Good-Faith Reliance on Cell-Site-Simulator and CCTV Warrants; Drug Quantity as Sentencing Factor Under §§ 841(a) and 846

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a multi-month federal investigation into a Chicago-based drug-trafficking organization with connections to Mexico. The government used two surveillance technologies pursuant to warrants: (1) a cell-site simulator (often referred to as a “Stingray”) to identify the defendant’s then-unknown phone, and (2) a covert closed-circuit television (“CCTV”) camera placed inside the garage of a Carpentersville, Illinois stash house used to package and distribute drugs and proceeds.

Defendant Antonio Carrazco-Martinez was convicted after trial of (i) conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and (ii) possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). On appeal, he challenged:

• Suppression: denial of motions to suppress evidence derived from the cell-site simulator and the garage CCTV.
• Jury instructions: an instruction stating the government need not prove the specific drug quantity alleged to establish guilt.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, grounding its suppression analysis in the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and reaffirming circuit law that drug quantity is not an element of §§ 841(a) or 846 (though it can be a jury-found sentencing fact when it triggers mandatory minima).

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion’s architecture is built from three bodies of precedent: (i) Fourth Amendment remedies and the exclusionary rule, (ii) the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of technologically enhanced surveillance (especially video), and (iii) Sixth Amendment jury factfinding in drug cases.

A. Fourth Amendment remedies and the good-faith exception

• Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009): The court invoked these cases for the modern remedial framing of the exclusionary rule—suppression is not automatic upon a Fourth Amendment violation; it is a deterrence-driven remedy, applied when it will meaningfully deter unconstitutional police conduct.
• United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): Leon supplies the doctrinal engine. Where officers rely on a facially valid warrant, suppression is generally inappropriate because the marginal deterrent value is low. Leon’s good-faith exception is the decisive lens for both challenged warrants.
• United States v. Curtis, 901 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2021): These Seventh Circuit decisions reinforce that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is deterrence and that good-faith reliance on a warrant typically defeats suppression.
• United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Yarber, 915 F.3d 1103 (7th Cir. 2019): The court used these cases for the presumption that obtaining a warrant evidences good faith and to frame the “heavy burden” on defendants to rebut it.
• United States v. Matthews, 12 F.4th 647 (7th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Rees, 957 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2020): These cases supply the recognized pathways for defeating good faith: misleading the issuing judge, judicial abandonment of neutrality, extreme lack of probable cause, or facial deficiency/overbreadth preventing reasonable reliance.
• United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 2020): Cited for the appellate review framework (clear error for facts; de novo for legal conclusions), structuring how the panel approaches the suppression rulings.

B. Technology-assisted surveillance: cell-site simulators and video

• United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2016): Patrick is cited to describe how a cell-site simulator works. The Carrazco-Martinez panel also notes that whether such use constitutes a Fourth Amendment search remains open, but it analyzes the issue as if it were a search because the government proceeded by warrant. Patrick’s broader significance here is contextual: it underscores that cell-site simulators are not merely traditional pen registers in practical capability, thereby sharpening the defendant’s “misleading” argument—even though the panel rejects that argument on the application’s text.
• In re Warrant Application for Use of Canvassing Cell-Site Simulator, 654 F. Supp. 3d 694 (N.D. Ill. 2023): Cited for the proposition that simulators may have broader technical capacities (including potentially collecting more than dialed numbers), highlighting why courts scrutinize their use. The panel nonetheless accepts the government’s representation that content-collection capabilities were disabled and/or that any non-target data would be deleted without review.
• United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984): Torres is the pivotal video-surveillance precedent. The court reiterates Torres’s warning that television surveillance is “potentially so menacing to personal privacy” and its position that a video-surveillance warrant that fails to satisfy the four Title III-inspired provisions implementing particularity would violate the Fourth Amendment. In Carrazco-Martinez, Torres frames the defendant’s “necessity” attack under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), even though the appeal ultimately turns on good faith.

