Government Employees Not Covered by the LHWCA May Bring Sieracki Unseaworthiness Claims, and State Volunteer Firefighter Exclusivity Cannot Bar General Maritime Negligence

1. Introduction

Case: In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Verplanck Fire District, No. 23-1218 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2026).
Parties: Verplanck Fire District (owner of the firefighting vessel Marine I) as petitioner-appellee; Troy Dyckman (volunteer firefighter injured aboard the vessel) as claimant-appellant.
Setting: A response run on the Hudson River. Dyckman’s foot was crushed when he extended his leg to fend off a collision with another vessel.

The Fire District sought to limit liability under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 46 U.S.C. § 30523, using Rule F. Dyckman—having already received benefits under New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law—filed claims asserting (i) Jones Act negligence/unseaworthiness, (ii) unseaworthiness under Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, and (iii) general maritime negligence. The district court granted summary judgment to the Fire District, rejecting the Sieracki and general maritime negligence claims on categorical grounds.

The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, announcing two practical rules with broad importance:

  • Sieracki unseaworthiness survives the 1972 LHWCA amendments for workers not covered by the LHWCA—including governmental employees excluded by 33 U.S.C. § 903(b).
  • A state “exclusive remedy” provision (here, N.Y. Vol. Fire. Ben. L. § 19) cannot be applied to bar a federal general maritime negligence claim where doing so would materially prejudice maritime law’s characteristic features and uniformity, applying a Kossick-style accommodation/balancing analysis.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held the district court erred by dismissing Dyckman’s Sieracki unseaworthiness claim on three categorical grounds—(1) that Sieracki requires an independent contractor relationship, (2) that land-based workers cannot qualify, and (3) that eligibility requires work “primarily as an aide to navigation.” Those rationales misread Sieracki and later Supreme Court doctrine.

The court further held the district court erred in concluding New York’s Volunteer Firefighters’ Benefit Law exclusivity provision barred Dyckman’s general maritime negligence claim. Applying Supreme Court federalism-in-admiralty principles, the court concluded that enforcing the state exclusivity rule here would “work material prejudice” to maritime law and impair maritime uniformity.

The judgment was VACATED and the case REMANDED for development of the factual record, including whether Dyckman was “doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards.”

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. The seaworthiness line: strict liability, expansion, and partial abrogation

  • Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960)
    Quoted for the modern formulation of seaworthiness: a duty to provide a vessel and appurtenances “reasonably fit for their intended use.” The Second Circuit uses Mitchell to anchor seaworthiness as a distinct, strict-liability-like maritime obligation.
  • Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944)
    Cited via Miles to mark the transformation of seaworthiness into a strict liability regime—explaining why seaworthiness became the dominant recovery vehicle for seamen.
  • Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990)
    Used for the historical proposition that seaworthiness originally ran to seamen “in the ship’s employ,” before Sieracki expanded the class.
  • Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)
    The doctrinal centerpiece. The court emphasizes Sieracki extended seaworthiness to non-seamen “doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards,” and did so “regardless of the fact that [the worker] is employed immediately by another than the owner.”
  • Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953)
    Reinforces that Sieracki protection depends not on labels (“stevedore”) but “the type of work” and exposure to hazards. It also supplies a key federalism-in-admiralty maxim: states may not deprive a person of substantial admiralty rights.
  • Gravatt v. City of New York, 226 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2000)
    Provides Second Circuit framing of “Sieracki-seamen” and explains the pre-1972 Sieracki/Ryan problem: employers’ LHWCA exclusivity was undermined by vessel liability and indemnity back to the employer.
  • Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956)
    Cited for the indemnity action that, combined with Sieracki, effectively shifted costs back to stevedore employers—one impetus for Congress’s 1972 amendments.
  • Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92 (1994)
    Cited for the proposition that the 1972 LHWCA amendments increased benefits while abolishing unseaworthiness suits by covered workers—supporting the “bargain” logic central to the Second Circuit’s statutory interpretation.
  • Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811 (2001)
    Crucial for precision: the Court there described the 1972 amendments as eliminating “covered workers’ unseaworthiness claims.” The Second Circuit treats this as confirming the correct scope of the abrogation: it tracks coverage, not a categorical eradication of Sieracki.

B. Defining “seaman” and rejecting “aid to navigation”

  • McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991)
    The district court relied on a Wilander sentence (“seamen do not include land-based workers”). The Second Circuit treats that language, insofar as it might be read to limit Sieracki, as dictum because Wilander addressed Jones Act seaman status—not the Sieracki extension of seaworthiness to non-seamen.
  • Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995)
    Cited to show the modern Jones Act seaman test and to reinforce that “aid in navigation” is not required even for Jones Act seamen, undermining the district court’s reliance on older Second Circuit formulations.
  • Klarman v. Santini, 503 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1974) and Harney v. William M. Moore Bldg. Corp., 359 F.2d 649 (2d. Cir. 1966)
    The district court used these to require “primarily an aide to navigation.” The Second Circuit distinguishes them as discussing Jones Act issues and notes later Supreme Court authority displaced such navigation-centric requirements.

