provided the classic clear-error formulation.

The court used these cases to (i) emphasize the deference owed to the trial judge’s step-three credibility finding, and (ii) reject arguments that comparator analysis automatically proves pretext where the challenger cannot show similarly situated non-Black jurors were treated better—especially where the suggested comparators were removed from the pool by the challenger’s own strikes before the challenged strike occurred.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Pro Hac Vice Revocation: Standing as the Gatekeeper

The Fourth Circuit did not decide whether the district court afforded Attorney Haysbert adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before revoking his pro hac vice admission. Instead, it held that Dr. Haysbert did not establish standing to litigate that claim on appeal because it asserted a violation of the attorney’s due-process rights, not her own.

Critically, the court noted that Dr. Haysbert “does not assert on appeal” that her own constitutional rights were violated by the revocation; and a new “right to select counsel of her choosing” theory raised at oral argument was not properly before the court under West Virginia CWP Fund v. Stacy.

Attempting to salvage review, Dr. Haysbert invoked third-party standing at oral argument. The court applied the three-part test quoted from Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv.: injury-in-fact, close relationship, and hindrance. Even assuming an injury-in-fact (loss of chosen counsel), the court held Dr. Haysbert offered “no explanation whatsoever” for the close-relationship and hindrance prongs. Under Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, that failure meant she did not carry her burden. Under Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, the court could not proceed to the merits.

The precedential point is procedural but consequential: litigants seeking appellate review of pro hac vice revocations must properly frame and preserve their own legally cognizable injury (if any) and, if relying on third-party standing, must develop the doctrinal predicates in briefing—not merely allude to them.

B. Expert Exclusion: Automatic Rule 37(c)(1) Plus Additional Rule 37(c)(1)(C) Sanctions

The district court excluded (i) Dr. Filler’s late-disclosed “New Patient Evaluation Report” as an automatic Rule 37(c)(1) sanction for untimely supplementation under Rule 26(e), and (ii) Dr. Filler’s testimony as an additional sanction under Rule 37(c)(1)(C). On appeal, Dr. Haysbert conceded the Rule 26 violation but argued the additional sanction was excessive.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, stressing three aspects of the reasoning:

• Correct legal framework: Additional sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1)(C) are governed by Anderson v. Foundation for Advancement of American Indians (not Southern States Rack and Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., which the court cabined to the automatic exclusion question).
• Case-specific prejudice: The sanction analysis was inseparable from the unusual posture created by the voluntary dismissal conditions—no new discovery, no supplementation, and carry-over of pretrial determinations. Dr. Filler’s post-mistrial telehealth visit, acquisition of new information, and new causation opinion risked altering the evidentiary landscape in a manner the conditions were designed to prevent. The court accepted that the prejudice could not be reliably “cabined” by limiting testimony.
• Deference to trial management: Relying on Smith v. Devine, the panel emphasized broad discretion in discovery and sanctions, particularly given the “protracted and contentious” history and the district court’s findings on delay and bad faith.

Notably, the court rejected an argument that the district court failed to make explicit bad-faith findings, concluding the record showed detailed findings of dilatory conduct and litigation behavior supporting a bad-faith conclusion.

C. Batson: Deference at Step Three and the Limits of Comparator Arguments

At step one, the district court found a prima facie case: Outback used two of three peremptory strikes against the only two Black prospective jurors. At step two, Outback articulated race-neutral reasons for striking Juror 32 (silence, youth, shipyard employment). The appeal turned on step three: whether those reasons were pretext for purposeful discrimination.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed under clear-error review, emphasizing:

• Age as permissible strategy: Citing United States v. Chaudhri, the court accepted that age can be a legitimate trial consideration, particularly where evidence is medically complex.
• Silence during voir dire: The court acknowledged Flowers v. Mississippi and Miller-El v. Dretke (no requirement for identical jurors), but found the record did not compel a finding of pretext where Outback distinguished other silent jurors by additional attributes (age/employment) and where Dr. Haysbert did not identify a comparable juror in a way that undermined credibility findings.
• Comparator “shipyard” point weakened by sequence: Dr. Haysbert argued Outback did not strike other shipyard workers who were not Black. The court found that point undercut because the two other shipyard workers were removed by Dr. Haysbert’s own strikes before Outback struck Juror 32—so they were not “permitted to serve” by Outback and could not cleanly support an inference of disparate treatment.
• Credibility is for the trial judge: The opinion leaned on Miller-El v. Cockrell and Flowers v. Mississippi to underscore that demeanor and plausibility assessments are uniquely within the trial judge’s competence and are owed deference on appeal.

