Gang Extortion Threats Are Not “On Account Of” a Protected Ground Without Evidence of Motive, and Unfulfilled Extortion Threats Typically Do Not Meet CAT “Torture”

1. Introduction

Case: Christina Lopez-Villeda v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (not precedential).
Parties: Christina De Los Angelos Lopez-Villeda (lead petitioner) and her two daughters (derivative applicants) vs. the Attorney General of the United States.
Procedural posture: Petition for review of a BIA final order affirming an IJ’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection.

After entering the United States without inspection, Lopez-Villeda sought relief based on threats from suspected Mara 13 gang members in Honduras who demanded weekly payments from her small clothing stand and threatened to kill her and her daughters if she did not pay. The key legal issues were:

  • Nexus (asylum/withholding): whether the extortion threats were “on account of” a protected ground—here, asserted “particular social groups” (PSGs) such as “Honduran single mothers” and “Honduran single mothers of daughters.”
  • CAT eligibility: whether the threats and feared harm amounted to “torture,” and whether any torture would occur with government “consent or acquiescence.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit denied the petition for review, upholding the agency’s determinations that:

  • Asylum/withholding: Substantial evidence supported the finding that the gang’s threats were economically motivated extortion, not persecution “on account of” a protected ground. Lopez-Villeda did not provide “some evidence” (direct or circumstantial) that her gender or single-mother status was a central reason for the threats.
  • CAT: The threats did not rise to the regulatory definition of torture, and the record did not compel the conclusion that she would more likely than not be tortured if returned. The Court also noted the absence of evidence tying Honduran officials to the threats.

The Court emphasized a critical administrative-law limitation: because the BIA did not adopt the IJ’s “non-cognizable PSG” analysis, the Court would not affirm on that ground.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Scope and standard of appellate review

  • Uddin v. Att'y Gen., 870 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Olivia-Ramos v. Att'y Gen., 694 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2012)): Where the BIA defers to or relies on the IJ’s reasoning, the court reviews both decisions. This justified the panel’s combined review while still respecting what the BIA actually decided.
  • Thayalan v. Att'y Gen., 997 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2021) and Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc): These anchor the substantial evidence standard—agency fact findings are conclusive unless the record compels a contrary conclusion. The panel used this lens to uphold the agency’s motive (nexus) findings and CAT likelihood assessment.

B. Asylum/withholding framework: burden, presumptions, and nexus

  • Toure v. Att'y Gen., 443 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2006): When an applicant shows past persecution, they receive a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. Here, even assuming past persecution, the case turned on nexus—the protected-ground link still must be proven.
  • INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987): Establishes that withholding requires a higher probability (“more likely than not”) than asylum. This supports the court’s reasoning that failure on asylum typically forecloses withholding.
  • Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003)): Reinforces that inability to meet asylum’s standard generally defeats withholding due to the higher burden.
  • Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att'y Gen., 781 F.3d 677 (3d Cir. 2015): Supplies the “one central reason” nexus formulation. The panel applied it to conclude that economic gain—rather than group membership—was the driver.
  • Guzman Orellana v. Att'y Gen., 956 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2020): An example of affirming a no-nexus finding where the protected ground was not shown to motivate persecution. The panel used it as a comparator for the evidentiary failure on motive.
  • INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992): Central to the outcome. It holds an applicant need not show direct proof of motive but must offer “some evidence” of persecutor motive; appellate courts cannot reverse unless evidence compels the opposite inference. The panel relied on this to uphold the agency’s conclusion that extortion threats lacked a protected-ground motive.
  • Doe v. Att'y Gen., 956 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoted in Thayalan): Clarifies deference does not apply to findings premised on legal misunderstanding. The panel invoked this principle to frame review, even while concluding no legal error occurred.
  • Ndayshimiye v. Att'y Gen., 557 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2009): Protected status cannot play merely an “incidental, tangential, or superficial role.” The court used this to explain why threats to children, without evidence of animus tied to “single mother of daughters,” can still be understood as an extortion tactic rather than protected-ground persecution.

C. Limits on affirming on alternative grounds (administrative law constraint)

  • Orabi v. Att'y Gen., 738 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2014) and Li v. Att'y Gen., 400 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2005): The court cannot uphold an agency decision on a ground the agency did not rely on. This is why the panel did not decide whether the proposed PSGs were cognizable, even though the IJ had rejected them.

