Grant v. Amazon.com: Claim-Splitting Bar and Texas Chapter 21 Preemption Support Dismissal With Prejudice and Denial of Leave to Amend

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date: June 25, 2026

Disposition: District court affirmed (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice; leave to amend denied)

Publication Status: Not designated for publication (5th Cir. R. 47.5)

I. Introduction

Grant v. Amazon.com Services, L.L.C. is the Fifth Circuit’s latest application of familiar procedural and Texas employment-law doctrines to repeated, overlapping litigation. Reginald Grant (pro se) sued his former employer, Amazon.com Services, L.L.C., multiple times—first in federal court on ADEA theories and separately in Texas state court on pay-related contract and fraud claims—then filed the present suit reasserting substantially the same theories while the earlier appeals were pending.

The central issues were:

  • whether res judicata barred Grant’s renewed ADEA, breach-of-contract, and fraud claims in light of prior federal and Texas judgments;
  • whether Texas common-law claims (IIED and defamation) were preempted by Texas Labor Code Chapter 21 and, independently, whether defamation was untimely and IIED inadequately pleaded;
  • whether “loss of use” and “loss of enjoyment” are cognizable claims under Texas law; and
  • whether the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend due to delay, forfeiture, and futility.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held:

  • Res judicata barred Grant’s ADEA claims because they involved the same parties, a competent prior court, a final merits judgment, and the same “nucleus of operative facts” previously litigated in Grant v. Amazon.com Servs., L.L.C., No. 3:22-cv-439, 2023 WL 6278912 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2023) (Grant I).
  • Texas res judicata barred Grant’s breach-of-contract and fraud claims because those claims were already litigated to final judgment in state court proceedings identified as Grant v. Amazon.com Servs., L.L.C. RA Corp. Servs., Cause No. JS2100164K (Tex. J.P. Ct. Pct. 1, Pl. 2, Dallas Cnty., June 14, 2022) (Grant II) and subsequent proceedings culminating in an amended final judgment.
  • Grant’s IIED and defamation claims were preempted by Chapter 21 because they were based on the same alleged workplace discrimination/retaliation facts; IIED also failed for lack of “extreme and outrageous” conduct.
  • Defamation was independently barred by Texas’s one-year statute of limitations.
  • “Loss of use” and “loss of enjoyment” are damages measures, not standalone causes of action, under Texas law.
  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend: Grant delayed, tried to raise a new “manager-name” theory only on appeal (forfeited), and amendment would be futile given res judicata and state-law bars.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Outcome)

1. Pleading and appellate review standards

  • Hinkley v. Envoy Air, Inc., 968 F.3d 544, 552 (5th Cir. 2020): supplied the de novo standard for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, enabling the panel to independently assess whether Grant stated plausible claims.
  • Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 781-82 (5th Cir. 2007): permitted affirmance on “any basis supported by the record,” which matters in multi-claim, multi-bar cases (res judicata, preemption, limitations, noncognizable theories).
  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007): anchored the plausibility standard—especially relevant to IIED’s “extreme and outrageous” requirement and to the notion that mere conclusions cannot survive dismissal.
  • Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016): emphasized that pro se pleadings get a more lenient read, but still must raise the right to relief above speculation. The court used this to reject any suggestion that pro se status could overcome res judicata or other legal bars.

2. Federal res judicata for the ADEA refiled claims

  • Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005): provided the four-element federal res judicata test and framed the inquiry the panel applied to Grant I.
  • Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 2004): cited within Test Masters for the same four elements, reinforcing the doctrinal baseline.
  • Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 313-14 (5th Cir. 2004): supplied the “same nucleus of operative facts” test and the rule that res judicata bars claims that were brought or could have been brought.
  • Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1983): quoted via Davis for the “could have been advanced” principle—critical to rejecting attempts to re-label the dispute as “new” harassment/retaliation.

These cases collectively allowed the court to treat Grant’s second federal attempt as impermissible claim-splitting: the same employment events (promotion, overtime, verbal abuse, CDL training, alleged constructive discharge) were already litigated to final judgment in Grant I.

3. Texas res judicata for the contract and fraud claims

  • Harmon v. Dallas Cnty., 927 F.3d 884, 890 (5th Cir. 2019): required the federal court to apply Texas res judicata principles to the preclusive effect of the state-court judgment.
  • Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996): supplied the Texas three-element test. The panel applied it straightforwardly because Grant conceded the claims had already been litigated.

4. Chapter 21 preemption of overlapping common-law workplace claims

  • Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 808, 813 (Tex. 2010): the centerpiece for Chapter 21 exclusivity and preemption where common-law claims merely repackage discrimination/retaliation allegations.
  • Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004): reinforced that IIED cannot be used as an end-run around statutory employment discrimination schemes when the gravamen is discrimination.
  • Wiggins v. St. Luke's Episcopal Health Sys., 517 F. App'x 249, 252 (5th Cir. 2013): supported applying Chapter 21 preemption in federal court where the factual core overlaps with discrimination allegations.

The court treated Grant’s IIED and defamation allegations as resting on the same workplace conduct as his discrimination narrative, making Chapter 21 preemption dispositive absent genuinely independent facts (which he did not plead).

5. Independent tort elements: IIED’s high threshold and defamation limitations

  • Swafford v. Bank of Am. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
  • Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993)
  • MacArthur v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr. at Tyler, 45 F.3d 890, 898 (5th Cir. 1995)

These authorities grounded the alternative holding that—even without preemption—ordinary workplace disputes and insults rarely meet IIED’s “atrocious” standard.

  • Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.002(a) and Deaver v. Desai, 483 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.): established the one-year limitations period for defamation, which barred a claim filed nearly two years after the allegedly defamatory August 13, 2022 email.

