Guidelines-Range “Independence” Must Be Clear: Ambiguous Sentencing Remarks Do Not Defeat Molina-Martinez Plain-Error Relief

Case: United States v. Donnell Leman Moore, Jr. (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication)
Posture: Appeal from the Middle District of Florida after a guilty plea and a 240-month concurrent sentence on six drug-distribution counts.

1. Introduction

Donnell Leman Moore, Jr. pleaded guilty to six federal drug-distribution offenses involving cocaine and methamphetamine, including a conspiracy count under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846. The investigation centered on a rented commercial garage in Lakeland, Florida, where law enforcement alleged Moore stored and distributed narcotics. At sentencing, Moore litigated drug quantity, contested two guideline enhancements (firearm and premises), and argued policy concerns about methamphetamine “purity as proxy for culpability.”

The appeal presented three core issues:

  • Premises enhancement: whether Moore “maintained a premises” for drug distribution under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), and whether the district court sufficiently resolved disputed facts under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
  • Firearm enhancement: whether a loaded firearm found in the garage warranted U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
  • Guidelines miscalculation / plain error: whether an undisputedly erroneous criminal history point (inflating Moore from criminal history category IV to V) affected substantial rights under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), especially given the court’s comments that it would have imposed the same 20-year sentence even without the Guidelines.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the application of both enhancements but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the criminal history error created a reasonable probability of a different outcome under Molina-Martinez v. United States.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s holdings can be distilled as follows:

  • Premises enhancement affirmed: The record supported that Moore’s garage was a primary (not incidental) site for storing and distributing drugs, satisfying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). Any failure to make express factual findings under Rule 32(i)(3)(B) was harmless because the enhancement was amply supported.
  • Firearm enhancement affirmed: A loaded firearm was found at the site of drug activity alongside trafficking paraphernalia; the government established presence, and Moore failed to show it was “clearly improbable” the gun was connected to the offense under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
  • Sentence vacated for plain guidelines error: The parties agreed a criminal history point was wrongly assessed, inflating the Guidelines range. Under plain-error review, Moore showed a reasonable probability of a different sentence because the record did not clearly demonstrate the district court’s sentence was truly independent of the erroneous range. The court’s immediate (mistaken) comparison of the sentence to the incorrectly calculated range and the court’s repeated recalculation inquiries “muddy” whether the sentence was imposed “irrespective” of the Guidelines.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Standards of review: guideline interpretation, factual findings, and “clear error”

  • United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2017): Cited for the framework that guideline interpretations are reviewed de novo, and factual findings for clear error. This undergirds the opinion’s approach: it treats the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(1) and § 2D1.1(b)(12) as legal questions, while deferring to the district court’s factual determinations absent a “definite and firm conviction” of mistake.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 34 F.4th 961 (11th Cir. 2022): Supplies the articulation of clear-error deference. The opinion uses this to justify affirming the enhancement-related findings given the substantial record evidence.

B. Premises enhancement doctrine: “primary use” and totality of the circumstances

  • United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2017): Central precedent defining the premises enhancement. George contributes two key principles the panel applies directly: (1) “Maintaining a premises” includes drug storage for distribution; and (2) drug distribution need not be the sole use, but must be a “primary or principal” use, not merely “incidental.”
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231 (11th Cir. 2023): Adds methodological direction—courts should compare the frequency of lawful use versus drug-distribution use and evaluate the “totality of the circumstances.” The panel invokes this to validate reliance on (i) Moore’s admitted distributions at the garage, (ii) surveillance consistent with trafficking, and (iii) discovery of trafficking tools in the space.

C. Firearm enhancement doctrine: presence, burden shifting, and “clearly improbable”

  • United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62 (11th Cir. 1995): Provides the two-step burden framework: the government must show by a preponderance that the firearm was present at the site of the charged conduct; then the defendant must show a connection is “clearly improbable.” The panel uses Hall both for the government’s initial burden (presence at the garage where distribution occurred) and for rejecting Moore’s attempt to sever the nexus.
  • United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2017): Reinforces that the enhancement applies if the firearm had “some purpose or effect” related to trafficking and was not there by accident or coincidence, and reiterates the “clearly improbable” exception.
  • United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited for the commonplace nature of plastic bags as drug-packaging materials, supporting the inference that the garage items were trafficking paraphernalia.

