A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
1. The controlling merits decision: Rutherford
Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. 454 (2026), controlled the substantive outcome. Its defendants, like Rizo, had received stacked mandatory sentences for multiple § 924(c) convictions in a single prosecution and sought compassionate release based on the 2018 amendment. The Supreme Court held that the amendment could not, as a matter of law, provide the necessary extraordinary and compelling reason.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning had three components. First, sentencing disparities resulting from prospective reforms are an ordinary consequence of a system in which nonretroactivity is the default. Second, Congress deliberately withheld the amendment from defendants already sentenced. Third, compassionate release has traditionally focused on prisoners’ personal circumstances, rather than functioning as a general mechanism for extending prospective sentencing reforms to earlier cases.
Rutherford v. United States also rejected reliance on the Commission’s policy statement to overcome that statutory conclusion. The Commission’s delegated authority does not permit it to define statutory language inconsistently with the governing statute. Consequently, § 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid to the extent it authorizes the contrary result. That qualification matters: the opinion does not invalidate every possible application of the policy statement.
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977), appears within the court’s account of Rutherford’s reasoning. It supports the administrative-law principle that delegated interpretive authority remains bounded by the statute. The Commission may elaborate statutory standards, but it cannot adopt a definition that contradicts them.
2. The evolution of § 924(c) stacking
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131–34 (1993), supplied the historical interpretation that produced Rizo’s sentence. It construed “second or subsequent conviction” to include additional § 924(c) convictions obtained in the same prosecution. Thus, a defendant without an earlier final § 924(c) conviction could nevertheless receive the enhanced penalty on a second count.
Hewitt v. United States, 606 U.S. 419 (2025), explained the effect and temporal reach of Congress’s later amendment. As the opinion describes it, the amendment displaced Deal’s statutory rule and restricted enhanced penalties to qualifying prior convictions that had become final. Hewitt also established the relevant distinction between defendants not yet sentenced and defendants already sentenced. Together, these cases demonstrate that Rizo’s sentence reflected the governing law when imposed, while the later reform did not itself authorize reopening it.
3. The traditional limits on government criminal appeals
United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), provides the historical foundation for the rule that the government lacks an inherent right to appeal a criminal judgment. Its discussion of the common-law tradition explains why general appellate language has not been treated as automatically authorizing prosecution appeals.
Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 244–47 (1981), reaffirmed that § 1291’s general jurisdictional grant does not itself authorize an ordinary federal government criminal appeal. Although Manypenny involved a state prosecution tried in federal court, its treatment of federal appellate authority supplied the relevant background rule.
Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400–03 (1957), identified an alternative route for orders sufficiently independent of the main prosecution to warrant treatment as plenary orders. Its importance here is explanatory: it identifies the limited independent-order exception against which earlier sentencing-appeal cases were assessed. Rizo’s appeal was sustained through the finality and statutory-authorization analysis, not by extending that exception.
4. Binding circuit decisions before § 3742 became applicable
United States v. Denson, 588 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1979), dismissed government appeals from final sentences because express statutory authority was absent and the sentences were not sufficiently severable or collateral under Carroll. The opinion also notes Denson’s examination of 18 U.S.C. § 3731; neither party relied on that statute in Rizo.
United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535 (11th Cir. 1985), similarly rejected reliance on § 1291 alone for a government appeal from a Rule 35(a) sentence reduction. Although decided after § 3742’s enactment, Dean concerned proceedings predating its effective application. The Eleventh Circuit therefore treated Denson and Dean as decisions from a different statutory landscape, rather than simply disregarding them.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), explains Denson’s precedential status. Under Bonner, qualifying former Fifth Circuit decisions bind the Eleventh Circuit. This made reconciliation with Denson a necessary part of the jurisdictional discussion.
5. The tension between Chotas and Chavarria-Herrara
United States v. Chotas, 913 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990), stated that jurisdiction over a government sentencing cross-appeal derived from § 1291. It described § 3742 as defining reviewable claims rather than altering the jurisdictional source. Rizo’s opinion identifies the difficulty in that formulation: Chotas did not address the earlier authorities requiring express authorization for government criminal appeals.
Chotas relied on United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1989). Fossett, however, involved a defendant’s appeal, not a government appeal. That distinction limits its usefulness in resolving the special restrictions applicable to prosecution appeals. Rizo’s opinion therefore does not treat Fossett as eliminating those restrictions.
United States v. Chavarria-Herrara, 15 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 1994), offered a different formulation. It held that § 3742(b) confers appellate jurisdiction over a government challenge to a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction when the resulting sentence falls within one of the statute’s listed categories. It also construed “sentence” and “imposed” to include sentence modifications, not merely original sentencing judgments.
That interpretation was particularly important in Rizo: a government challenge to a postjudgment reduction is not outside § 3742(b) merely because it concerns a modified sentence. Chavarria-Herrara itself vacated a reduction that rested on legally impermissible considerations, making it a close structural analogue.
United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1992), supplied part of Chavarria-Herrara’s reasoning. Its recognition of review under § 3742 for a defendant’s Rule 35(b) appeal supported the conclusion that the statute’s symmetrical structure also authorizes qualifying government appeals. Rizo recounts that reasoning without resolving every disagreement over the statute’s jurisdictional classification.
