Harmless-Error Treatment of Erlinger “Different Occasions” Violations After Guilty Pleas Under the ACCA (Fourth Circuit)

Introduction

In United States v. Lawrence Anderson (4th Cir. May 12, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit affirmed Lawrence Rehmeil Anderson’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and his enhanced sentence as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Anderson’s appeal raised two principal issues: (1) whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen; and (2) whether he was properly sentenced under the ACCA, including whether his North Carolina breaking-or-entering convictions qualify as “violent felonies” and whether those predicates occurred on “occasions different from one another.”

Procedurally, the case returned to the district court after a joint-motion remand in light of Wooden v. United States, which clarified the inquiry into whether ACCA predicates occurred on different occasions. On resentencing, the district court imposed 184 months. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Anderson’s constitutional challenge was barred by circuit precedent and that any Erlinger “different occasions” error was harmless.

Summary of the Opinion

  • § 922(g)(1) constitutionality: Anderson’s facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges were foreclosed by binding Fourth Circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Hunt and United States v. Canada.
  • ACCA “violent felony” predicates: Anderson’s North Carolina breaking-or-entering convictions remain ACCA burglary predicates under United States v. Mungro and United States v. Dodge.
  • “Different occasions” finding: The district court erred under Erlinger v. United States by deciding the different-occasions issue at sentencing; however, applying United States v. Brown, the Fourth Circuit held the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the plea context and undisputed record showing the offenses occurred at different places, against different victims, and at least a week apart.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) after Bruen

  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Anderson relied on Bruen to argue that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. The panel did not re-litigate Bruen’s framework; instead, it treated the claim as controlled by subsequent circuit authority.
  • United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2024): The opinion treated Hunt as dispositive. It emphasized that Anderson did not claim his disqualifying convictions had been pardoned or invalidated, placing him squarely within Hunt’s rule that such Second Amendment challenges are precluded in this circuit.
  • United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024): Cited alongside Hunt as further binding circuit authority rejecting the asserted post-Bruen invalidation of § 922(g)(1) on the theory advanced.
  • United States v. Runyon, 994 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2021): Not a Second Amendment case, but crucial to the panel’s methodology: it invoked the intra-circuit rule that one panel cannot overrule another, explaining why Hunt and Canada controlled.

What counts as an ACCA “violent felony” (enumerated burglary)

  • United States v. Cornette, 932 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2019): Provided the standard of review—whether a conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate is reviewed de novo.
  • United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Dodge, 963 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2020): Together foreclosed Anderson’s argument that North Carolina breaking or entering is not ACCA burglary. The panel treated those decisions as binding and determinative of the “violent felony” question under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Who decides “different occasions,” and how errors are reviewed

  • Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022): The case that prompted the earlier remand. Wooden requires a “multi-factored” inquiry into whether predicate crimes were committed on “occasions different from one another,” and it anchors the “ordinary meaning” of “occasion” as an “episode or event.”
  • Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024): Established the constitutional allocation of factfinding: the “different occasions” facts must be found by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea). The panel recognized that it is error for a judge to decide that issue at sentencing.
  • United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 391 (2025): Supplied the governing harmless-error framework. For guilty-plea cases, Brown requires the Government to show beyond a reasonable doubt that, if correctly advised of the jury right on different occasions, the defendant would still have waived it and admitted the predicates occurred on different occasions.
  • United States v. Boggs, No. 22-4707, 2025 WL 1249364 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 2025) (argued but unpublished), and United States v. Blackmon, No. 22-4576, 2026 WL 624484 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) (argued but unpublished): Mentioned to explain the court’s abeyance decision while awaiting related guidance, reinforcing that Brown is the controlling published authority.

Legal Reasoning

1) Why the court rejected the post-Bruen constitutional attack

The panel did not reach an original historical-tradition analysis under Bruen. Instead, it treated the challenge as foreclosed by binding circuit precedent—principally United States v. Hunt and United States v. Canada. The court noted Anderson did not claim his disqualifying convictions had been pardoned or invalidated, placing him within the rule that such defendants cannot succeed on the Second Amendment theory advanced. Under United States v. Runyon, the panel could not depart from that precedent.