3.3. Impact

A. Appellate Review of Pro Hac Vice Revocations

The decision signals that appellate courts in the Fourth Circuit will strictly police standing when clients attempt to challenge attorney-directed disciplinary or admission rulings (such as pro hac vice revocations) through the lens of the attorney’s due-process rights. Unless the client: (i) preserves a personal constitutional or other legally protected injury theory in briefing, or (ii) develops third-party standing with specific argument on close relationship and hindrance, appellate review may be unavailable regardless of the underlying merits.

B. Sanctions After Voluntary Dismissal Conditions / “Frozen Posture” Refilings

The case is especially influential for litigation managed through conditional voluntary dismissal orders designed to “freeze” the case posture. Where a party seeks to introduce post-dismissal expert development (new visit, new opinions, new records) contrary to the “no new discovery / no supplementation” conditions, courts may treat the risk of unfairness as structural and difficult to cure with limiting instructions—supporting the severe remedy of expert preclusion.

C. Batson Practice: Comparative Analysis Must Match the Procedural Reality

The opinion illustrates that comparator evidence must account for who actually controlled whether a comparator juror “was permitted to serve.” When the proposed comparator jurors were removed by the Batson challenger’s own peremptories, the inference of discriminatory disparate treatment by the opponent weakens. Future Batson litigants will likely focus more on sequencing, availability of comparators at the moment of the challenged strike, and record-building to show similarly situated non-Black jurors were retained by the striking party.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing (Including Third-Party Standing)

“Standing” is the constitutional requirement that the person asking a federal court to act has a sufficient stake in the dispute. Typically, you can only complain about violations of your rights—not someone else’s. “Third-party standing” is an exception that requires, at minimum: (1) you were injured; (2) you have a close relationship with the person whose rights you assert; and (3) there’s some hindrance preventing that person from protecting their own interests. Here, the court held Dr. Haysbert did not explain (2) and (3), so the court could not consider the claim at all.

Pro Hac Vice Admission

“Pro hac vice” is permission for an out-of-state lawyer to appear in a particular case in a court where they are not otherwise admitted. Courts can revoke that permission for misconduct. Whether that revocation process must include certain due-process protections can be a merits question—but only if the appellant has standing to raise it.

Rule 26(e) Supplementation and Rule 37(c)(1) Exclusion

Rule 26(e) requires parties to update (“supplement”) certain disclosures, including expert information, when they learn earlier disclosures are incomplete or incorrect. Rule 37(c)(1) generally punishes a violation by automatically excluding the untimely information unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.

“Additional” Sanctions Under Rule 37(c)(1)(C)

Beyond excluding the late material itself, Rule 37(c)(1)(C) lets courts impose other sanctions—such as barring the expert from testifying. In the Fourth Circuit, when selecting such an added sanction, courts weigh bad faith, prejudice, deterrence, and whether a lesser sanction would work (Anderson v. Foundation for Advancement of American Indians).

Batson’s Three Steps

1. Prima facie showing: the challenger shows circumstances suggesting a strike was race-based.
2. Race-neutral explanation: the striker gives a facially race-neutral reason.
3. Pretext/purposeful discrimination: the challenger must prove the stated reason is not the true reason and that discriminatory intent substantially motivated the strike.

Appellate courts rarely reverse step-three findings because they depend heavily on the trial judge’s credibility assessments.

5. Conclusion

Haysbert v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC is a procedural precedent with practical bite. First, it tightens the jurisdictional gateway: an appellant cannot obtain review of a pro hac vice revocation by asserting only the attorney’s due-process rights without establishing standing—particularly third-party standing—through developed briefing. Second, it clarifies sanction doctrine in the Fourth Circuit: when a district court goes beyond Rule 37(c)(1)’s automatic exclusion and imposes an additional sanction, Anderson v. Foundation for Advancement of American Indians supplies the governing factors (while Southern States Rack and Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co. is confined to the automatic-exclusion inquiry). Third, it reaffirms deferential Batson review and highlights that comparator arguments must match the actual procedural sequence of strikes.