Hawaiʻi Guardianship Termination: Parental Presumption Survives Consent; Unfitness Requires Clear and Convincing Proof

Case: In the Matter of the Guardianship of I.W. and T.E., SCWC-23-0000356 (Haw. June 16, 2026)
Court: Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi (Eddins, J.)
Review: Certiorari to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)

1. Introduction

This contested guardianship concerns two minors (pseudonyms “Toby” and “Izzy”) who lived with their maternal grandparents for nearly a decade under a guardianship originally created by parental consent. Mother later sought to terminate the guardianship and resume full parenting; grandparents opposed termination and sought to expand/restore the guardianship’s scope.

The case presented two central legal issues with statewide significance:

  • Whether a fit-parent presumption applies in guardianship proceedings, including when the parent previously consented to the guardianship; and
  • What standard of proof governs a finding of parental unfitness sufficient to set aside that presumption in a guardianship termination/modification dispute.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi affirmed the ICA “in result” and remanded for a new fitness determination under the correct constitutional standard. The court announced and clarified several rules:

  • Parental presumption applies in guardianship proceedings: the presumption that a fit parent acts in the child’s best interest extends to guardianships, and consent to guardianship is not a waiver of that presumption.
  • Clear and convincing evidence of unfitness is constitutionally required (Haw. Const. art. I, §§ 5 & 6) before a family court may set aside the parental presumption.
  • Two standards operate in sequence:
    • Fitness must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
    • Best interests under HRS § 560:5-210(b) and HRS § 571-46 are weighed by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • No “terminable at will” rule: a fit-parent finding does not automatically end a guardianship; rather, it triggers a strong presumption favoring termination that can be rebutted by a best-interests showing.
  • Overruling: “To the extent In re Guardianship of Doe, 106 Hawaiʻi 75, 78, 101 P.3d 684, 687 (App. 2004) held otherwise,” it is overruled on the standard of proof for unfitness.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the decision)

  • Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)
    Role: Foundation for the “fit parent” presumption (“there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children”). The court used Troxel to justify importing the presumption into guardianship disputes, because guardianship—like visitation—invokes the state’s intrusion into family autonomy.
  • In the Interest of JH, 152 Hawaiʻi 373, 378, 526 P.3d 350, 355 (2023) and In re Doe, 99 Hawaiʻi 522, 533, 57 P.3d 447, 458 (2002)
    Role: Hawaiʻi constitutional grounding for parental liberty interests (care, custody, control). The court relied on these cases to locate the presumption and protection of parenting within Hawaiʻi’s constitutional tradition.
  • Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawaiʻi 323, 334, 172 P.3d 1067, 1078 (2007)
    Role: Established Hawaiʻi privacy protection against unjustified government interference in “child rearing and education,” and applied Troxel-type principles to third-party visitation. The court used this to argue that if the presumption protects decisions about visitation, it must also protect decisions about ending a guardianship that displaces day-to-day parenting.
  • In re Guardianship of Jane Doe and In re Guardianship of Doe, 93 Hawaiʻi 374, 385, 4 P.3d 508, 519 (App. 2000)
    Role: The family court invoked the ICA’s earlier guardianship jurisprudence recognizing a parental presumption “subject to rebuttal.” The Supreme Court did not reject the idea of a presumption; it constitutionalized and clarified its operation and the required burden to defeat it.
  • In re Guardianship of Doe, 106 Hawaiʻi 75, 78, 101 P.3d 684, 687 (App. 2004)
    Role: Key target of the Supreme Court’s correction. That ICA decision applied a preponderance standard to fitness in guardianship proceedings. The Supreme Court held that due process and privacy under the Hawaiʻi Constitution require clear and convincing proof of unfitness, and expressly overruled the 2004 ICA rule to the extent it required only a preponderance.
  • DJ v. CJ, 147 Hawaiʻi 2, 17, 464 P.3d 790, 805 (2020)
    Role: Confirmed that parental care/custody/control is a fundamental liberty interest under U.S. and Hawaiʻi constitutions and “entitled to due process protection.” This supported treating the standard of proof as a constitutional due process question.
  • State v. Bani, 97 Hawaiʻi 285, 297, 36 P.3d 1255, 1267 (2001) and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
    Role: Provided the three-factor framework for determining “what process is due.” The court used the Mathews balancing test to justify the heightened standard.
  • Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982)
    Role: Supported the proposition that, where fundamental parental rights are at stake, a preponderance standard can be constitutionally inadequate. Although Santosky is a termination-of-parental-rights case, it supplied the constitutional logic for requiring “greater-than-ordinary” confidence in factfinding.
  • In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 118 A.3d 229, 241 (Me. 2015)
    Role: Persuasive authority describing parental-rights proceedings as a “continuum of finality,” placing guardianship between child protection interim orders and termination/de facto parenthood determinations, yet still transferring parental rights “almost in their entirety.” The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court adopted this reasoning to justify clear and convincing evidence for unfitness in guardianship.
  • A.A. v. B.B., 139 Hawaiʻi 102, 116 n.22, 384 P.3d 878, 892 n.22 (2016)
    Role: Recognized the State’s compelling interest and duty regarding child welfare, which the court balanced against parental rights in the due process analysis.
  • Out-of-state authorities emphasizing that consent does not forfeit the parental presumption: In re Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d 509, 513 (N.H. 2011); Morris v. Clark, 572 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Ark. 2019); In re Guardianship of D.J., 682 N.W.2d 238, 246 (Neb. 2004); Hunter v. Hunter, 771 N.W.2d 694, 705 (Mich. 2009).
    Role: Used to show a broad doctrinal consensus: parents retain the fundamental liberty interest even after agreeing to a guardianship.
  • Authorities integrating the presumption with best-interests analysis (and rejecting automatic termination): In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 784, 786-87 (Colo. 2011); Boisvert v. Harrington, 796 A.2d 1102, 1107-08 (Vt. 2002).
    Role: The court adopted the conceptual structure: fitness triggers a presumption favoring parental restoration, but best interests remain adjudicated—guardians may rebut by a preponderance. In re D.I.S. also provided the court’s caution about “status quo” advantages that guardianships can create over time.
  • Authorities supporting clear and convincing evidence in guardianship termination with consent: Matter of Guardianship of L.Y., 968 N.W.2d 882, 899 (Iowa 2022); Guardianship of Kelvin, 114 N.E.3d 102, 109 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018); Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d at 515.
    Role: Reinforced the court’s constitutional conclusion that unfitness should require a heightened standard, even when the case is not a formal termination of parental rights.
  • Doe v. Doe, 120 Hawaiʻi 149, 170, 202 P.3d 610, 631 (App. 2009) and In re Doe, 95 Hawaiʻi 183, 190, 20 P.3d 616, 623 (2001)
    Role: Cited in the harmless-error and remand discussion: appellate courts should not overlook due process violations affecting fundamental parental rights, and credibility/weight determinations belong to the trial court.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Extending the fit-parent presumption to guardianship

