Date: Apr 4, 2026

Grave-Risk Findings and Discretionary Non-Return Under the Hague Convention Need Not Address Every Proposed Safeguard Explicitly

Introduction

In Affachao Abdon Samey v. Grace Aguegue (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (unpublished), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a petition seeking a child’s return to France under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the “Convention”) and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–11.

The petitioner-father, Affachao Abdon Samey, alleged that the child’s maternal relatives—Grâce Aguégué (aunt), Stéphano Adoukonou (uncle), and Françoise Gambe (grandmother)—wrongfully retained his daughter in South Carolina after what began as an agreed summer visit from France in June 2022. After a bench trial, the district court denied return, finding (among other things) that respondents established the Convention’s “grave risk” defense and that discretionary return was unwarranted.

On appeal, Samey challenged the district court’s determinations on wrongful retention, affirmative defenses, and discretionary return. The Fourth Circuit affirmed primarily on the grave-risk defense, emphasizing the deference owed to trial-court factfinding under clear-error review and rejecting the argument that the district court had to expressly discuss every item of record evidence or every proposed protective arrangement.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit applied the Hague Convention framework and confirmed that Hague proceedings determine the proper forum (“venue”) for custody disputes, not the merits of custody. (Convention, art. 19.)
Even assuming error in the district court’s wrongful-retention analysis, the Fourth Circuit affirmed because the district court’s grave-risk finding independently supported denial of return.
The court held the district court did not clearly err in finding a grave risk of harm (including sexual and physical abuse) if the child were returned to France.
The court rejected arguments that the district court failed to consider proposed safeguards (e.g., French authorities’ ability to protect the child; friends in France), noting that the court considered French law enforcement and need not “explicitly recite the entire record.”
The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to order return as a discretionary matter under Convention, art. 18, citing the trial court’s weighing of equitable factors.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion’s reasoning is anchored in established Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit Hague Convention doctrine, along with standards-of-review precedents:

1) Hague Convention purpose, “habitual residence,” and non-merits nature of proceedings

Golan v. Saada, 596 U.S. 666 (2022): Quoted for the Convention’s core aim—prompt return to the child’s country of habitual residence when wrongful removal/retention is shown—and for the existence and function of exceptions, including grave risk. The Fourth Circuit also cited Golan for the proposition that sexual and physical abuse can constitute “intolerable situation[s]” and “obvious grave risk[s]” not readily ameliorated.
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010): Cited (via Golan) for historical context: the Convention was adopted in response to international child abductions during domestic disputes.
Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68 (2020): Cited (via Golan) for the “habitual residence” concept and directly for the appellate standard: factual findings reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions de novo.

2) Fourth Circuit Hague elements and discretionary return

Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2001): Used to frame the three distilled elements of wrongful removal/retention (habitual residence, custody rights, exercise of rights). Also cited for the proposition (quoting the Third Circuit) that courts retain discretion to order return even when an exception is proven.
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995): Quoted via Miller on discretionary return—exceptions do not eliminate judicial power to return.
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2009): Cited for the standard of review in Hague Convention cases (facts clear error; law de novo).

3) Clear-error review and trial-court articulation obligations

Tekmen v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 55 F.4th 951 (4th Cir. 2022) and Wall v. Rasnick, 42 F.4th 214 (4th Cir. 2022): Cited for the formulation of clear error (“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”).
Platt v. Mansfield, 162 F.4th 430 (4th Cir. 2025): Cited to support the proposition that a district court need not “explicitly address” every issue in its decision—relevant to Samey’s argument that the court failed to discuss testimony about friends in France who could care for the child.

