Date: May 29, 2026

Governor’s Discretion to Declare an “Extraordinary Occasion” Under Mo. Const. art. IV, § 9 Is Broad and Not Limited by “Unusualness”

Introduction

In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Missouri State Conference v. Kehoe, the Supreme Court of Missouri (en banc) addressed a recurring separation-of-powers question: when the Missouri Constitution authorizes the governor to convene the General Assembly “on extraordinary occasions,” who decides whether an “extraordinary occasion” exists—and by what standard?

After Governor Mike Kehoe issued a proclamation calling the Second Extraordinary Session of the 103rd General Assembly to address (1) congressional redistricting and (2) changes to the initiative petition process, the NAACP Missouri State Conference and two individuals (collectively, “NAACP”) sued the State of Missouri and multiple officials (collectively, “State”), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court upheld the governor’s authority and additionally characterized the issue as political in nature. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed on constitutional-text grounds and did not reach the political-question holding.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the plain language of article IV, section 9 gives the governor discretion to determine when an “extraordinary occasion” has arisen and to call an extraordinary session by proclamation specifying the matters for action. The Court rejected NAACP’s argument that an “extraordinary occasion” must satisfy a heightened “unusual circumstances” threshold—especially one turning on whether the underlying conditions existed before the close of the regular session.

Because this constitutional interpretation disposed of the case, the Court did not reach the circuit court’s alternative reliance on the political question doctrine. The circuit court’s judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Luther v. Hoskins (standard of review; constitutional interpretation).
The Court used Luther to frame the posture: because the facts were stipulated, the question was whether the circuit court properly declared and applied the law, and constitutional interpretation is reviewed de novo.
Robust Mo. Dispensary 3, LLC v. St. Louis Cnty. (plain meaning; interpret provisions as a whole).
This case anchored the Court’s interpretive method: give constitutional words their “plain, ordinary, and natural meaning,” and do not read a word in isolation. The Court relied on this holistic approach to conclude that “extraordinary occasions” must be read alongside the repeated “as he may deem necessary” language that pervades article IV, section 9.
State v. League of Women Voters of Mo. (same words in same provision presumed to carry the same meaning).
The Court treated the repeated phrase “deem necessary” as a key structural clue: because the provision repeatedly assigns necessity judgments to what the governor “deems,” the same discretionary allocation carries through to the extraordinary-session clause.
McGibney v. Mo. Dep't of Nat. Res. (no reading extra words into the Constitution).
This canon did the work of rejecting NAACP’s proposed “unusualness” limitation. The Court reasoned that article IV, section 9 does not articulate a judicially enforceable “unusual/urgent” threshold or any mechanism to measure it; imposing one would add words not present.
Nicholson v. State (judicial restraint; avoid unnecessary issues).
Cited for the Court’s decision not to reach the political question doctrine because the constitutional holding was dispositive.
State ex rel. Bugg v. Roper (abandonment of claims not preserved).
Used to note NAACP abandoned an earlier theory about article III, section 45 by omitting it from the amended petition.
Maggard v. State (procedural posture; transfer; contextual election-law background).
Referenced for the Court’s discretionary transfer and to flag uncertainty about whether HB 1 ever went into effect, depending on referendum petition sufficiency—illustrating that the extraordinary-session authority issue was important regardless of downstream implementation disputes.

The Court also cited a line of out-of-state authority (in a footnote) reflecting a broad consensus that comparable “extraordinary/special session” clauses typically leave the triggering determination to the executive:

McConnell v. Haley (S.C.)
Jaksha v. State (Neb.)
State v. Fair (Wash.)
Farrelly v. Cole (Kan.)
In re State Census (Colo.)
People ex rel. Carter v. Rice (N.Y. Gen. Term)

Notably, Farrelly v. Cole directly supports the Missouri Court’s interpretive thrust by rejecting any equation of “extraordinary occasion” with “over-powering and urgent necessity,” and instead permitting special sessions for “purposes common and ordinary.”