2) Why North Carolina breaking or entering counted as ACCA burglary

The ACCA defines “violent felony” to include “burglary” as an enumerated offense. Applying de novo review per United States v. Cornette, the panel held Anderson’s argument was squarely foreclosed by United States v. Mungro and United States v. Dodge, which treat North Carolina breaking-or-entering as qualifying ACCA burglary. The panel therefore did not reopen the categorical analysis.

3) The Erlinger error—and why it was harmless here

The court accepted that the district court committed an Erlinger error by itself determining that Anderson’s predicates occurred on different occasions. Following United States v. Brown, however, it examined whether the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson would still have pleaded guilty and effectively admitted the “different occasions” facts if properly advised of the right to a jury determination.

The panel found harmlessness based on four converging considerations drawn from Brown:

  1. Notice of ACCA exposure at the plea stage: Anderson was informed in his plea agreement and plea colloquy that ACCA could apply and he affirmed his understanding of the alternative statutory ranges depending on the ACCA determination.
  2. No attempt to withdraw the guilty plea: Although he litigated “different occasions” at sentencing, he did not seek plea withdrawal, supporting the inference that the plea bargain remained advantageous even under the ACCA risk.
  3. Undisputed PSR facts: Anderson did not challenge the PSR’s accuracy, and the PSR supplied the factual basis for different occasions.
  4. Overwhelming “different occasions” evidence under Wooden: The PSR showed three breaking-and/or-entering felonies occurred on September 26, October 6, and October 22, 2014, at different locations, against different victims, and separated by at least a week. Under Wooden’s understanding of an “occasion” as a distinct “episode or event,” the court deemed a contrary jury finding effectively implausible—mirroring Brown’s “long odds” rationale.

Impact

  • Operational rule for guilty-plea cases post-Erlinger: Even where the sentencing judge (not a jury) decided “different occasions,” the Fourth Circuit will affirm if the Brown harmless-error showing is met—especially where undisputed records (often the PSR) make separate occasions unmistakable under Wooden.
  • Reinforcement of PSR centrality: The opinion underscores that failing to dispute PSR “different occasions” facts can be pivotal. In practice, PSR admissions-by-omission may strongly support harmlessness on appeal.
  • Second Amendment challenges remain channel-limited: Within the Fourth Circuit, defendants with valid, unpardoned felony convictions continue to face a steep barrier to § 922(g)(1) challenges after Bruen, so long as Hunt and Canada remain controlling.
  • Doctrinal stability on NC breaking-or-entering predicates: The panel reiterates that Mungro and Dodge remain the settled law on that predicate question, reducing litigation uncertainty in ACCA cases arising from North Carolina convictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

ACCA enhancement
A federal sentencing rule that increases the penalty for a § 922(g) firearm offense to a mandatory minimum of 15 years (up to life) if the defendant has three qualifying prior convictions that were committed on different occasions.
“Violent felony” (enumerated offenses)
Under the ACCA, certain crimes count automatically if they match listed offenses like “burglary.” Courts compare the elements of the prior offense to the federal definition (a “categorical” inquiry). Here, the Fourth Circuit treated North Carolina breaking or entering as qualifying “burglary” based on prior precedent.
“Different occasions”
The ACCA requires that the three predicates be committed on separate “episodes or events.” After Wooden, courts consider multiple factors (timing, location, victims, intervening events) rather than applying a rigid test.
Erlinger error
A constitutional error where a judge, instead of a jury, decides the “different occasions” facts (unless the defendant admits them in a plea).
Harmless error (as applied here)
Even if the court made a legal mistake, an appellate court may affirm if it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the mistake did not affect the outcome. Under Brown, the question becomes whether the defendant would still have pleaded guilty and waived the jury right on “different occasions” if properly advised.

Conclusion

United States v. Lawrence Anderson is a Fourth Circuit application of the post-Erlinger landscape: while recognizing that “different occasions” is a jury question unless admitted, the court affirmed because the record—especially the undisputed PSR—made separate occasions undeniable under Wooden, satisfying Brown’s demanding harmless-error test in a guilty-plea setting. The opinion also reiterates two stabilizing circuit positions: (1) most post-Bruen Second Amendment attacks on § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by Hunt and Canada; and (2) North Carolina breaking or entering remains an ACCA burglary predicate under Mungro and Dodge.