Legal Reasoning

Affirmance on an independent ground (grave risk), without resolving wrongful retention. The Fourth Circuit effectively treated the grave-risk determination as dispositive: even if the district court erred on the elements of wrongful retention, the Convention permits denial of return when Article 13b is established, and the appellate court found no reversible error in that finding.
Deference to credibility determinations and competing evidence. Samey attacked the credibility of abuse allegations and the forensic interview. The court acknowledged the competing narratives but emphasized that the record contained evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion; under clear-error review, that was enough to affirm.
Safeguards/amelioration arguments did not undermine the grave-risk conclusion on this record. The court held the district court did consider French law enforcement, but found it did not “change its calculus” given the evidence of abuse. As to alternative caretaking by friends in France, the court relied on the principle that courts need not recite every piece of evidence and treated the omission as non-reversible given the district court’s core findings about abuse and its rejection of the broader mitigation premise. The court’s citation to Golan v. Saada underscored that some abuse-related risks may not be “readily” ameliorated.
Discretionary return under Article 18 is reviewed with deference to equitable weighing. The Fourth Circuit recognized the district court’s continuing power to order return “at any time” under Convention, art. 18, even where exceptions apply. It affirmed because the district court considered multiple equitable factors (child’s interest in returning to France, need for contact with Samey, and respondents’ alleged inequitable conduct) and reached a supported conclusion not to order return.
Non-merits admonition preserved. The court reiterated that Hague findings (including grave risk) are not custody merits determinations under Convention, art. 19—an important constraint, particularly where the record includes abuse allegations.

Impact

Appellate pathway: The decision illustrates how an Article 13b grave-risk finding—if factually supported—can sustain denial of return even if wrongful-retention elements are contested, narrowing the practical value of appealing only the “wrongful retention” analysis.
Trial-court record building: Because the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on clear-error deference, litigants should treat the district court as the decisive forum for credibility disputes (e.g., forensic interview reliability; alleged fabrication; corroboration).
Arguments about protective measures: The opinion suggests that proposing protective alternatives (police protection, third-party care, etc.) may not overcome a grave-risk finding where the trial court credits evidence of serious abuse and finds the proposed safeguards insufficient. It also indicates that failure to expressly address every proposed arrangement may not be reversible if the court’s core analysis necessarily rejects the underlying mitigation theory.
Discretionary return remains real but limited: Article 18 discretion is confirmed, but the decision indicates that where grave risk is found and the district court performs an equitable analysis, appellate courts will be reluctant to second-guess the refusal to order return.
Precedential weight: The opinion is unpublished and expressly “not binding precedent in this circuit,” but it may still be cited for persuasive value and as an indicator of how the Fourth Circuit applies Golan, clear-error review, and Article 18 discretion in abuse-centered cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Habitual residence: The country that functions as the child’s ordinary home immediately before the alleged wrongful removal or retention. Hague return generally sends the child back there so custody can be decided in that forum.
Wrongful removal vs. wrongful retention: “Removal” is taking the child across borders in breach of custody rights; “retention” is keeping the child abroad beyond what custody rights allow (often after a visit or travel authorization ends).
Affirmative defenses: “well-settled” and “grave risk”: Even if removal/retention was wrongful, return may be denied if (i) after more than one year the child is “now settled in its new environment” (Article 12), or (ii) return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm or an “intolerable situation” (Article 13b).
Burdens of proof under ICARA: The petitioner must prove wrongful removal/retention by a preponderance of the evidence. The respondent must prove “well-settled” by a preponderance and “grave risk” by clear and convincing evidence.
Article 18 discretion: Even when an exception is proven, the court still has power to order return. That power is discretionary and typically guided by equitable considerations and the Convention’s purposes.
Clear-error review: On appeal, factual findings—especially credibility determinations—are upheld unless the appellate court has a “definite and firm conviction” the trial court made a mistake.

Conclusion

Affachao Abdon Samey v. Grace Aguegue reinforces three practical points in Hague Convention litigation within the Fourth Circuit: (1) a supported Article 13b grave-risk finding can be dispositive on appeal; (2) appellate courts will defer heavily to trial-court credibility determinations and need not require explicit discussion of every proposed protective option; and (3) while Article 18 preserves discretionary authority to order return despite exceptions, a district court’s reasoned equitable refusal to do so will generally be sustained. The decision also reiterates the Convention’s boundary line: these proceedings decide forum, not custody merits.