Harmless Error in Withholding-of-Removal Nexus: Misuse of “One Central Reason” Does Not Require Remand Where Record Shows No Protected-Ground Motive

I. Introduction

In Fermin Pablo-Diaz v. Todd W. Blanche, Acting U.S. Attorney General (Sixth Cir. Apr. 15, 2026), the petitioner, a Mexican national who entered the United States as a teenager, sought withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). He feared gang violence in Mexico based largely on harms suffered by deported relatives and country-conditions evidence describing widespread crime and corruption.

The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review, focusing on two gatekeeping issues: (1) whether any feared harm would be “on account of” a protected ground (the nexus requirement) for withholding, and (2) whether the CAT claim was exhausted before the BIA.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Withholding of removal: The court held that the petitioner failed to prove nexus. Although the BIA used the wrong nexus formulation (applying a “one central reason” test), the error was harmless because substantial evidence supported the BIA’s factual finding that the feared harm was driven by financial gain—not animus toward a protected ground—so remand would be futile.
• Particular social group (PSG) cognizability: The petitioner argued his proposed PSGs were cognizable, but the court declined to review that issue because the BIA did not reach it.
• CAT: The court refused to consider CAT on the merits because the petitioner did not meaningfully raise CAT to the BIA, and the government invoked the exhaustion rule on petition for review.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. What the court reviews (and what it cannot)

The Sixth Circuit framed the scope of review through Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347 (6th Cir. 2023), emphasizing that when the BIA issues its own opinion, that decision is the final agency determination; the IJ’s reasoning matters only to the extent adopted. Critically, Turcios-Flores also supplies the court’s limiting principle: “any issues the Board did not address are not before the court.” That rule disposed of the petitioner’s attempt to litigate PSG cognizability in the court of appeals once the BIA chose to affirm on other grounds.

2. Deference to agency factfinding

The court reiterated the substantial-evidence standard using K. H. v. Barr, 920 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2019), Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972 (6th Cir. 2005), and Slyusar v. Holder, 740 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 2014), grounding deference in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B): agency factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The nexus determination was treated as factual (and thus deferentially reviewed) via Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838 (6th Cir. 2023).

3. Withholding: burden and “clear probability”

For the governing burden, the court relied on Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2017), which in turn draws from INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984): the applicant must show it is “more likely than not” that life or freedom would be threatened on a protected ground.

4. Nexus as motive (not mere causation) and “financial gain” as non-protected motive

The opinion’s core reasoning flows from Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377 (6th Cir. 2025), and Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033 (6th Cir. 2019): nexus turns on persecutor motive. The applicant must show animus toward the protected characteristic itself, not simply an “ordinary criminal desire for financial gain.” This framework was decisive because the petitioner’s record evidence was read as supporting opportunistic targeting of perceived wealth rather than persecution because of protected status.

5. Mixed-motive nexus standard for withholding and the BIA’s legal error

The Sixth Circuit underscored that withholding of removal uses a less demanding mixed-motive formulation: per Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2020), an applicant need show a protected ground was “at least one reason” for persecution, consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C). The BIA erred by using the more stringent “one central reason” test.

6. Harmless error and “futility” remand in immigration cases

The court’s decision not to remand is built on a line of Sixth Circuit harmless-error cases: Abdulahad v. Garland, 99 F.4th 275 (6th Cir. 2024) (limited harmless-error use; remand generally required where reasoning is inadequate), quoting Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2007) (remand ordinarily appropriate), and further quoting Preçetaj v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2018) (agency must articulate rationale). The key “rare circumstances” carve-out came through Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2010), and the futility principle in Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2009): remand is unnecessary where the record is so weak that it would not reasonably change the result.

The court also referenced Mazariegos-Rodas, 122 F.4th at 672–73, to illustrate the type of record evidence that can matter to motive—e.g., whether persecutors “expressly connect” their actions to the asserted protected status—and found that link absent here.

7. PSG background in the IJ decision (not reached by the Sixth Circuit)

Although the Sixth Circuit did not adjudicate PSG cognizability (because the BIA did not), the opinion recounts the IJ’s reliance on: Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2015) (immutability, particularity, social distinction); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2009) (family membership may qualify); Akhta v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2005) (cited by IJ regarding PSGs tied to a family member’s persecution); and Sanchez-Robles v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 688 (6th Cir. 2015) (cited by IJ regarding wealth/financial-gain targeting). Their functional role in this appeal was indirect: they framed the petitioner’s litigation posture, but the Sixth Circuit’s affirmance rested on nexus alone.