6. Non-cognizable “claims” that are actually damages measures

  • Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686-87 (Tex. App.—Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.): supported dismissal because “loss of use” and “loss of enjoyment” are not causes of action under Texas law, only damages concepts.

7. Leave to amend: discretion, delay, forfeiture, and futility

  • Vuoncino v. Forterra, Inc., 140 F.4th 200, 206 (5th Cir. 2025): supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for denying leave to amend.
  • Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 846 (5th Cir. 1992): emphasized leave to amend is not automatic.
  • Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2004): identified “substantial reason” factors—undue delay, bad faith, repeated failures, undue prejudice—which the district court relied on (especially delay and lack of new allegations).
  • Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2021): used to reject Grant’s attempt to cure by adding a manager’s name for the first time on appeal (forfeiture).
  • HCB Fin. Corp. v. McPherson, 8 F.4th 335, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2021): supported dismissal with prejudice where amendment would be futile.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court treated the case as a preclusion problem, not a “better pleading” problem

The heart of the opinion is that Grant’s core theories were already adjudicated. Under Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh and Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, the court focused on whether the operative facts overlapped with Grant I, not on whether Grant reworded his legal labels. Because the federal ADEA claims arose from the same employment events, res judicata foreclosed the new filing.

2. Separate sovereign judgments received separate preclusion rules

The court distinguished between the preclusive effect of:

  • a prior federal judgment (Grant I) on later federal claims (federal res judicata elements), and
  • a prior Texas judgment (Grant II) on later contract/fraud claims, applying Texas law as required by Harmon v. Dallas Cnty. and Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.

That structure matters: even when federal and state claims are filed in parallel, each final judgment can independently bar subsequent attempts to re-litigate the same dispute.

3. Chapter 21 preemption prevented tort “workarounds”

Having disposed of the principal statutory and contract/fraud theories, the court addressed the remaining tort claims as an attempted end-run around workplace-discrimination remedial schemes. Under Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams and Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, Chapter 21 is the exclusive state-law vehicle for discrimination-based workplace claims; common-law torts cannot proceed where they are merely discrimination allegations in tort clothing.

4. Independent defects provided alternative bases for dismissal

The panel endorsed multiple independent dismissal grounds:

  • IIED: even if not preempted, Grant’s allegations resembled “mere employment disputes” under MacArthur v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr. at Tyler, not “utterly intolerable” conduct under Twyman v. Twyman (as applied in Swafford v. Bank of Am. Corp.).
  • Defamation: independently untimely under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.002(a) and Deaver v. Desai.
  • “Loss of use/enjoyment”: dismissed because they are not causes of action under Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co.

5. Leave to amend was denied because amendment could not change the legal bars

The denial of leave to amend follows a familiar Fifth Circuit logic: where a complaint is barred as a matter of law (preclusion, limitations, preemption), adding details does not cure the defect. The court highlighted (i) Grant’s eight-month delay, (ii) the lack of new allegations, (iii) forfeiture of the “add my manager’s name” idea under Rollins v. Home Depot USA, and (iv) futility under HCB Fin. Corp. v. McPherson.

C. Impact

1. Practical reinforcement of anti-claim-splitting principles

Although unpublished, the decision is a clear roadmap for defendants facing serial or duplicative employment litigation: where a plaintiff re-files claims arising from the same employment events after an adverse merits judgment, res judicata can end the case at the pleading stage—often with prejudice.

2. Chapter 21’s continued role as a gatekeeper for Texas workplace torts

The opinion underscores that plaintiffs in Texas cannot routinely supplement discrimination narratives with IIED and defamation claims unless they plead genuinely independent tortious conduct untethered to discrimination/retaliation grievances, consistent with Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams.

3. Leave-to-amend doctrine: delay plus futility equals finality

The ruling illustrates how Rule 15’s liberal amendment policy yields to finality concerns when amendment is late and legally futile—particularly in cases dominated by preclusion and other categorical bars.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Res judicata (claim preclusion): if you already litigated (or could have litigated) a claim arising from the same core facts against the same party, a final judgment generally prevents starting over in a new lawsuit.
  • “Same nucleus of operative facts”: courts look to the underlying events, not the legal labels. Rebranding “discrimination” as “harassment” or adding new adjectives does not avoid preclusion if it’s the same workplace dispute.
  • Chapter 21 preemption: Texas Labor Code Chapter 21 is treated as the exclusive state-law remedy for workplace discrimination-type injuries; common-law tort claims that merely restate that injury are barred.
  • IIED “extreme and outrageous”: Texas sets a very high bar; rude treatment, unfair discipline, and typical workplace conflict rarely qualify.
  • Statute of limitations: a hard filing deadline. For Texas defamation, it is one year; missing it usually ends the claim regardless of its merits.
  • Leave to amend / futility: courts often allow amendments, but not when the legal problem is incurable (e.g., res judicata). Adding facts cannot undo a final prior judgment.

V. Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s decision affirms a dismissal with prejudice primarily on preclusion and Texas employment-law exclusivity grounds: Grant’s ADEA claims were barred by the prior federal merits judgment in Grant I, and his contract and fraud claims were barred by the prior Texas litigation in Grant II. His remaining tort theories failed because Chapter 21 preempted them and, independently, because IIED was not “extreme and outrageous,” defamation was untimely, and “loss of use/enjoyment” is not a standalone claim. Finally, the court’s denial of leave to amend reinforces that Rule 15 does not require courts to permit amendments that are delayed, forfeited, or legally futile—especially where the plaintiff is effectively attempting to relitigate concluded disputes.