Hawkins v. Northwestern Corp.: Waiver of Procedural Judicial-Assignment Objections, Rule 2(c) Dismissal for Nonresponse, and “Good Cause” Limits on Post-Deadline Joinder

Introduction

In Hawkins v. Northwestern Corporation, 2026 MT 149N (DA 25-0393), the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the Twenty-First Judicial District Court’s order (April 24, 2025) that (1) dismissed Kris Hawkins’s case after she failed to file an answering brief to Northwestern’s motion to dismiss under Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c), and (2) struck Hawkins’s attempted joinder of Terry Wallace as an additional plaintiff after the scheduling-order deadline. Hawkins appeared self-represented and purported to act for herself and “on behalf of the Olson Trust as a trustee.”

The appeal primarily raised three issues: (a) whether Judge Kaydee Snipes Ruiz “lacked jurisdiction” because she assumed the case upon Judge Recht’s invitation rather than via the procedure in § 3-1-805, MCA; (b) whether it was procedurally improper for Northwestern to file a second Rule 12 motion asserting Rule 12(b)(6); and (c) whether Hawkins could permissively join Wallace under M. R. Civ. P. 20 notwithstanding the expired joinder deadline in the scheduling order.

Although decided as a memorandum opinion that “shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent,” the Court’s reasoning is a clear application of settled Montana procedure in three recurring areas: disqualification/assignment challenges, nonresponse dismissal under Rule 2(c), and post-deadline joinder under Rule 16(b).

Summary of the Opinion

  • Judicial-assignment challenge waived: Hawkins’s objection to Judge Snipes Ruiz’s assumption of jurisdiction was a procedural/impartiality-based disqualification claim subject to timeliness; because Hawkins waited until appeal to object, she waived it.
  • Dismissal under Rule 2(c) affirmed: Hawkins did not file a response brief to Northwestern’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion; the District Court had discretion to deem the motion “well taken” and dismiss under Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c).
  • No conversion to summary judgment required: Even if Northwestern referenced materials outside the pleadings, they had “no bearing” on the District Court’s decision because dismissal rested on the nonresponse; therefore M. R. Civ. P. 12(d) conversion was not required.
  • Post-deadline joinder properly denied: The December 1, 2024 joinder deadline in the scheduling order remained effective unless modified for good cause with judicial consent under Rule 16(b)(4); Hawkins failed to show good cause and failed to substantively support joinder under Rule 20.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Disqualification and waiver: Draggin' Y I, Draggin' Y II, and State v. Dunsmore

The Court framed the judicial-disqualification/assignment dispute through the settled structure described in Draggin' Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Addink, 2016 MT 98 (“Draggin' Y I”), and Draggin' Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 2017 MT 125 (“Draggin' Y II”). Those decisions distinguish: (a) the substantive grounds for disqualification under the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct (including Rule 2.12), and (b) the statutory procedure in §§ 3-1-803 and -805, MCA, including the affidavit mechanism and referral/assignment process when a sufficient affidavit alleging bias or prejudice is filed.

Critically, the Court relied on the waiver principle articulated in Draggin' Y I (quoting State v. Dunsmore, 2015 MT 108): a party waives disqualification claims other than bias or prejudice if not raised “within a reasonable time” after learning the underlying facts. Here, Hawkins’s complaint was procedural—how Judge Snipes Ruiz came onto the case (invitation vs. § 3-1-805, MCA process)—and an “impartiality might be reasonably questioned” theory, not a claim that Judge Snipes Ruiz personally harbored bias or prejudice. That placed the challenge squarely within the timeliness/waiver doctrine from Draggin' Y I and Dunsmore.

2) Unanswered motions and Rule 2(c): In re Marriage of Marez & Marshall and State v. Pizzola

On dismissal for failure to file an answering brief, the Court invoked In re Marriage of Marez & Marshall, 2014 MT 333, for the proposition that Rule 2(c) gives the district court discretion to grant or deny an unanswered motion. At the same time, the Court cited State v. Pizzola, 283 Mont. 522 (1997), for a limiting principle: Rule 2(c) cannot transform a motion that is incorrect as a matter of law into a well-taken motion. The Court then applied these principles by emphasizing that Hawkins did not dispute she failed to file a response brief; thus the District Court acted within Rule 2(c) discretion, and nothing in the appeal demonstrated that granting the motion was legally erroneous in the Pizzola sense.