D. Plain error and guideline miscalculations: substantial rights and remedial discretion

  • United States v. Grady, 18 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2021): Establishes that unpreserved sentencing issues are reviewed for plain error.
  • United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc): Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s contemporary plain-error structure: error, plainness, substantial rights, and discretionary correction when fairness/integrity/public reputation is seriously affected. The panel relies on Steiger to frame the post-error inquiry once the parties concede error and plainness.
  • United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005): Cited for the fourth-prong discretion component—when an error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  • Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016): The controlling Supreme Court authority for whether a Guidelines-range error affects substantial rights. The panel applies three Molina-Martinez propositions: (1) reasonable probability of a different outcome is the test; (2) in most cases, an incorrect range suffices to show substantial-rights prejudice if the record is silent; and (3) the exception is where the record makes clear the district court would have imposed the same sentence irrespective of the Guidelines.
  • United States v. Thomas, 108 F.4th 1351 (11th Cir. 2024): Adds that courts must consult the record and consider circumstances “holistically” when assessing whether the wrong range affected substantial rights. The panel uses this to treat the sentencing transcript as a whole (including the court’s range recalculation questions and its misapprehension about where the sentence fell).
  • United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019): Supports the idea that even a variance does not necessarily neutralize a range error if the sentencing decision remained “tethered” to what the court believed was the correct Guidelines range. The panel analogizes Moore’s case to Corbett to show tethering can persist even where the court expresses independent sentencing instincts.

E. The opinion’s treatment of “same sentence anyway” doctrines (and why it did not apply them)

  • United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006): Mentioned but not applied. The panel declines to analyze the district court’s comments under Keene because (i) Moore did not object, depriving the district court of the chance to rule in that posture, and (ii) the government did not invoke the Keene doctrine on appeal.
  • United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1 (11th Cir. 2022): Cited in explaining why lack of an objection matters to whether the appellate court should treat the case as one suitable for a Keene-style analysis.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Premises enhancement: “drug distribution as a primary use” was supported on this record

The panel treated the premises enhancement as a fact-intensive question governed by George and the more recent guidance in United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231. It pointed to a layered record:

  • Plea admissions: Moore admitted distributing methamphetamine and cocaine at the garage.
  • Surveillance patterns: The agent observed repeated “come-and-go” vehicle traffic consistent with drug dealing, and he personally saw what appeared to be transactions more than five times.
  • Search-warrant yield: Trafficking-related tools (packaging materials, vacuum-seal bags, scales) were found in the garage; their location and character supported drug storage/distribution rather than an incidental or accidental presence.
  • Limited lawful use evidence: The agent observed Moore washing cars only “on a few occasions,” supporting the inference that lawful business did not dominate the premises’ use.

Moore’s procedural attack—asserting the district court failed to make findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B)—was effectively neutralized by the panel’s harmlessness determination: even if findings were not explicit, the “totality of the circumstances” made the enhancement supportable. The opinion thus signals that Rule 32 shortcomings will not compel reversal where the appellate record makes the enhancement outcome inevitable.

B. Firearm enhancement: presence plus trafficking context defeated the “clearly improbable” exception

Applying the burden framework of Hall and the nexus articulation in George, the panel emphasized that the government’s burden is comparatively modest: it need only show the gun was present at the site of the charged conduct. Once that is shown, the defendant must shoulder the more demanding task of demonstrating that a connection between the firearm and the drug offense is “clearly improbable.”

Here, the panel relied on:

  • Loaded firearm inside the garage (the distribution premises);
  • Trafficking paraphernalia co-located (packaging materials, vacuum-seal bags, scales), with Mercer supplying context for typical packaging materials; and
  • Moore’s exclusive presence when the warrant was executed.

In that evidentiary setting, Moore’s effort to argue a missing “nexus” failed because, under this guideline, the nexus is generally inferred from presence plus context unless the defendant can make the “clearly improbable” showing. The panel also reinforced that alternative uses of the garage (car washing, dog breeding) did not, by themselves, break the inference when trafficking indicators were substantial.

C. Plain error, Molina-Martinez, and what counts as a clear “same sentence regardless” record

The opinion’s most consequential reasoning lies in its application of Molina-Martinez to a record containing both: (i) an acknowledged Guidelines-range error, and (ii) the district court’s statement that it would impose the same sentence even without the Guidelines.

The panel treated the “same sentence anyway” language as insufficiently definitive because it was undermined—almost immediately—by the court’s mistaken belief that the 240-month sentence fell within the (erroneous) Guideline range. That matters under Molina-Martinez because the exception requires a record that makes it clear the sentence was selected “irrespective of the Guidelines range.” A sentencing judge’s asserted independence is less persuasive where the transcript indicates the judge was still anchoring to (or checking against) the range and misunderstood where the sentence sat within it.

The panel’s “holistic” approach (explicitly relying on United States v. Thomas, 108 F.4th 1351) identified multiple “anchoring” indicators:

  • Repeated requests for recalculations of hypothetical Guidelines ranges depending on how objections were resolved (suggesting the range materially informed the court’s thinking).
  • Immediate comparison of the chosen sentence to the calculated range—followed by a mistaken conclusion about that comparison.
  • “Muddiness” rather than clarity about whether the court would have adhered to 240 months if it understood the correct criminal history category and correct range.

