Griffin v. LaManna: Certificate of Appealability Required to Appeal Denial of Rule 4(a)(5) Extension in State Habeas

1. Introduction

In Griffin v. LaManna (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 2026), the Second Circuit addressed a recurring procedural bottleneck in federal habeas practice: what happens when a state prisoner’s counsel misses the deadline to appeal the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition and the district court denies an extension of time under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).

The petitioner, Gary Griffin, is a New York state prisoner serving life without parole. After the district court denied his § 2254 petition on the merits and declined a certificate of appealability (“COA”), Griffin filed an untimely notice of appeal and moved for a Rule 4(a)(5) extension, arguing “excusable neglect” based on law-office staffing absences, delayed awareness of the judgment, miscommunications, and difficulty contacting his incarcerated client. The district court denied the extension (and declined a COA). Griffin then sought to appeal that denial.

The key issues before the Second Circuit were:

  • COA gatekeeping: Does a habeas petitioner need a COA to appeal the denial of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion?
  • Harbison’s scope: Did Harbison v. Bell eliminate the COA requirement for such procedural appeals?
  • Excusable neglect: If a COA is required, is it debatable that the district court abused its discretion in denying the extension?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that:

  1. A COA is required to appeal the denial of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion seeking more time to appeal the denial of a § 2254 petition, because the denial concludes the habeas proceeding in the relevant sense and is therefore a “final order” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).
  2. Eltayib v. United States remains controlling in the Circuit; Harbison v. Bell did not abrogate it because Harbison’s COA exception is limited to collateral orders that do not determine whether the habeas litigation can proceed.
  3. The court declined to issue a COA because reasonable jurists would not debate that the district court acted within its discretion in finding no “excusable neglect” under the Pioneer factors, particularly given the dispositive weight the Second Circuit gives to the reason-for-delay factor.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The Second Circuit’s baseline rule: COA required for post-judgment orders that end the habeas path

  • Eltayib v. United States, 294 F.3d 397 (2d Cir. 2002): The foundational precedent. The court held a COA is required to appeal denial of a Rule 4(a)(6) motion (reopening time to appeal), reasoning that such denial is a “final decision” appealable under § 1291 and therefore a “final order” for § 2253(c)(1)(A) purposes. Griffin extends and reaffirms that logic for Rule 4(a)(5) (extensions).
  • Kellogg v. Strack, 269 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2001): Used in Eltayib and reiterated here to support that denials of certain post-judgment motions (there, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)) qualify as “final orders” triggering the COA requirement.

B. Harbison and the “collateral order” carve-out

  • Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009): Held no COA is required to appeal an order denying a motion to expand counsel’s authority to represent the petitioner in state clemency proceedings. The Supreme Court described § 2253 as governing “final orders that dispose of the merits of a habeas corpus proceeding.” In Griffin, the Second Circuit reads this language contextually: Harbison excludes orders that are entirely collateral to whether habeas litigation can proceed, not orders that foreclose appellate review of the habeas judgment.
  • Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2021): Cited approvingly for the framing that Harbison distinguishes orders that conclude the habeas proceeding from those resolving a collateral issue. This supports the Second Circuit’s interpretation against Griffin’s broader reading of Harbison.
  • United States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2015): Cited for the practical point that where an order cannot affect the habeas disposition or the petitioner’s path to relief, a COA screen serves little gatekeeping function—reinforcing why Harbison is limited to collateral matters.

C. COA as jurisdiction and as gatekeeping

  • Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012): Establishes that failure to obtain a COA is a jurisdictional bar to appellate review—critical to the disposition (“we thus lack jurisdiction”).
  • Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2009): Central to the court’s gatekeeping logic. Slack requires a COA even when the habeas denial is procedural and, in that posture, demands a showing that both the procedural ruling and underlying constitutional claim are debatably wrong/right. The Second Circuit uses Slack to rebut the idea that “procedural” automatically means “no COA.”
  • Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020): Cited for purposive interpretation of AEDPA mechanisms. The Second Circuit analogizes: interpret the COA regime in light of AEDPA’s objectives, including screening unmeritorious habeas appeals and avoiding piecemeal review.
  • Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005): Supports the notion that requiring a COA to appeal denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is a “plausible and effective screening requirement,” bolstering the court’s view that screening is sensible where the order affects the habeas judgment’s finality.

