Reliability Proof Required for Expert Design-Defect Opinions Under § 490.065; Exclusion Can Compel Summary Judgment

1. Introduction

In Hanshaw v. Crown Equipment Corp. (Mo. banc Feb. 24, 2026), the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed summary judgment for Crown Equipment Corporation after the circuit court excluded the plaintiff’s only design-defect expert under section 490.065. The case arose from a 2016 workplace accident in which Christopher Hanshaw was injured while operating a Crown stand-up forklift with an “open operator compartment” design.

Hanshaw sued Crown Equipment asserting product liability theories centered on defective design (and related warnings), and he sought punitive damages. His theory depended on expert testimony that the forklift was unreasonably dangerous and that adding a door or bumper would be a safer alternative design.

The core issues on appeal were (i) whether the expert’s opinions satisfied the reliability requirements of § 490.065.2(1)(c)-(d), and (ii) whether, without admissible expert evidence, any genuine issue of material fact remained to defeat summary judgment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court held the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hanshaw’s expert because Hanshaw failed to demonstrate the expert’s opinions were the product of reliable principles and methods reliably applied to the facts, as required by § 490.065.2(1)(c)-(d).
  • With the expert excluded, the Court held summary judgment was proper because Hanshaw lacked admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on his product liability claims.
  • The Court also affirmed summary judgment on punitive damages because punitive damages are unavailable absent a plaintiff’s success on an underlying claim for actual damages.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Procedural posture and what is appealable

  • Lozano v. BNSF Ry. Co., 421 S.W.3d 448, 453 n.4 (Mo. banc 2014): The Court reiterated that a motion in limine “by itself, preserves nothing for appeal.” This framed the appeal as review of the summary judgment rather than a free-standing review of the in limine ruling—while recognizing the expert admissibility analysis may be embedded in (and relevant to) the summary judgment decision.

Standard of review—expert admissibility

  • Linton ex rel. Linton v. Carter, 634 S.W.3d 623, 626-27 (Mo. banc 2021): The Court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard and quoted the classic formulation—abuse occurs only when the ruling is “clearly against the logic of the circumstances” and “shocks the sense of justice.” This high deference mattered because Hanshaw’s showing of reliability was thin and incomplete.

Summary judgment record discipline

  • Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 117-18 (Mo. banc 2020): The Court emphasized that summary judgment review is confined to the Rule 74.04(c) record, not “the whole trial court record,” and courts need not “sift through the entire record” to find disputes. This reinforces a key practical lesson of Hanshaw: even if helpful material exists somewhere in discovery, it must be properly placed before the court in a usable form for the relevant motion.

Missouri’s § 490.065 and the federal Daubert framework

  • Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993): The Court adopted Daubert’s core reliability concepts and factors (testability, peer review/publication, error rate/standards, general acceptance), stressing the court’s gatekeeping focus on “principles and methodology,” not just conclusions.
  • State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 361 n.4 (Mo. banc 2020): Used to explain interpretive alignment: because § 490.065 is identical to Rule 702, federal decisions are persuasive (not binding).
  • Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997): Central to the Court’s reasoning. Joiner supplies the “ipse dixit” and “analytical gap” concepts: courts need not admit opinions connected to data only by the expert’s say-so, and may exclude opinions where the inferential bridge from data to conclusion is too large.

“Personal observations” are not a shortcut around reliability

  • State ex rel. Gardner v. Wright, 562 S.W.3d 311 (Mo. App. 2018): Hanshaw relied on Gardner for the proposition that expert testimony based on personal observation is not per se unreliable. The Court distinguished Gardner as addressing generalized testimony by a social worker/forensic interviewer about disclosure processes—not a technical design-defect opinion requiring demonstrated engineering methodology.
  • State v. Gibbons, 629 S.W.3d 60, 85 (Mo. App. 2021): Cited as an example applying § 490.065.2(1) to generalized forensic-interviewer testimony, underscoring that the statute’s requirements remain operative across expert contexts.

Summary judgment standards

  • Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Mo. banc 2009): De novo review; view the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
  • Larabee v. Eichler, 271 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Mo. banc 2008): The “no genuine issue of material fact” and “entitled to judgment as a matter of law” formulation.

Admissible evidence requirement at summary judgment

  • L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 253 n.3 (Mo. banc 2002): “Only evidentiary materials that are admissible or usable at trial can sustain or avoid summary judgment.” This principle allowed the Court to treat exclusion of the expert as dispositive of the merits at the summary-judgment stage.
  • Rule 74.04(e): Affidavits must set forth facts admissible in evidence, reinforcing the admissibility filter at the summary judgment stage.

Timing and inability to “fix” the expert after exclusion

  • Rhoden v. Mo. Delta Med. Ctr., 621 S.W.3d 469, 484 (Mo. banc 2021): Cited for the practical point that when discovery has closed, it may be too late to endorse a new expert or cure defects—even though exclusion rulings are typically interlocutory. This supports the case-management consequence: reliability deficiencies can become case-ending once deadlines pass.