Notably, the panel also considered a contextual factor beyond the arithmetic: the later-imposed sentences of Moore’s upstream co-defendants (87 months and 65 months). The court did not hold that disparity alone compelled reversal; instead, it used those numbers to reinforce that the record was not crystal-clear on whether the district court’s selection would have remained unchanged under a correct range—especially because the district court had referenced avoiding unwarranted disparities.

3.3. Impact

A. Practical rule for future plain-error Guideline appeals

The decision sharpens (even in an unpublished posture) a practical lesson for Eleventh Circuit sentencing litigation: when the Guidelines range is wrong, appellate courts will be reluctant to deny Molina-Martinez relief unless the sentencing record unambiguously shows the district court’s sentence was truly independent of the range. A judge’s statement of independence may be discounted if the transcript shows continued anchoring behavior—such as range-checking, range comparisons, or misunderstandings about whether the sentence is within or outside the range.

B. Sentencing judges: precision matters when announcing “same sentence” rationales

The panel’s reasoning implicitly encourages district courts—when they intend to impose the same sentence regardless of Guidelines disputes—to:

  • state that intention clearly,
  • demonstrate accurate understanding of the correct and alternative ranges, and
  • explain why the selected term follows from § 3553(a) considerations independent of the calculated range.

Without that clarity, appellate courts applying Molina-Martinez may view the record as “muddy” and therefore find substantial-rights prejudice.

C. Enhancement litigation: evidentiary sufficiency signals

On the enhancements, the opinion confirms two recurring evidentiary patterns that will often carry the government’s burden:

  • Premises: admissions of distribution at the location + surveillance consistent with trafficking + trafficking tools found there tends to support “primary use,” even if lawful activity also occurs.
  • Firearm: a loaded gun co-located with trafficking paraphernalia at the distribution site makes it difficult for a defendant to establish “clearly improbable” connection.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Converted drug weight”: The Guidelines convert different drugs into a standardized weight to compute a single base offense level. Disputes often arise about how much weight is attributable to a defendant (e.g., full conspiracy quantity versus a smaller share).
  • Premises enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12)): A two-level increase applies if the defendant “maintained” a place (house, apartment, garage, etc.) as a primary location for manufacturing, storing, or distributing drugs. The place can have lawful uses too—drug activity just can’t be merely incidental.
  • Firearm enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)): A two-level increase applies if a gun was possessed during drug trafficking. If the gun is present at the drug site, the burden shifts to the defendant to show it is “clearly improbable” the gun was connected to the drug offense—an intentionally high bar.
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B): At sentencing, the judge must rule on disputed PSR matters (or determine a ruling is unnecessary) to ensure the sentence is based on accurate facts. Appellate courts may treat failures as harmless if the record conclusively supports the outcome.
  • Plain error (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)): When a defendant fails to object at sentencing, an appellate court corrects only (1) error that is (2) plain and (3) affects substantial rights, and then only if (4) correction is necessary to protect the fairness/integrity/public reputation of the proceedings.
  • “Substantial rights” and Molina-Martinez: For a wrong Guidelines range, the defendant typically shows substantial-rights harm by demonstrating a reasonable probability of a lower sentence under the correct range. If the record clearly shows the judge would impose the same sentence regardless, that can defeat the claim—but ambiguity usually favors the defendant.
  • “Purity as proxy for culpability”: A policy argument that drug purity no longer reliably indicates a defendant’s role in the drug hierarchy (because high-purity meth may be common at lower levels), and thus guideline severity can over-punish lesser participants. The panel did not decide this issue because resentencing was required on other grounds.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Donnell Leman Moore, Jr. delivers a focused but important sentencing lesson: when a Guidelines error inflates the advisory range, a district court’s assertion that it would impose the same sentence “regardless” will not defeat plain-error relief unless the record makes that independence unmistakably clear. Here, the district court’s reliance-like behavior—requests for range recalculations and an immediate, mistaken belief that the chosen sentence fit within the erroneous range—prevented the government from benefiting from the Molina-Martinez exception.

At the same time, the opinion reinforces the evidentiary foundations that routinely support drug-trafficking enhancements: a rented garage can qualify as a maintained drug premises when trafficking is a primary use, and a loaded firearm found at the trafficking site alongside distribution paraphernalia will ordinarily trigger § 2D1.1(b)(1) absent a “clearly improbable” disconnect.

Bottom line: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the premises and firearm enhancements, but vacated and remanded because an undisputed criminal history miscalculation likely mattered under Molina-Martinez, given a sentencing record too ambiguous to show a truly guidelines-independent sentence.