Date: Jul 25, 2026

Harding v. Seminole County Sheriff: No Title VII/FCRA Employer Liability Absent Supervisory Power or Notice; Probable Cause for Each Charged Offense Defeats § 1983/Fla. Malicious Prosecution

1. Introduction

In David Harding v. Seminole County Sheriff (11th Cir. July 24, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on two distinct clusters of claims brought by David Harding, a former detention deputy with the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office.

First, Harding sought to hold the Sheriff (Dennis Lemma) liable under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) for sexual harassment perpetrated by Lieutenant Charles Albrecht—conduct that occurred primarily off-duty via a video call and messages, with a limited subsequent workplace encounter.

Second, Harding challenged Sergeant Alan Layton’s role in initiating and supporting an arrest warrant for false personation of an official while in the commission of a felony, false imprisonment, and battery. Harding framed these as § 1983 Fourth Amendment and Florida malicious prosecution theories.

The core issues were (i) when an employer may be liable for harassment by a non-supervisor, including whether “apparent authority” can substitute for actual supervisory power and whether the employer had actual/constructive notice, and (ii) how probable cause—evaluated charge-by-charge—controls federal and state malicious prosecution claims arising from an arrest warrant.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Sexual harassment (Title VII/FCRA): The court held the Sheriff was not liable because Albrecht was not Harding’s supervisor under the governing definition and the Sheriff lacked actual or constructive notice of the harassment before Harding’s termination. With no supervisory status, vicarious liability theories tied to a “tangible employment action” could not proceed.
§ 1983 Fourth Amendment / malicious prosecution: The court treated the “unlawful seizure pursuant to legal process” claim as a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim and concluded it failed because Layton had probable cause for each charge included in the warrant affidavit; alleged misstatements about Harding’s authority were not shown to be intentionally or recklessly false.
Florida malicious prosecution: The state claim failed for the same reason: under Florida law, malicious prosecution requires absence of probable cause, and the probable-cause standard aligns with the federal standard applied here.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Standards at summary judgment

The panel reiterated the summary judgment posture and evidentiary lens from Ismael v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752 (11th Cir. 2025), emphasizing that courts view evidence in the nonmovant’s favor but a “mere scintilla” cannot create a triable issue. This framing mattered because Harding relied heavily on inferences about Albrecht’s authority and Layton’s knowledge, without producing record evidence of actual delegated power or knowing falsity.

FCRA parity with Title VII

Citing Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2020), the court treated the FCRA claim as coextensive with Title VII, eliminating any possibility that Florida’s statute would supply a different employer-liability rule for the harassment theory.

Non-supervisor harassment: employer knowledge and remedial action

The controlling framework for co-worker harassment liability came from Wilcox v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 892 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2018), which requires the plaintiff to establish a basis for employer liability—specifically that the employer “knew or should have known” of harassment by a non-supervisor and failed to take prompt remedial action. The court used Wilcox to focus the dispute on notice (actual complaint or constructive knowledge through pervasiveness).

Who is a “supervisor” for vicarious liability?

The court applied the Supreme Court’s bright-line rule from Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013): a supervisor is an employee empowered to take tangible employment actions (e.g., hiring, firing, promotion, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or significant benefits changes). Harding’s evidence—at most that Albrecht could “put in a word”—did not satisfy Vance’s delegated-power requirement.

Apparent authority and “unusual case” language

Harding argued that even if Albrecht lacked actual authority, he had apparent authority. The court invoked Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), where the Supreme Court noted that “a supervisor’s harassment involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression of its existence,” leaving only a narrow opening for an “unusual case” where a false impression of supervision might be reasonably created. Here, the Eleventh Circuit rejected apparent authority on this record, stressing Harding offered no authority showing seniority alone can make a belief in supervisory power reasonable.

Constructive notice and pervasiveness

For constructive knowledge, the court relied on Wilcox’s “so pervasive” standard and cited Tonkyro v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2021), to underscore that minimal workplace conduct (here, a single “uncomfortable look”) cannot establish pervasiveness.

