Guilty Plea and Appeal-Waiver Bar to “Nonexistent § 924(c) Offense” Claims Based on Predicate-Interpretation Theories

Introduction

In United States v. Jerron D. Williams (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026), the Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal challenging a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use/discharge of a firearm during a “crime of violence”) where the predicate offense was 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) & (b) (assaulting a federal employee with a deadly or dangerous weapon / inflicting bodily injury). The defendant argued for the first time on appeal that § 111(b) is not a “crime of violence,” and therefore he pleaded guilty to a “nonexistent offense.”

The case arose from a violent assault on a uniformed USPS letter carrier in Gary, Indiana. After backing into the carrier’s delivery vehicle, Williams retrieved a gun and fired four shots at the retreating vehicle, shattering a window and causing cuts and vision damage. Williams pleaded guilty to the § 111 assault count and the § 924(c) count under a plea agreement that included an appeal waiver; he later unsuccessfully moved to withdraw the plea on ineffective-assistance grounds. On appeal, he pivoted to a statutory “crime of violence” argument.

The key issues were (1) whether Rule 11 and due process were violated because the plea allegedly rested on a mistaken legal premise about § 111(b) as a § 924(c) predicate, and (2) whether Williams could raise that predicate-status argument despite multiple layers of waiver.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. It held that it need not decide whether § 111(b) qualifies as a “crime of violence” for § 924(c) because Williams repeatedly waived that argument:

  1. by entering an unconditional guilty plea;
  2. by signing an appeal waiver in the plea agreement; and
  3. by strategically failing to raise the predicate-status argument in his motion to withdraw the plea.