The court treated guardianship as a major state-sanctioned reallocation of parental powers—because a guardian holds “the powers of a parent regarding the [child’s] support, care, education, health, and welfare” under HRS § 560:5-208(a). From that premise, the court reasoned that the Troxel presumption cannot logically stop at visitation disputes; it must apply where the state authorizes a third party to exercise day-to-day parental authority.

Critically, the court rejected the idea that a parent’s prior consent to guardianship waives constitutional status: consenting to temporary caregiving help does not surrender the enduring presumption that a fit parent acts in the child’s best interest.

B. Why “clear and convincing” (and why by constitutional law, not statutory inference)

The ICA reached “clear and convincing” largely by statutory/legislative inference (drawing from HRS § 560:5-204 and analogizing to HRS § 587A-33). The Supreme Court agreed with the result but rejected that chain of reasoning as textually and structurally strained because:

  • HRS § 560:5-204 governs initial appointment, while post-appointment modification/termination is in HRS § 560:5-210.
  • HRS § 560:5-210 speaks in “best interest” terms and does not specify a burden for unfitness; legislative silence was insufficient to “import” a standard from a different statutory regime.

Instead, the Supreme Court grounded the rule in Hawaiʻi constitutional due process and privacy (article I, sections 5 and 6), applying Mathews v. Eldridge balancing:

  • Private interest: substantial—guardianship shifts core parental decision-making and can become long-lasting, making reunification practically difficult even if formally possible.
  • Risk of erroneous deprivation: heightened because guardianship tends to create “structural tilt” in the evidence (guardians accrue caregiving history and institutional knowledge while parents necessarily have less recent day-to-day involvement).
  • Government interests: both child safety/welfare and family reunification; a heightened standard protects children where needed without discouraging parents from consenting to temporary guardianships to stabilize a child’s life.

The conclusion followed: before a court may strip a fit parent of the presumption (and thereby allow the case to proceed as if parent and guardian were on equal footing), unfitness must be established by clear and convincing evidence.