“Quid pro quo” terminology and tangible employment action theory

On the “quid pro quo” characterization, the court used Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2004), which—citing Ellerth—discourages “quid pro quo” as an analytic category and instead focuses on whether harassment culminated in a “tangible employment action.” The court then cited Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501 (11th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that tangible employment actions are, by nature, actions a supervisor can take—thus foreclosing Harding’s theory because Albrecht was not a supervisor.

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution framework

The court framed Harding’s § 1983 seizure claim as Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution under Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102 (11th Cir. 2023), which in turn relies on Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022), for the modern description of seizure “pursuant to legal process.” Butler also supplied the court’s element-by-element structure, including the requirement that the “legal process” be constitutionally infirm.

Qualified immunity threshold

While not disputed on the facts, the court cited Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004), for the rule that an officer must be acting within a discretionary function to invoke qualified immunity, which Layton was. Practically, this positioned probable cause as the decisive issue: if probable cause supported the warrant, qualified immunity would follow.

Affidavit misstatements/omissions and probable cause

The court relied on Prospero v. Sullivan, 153 F.4th 1171 (11th Cir. 2025), for the two-step inquiry: (1) whether the affiant intentionally or recklessly made misstatements/omissions, and (2) whether probable cause would still exist absent them. The court found Harding failed at step (1) because he did not establish deliberate/reckless falsity about how Layton learned Harding’s sworn status.

No “any-crime rule” in Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution

Critical to the structure of the analysis, the court cited Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020), holding that the “any-crime rule” does not apply to Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution. Accordingly, Layton needed probable cause for each charged offense used to justify the warrant; the court assessed all three.

Florida malicious prosecution probable cause

For state law, the court cited Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2019), for the elements of Florida malicious prosecution, including absence of probable cause, and Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425 (11th Cir. 1998), for the alignment between Florida and federal probable-cause standards—allowing the federal probable cause holding to dispose of the Florida claim.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Title VII/FCRA: why the employer was not liable

Supervisor status is a gatekeeper. Applying Vance v. Ball State Univ., the court required evidence that Albrecht could take tangible employment actions against Harding. Harding’s account—that Albrecht offered to “put in a word” for a transfer—was treated as, at most, a promised recommendation, not delegated authority. Harding also admitted Albrecht was outside his chain of command and in a different division.
Apparent authority did not substitute for actual delegated power. Using Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the court emphasized that Title VII vicarious liability typically concerns misuse of actual authority. The panel found Harding’s belief in Albrecht’s power was not shown to be reasonable and noted the absence of Eleventh Circuit authority recognizing apparent authority alone as sufficient in this setting.
Without a supervisor, employer liability requires notice and failure to act. Under Wilcox v. Corr. Corp. of Am., Harding needed to show actual notice (complaints to management) or constructive notice (pervasive harassment). The record showed Harding did not report the harassment to the Sheriff’s Office before he was suspended/terminated, and the alleged workplace manifestations were not pervasive (one uncomfortable look). With no notice, the employer had no duty to remediate before the fact.
Tangible employment action theory failed because only supervisors can “take” such actions. Relying on Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC and Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., the court rejected Harding’s attempt to frame the incident as quid pro quo/tangible employment action harassment: co-workers cannot impose the employment actions that trigger vicarious liability.

(B) § 1983 Fourth Amendment and Florida malicious prosecution: why probable cause ended the case