In addition, even if waiver did not control, the court concluded there was no Rule 11/due process problem: the magistrate judge accurately explained the elements of § 924(c), ensured a factual basis, and was not required to anticipate or supply novel statutory theories.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020)
    Used for the standard of review: because Williams raised his Rule 11 theory for the first time on appeal, review is limited to plain error. This framing mattered because “plainness” is difficult to show when the underlying legal question is unsettled.
  • Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005)
    Supplied the constitutional baseline: guilty pleas must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The court invoked Bradshaw to emphasize that a plea fails where the defendant is not informed of the crime’s elements (by court or counsel).
  • Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1998)
    Supported two propositions: (1) a plea is invalid if the defendant/counsel/court did not understand the essential elements, but also (2) a plea does not become invalid merely because the defendant later “did not correctly assess every relevant factor” bearing on the decision to plead guilty. The Seventh Circuit used Bousley to separate “elemental misunderstanding” from “legal miscalculation.”
  • United States v. Goliday, 41 F.4th 778, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2022)
    Provided the “totality of the circumstances” approach to assessing Rule 11 compliance. The court relied on the plea colloquy, written plea agreement, indictment, and factual basis as a complete record showing understanding.
  • United States v. Fard, 775 F.3d 939, 944-45 (7th Cir. 2015)
    Served as a contrast case: a plea can be invalid if the defendant never understood an element and never admitted the requisite intent. The court cited Fard to show the absence of comparable confusion here.
  • United States v. Jackson, 310 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2002)
    Williams’s statutory argument leaned on Jackson to claim § 111(b) lacks a mens rea requirement compatible with “crime of violence” doctrine. The panel characterized the argument as “tenuous,” noting Jackson’s own description that § 111(b) does not require mens rea beyond the “intent to assault” required by § 111(a).
  • Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 434 (2021) (plurality opinion)
    Used to articulate the “crime of violence” mens rea requirement: only offenses requiring “purposeful or knowing conduct” qualify (in the relevant sense). Williams invoked Borden to argue § 111(b) does not qualify; the Seventh Circuit declined to decide the point due to waiver and lack of binding circuit precedent foreclosing predicate status.
  • United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975)
    Cited to reinforce that § 111 requires “an intent to assault,” which undermines a simplistic claim that § 111(b) is entirely mens rea-free. Feola functioned as doctrinal context for why the statutory-interpretation question was not straightforward.
  • United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 571 (1989)
    Central to the court’s Rule 11/due process analysis: neither Rule 11 nor due process obligates the judge to “conjure new legal theories” for the defendant, and a “strategic miscalculation about the law” is not grounds to set aside an otherwise valid plea.
  • United States v. McDaniel, 85 F.4th 176, 187-88 (4th Cir. 2023) and United States v. Medearis, 65 F.4th 981, 986-87 (8th Cir. 2023)
    Cited as persuasive authority indicating that, after Borden, other circuits have found § 111(b) to be a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit used these to underscore the absence of binding precedent invalidating § 111(b) as a predicate—and therefore the implausibility of “plain” error.
  • United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc)
    Provided the decisive “plain error” principle: “An error that is subject to reasonable dispute is not plain.” Because § 111(b)’s status was at least reasonably disputable, plain error could not be established even on the assumption there was error.
  • Grzegorczyk v. United States, 997 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2021)
    Anchored the court’s first waiver holding: “an unconditional plea of guilty” waives the right to contest “the proper interpretation of the statute of conviction.” The panel treated Williams’s “crime of violence” challenge as a statutory-interpretation attack that is forfeited by the guilty plea.
  • United States v. Wheeler, 857 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2017)
    Supported the characterization of Williams’s claim as statutory interpretation about the definition of “crime of violence,” rather than a defect in plea notice about elements. This classification mattered because statutory-interpretation attacks are the kind typically waived by an unconditional plea under circuit doctrine.
  • Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 183 (2018)
    Used to explain the general effect of guilty pleas: a valid plea relinquishes claims that contradict admissions necessarily made by the plea. Williams’s claim contradicted the admission that he committed the charged crimes, including the § 924(c) offense predicated on the § 111 assault.
  • Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970)
    Reinforced finality: a voluntary plea “intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law” does not become vulnerable because later decisions suggest the plea rested on a faulty premise. The court used Brady to rebut the idea that uncertainty about predicate doctrine retroactively undermines an otherwise valid plea.
  • United States v. Edwards, 145 F.4th 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2025)
    Provided the governing framework for appeal waivers: they “rise and fall” with the plea agreement, and challenges that render the plea unknowing or involuntary can escape the waiver. Because the court found the plea valid, Edwards supported enforcing the waiver.
  • United States v. Vela, 740 F.3d 1150, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 2014) and Oliver v. United States, 951 F.3d 841, 845-46 (7th Cir. 2020)
    Cited to confirm that defendants are held to appeal waivers where the plea is valid; the court used these to reject Williams’s attempt to repackage his statutory argument as a plea-validity defect that would evade the waiver.
  • United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 974-75 (7th Cir. 2018)
    Supported the third, “traditional” waiver ruling: when a defendant chooses to present one argument and not another as a matter of strategy, the unraised argument is waived. The court emphasized that Williams and counsel discussed the predicate theory but did not pursue it in the motion to withdraw the plea.