3) Successive Rule 12 practice: Garza v. Forquest Ventures, Inc. (and the text of Rule 12)

Hawkins argued Northwestern’s second Rule 12 motion was barred because Northwestern omitted 12(b)(6) from its first motion. The Court addressed the issue using the Rule 12 framework (Rules 12(g)(2), 12(h)(1), and 12(h)(2)) and referenced Garza v. Forquest Ventures, Inc., 2015 MT 284, for waiver principles applicable to certain Rule 12 defenses.

The key distinction the Court drew—consistent with Rule 12’s text—is that some defenses (notably 12(b)(2)-(5)) are waived if omitted, while failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) is preserved by Rule 12(h)(2) and may be raised later by other means. The Court concluded that, even if Northwestern’s chosen vehicle (a second Rule 12 motion) was not ideal, the District Court did not abuse discretion by considering it in the interest of judicial economy, explicitly invoking M. R. Civ. P. 1’s mandate to secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of actions.

4) Conversion to summary judgment: Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A. and Ming Da Situ v. Smole

On whether the District Court had to convert the 12(b)(6) motion under Rule 12(d), the Court relied on Anderson v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 2017 MT 313 (citing Ming Da Situ v. Smole, 2013 MT 33). Those cases establish: (a) district courts have discretion to consider matters outside the pleadings in the 12(b)(6) setting, but (b) if they actually do so, they must provide notice and an opportunity to respond under summary judgment standards; and (c) mere reference to outside facts not bearing on the decision does not trigger conversion.

The Court applied the “bearing on the decision” concept directly: because dismissal was grounded on Hawkins’s failure to respond under Rule 2(c), any extra-pleading exhibits were immaterial; conversion was therefore unnecessary.

5) Scheduling orders, good cause, and joinder: Brookins v. Mote and In re Est. of Burns

For joinder after a scheduling-order deadline, the Court used the Rule 16(b) framework and cited Brookins v. Mote, 2012 MT 283, for the proposition that “good cause” depends on the totality of the circumstances. For permissive joinder standards, the Court cited In re Est. of Burns, 2023 MT 253, emphasizing liberal construction to promote convenience and economy, while recognizing the district court’s “broad discretion” over Rule 20 joinder.

The Court’s application of these principles was two-layered: (1) Rule 16(b)(4) controlled because a scheduling-order joinder deadline existed and had not been modified “with the judge’s consent”; and (2) even under Rule 20’s liberal policy, Hawkins did not adequately substantiate Wallace’s purported trustee status.

6) Case-specific risk factor: Wallace v. Law Offices of Bruce M. Spencer, PLLC

The Court noted Northwestern’s showing that Wallace had been deemed a vexatious litigant in Wallace v. Law Offices of Bruce M. Spencer, PLLC, 2021 MT 253, and had been suspended from practicing law in Montana in 2018. The Court treated this as relevant to whether joinder would undermine trial convenience and judicial economy—core considerations embedded in Rule 20’s permissive-joinder rationale as discussed in Est. of Burns.

Legal Reasoning

A) The “jurisdiction” argument was analyzed as a waivable disqualification/assignment procedure claim

Hawkins cast Judge Snipes Ruiz’s assignment as a “lack of jurisdiction” problem, but the Court treated it as a challenge to the propriety of the assignment procedure and an impartiality-based objection. Under Draggin' Y I, such claims must be asserted within a reasonable time after the relevant facts are known. Hawkins knew immediately that Judge Snipes Ruiz assumed jurisdiction “upon Judge Recht’s invitation,” yet did not object until appeal; this delay triggered waiver.

B) Rule 2(c) dismissal rested on procedural default, not merits adjudication

The District Court dismissed because Hawkins failed to file an answering brief; the Supreme Court affirmed because Rule 2(c) authorizes treating the failure to respond as an admission that the motion is well taken, subject to the district court’s discretion. The Court also rejected Hawkins’s characterization of the dismissal as an “unlawful sanction,” clarifying it was a Rule 2(c) discretionary dismissal rather than a Rule 11 sanction.

C) The Court tolerated a second 12(b)(6) motion as a case-management decision consistent with Rule 1

While acknowledging Northwestern omitted 12(b)(6) from its initial Rule 12 motion, the Court emphasized the structure of Rule 12 waiver: omission does not produce the same forfeiture consequences for 12(b)(6) that it does for 12(b)(2)-(5). The Court then anchored its conclusion in pragmatic case management: reaching potentially dispositive or narrowing issues early promoted judicial economy in line with Rule 1.