D. Second Circuit post-Harbison applications: collateral orders do not require a COA

  • Illaramendi v. United States, 906 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2018): Held no COA is required to appeal denial of bail because it is not a final disposition of the habeas proceeding—used to illustrate Harbison’s collateral-order domain.
  • Lasher v. United States, 970 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2020): Held no COA is required to appeal a district court’s denial of a COA because that denial does not end merits litigation (a petitioner may seek a COA from the circuit)—again demonstrating the “collateral” category.

E. Inter-circuit disagreement noted and rejected

  • Mizori v. United States, 23 F.4th 702 (6th Cir. 2022) and United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015): Cited in a footnote as circuits reading Harbison more broadly to mean that COAs are required only for orders addressing the “merits” in a substantive sense. The Second Circuit rejects that approach as overreading Harbison’s phrasing.
  • Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001): Used to show that “on the merits” is context-dependent and can include dispositions that do not address substantive merits, undermining a purely literal reading of Harbison.

F. Standards and doctrines governing the Rule 4(a)(5) decision

  • Alexander v. Saul, 5 F.4th 139 (2d Cir. 2021): Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard for Rule 4(a)(5) denials and reiterates the four-factor test (via Pioneer), including that the third factor is given dispositive weight in the Second Circuit.
  • Lynch v. City of New York, 589 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2009): Defines abuse of discretion (erroneous legal view, clearly erroneous evidence assessment, or decision outside permissible range).
  • Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380 (1993): Source of the four “excusable neglect” factors.
  • In re Johns-Manville Corp., 476 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2007): “Absent extraordinary circumstances, attorney inadvertence is not excusable neglect.” This is the court’s key doctrinal lever for rejecting law-office failure as “excusable neglect.”
  • In re WorldCom, Inc., 708 F.3d 327 (2d Cir. 2013) and United States v. Hooper, 43 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1994): Used as concrete examples where counsel’s administrative failures and misunderstandings were not excusable neglect.
  • Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) and Martinez v. Superintendent of E. Corr. Facility, 806 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2015): Cited to emphasize that post-conviction litigants generally bear the risk of counsel’s negligence, absent effective abandonment.
  • Aksman v. Greenwich Quantitative Rsch. LP, No. 21-2916, 2023 WL 6799770 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2023): Supports that a district court need not give equal airtime to each Pioneer factor when it lists them and focuses on the third factor, consistent with Second Circuit precedent.
  • Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2005): Cited for the appellate rule against considering issues raised for the first time on appeal, cabining the record to what was presented below.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. What counts as a “final order” for § 2253(c)(1)(A)

The court’s central move is to define “final order” functionally in a way that preserves AEDPA’s screening role. It treats a denial of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion not as a mere scheduling decision, but as an order that determines whether the habeas petitioner can obtain appellate review at all. If the extension is denied, the petitioner’s path to merits review in the court of appeals is closed—so the order effectively “concludes” the federal habeas proceeding as a practical matter.

This reasoning tracks Eltayib v. United States (Rule 4(a)(6)) and generalizes it to Rule 4(a)(5): different rules, same effect—foreclosing appellate review of the habeas judgment.

B. Reconciling Harbison with Slack: “procedural” does not mean “no COA”

Griffin’s argument depended on reading Harbison’s phrase—“final orders that dispose of the merits”—as excluding orders that do not discuss the substantive merits of the constitutional claims. The Second Circuit rejects that reading by placing Harbison alongside Slack v. McDaniel, which unmistakably requires a COA for procedural dismissals of habeas petitions.

If Harbison were read as eliminating COAs whenever an order is “procedural,” it would destabilize Slack’s framework. The court instead interprets Harbison to mean: no COA for collateral orders that do not affect whether the habeas case can proceed toward relief, but COA required for orders that cut off the habeas litigation’s continuation, including access to appellate review.

C. Why screening makes sense at the Rule 4(a)(5) stage

The court emphasizes that allowing appeal of a Rule 4(a)(5) denial without a COA would invite “piecemeal” litigation: first litigate extension issues, then—if the extension is granted—litigate the habeas appeal. A COA requirement forces an initial check that the case is worth moving forward at all, consistent with Slack’s idea that appellate resources should not be spent where the underlying constitutional claims are not even debatably meritorious.

Even though the panel ultimately denies a COA based on the non-debatability of the Rule 4(a)(5) abuse-of-discretion question, the logic is structural: the COA mechanism is meant to screen threshold disputes that condition access to habeas appellate review.