C. The survival of Sieracki for non-covered workers: the circuit split

  • Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981)
    Held government employees excluded from the LHWCA may still bring Sieracki unseaworthiness claims. The Second Circuit finds its reasoning compelling because it follows § 905(b)’s text limiting abrogation to “a person covered under this Act.”
  • Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States, 937 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
    Similarly concludes § 905(b) abrogates Sieracki/Ryan only for covered workers and emphasizes the absence of the 1972 benefit “quid pro quo” for federal employees.
  • Normile v. Maritime Co. of the Philippines, 643 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1981)
    Took the opposite view, reading the 1972 amendments as effectively eliminating Sieracki even for public employees. The Second Circuit rejects this, primarily as inconsistent with the statutory text (“covered under this Act”), the bargain rationale, and a more faithful reading of congressional intent.

D. Federalism in admiralty: uniformity, “maritime but local,” and accommodation

  • Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)
    Establishes the classic uniformity constraint: state law is invalid if it materially prejudices maritime law’s characteristic features or interferes with maritime harmony and uniformity.
  • Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921)
    Example of permissible state supplementation where the subject is “maritime and local in character” and does not prejudice maritime uniformity—forming part of the balancing tradition.
  • Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922) and P.J. Carlin Construction Co. v. Heaney, 299 U.S. 41 (1936)
    Key state-compensation decisions. The Second Circuit reads them not as categorical permission for state exclusivity to defeat maritime claims, but as fact-specific accommodations where the underlying relationships were nonmaritime/local (ship construction; transportation to a land construction job).
  • Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142 (1928), Davis v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus. of Wash., 317 U.S. 249 (1942), and John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930)
    Cited for the historical difficulty and case-by-case nature of the boundary between state compensation and admiralty remedies.
  • Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961)
    Central to the Second Circuit’s method. Kossick rejects a categorical Supremacy Clause rule (“wherever a maritime interest is involved … it must displace a local interest”) and instead calls for “accommodation” considering the intensity of maritime interests and the need for uniformity.
  • Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., 601 U.S. 65 (2024) and Norfolk S. R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14 (2004)
    Provide modern reaffirmation that admiralty contemplates a maritime law operating uniformly nationwide, and acknowledge the field’s federalism complexity.

E. Lower-court and circuit guidance on exclusivity vs. maritime tort

  • Green v. Vermilion Corp., 144 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1998) and Purnell v. Norned Shipping B.V., 801 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1986)
    Represent a stronger Supremacy Clause approach. The Second Circuit declines to follow a categorical rule because it conflicts with Kossick’s rejection of automatic displacement.
  • Brockington v. Certified Electric, Inc., 903 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1990)
    Adopted balancing and enforced state exclusivity where the maritime interest was minimal (a land-based electrician using a boat for commuting). The Second Circuit aligns with the balancing framework but distinguishes the facts.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Correcting categorical limits on Sieracki status

The court’s first move is doctrinal housekeeping: the district court treated Sieracki as if it were confined to independent contractors and excluded land-based workers, and further required “aid to navigation.” The Second Circuit rejects all three:

  • No independent-contractor requirement: Sieracki extended seaworthiness “regardless of the fact that [the worker] is employed immediately by another than the owner,” so independence is not a condition but a non-disqualifier.
  • Land-based workers can qualify: Sieracki itself involved a longshoreman, the archetypal land-based maritime worker. The “land-based workers” sentence in McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander is treated as Jones Act-focused and not controlling for Sieracki.
  • “Aid to navigation” is not required: Even if older Second Circuit cases suggested that requirement in Jones Act contexts, the Supreme Court in McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander and Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis abandoned it for Jones Act seaman status; a fortiori it cannot be imposed as a categorical gatekeeper for Sieracki.

B. The major statutory holding: § 905(b) abolishes unseaworthiness only for “person[s] covered under” the LHWCA

The opinion’s most consequential reasoning is its textual and structural reading of the 1972 LHWCA amendments.

Section 905(b) eliminates unseaworthiness as a basis of vessel liability “under this subsection,” and the subsection applies only “[i]n the event of injury to a person covered under this Act.” From that, the Second Circuit draws a clean interpretive conclusion:

  • Covered workers (e.g., private longshore and harbor workers) cannot sue vessels for unseaworthiness post-1972.
  • Non-covered workers are outside the subsection’s scope; thus, the 1972 bargain cannot be used to strip them of Sieracki rights they previously had.