6. Jurisdictional requirements versus claim-processing rules
Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 547–50 (2019), was invoked by the government to challenge Chavarria-Herrara’s characterization of § 3742(b) as jurisdictional. Fort Bend distinguishes limits on judicial authority from procedural rules governing claims. The government argued that intervening Supreme Court doctrine had undermined the earlier terminology.
The Eleventh Circuit did not decide that contention. Because the government satisfied the relevant requirements under either classification, resolving whether intervening doctrine had displaced the older circuit formulation was unnecessary. Fort Bend therefore framed an expressly reserved question rather than supplying the holding.
7. Supporting authorities on finality and judicial power
| Precedent |
Contribution to the analysis |
| Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) |
Establishes the starting principle that federal courts possess only constitutionally and statutorily authorized jurisdiction. It explains why the court could not assume authority merely because the merits issue was straightforward. |
| Overlook Gardens Props., LLC v. ORIX USA, L.P., 927 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) |
Supports the court’s independent duty to verify appellate jurisdiction before deciding the merits. |
| United States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003) |
Characterizes § 3582(c) proceedings as criminal rather than civil. The special rules governing government criminal appeals therefore remain relevant despite the proceeding’s postjudgment setting. |
| Dunn v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 179 F.4th 1277, 1298 (11th Cir. 2026) |
Supplies the finality test: a decision ends the merits litigation and leaves only execution of the judgment. The order resolving Rizo’s reduction motion met that standard. |
| United States v. Shalhoub, 855 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2017), and Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984) |
Require especially strict application of finality in criminal cases. Even under that demanding approach, the completed sentence-reduction proceeding presented no finality obstacle. |
| United States v. Curry, 760 F.2d 1079, 1079 (11th Cir. 1985) |
Identifies the sentence as the final judgment in a criminal case, reinforcing the treatment of a completed sentencing determination as final. |
| Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 475 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2007) |
Explains that jurisdictional assumptions made without discussion are not authoritative holdings. Earlier government § 3582 appeals therefore did not conclusively resolve the question presented here. |
| United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2009) |
Illustrates an earlier government appeal that did not expressly discuss jurisdiction. Separately, it supports de novo review of whether a district court had legal authority to reduce a sentence. |
8. Standards of review and the earlier prosecution
United States v. Solomon, 136 F.4th 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2025), supports de novo review of appellate jurisdiction. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021), supplies both de novo review of compassionate-release eligibility and the requirements concerning extraordinary and compelling reasons, dangerousness, and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017), distinguishes that threshold legal inquiry from the abuse-of-discretion review applicable to a reduction decision once eligibility exists.
United States v. Gallego, 247 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2001), supplies the account of the underlying criminal scheme and records the affirmance of Rizo’s original sentence. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), appears because Rizo had invoked it in that earlier appeal to challenge his drug sentences. Neither case supplies a new basis for relief in the present proceeding; their role is historical rather than controlling.
B. Legal Reasoning
Finality and statutory authorization answer different questions
The jurisdictional analysis separates two propositions that can otherwise become blurred. Finality concerns whether the district court has completed the relevant proceeding. Statutory authorization concerns whether the government may pursue the particular criminal appeal.
Rizo’s sentence-reduction order was final because it completely disposed of the motion initiating the postjudgment proceeding. Nothing remained except implementing the modified sentence. The government also satisfied § 3742(b)(1) by presenting a cognizable claim that the reduction was imposed “in violation of law”: it argued that neither § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) nor a valid policy statement authorized relief on the asserted basis.
Importantly, the court did not equate every disagreement with a sentencing decision with statutory authorization to appeal. The government identified a threshold legal defect, rather than merely disputing how the district court weighed permissible considerations. Nor did the court make appellate authority depend on proving the government’s merits position in advance; a cognizable legal claim established the relevant statutory category.
The court adopted a narrow resolution of competing jurisdictional theories
Under one theory, § 1291 supplies jurisdiction while § 3742(b) supplies the necessary permission for a government appeal. Under the other, § 3742(b) itself supplies jurisdiction. Because both required finality and satisfaction of a listed statutory ground in this case, the court could sustain review without choosing between them.
This is a limited holding. It neither establishes that § 1291 alone permits government sentencing appeals nor conclusively reclassifies § 3742(b) as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing provision.
Statutory eligibility precedes discretionary sentencing judgment
On the merits, the district court’s favorable findings about dangerousness and the § 3553(a) factors could not cure the absence of a legally permissible extraordinary and compelling reason. Those considerations are additional requirements, not substitutes for the threshold statutory condition.
The court therefore did not need to reassess Rizo’s rehabilitation, weigh the seriousness of his offenses anew, or decide whether fifteen years was a sufficiently substantial disparity. Rutherford had already made the asserted basis legally unavailable. The size of the disparity could not change that conclusion.
The Commission’s authority is substantial but subordinate to statute
The district court had treated the statutory phrase as ambiguous and accepted the Commission’s inclusion of certain nonretroactive changes in law. Rutherford foreclosed that approach for this amendment. Congress’s delegation to describe extraordinary and compelling reasons operates alongside the express requirement that Commission policy statements remain consistent with federal law.
Accordingly, satisfying § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s factual conditions did not establish eligibility where its application conflicted with the controlling construction of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The defect was legal authority, not inadequate individualized consideration.