Legal Reasoning

Text controls; discretion is embedded in the clause.
Article IV, section 9 repeatedly uses “as he may deem necessary” and “he shall deem necessary and expedient,” and then provides: “On extraordinary occasions he may convene the general assembly by proclamation, wherein he shall state specifically each matter on which action is deemed necessary.” The Court treated the clause as a unified grant of gubernatorial judgment, not a two-step regime in which courts independently police the “extraordinary” trigger.
Consistency of meaning within a single constitutional provision.
Relying on State v. League of Women Voters of Mo., the Court presumed the recurring “deem necessary” phrasing has the same referent throughout: the governor is the decider of necessity both in providing information/recommendations and in convening the legislature.
“Extraordinary” is contextual: outside the ordinary session framework.
The Court rejected NAACP’s “unusual circumstances” framing and adopted a structural one: “extraordinary” describes a session outside the regular session cycle. To reinforce historical meaning, the Court relied on Noah Webster's Am. Dictionary of the English Language (1828), defining “extraordinary” as “Beyond or out of the common order or method; not in the usual, customary or regular course; not ordinary.”
No implied limitation tied to timing or novelty of events.
NAACP argued the proclamation was invalid because the cited circumstances existed before the regular session ended. The Court concluded this “novelty” requirement appears nowhere in the text; imposing it would violate the interpretive prohibition (from McGibney v. Mo. Dep't of Nat. Res.) against reading additional restrictions into the Constitution.
Judicial minimalism on alternative doctrines.
Having found the governor acted within constitutional authority, the Court declined to reach whether the claim was nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine (Nicholson v. State).

Impact

High deference to the executive’s call for extraordinary sessions.
The decision establishes that challenges arguing the governor’s stated reasons are not “extraordinary enough” face a steep, likely insurmountable hurdle, absent some separate constitutional defect (e.g., failure to “state specifically each matter”).
Limits judicial policing of session-triggering judgments; focus shifts to procedure and subject-matter specification.
Future litigation is more likely to contest whether the proclamation properly specifies matters for action or whether enacted bills stay within the call, rather than contesting whether the occasion is sufficiently “unusual.”
Separation-of-powers realignment in practice.
By characterizing “extraordinary” primarily as “outside the ordinary session,” the Court effectively leaves the political accountability for calling sessions to the electoral and inter-branch process, not judicial review.
Election-law and governance stakes without merits adjudication.
Although the extraordinary session produced a redistricting law (HB 1) and an initiative-process proposal (HJR 3), the Court’s holding is institutional: it validates the convening power, not the policy merits or federal-law compliance of the measures themselves.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Extraordinary session: A legislative session convened outside the regular schedule, called by the governor, and limited to the topics listed in the governor’s proclamation.
“Deem necessary”: Constitutional language signaling that the decision is entrusted to the governor’s judgment. Here, it supported treating the “extraordinary occasion” determination as discretionary rather than judicially reweighed.
Plain meaning / textualism: An interpretive method that prioritizes the ordinary public meaning of the constitutional text in context, avoiding implied additions.
Political question doctrine: A principle under which courts decline to decide certain disputes deemed committed to other branches. The Court did not decide this case on that basis, because it resolved the dispute through constitutional text alone.
Declaratory judgment: A court’s binding declaration of the parties’ rights under law, often used to resolve constitutional disputes before (or alongside) requests for injunctions.

Conclusion

The Missouri Supreme Court’s central takeaway is straightforward and durable: article IV, section 9 assigns the “extraordinary occasion” determination to the governor’s discretion, and courts will not superimpose an “unusualness,” “urgency,” or “novelty” requirement that the constitutional text does not contain. In doing so, the Court reinforces a text-and-structure approach to constitutional interpretation, narrows the path for future challenges to gubernatorial special-session calls, and aligns Missouri with a broader interstate consensus treating special-session triggers as primarily an executive judgment.