Legal Reasoning

  1. No Rule 11 / due process defect on this record.
    The court treated Williams’s claim as an attempted Rule 11(b)(1)(G) and 11(b)(3) attack (understanding “the nature of each charge” and a factual basis). Under the Goliday “totality” approach, the magistrate judge (a) recited the essential elements of § 924(c), (b) confirmed Williams reviewed the indictment and plea agreement with counsel, and (c) elicited an adequate factual basis via the government’s proffer and Williams’s confirmation. The panel emphasized that the courtroom understanding was consistent: the § 111 assault was the “crime of violence” predicate for § 924(c).
  2. Judges accepting pleas need not anticipate novel predicate-status theories.
    Williams argued the magistrate judge should have recognized—based on United States v. Jackson and Borden v. United States—that § 111(b) could not serve as a predicate. The panel rejected that premise using United States v. Broce: Rule 11 and due process require correct elemental explanation and a factual basis, not judicial forecasting of evolving statutory doctrine or unsolicited defense lawyering. This is also where the court’s observation about the lack of binding circuit precedent mattered; it underscores why any supposed error could not be “plain.”
  3. Plain-error review independently foreclosed relief.
    Even if there were an arguable legal issue about § 111(b)’s mens rea and Borden’s “purposeful or knowing” requirement, the court pointed to United States v. Page (en banc): a reasonably disputable issue cannot be “plain error.” The citations to United States v. McDaniel and United States v. Medearis further illustrated reasonable dispute across circuits.
  4. Three separate waivers required dismissal.
    • Waiver by guilty plea: Under Grzegorczyk v. United States, an unconditional guilty plea waives statutory interpretation attacks on the statute of conviction. The court classified Williams’s “crime of violence” contention, with the help of United States v. Wheeler, as precisely that sort of interpretive challenge. It also invoked Class v. United States to emphasize that the claim contradicted admissions inherent in the plea.
    • Waiver by appeal waiver in the plea agreement: Under United States v. Edwards, a valid plea makes the appeal waiver enforceable. Because the court found no plea invalidity, it enforced the waiver, citing United States v. Vela and Oliver v. United States.
    • Strategic waiver by omission in plea-withdrawal litigation: Under United States v. Scott, when a defendant elects to litigate one theory (ineffective assistance) and not another (predicate-status challenge) despite awareness of the issue, the unraised theory is waived.

Impact

The decision’s practical significance lies less in resolving whether § 111(b) is a “crime of violence” for § 924(c) and more in reinforcing finality doctrines in plea cases. Key likely effects include:

  • Stronger barriers to “nonexistent offense” framing where the underlying claim is really a predicate-definition or statutory interpretation argument that could have been litigated before pleading guilty.
  • Increased importance of preserving predicate-status arguments at the district court level—especially in motions to withdraw pleas—because strategic silence can be treated as waiver under United States v. Scott.
  • Rule 11 challenges narrowed to genuine failures to explain elements or secure a factual basis; courts in this circuit are not required to advise defendants about unsettled or creative legal theories concerning what qualifies as a “crime of violence.”
  • Appeal waivers remain highly enforceable even when defendants later identify plausible legal arguments they did not appreciate at the time—so long as the plea was otherwise knowing and voluntary.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Crime of violence” (in § 924(c)): A legal category that determines whether certain felonies can serve as predicates for enhanced firearm penalties. Litigation often focuses on whether the predicate offense requires sufficiently intentional and violent conduct.
  • Mens rea: The required mental state (e.g., purposeful, knowing, reckless). After Borden v. United States, courts scrutinize whether statutes allowing conviction based on recklessness can qualify as “violent” predicates in certain contexts.
  • Rule 11(b)(1)(G) and 11(b)(3): Before accepting a guilty plea, the court must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charge and that there is a factual basis for the plea.
  • Plain error: A demanding appellate standard when an issue was not raised in the district court; relief generally requires an error that is clear/obvious under existing law and that affected substantial rights. Under United States v. Page, issues open to reasonable dispute are not “plain.”
  • Waiver vs. forfeiture: Forfeiture is a failure to timely assert a right (often reviewed for plain error). Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, which typically bars review altogether. This opinion emphasizes multiple forms of waiver: by guilty plea, by contractual appeal waiver, and by strategic litigation choices.
  • Appeal waiver: A term in a plea agreement where the defendant promises not to appeal certain issues. It is usually enforced unless the plea itself was unknowing/involuntary or another agreed exception applies.

Conclusion

United States v. Jerron D. Williams establishes a clear Seventh Circuit roadmap for rejecting late-stage attacks on § 924(c) convictions that are styled as Rule 11/due-process defects but function as statutory “predicate offense” disputes. The court held that a defendant who (1) pleads guilty, (2) signs an appeal waiver, and (3) strategically omits the predicate-status argument in plea-withdrawal proceedings cannot resurrect that argument on appeal. Separately, the court reaffirmed that Rule 11 does not require judges to anticipate unsettled legal theories about predicate status; it requires correct elemental explanations and a factual basis—both satisfied here.