That matters here because Dyckman is a governmental employee excluded from LHWCA coverage by 33 U.S.C. § 903(b). The Second Circuit resolves the circuit split in favor of Aparicio v. Swan Lake and Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States, rejecting Normile v. Maritime Co. of the Philippines as inconsistent with statutory text and congressional “quid pro quo” logic (expanded LHWCA benefits in exchange for reduced vessel strict liability).

C. Admiralty federalism and state exclusivity: adopting balancing, but finding maritime interests predominate here

On whether N.Y. Vol. Fire. Ben. L. § 19 can bar Dyckman’s general maritime negligence claim, the Second Circuit treats the Supreme Court’s admiralty federalism as rejecting rigid rules. It follows Kossick v. United Fruit Co.’s “accommodation” approach rather than the Third and Fifth Circuits’ categorical supremacy approach.

Applying that balancing, the court acknowledges New York’s strong interests (a no-fault benefit scheme plus employer protection via exclusivity). But it finds the federal maritime interests more directly engaged on these facts:

  • Dyckman’s injury occurred during a waterborne emergency response mission on navigable waters—work the court characterizes as “distinctly maritime,” unlike transportation to land jobs (Heaney, Brockington) or ship construction (Rohde).
  • Maritime tort policy’s safety-and-compensation functions are implicated: if negligence or unseaworthiness caused injury, maritime law’s characteristic features include meaningful remedies and incentives for vessel safety.
  • Enforcing state exclusivity to defeat the federal claim would materially prejudice maritime law and impair uniformity, thus failing the Jensen/Western Fuel Co. uniformity constraint as applied through Kossick.

3.3. Impact

A. Revival and clarification of “gap” Sieracki claims in the Second Circuit

The opinion places the Second Circuit with the Fifth and D.C. Circuits: Sieracki unseaworthiness remains available for workers excluded from the LHWCA. This is particularly significant for:

  • State and local governmental maritime workers (fire, police, municipal marine units) injured on vessels while performing vessel-related service.
  • Other statutory exclusions from LHWCA coverage who nonetheless may be “doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards.”

B. Limits on state benefit-exclusivity defenses in maritime tort suits against governmental vessel owners

By holding New York’s volunteer firefighter exclusivity cannot bar a general maritime negligence claim on these facts, the court signals that state workers’ compensation exclusivity is not automatically enforceable in admiralty. Defendants (including public entities) should expect courts to scrutinize whether a state exclusivity defense would materially impair maritime uniformity.

C. Litigation consequences on remand and beyond

  • Fact-intensive “Sieracki-seaman” inquiries will matter: the key question becomes whether the claimant was “doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards,” not employment labels or navigation authority.
  • Potential expansion of public-entity vessel exposure: fire districts and other subdivisions operating vessels may face maritime negligence and unseaworthiness claims notwithstanding state benefit payments.
  • Potential Supreme Court interest: the decision deepens the salience of the longstanding circuit split with the Ninth Circuit’s Normile.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Seaworthiness”: A vessel owner’s duty to provide a vessel reasonably fit for its intended use. It is traditionally stricter than negligence—often described as strict liability for unsafe conditions of the vessel or its equipment.
  • “Sieracki seaman”: Not a Jones Act “seaman,” but a non-crew worker who can claim seaworthiness because, at the time of injury, the worker was doing work traditionally done by seamen and facing seamen’s risks (“doing a seaman’s work and incurring a seaman’s hazards”).
  • LHWCA and the 1972 amendments (in one line): Congress increased no-fault compensation benefits for covered longshore/harbor workers and, in exchange, removed their ability to sue vessels for unseaworthiness—but only for people “covered under” the Act.
  • State “exclusive remedy” provisions: Workers’ compensation statutes often say: if you take statutory benefits, you cannot sue your employer in tort. This case holds that such exclusivity cannot be used to wipe out certain federal maritime remedies where maritime interests predominate and uniformity would be harmed.
  • Admiralty federalism (“uniformity”): States can sometimes supplement maritime law, but cannot materially prejudice maritime law’s characteristic features or disrupt its need to operate uniformly nationwide.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision is a significant clarification of modern maritime remedies at the intersection of the LHWCA and state benefit schemes. It (1) rejects categorical limitations that would have narrowed Sieracki to independent contractors, non-land-based workers, or navigation aides; (2) holds the 1972 LHWCA abrogation of unseaworthiness applies only to persons “covered under” the LHWCA, preserving Sieracki claims for excluded workers such as governmental employees; and (3) applies a Kossick-style balancing approach to refuse enforcement of New York volunteer firefighter exclusivity where it would materially prejudice maritime law and its uniformity.

Practically, the opinion reopens seaworthiness and negligence pathways for certain public-sector maritime workers and signals that state exclusivity defenses will not automatically defeat federal maritime tort claims when the work and hazards are genuinely maritime.