D. Application: no debatable abuse of discretion on excusable neglect

Under Alexander v. Saul and Pioneer, the “reason for delay” factor receives dispositive weight in the Second Circuit. The district court found that the proffered reasons were essentially law-office failures and miscommunications—“run-of-the-mill attorney errors.” The panel agrees that:

  • Staffing absences, delayed internal routing of ECF materials, and misunderstandings are not “extraordinary circumstances” under In re Johns-Manville Corp..
  • Difficulty contacting an incarcerated client and general workload pressures are not unusual, and counsel could have filed a “protective” notice of appeal while clarifying the client’s wishes.
  • The district court’s explicit listing of Pioneer factors while focusing on the third factor was consistent with Second Circuit practice (citing Aksman v. Greenwich Quantitative Rsch. LP).

Because the panel saw no plausible legal error, no clearly erroneous factfinding, and no decision outside the permissible range, it concluded that reasonable jurists would not debate the denial—so the COA was denied and jurisdiction was absent.

3.3. Impact

A. A clarified Second Circuit rule for Rule 4(a)(5) in § 2254 cases

The opinion squarely establishes (and makes explicit) that within the Second Circuit, the COA requirement applies to appeals from denials of: Rule 4(a)(5) motions to extend time to appeal habeas denials, just as it applies to Rule 4(a)(6) denials under Eltayib v. United States. Practitioners should treat these orders as COA-gated “final orders” for § 2253(c)(1)(A) purposes.

B. Reinforced line between “collateral” and “case-concluding” orders

The court’s Harbison analysis gives a more operational boundary:

  • No COA: orders that are collateral to obtaining habeas relief (e.g., counsel-authority disputes per Harbison v. Bell, bail per Illaramendi v. United States).
  • COA required: orders that determine whether the habeas litigation can proceed toward appellate review (e.g., Rule 4(a)(5)/(6) denials here; analogous screening for Rule 60(b) denials per Kellogg v. Strack and the rationale noted in Gonzalez v. Crosby).

C. Practical litigation consequences

  • COA strategy becomes mandatory: A petitioner appealing a Rule 4(a)(5) denial must frame COA arguments directed at the abuse-of-discretion analysis.
  • Protective notice of appeal: The panel’s suggestion that counsel “could have easily filed a protective notice of appeal” will likely be cited against future excusable-neglect claims, raising expectations for minimally protective appellate practice.
  • Inter-circuit divergence persists: By explicitly rejecting the broader Harbison reading taken in Mizori v. United States and United States v. McRae, the decision entrenches a circuit split on whether COAs are required for certain procedural, case-terminating orders. That split may invite Supreme Court review if it continues to generate inconsistent access to appellate review across circuits.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Certificate of Appealability (COA): A jurisdictional “permission slip” required for most appeals in habeas cases. Without it, the court of appeals cannot hear the case. The COA is meant to screen out appeals that are not reasonably debatable.
  • Rule 4(a)(1)(A) deadline: The standard 30-day deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil case (including habeas).
  • Rule 4(a)(5) extension: Allows the district court to extend the appeal deadline if the movant shows excusable neglect or good cause.
  • Excusable neglect: A flexible equitable standard, but in the Second Circuit ordinary law-office mistakes usually do not qualify. Courts apply the Pioneer factors (prejudice, length of delay/impact, reason for delay/control, good faith), with the “reason for delay” factor often decisive.
  • “Final order” in habeas: In this opinion’s usage, an order is treated as “final” not only when it resolves constitutional claims, but when it effectively ends the petitioner’s ability to keep the habeas case moving toward relief (including by cutting off appellate review).

5. Conclusion

Griffin v. LaManna cements a clear Second Circuit rule: a habeas petitioner must obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal a district court’s denial of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion seeking extra time to appeal the denial of a § 2254 petition. The court reads Harbison v. Bell narrowly—limited to collateral orders—while reaffirming Eltayib v. United States and grounding the result in AEDPA’s gatekeeping purpose as articulated through Slack v. McDaniel.

On the merits of the procedural dispute, the decision underscores the Second Circuit’s strict approach to “excusable neglect,” treating routine attorney oversight and office-management problems as insufficient, particularly where counsel could have filed a protective notice of appeal. The immediate doctrinal effect is jurisdictional: absent a COA, appeals from Rule 4(a)(5) denials in habeas cases will be dismissed.