C. Jury factfinding, elements, and drug quantity

• United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995): Cited for the baseline constitutional rule: juries must find every element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt (Fifth/Sixth Amendments). The instruction dispute thus turns on whether drug quantity is an “element” of §§ 841(a) and 846.
• Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): These cases provide the modern jury-factfinding constraint: facts increasing statutory maxima (Apprendi) or mandatory minima (Alleyne) must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel uses them not to expand quantity-as-element doctrine, but to explain how quantity functions as a sentencing trigger even if not an element of guilt.
• United States v. Martinez, 518 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2008): This is the controlling circuit statement: drug quantity is not an element of the crimes defined by § 846 or § 841(a)(1). The panel relies on Martinez to validate Instruction 28’s core proposition.
• United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2013): Claybrooks is used to harmonize Martinez with Alleyne: while quantity is not an element of guilt, mandatory minimum exposure must be determined by the jury’s quantity finding (e.g., special verdict). This supports the instruction structure: guilt first (some measurable quantity), then quantity determination for statutory sentencing consequences.
• United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2010), United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2013): These cases supply the standard of review for jury instructions: de novo as to whether instructions accurately state the law, and abuse-of-discretion as to phrasing, with reversal only for misleading instructions that prejudice the defendant.
• United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir. 2015): Ajayi underwrites a crucial practical presumption: juries are assumed to follow instructions absent record evidence to the contrary. This presumption helps the panel reject the claim that Instructions 28 and 29 “confused” the jury into bypassing quantity findings.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Suppression: the opinion is a “good-faith” decision

The court sidestepped—by assumption rather than decision—two potentially far-reaching constitutional questions: (i) whether use of a cell-site simulator is a Fourth Amendment “search,” and (ii) the precise scope of Title III’s applicability to silent video surveillance. Instead, it treated the warrants as triggers for a robust presumption of reasonable police conduct.

The analytical sequence is consistent and decisive:

• Step 1: Because the government obtained warrants, officers are presumed to have acted in good faith.
• Step 2: The defendant bears a heavy burden to rebut good faith using the recognized Leon/Matthews/Rees pathways.
• Step 3: The defendant fails to carry that burden for both warrants on this record.

B. Cell-site simulator: “misleading the judge” fails on the face of the application

The defendant’s principal attack was rhetorical: the government allegedly dressed a Stingray request up as a routine “pen register.” The panel rejected that characterization by pointing to the application’s express disclosures: it specified “cell-site simulator” in the header and footnote and tied the request to the statutory definition of “pen register” in 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).

On that basis, the court concluded there was no showing that the affiant misled the issuing judge, nor that the warrant was so deficient that reliance was unreasonable. The panel also credited the government’s representation (consistent with Department of Justice policy as described in briefing) that the device’s broader collection abilities were disabled and that non-target information would be deleted without investigative use absent further court order.

Critically, the court did not announce that cell-site simulators categorically fit pen-register authority as a constitutional matter; it held only that, on these facts, any suppression remedy was blocked by good faith.

C. CCTV in the garage: necessity arguments do not defeat good faith absent falsity or recklessness

The defendant’s developed argument focused on “necessity” under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) as imported into video warrants by United States v. Torres. He contended that the government already had substantial evidence (many identified conspirators; pole-camera surveillance) and “overstated” the need for a hidden camera in the garage.

The panel treated this as, in substance, a claim that the government misled the issuing judge. It found the record insufficient because the affidavit articulated reasons why other methods were inadequate—especially given the international scope of the organization and the need to identify and prove the roles of those handling and transporting the drugs (not merely proceeds or communications).

Absent contradictions or evidence of falsity/recklessness, a defendant’s disagreement with investigative judgment does not convert a necessity debate into a Leon exception. Thus, the warrant’s alleged weakness did not translate into a showing that officers’ reliance was unreasonable.

D. Jury instructions: separating “guilt elements” from “mandatory-minimum triggers”

The court resolved the instruction challenge by drawing a sharp doctrinal distinction:

• Elements of guilt: Under United States v. Martinez, drug quantity is not an element of § 846 or § 841(a). The government must prove only that the offense involved a controlled substance (here described as “some measurable quantity”).
• Sentencing facts with statutory effect: Under Alleyne v. United States and United States v. Claybrooks, if quantity increases a mandatory minimum (e.g., § 841(b)(1)(A) thresholds), the jury must find that quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Read together, Instruction 28 (no need to prove the specific alleged quantity to convict) and Instruction 29 (jury must determine the amount involved upon conviction) were deemed legally accurate and not misleading, especially given the presumption from United States v. Ajayi that juries follow instructions.