C. Separating “fitness” from “best interests,” and rejecting automatic termination

The court insisted on a two-step structure:

  • Step 1 — Fitness (clear and convincing): determines whether the parental presumption applies.
  • Step 2 — Best interests (preponderance): applies HRS § 560:5-210(b) and HRS § 571-46 factors, with the presumption operating as a meaningful weight in the analysis if the parent is fit.

The court rejected Mother’s proposed “fit parent = termination” rule as incompatible with HRS § 560:5-210 and general custody principles (citing Boisvert v. Harrington and A.A. v. B.B.). It also refused to import the “harm to the child” standard from Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawaiʻi 323, 336, 172 P.3d 1067, 1080 (2007), explaining that visitation cases and guardianship (daily custody and comprehensive decision-making) present different stakes and statutory structures.

D. How the presumption must operate in practice

The opinion adds a practical instruction: the presumption is not a “checkbox.” When evaluating HRS § 571-46(b) factors that may superficially favor the guardian (e.g., history of caregiving, ability to meet educational and emotional needs), the family court must account for the fact that the guardianship itself may have produced that evidentiary advantage. The court highlighted “status quo” effects: the longer a guardianship lasts, the more evidence accumulates favoring its continuation—sometimes independent of the parent’s true present fitness.

E. Harmless error and remand

The family court found Mother unfit by a preponderance, which the Supreme Court deemed constitutional error. The error was not harmless because it determined whether the parental presumption applied at all; the ensuing best-interests analysis proceeded without that constitutional weight. The case was remanded for the family court to reassess fitness under the clear-and-convincing standard, and then (depending on the finding) to apply the presumption appropriately within the best-interests inquiry.

3.3. Impact

  • Statewide rule for guardianship litigation: Hawaiʻi family courts must apply clear and convincing evidence to findings of parental unfitness in guardianship contexts before setting aside the fit-parent presumption.
  • Consent-to-guardianship cases are rebalanced: parents who consented to a guardianship retain constitutional presumption protections in later termination proceedings, reducing the “consent trap” concern (where seeking help could later be used to permanently diminish parenting rights).
  • Doctrinal clarification of burdens: the opinion creates a stable two-tier burden structure (clear-and-convincing for fitness; preponderance for best interests), likely reducing inconsistent trial-court approaches.
  • Litigation strategy consequences: guardians opposing termination will need a stronger evidentiary record on unfitness to avoid the presumption; if the parent is fit, guardians must be prepared to rebut the presumption via HRS § 571-46 best-interest proof by a preponderance.
  • Overruled precedent: to the extent In re Guardianship of Doe, 106 Hawaiʻi 75, 78, 101 P.3d 684, 687 (App. 2004) used a preponderance standard for unfitness, it no longer governs.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Parental presumption” (fit-parent presumption): If a parent is “fit,” the law presumes the parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interest. In this case, it means a fit parent starts with a strong advantage when asking to end a guardianship.
  • “Unfitness”: A legal finding that a parent is unwilling or unable to exercise parental rights in a way that meets the child’s needs. Here, unfitness is the gateway issue: only if unfitness is proven does the parent lose the presumption.
  • “Clear and convincing evidence” vs. “preponderance of the evidence”:
    • Preponderance means “more likely than not” (just over 50%).
    • Clear and convincing means a much higher level of certainty—firm belief/conviction—though still less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • “Mathews balancing” (from Mathews v. Eldridge): A constitutional test to decide what procedures (like a higher burden of proof) are required when the government affects important private rights. The court balanced parental rights, risk of mistake, and the State’s interests.
  • “Status quo” or “structural tilt” in guardianship: A guardianship can generate evidence that supports continuing it (the guardian has the recent caregiving history because the guardianship gave them that role). The presumption forces courts to recognize that dynamic rather than treat it as neutral.

5. Conclusion

This opinion establishes a constitutional rule for Hawaiʻi guardianships: a parent’s consent to guardianship does not waive the fit-parent presumption, and clear and convincing evidence of unfitness is required before a court may set that presumption aside under article I, sections 5 and 6 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution. At the same time, the court preserved the legislature’s best-interests framework under HRS § 560:5-210(b) and HRS § 571-46, applying it by a preponderance once the presumption is properly placed.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its careful separation of (1) constitutional protection for parental status (fitness and the presumption) from (2) the fact-intensive best-interests inquiry—while warning courts not to let guardianship-created “status quo” evidence silently harden a temporary arrangement into a near-permanent displacement of parental rights.