8. CAT exhaustion as a mandatory claim-processing rule

On CAT, the court applied 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) through the Supreme Court’s reframing in Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023): exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but it is a mandatory claim-processing rule when properly invoked. The “mandatory if raised” concept came from Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019).

The Sixth Circuit used Cuevas-Nuno v. Barr, 969 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2020), quoting Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2004), to hold that a petitioner must preserve each claim by presenting it to the BIA, and that the court looks to the BIA brief to determine preservation. Because the petitioner’s BIA briefing did not discuss CAT, the court would not reach CAT in the petition for review.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The dispositive move: nexus ends the withholding analysis

The Sixth Circuit explicitly treated nexus as dispositive: even if the petitioner had sincere fear and even assuming arguendo that his proposed groups might be framed as PSGs, withholding fails without proof that feared persecution would occur because of a protected ground. Using Patel v. Bondi and Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, the court required evidence that gang violence would be motivated by animus toward the protected status, not merely opportunistic extortion or assault based on perceived wealth.

2. Mixed motive was unavailable on this record

The petitioner argued for a mixed-motive analysis, but the court held the record did not support even the threshold showing that his asserted protected grounds were a reason for harm. The evidence pointed to generalized criminality and financially motivated targeting; there was no record evidence compelling a finding that the gangs would act because of the proffered social groups.

3. The BIA applied the wrong legal test, but the error did not matter

A key doctrinal point is the court’s handling of the BIA’s legal mistake: the BIA used the “one central reason” test when withholding requires only “a reason” (Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr). Ordinarily, such an error could warrant remand for application of the correct standard. Here, however, the court treated the error as harmless under Abdulahad v. Garland and its predecessors because the BIA’s bottom-line factual finding was effectively “no nexus at all”—i.e., no protected-ground implication whatsoever—making a remand futile.

4. CAT was barred by non-exhaustion once the government invoked the rule

The court’s CAT holding is procedural: because the petitioner did not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s CAT denial in his BIA appeal, and because the government pressed exhaustion on judicial review, the claim-processing rule required dismissal of CAT arguments without reaching the merits.

C. Impact

• Harmless-error “futility” applied to nexus-standard mistakes: The opinion signals that even a clear legal error in the nexus standard (using “one central reason” rather than “a reason”) may not yield a remand if the agency’s findings amount to “no protected-ground motive at all.” Practically, petitioners should expect courts to ask whether a corrected standard could plausibly change the outcome.
• Nexus evidence must be motive-specific: General country-conditions evidence and accounts of crime affecting returnees may be insufficient unless tied to proof that the persecutor targets the applicant because of a protected characteristic rather than because of money or opportunity.
• Issue selection by the BIA shapes judicial review: By affirming on nexus and declining to decide PSG cognizability, the BIA narrowed what the Sixth Circuit could review, reinforcing Turcios-Flores v. Garland as a significant constraint on petition-for-review strategy.
• CAT briefing must be explicit at the BIA level: Post-Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but it remains enforceable when invoked; litigants must brief CAT distinctly to preserve it.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Withholding of removal

A mandatory protection that bars removal to a country where the person is more likely than not to face persecution on a protected ground (a higher burden than asylum’s “well-founded fear”).

Nexus (“on account of”)

The required link between feared harm and a protected ground. It is about the persecutor’s motive: were they targeting the person because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group?

Particular social group (PSG)

A protected category that must meet criteria such as immutability, particularity, and social distinction. Even if a PSG exists, withholding still fails if the harm is not because of membership in that group.

Mixed-motive analysis

The idea that persecution can have multiple reasons; for withholding in this circuit, a protected ground must be at least one reason, not necessarily the “central” reason. But there must be evidence the protected ground is truly among the reasons.

Substantial-evidence review

A highly deferential standard: the court upholds agency fact findings unless the record would compel any reasonable adjudicator to reach the opposite conclusion.

Harmless error / futility remand

Even if the agency used the wrong legal test, a court may affirm without remand when the outcome could not realistically change—i.e., remand would be futile.

Exhaustion

The requirement to present an issue to the BIA before raising it in the court of appeals. After Santos-Zacaria, this is not jurisdictional, but it is enforced when the opposing party properly raises it.

V. Conclusion

Pablo-Diaz reinforces that withholding of removal cases often turn on nexus: absent persuasive motive evidence tying feared harm to a protected ground, generalized violence and fear of financially motivated gang crime will not suffice. The decision also crystallizes a practical appellate rule: even when the BIA applies the wrong nexus standard, the Sixth Circuit may treat the error as harmless where the record supports a finding of no protected-ground motive at all, making remand futile. Finally, the opinion underscores that CAT claims must be clearly briefed to the BIA to be preserved for judicial review.