3.3 Impact

A. Practical reinforcement of “good faith first” in surveillance litigation

The opinion exemplifies a continuing appellate trend: challenges to novel surveillance methods often fail not because the surveillance is definitively constitutional, but because suppression is foreclosed by good-faith reliance on a warrant. For practitioners, this reinforces that suppression motions must be built to defeat Leon—through concrete evidence of misstatements, omissions, reckless disregard, or facial deficiencies—rather than by arguing the technology is “intrusive” in the abstract.

B. Cell-site simulators: disclosure in the application matters

The court’s emphasis on the application’s express reference to a “cell-site simulator” highlights a litigation fault line: suppression arguments premised on “pen register” euphemisms will be difficult where the government is explicit about the tool and its statutory theory. Future disputes in the Seventh Circuit are likely to focus on (i) the simulator’s actual capabilities and minimization/deletion practices, (ii) whether a warrant supported by probable cause (rather than pen-register relevance) is constitutionally required, and (iii) whether any nondisclosure about capabilities or collateral collection crosses the Franks/Leon line.

C. Video surveillance: Torres remains a warning, but good faith can dominate the remedy

By reiterating United States v. Torres and referencing Title III’s necessity concept, the panel signaled continued sensitivity to covert video monitoring, particularly when installed in highly private spaces. Yet Carrazco-Martinez shows that even a robust “necessity” critique may not yield suppression unless it is tethered to the Leon exceptions (e.g., demonstrable falsity, reckless omissions, or plainly deficient warrants).

D. Drug quantity instructions: doctrinal clarity for trials using special verdicts

The decision strengthens trial-court confidence in a two-step instruction framework in § 841/§ 846 cases: guilt does not require the indictment’s specific quantity, but mandatory-minimum exposure does require a jury quantity finding beyond a reasonable doubt. This reduces the risk that juries will treat a quantity dispute as a guilt-or-innocence dispute, while preserving Alleyne compliance through special findings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cell-site simulator (“Stingray”): A device that pretends to be a cell tower so nearby phones connect to it, allowing police to learn identifying information (like phone numbers) and, depending on configuration, potentially more. The court accepted that the government limited collection here.
• Pen register (18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)): Traditionally records dialing/routing/signaling information (metadata), not the content of communications. The government’s warrant application treated the simulator as fitting this definition.
• Exclusionary rule: A rule that can bar illegally obtained evidence at trial. It is not a personal “right” to exclusion; it is a remedy designed to deter police misconduct.
• Good-faith exception (Leon): Even if a warrant is later found flawed, evidence is usually not suppressed if officers reasonably relied on it. A defendant must show serious problems (e.g., lying to the judge, totally lacking probable cause, or facially deficient scope) to defeat good faith.
• Title III “necessity” (18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)): For wiretaps (and by analogy in some video cases), the government must explain why other investigative methods failed or are unlikely to work or are too dangerous. Disagreeing with that explanation is not enough to win suppression without proof of deception or recklessness.
• Element vs. sentencing factor: An “element” must be proved to convict. A “sentencing factor” can affect punishment. After Apprendi/Alleyne, a sentencing fact that raises statutory maximums or mandatory minimums must still be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Seventh Circuit, drug quantity is not an element of guilt under §§ 841(a) and 846, but it is a jury-found trigger for certain mandatory minima under § 841(b).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Carrazco-Martinez is less a constitutional pronouncement on cutting-edge surveillance than a pointed reaffirmation of remedial doctrine: where investigators secure judicial warrants and defendants cannot show deception, abandonment of neutrality, or facial deficiency, the Leon good-faith exception will typically defeat suppression—even in technologically sophisticated investigations involving cell-site simulators and covert video.

On the trial side, the opinion also consolidates Seventh Circuit doctrine on drug quantity: guilt under § 841(a) and § 846 does not require proof of the indictment’s specific quantity, while statutory mandatory minimums do require a jury quantity finding beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision thus endorses a bifurcated instructional approach (guilt first, quantity finding second) as consistent with Gaudin, Apprendi, and Alleyne.