Punitive damages depend on success on the underlying claim

  • Ellison v. Fry, 437 S.W.3d 762, 777 (Mo. banc 2014): The Court applied the rule that punitive damages are available only if the plaintiff prevails on the underlying claim and is entitled to actual damages. Because Hanshaw’s liability claims failed on summary judgment, punitive damages necessarily failed as well.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Missouri’s gatekeeping framework is codified—and demands proof, not assurances. The Court treated § 490.065.2(1)(c)-(d) as independent, mandatory requirements: it is not enough that an expert is credentialed or reviewed “sufficient facts or data.” The proponent must show (c) reliable principles and methods and (d) reliable application to the case.
  2. “Personal observations” and experience do not substitute for an explained, reviewable methodology. Hanshaw argued reliability because the expert observed the forklift and accident scene, reviewed video, built models, and performed “safety engineering analyses.” The Court found this framing blurred the statutory lines: without a disclosed methodology, the court cannot assess reliability.
  3. The “analytical gap” problem controlled. Relying on Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, the Court emphasized that even where an expert has data (e.g., accident reports, OSHA data), the opinion is inadmissible if the link between data and conclusion is only the expert’s ipse dixit. Here, the proponent failed to demonstrate:
    • what data the expert actually used and how;
    • what test protocols, calculations, standards, or engineering principles were applied;
    • how the proposed alternative designs (door/bumper) were validated as safer, feasible, or risk-reducing.
  4. Absent the methodology and supporting materials, the circuit court could not do Daubert’s job. The opinion repeatedly returns to a practical gatekeeping constraint: if the proponent does not provide the methodology and supporting documentation, the circuit court cannot evaluate testability, peer review, standards, or general acceptance. The Court found it dispositive that the peer-reviewed papers were not produced and their relevance was not shown, and that alleged testing was described only at a high level without methodology or results.
  5. Once the expert is excluded, summary judgment follows if the expert was the only proof of defect/causation. By invoking L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co. and Rule 74.04(e), the Court treated admissibility as a necessary condition to create a triable factual dispute at summary judgment. Because Hanshaw relied on the excluded opinions to establish defect/unreasonable danger (and related theories), summary judgment was “proper.”
  6. Punitive damages fall with the underlying claim. Applying Ellison v. Fry, the Court held punitive damages cannot proceed independently when the underlying liability claim has been resolved against the plaintiff.

3.3 Impact

  • Elevated practical burden on plaintiffs in design-defect cases. Hanshaw underscores that design-defect experts must do more than identify an intuitive “safer” concept. The proponent must present a reviewable basis: testing, calculations, standards, validation of alternative designs, and an explained inferential path from data to conclusions.
  • Expert exclusion becomes a summary-judgment lever—especially after discovery closes. By emphasizing timing (with reference to Rhoden v. Mo. Delta Med. Ctr.), the opinion highlights a litigation reality: reliability defects may be incurable once scheduling deadlines pass, making early, document-backed methodology disclosure strategically essential.
  • Reinforcement of “record hygiene” under Rule 74.04. Citing Green v. Fotoohighiam, the Court signals that parties must properly place supporting material into the summary-judgment record; courts will not search the broader file to rescue under-supported expert opinions.
  • Clarification that Missouri’s § 490.065 is a true Daubert-style gatekeeping statute. The opinion aligns Missouri practice closely with federal Rule 702 jurisprudence (Daubert/Joiner), encouraging more rigorous motion practice focused on methodology rather than credentials or conclusions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 490.065.2(1)(c)-(d): “reliable principles and methods” and “reliable application”
It is not enough for an expert to be experienced or to have looked at information. The expert must use a dependable method (e.g., tested engineering analysis, validated modeling, accepted standards) and must show how that method was applied to the specific facts of the accident and product design.
Daubert factors
A set of flexible checks for scientific/technical reliability: can the method be tested, was it peer reviewed, does it have known error rates/standards, and is it generally accepted. The factors are not a checklist, but they provide a way to evaluate whether an opinion is grounded in more than intuition.
Ipse dixit
Latin for “he himself said it.” In this context, it means an expert’s conclusion cannot be accepted merely because the expert asserts it. The opinion must be supported by an explained methodology.
“Analytical gap”
When an expert has some data (like accident reports) but does not explain the reasoning steps that connect that data to the conclusion (like “a door would have prevented this injury”), the gap is too large and the testimony can be excluded.
Summary judgment and admissible evidence
At summary judgment, the court considers whether a case has enough admissible proof to justify a trial. If the plaintiff’s only evidence on a necessary element is inadmissible (such as an excluded expert opinion), the defendant can win without a trial.

5. Conclusion

Hanshaw v. Crown Equipment Corp. reinforces a stringent, method-focused application of § 490.065: expert opinions in technical product cases must be supported by disclosed, evaluable principles and methods and a clear explanation of their application—credentials, observations, and references to data are not enough. By coupling that gatekeeping holding with Missouri’s summary judgment doctrine that only admissible evidence can create a triable issue, the Court confirms that exclusion of the plaintiff’s sole expert commonly resolves the case as a matter of law. Finally, the decision reiterates that punitive damages cannot survive the failure of the underlying liability claim.