The claim is evaluated as Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution. Under Butler v. Smith (quoting Thompson v. Clark), the court treated the arrest pursuant to a warrant as seizure via legal process, requiring Harding to show the process was constitutionally infirm (typically, no probable cause, or warrant obtained by material lies/omissions).
Charge-by-charge probable cause was required. Under Williams v. Aguirre, Layton needed probable cause as to each charged offense listed in the affidavit. The court therefore reviewed false personation (enhanced by “during the commission of a felony”), false imprisonment, and battery separately.
False personation while committing a felony: probable cause supported by multiple statements and Harding’s lack of appointment/oath. The affidavit recounted Frick’s statements that Harding flashed a badge, asserted authority to take him to jail, ordered him to assume a search position, and conducted an allegedly sexualized search. Bar witnesses corroborated that Harding said he was “a cop,” that Frick was detained/frisked, and that Harding later claimed he could have arrested Frick. The court also credited Layton’s stated discovery that Harding was a detention deputy, not a deputy sheriff with public-arrest authority. Harding’s “dual certification” did not establish he was a deputy sheriff; the court pointed to Florida statutes requiring appointment and an oath.
False imprisonment and battery: probable cause followed from lack of lawful authority plus restraint/touching allegations. The court emphasized Harding did not dispute essential conduct elements (restraint and intentional touching), focusing instead on claimed lawful authority. Having rejected the claim that Harding was acting as a properly appointed deputy sheriff, the court found probable cause for the lack-of-authority aspect.
No showing of intentional or reckless falsity. Under Prospero v. Sullivan, Harding needed evidence that Layton intentionally or recklessly misstated or omitted facts necessary to probable cause. The panel concluded Harding did not show Layton lied about how he learned Harding’s status, and did not prove Harding was, in fact, appointed/sworn as a deputy sheriff.
State claim fails with federal probable cause. Under Paez v. Mulvey and Rankin v. Evans, Florida malicious prosecution fails if probable cause exists, and the standard is the same. Thus the state claim fell with the federal claim.

3.3 Impact

Employer liability is narrowed to evidence of real power or real notice. The decision reinforces that Title VII/FCRA claims premised on vicarious liability require proof that the harasser could actually take tangible employment actions (Vance), and that “I can put in a word” is not enough. Where harassment is by a non-supervisor, plaintiffs must build a record of timely reporting or workplace pervasiveness sufficient to impute constructive notice (Wilcox).
“Apparent authority” arguments face a steep evidentiary burden in harassment cases. By leaning on Ellerth’s skepticism of apparent authority and rejecting seniority-based assumptions, the opinion signals that plaintiffs should expect to prove concrete delegation (policies, job descriptions, actual decision-making power) rather than rely on rank or informal influence.
Warrant-based arrests: plaintiffs must negate probable cause for each charged offense. The application of Williams v. Aguirre underscores that Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution is not rescued by probable cause for some other crime: litigants should anticipate a count-by-count probable cause analysis and attack (or defend) each charge supporting the legal process.
Florida law enforcement status: certification is not appointment. The court’s use of Florida’s appointment-and-oath requirements highlights a recurring practical distinction for agencies: “dual certification” does not necessarily confer “deputy sheriff” authority absent appointment and oath—facts that can become dispositive in probable cause disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Hostile work environment: A Title VII theory where harassment is so severe or pervasive that it changes the conditions of employment. When the harasser is a co-worker, the employer is liable only if it knew/should have known and failed to act.
Supervisor (Title VII): Not merely someone higher-ranking. Under Vance, it is someone the employer empowered to take tangible employment actions (hire/fire/promote/demote/reassign with significant change).
Tangible employment action: A significant job consequence (e.g., termination, demotion, undesirable reassignment). The Eleventh Circuit treated this as a supervisor-only pathway for harassment liability (Hulsey; Johnson).
Actual notice vs. constructive notice: Actual notice usually means management was told. Constructive notice can exist if harassment is so widespread at work that the employer should have known.
Probable cause: A practical, common-sense standard: whether reasonably trustworthy information supports a fair probability the person committed the offense. If probable cause supports the warrant, malicious prosecution claims typically fail.
Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution: A § 1983 claim challenging a seizure (arrest/detention) that occurred through legal process (like an arrest warrant) where the process was constitutionally defective, commonly because the warrant lacked probable cause or was procured by material lies/omissions.
Qualified immunity: A doctrine shielding officials from damages unless they violated clearly established law. In warrant cases, probable cause (or at least arguable probable cause) often resolves the immunity question.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms two disciplined, evidence-driven thresholds. On harassment, it reiterates that employer liability hinges on actual supervisory power or employer notice—not a harasser’s rank, perceived influence, or an employee’s unreported, largely off-duty incident. On warrant-based arrests, it reinforces that malicious prosecution claims rise or fall on whether the affidavit was materially dishonest or lacked probable cause as to each charged offense, with state-law malicious prosecution tracking the same probable-cause reality.