D) Rule 12(d) conversion depends on whether outside material mattered to the ruling

The Court avoided a potentially thorny public-record/outside-pleadings debate by focusing on materiality. Because the dismissal turned on nonresponse, not on evaluation of evidence, any outside materials “had no bearing” on the decision, so conversion was not required under Anderson.

E) Scheduling orders remain operative across judge changes; modification requires good cause and consent

Hawkins argued the September 2024 scheduling order became “void” once Judge Snipes Ruiz assumed jurisdiction. The Court rejected this as inconsistent with the “plain language” of Rule 16(b)(4), which requires good cause and judicial consent to modify the schedule. No judge entered an order modifying the December 1, 2024 joinder deadline, so Hawkins’s February 13, 2025 joinder attempt was untimely.

On good cause, the Court acknowledged case stagnation stemming from multiple pending motions and the earlier disqualification dispute, but held the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding good cause was absent where Hawkins offered no evidence supporting Wallace’s trustee status and Northwestern provided reasons joinder could impede efficient resolution.

Impact

  • Disqualification/assignment objections must be timely even when framed as “jurisdiction”: The decision reinforces that procedural objections to a judge’s assignment—especially “appearance of impartiality” claims—are subject to waiver if not raised promptly. Litigants cannot wait to see how the case goes and then object on appeal.
  • Rule 2(c) remains a potent case-management tool: The Court’s affirmance underscores that failure to brief can be fatal. Even where a movant’s procedural choices (like a second Rule 12 motion) are challenged, the nonmovant’s failure to respond can independently support dismissal.
  • Conversion under Rule 12(d) is not automatic: If the district court’s dismissal does not rely on outside materials, conversion is unnecessary, reducing incentives for litigants to force summary-judgment procedures through immaterial attachments.
  • Scheduling-order deadlines have real bite: The decision confirms that joinder after a Rule 16(b) deadline is not simply a Rule 20 question; it is first a Rule 16(b)(4) “good cause” question. A change in presiding judge does not nullify existing deadlines.

Note: because the Court designated the decision a memorandum opinion under its Internal Operating Rules, it “shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent.” Practically, however, it reflects how the Court is likely to apply established doctrine in similar procedural settings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Memorandum opinion (“noncitable”)
A decision the Court issues when the outcome is controlled by settled law or clear application of standards of review. It resolves the parties’ dispute but is not precedential and may not be cited as authority.
Judicial disqualification vs. procedural assignment challenge
Disqualification typically concerns whether a judge must step aside due to bias, prejudice, or an objective appearance of partiality under the Code of Judicial Conduct. A procedural assignment challenge argues the wrong process was used to assign a judge. Montana law requires many such objections to be raised promptly or they are waived.
Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c)
A rule allowing the district court to treat a party’s failure to file an answering brief as an admission that the motion is well taken. The court has discretion and must still avoid granting a motion that is incorrect as a matter of law.
Rule 12(b)(6) and “conversion” under Rule 12(d)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the complaint states a legally viable claim assuming the pleaded facts are true. If the court actually relies on evidence outside the pleadings, Rule 12(d) generally requires treating the motion as summary judgment (with notice and an opportunity to present evidence). If outside material is not relied upon, conversion is not required.
Scheduling orders and “good cause” (Rule 16(b)(4))
A scheduling order sets case deadlines (including for joining parties). After a deadline passes, it can be modified only for “good cause” and with the judge’s consent—meaning a party must justify why the deadline could not reasonably be met and why modification is appropriate under the case’s circumstances.
Permissive joinder (Rule 20)
Rule 20 allows adding plaintiffs when their claims arise from the same events and share common issues. The rule is liberal, but it does not override scheduling-order deadlines, and the party seeking joinder must provide a meaningful factual basis for it.

Conclusion

Hawkins v. Northwestern Corporation applies settled Montana procedural law to affirm dismissal and denial of a late joinder attempt. The Court held that procedural/impartiality-based objections to a judge’s assignment are waivable if not timely raised; that a district court may dismiss an action under Rule 2(c) when a party fails to brief a dispositive motion; that Rule 12(d) conversion is not required when outside materials do not affect the decision; and that scheduling-order deadlines remain enforceable unless modified for good cause with judicial consent, with late joinder requiring both Rule 16(b)(4) justification and Rule 20 support. Even as a noncitable memorandum opinion, the decision is a pointed reminder that Montana civil litigation is strongly deadline- and briefing-driven, and that appellate courts will often affirm discretionary case-management rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.