D. CAT framework: two-prong inquiry, torture definition, intent, and family-safety inference

  • Myrie v. Att'y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017): Sets out the two-prong CAT analysis: (1) what is likely to happen and whether it is “torture” (mixed factual/legal), and (2) how officials will respond and whether it is acquiescence. The panel applied this structure and affirmed primarily on prong (1), then noted prong (2) also failed on this record.
  • Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att'y Gen., 837 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2016): Supports the inference that when similarly situated family remains in the country unharmed, it can “undercut” an applicant’s claimed likelihood of future severe harm.
  • Pierre v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc): Emphasizes CAT requires that a prospective torturer have the “goal or purpose” of inflicting severe pain or suffering. The panel used Pierre to distinguish extortion threats aimed at obtaining money from acts intended to inflict severe pain for its own sake or as a primary purpose.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Asylum and withholding: the decision turns on nexus, not credibility or hardship

Two aspects are notable. First, the IJ found Lopez-Villeda credible and even found past persecution based on the threats. Second, despite that favorable credibility posture and the presumption of future persecution that can follow, the claim failed because the agency (and the court) treated motive as the essential missing link.

The panel accepted the agency’s central factual determination: the gang threatened Lopez-Villeda to extract money, not because of hostility toward “Honduran women,” “Honduran single mothers,” “Honduran single mothers of daughters,” or “Honduran small business owners.” The opinion highlights that Lopez-Villeda herself testified that gangs extorted businesses regardless of the owner’s sex or family status. From that, a reasonable factfinder could conclude the protected-ground explanations were not “one central reason.”

The court also treated the threat to harm her children as consistent with extortion mechanics (increasing pressure to pay), rather than evidence of targeting her because she was the mother of daughters. Under Ndayshimiye v. Att'y Gen., even if a protected trait is present, it must be more than incidental to the persecution.

B. The court’s restraint: refusing to decide PSG cognizability

A key administrative-law feature is the panel’s refusal to affirm on the IJ’s PSG-cognizability ground because the BIA did not reach it. Citing Orabi v. Att'y Gen. and Li v. Att'y Gen., the panel confined itself to the rationale the BIA actually adopted: no nexus. Practically, this channels future litigants’ focus toward what the BIA explicitly decides—and encourages careful issue preservation and BIA merits engagement.

C. CAT: unfulfilled extortion threats and the “torture” threshold

On CAT, the panel affirmed the agency’s view that the record did not compel a finding that the feared harm was “torture” under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a). The court emphasized:

  • No physical harm occurred before departure.
  • Threats were unfulfilled, and the predicted future harm remained insufficiently developed in the record to compel a torture finding.
  • Family remained unharmed in Honduras, a fact the IJ treated as undermining likelihood (citing Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att'y Gen.).
  • Purpose/intent matters: the record showed the gang’s purpose was to obtain money, not to inflict severe pain or suffering as such (citing Pierre v. Att'y Gen.).

Having found no likelihood of torture, the panel stated it “need not” reach acquiescence, but it nevertheless noted the record also lacked evidence connecting government officials to the threats—supporting denial under the acquiescence requirement too.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is significant as a practical application of established Third Circuit and Supreme Court doctrine in a recurring fact pattern: gang extortion of small businesses accompanied by threats to family members.

  • For asylum/withholding applicants: The decision underscores that credible testimony about danger and even past persecution may still fail without evidence that a protected ground was a central motive. Applicants facing generalized extortion must develop facts showing why they were targeted beyond being an available source of money—e.g., statements by persecutors, patterns of selecting victims because of a protected trait, or country-condition evidence tied directly to the applicant’s subgroup and the persecutor’s motives.
  • For PSG litigation: The panel’s reliance on the BIA’s chosen ground (nexus) illustrates how cases can be resolved without reaching PSG cognizability. This can leave PSG questions unsettled in individual cases and places added importance on building the record for both PSG and nexus.
  • For CAT claims: The opinion reinforces a demanding threshold: threats linked to extortion, without more, often will not satisfy “torture,” particularly where evidence of severe harm, specific intent/purpose to inflict severe suffering, and likelihood is thin. It also signals the continued relevance of evidence that family members remain in-country unharmed.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Particular social group” (PSG): A protected category under asylum law defined by specific legal criteria (not fully analyzed here because the BIA did not decide it). In practice, applicants must show their proposed group is recognized under the INA and that they are targeted because of membership in it.
  • “Nexus” / “on account of”: The causal link between the harm and a protected ground. It is not enough that the applicant is, for example, a single mother; she must show that status is a central reason the persecutor targeted her.
  • “One central reason”: A protected ground must be a major motivating factor—not merely incidental—among the reasons for the harm.
  • “Substantial evidence” review: The court does not re-weigh facts. It asks whether the agency’s view is reasonable on the record. Reversal is warranted only if the record compels the opposite finding.
  • CAT “torture”: Defined as an “extreme” form of cruel and inhuman treatment, beyond lesser mistreatment. It also requires involvement (directly or by acquiescence) of government officials.
  • Government “acquiescence”: Not mere inability to control crime; it generally requires that officials know of (or are willfully blind to) the torture and breach their legal responsibility to intervene, depending on the governing regulatory standards applied in the circuit.

5. Conclusion

Christina Lopez-Villeda v. Attorney General United States of America is a clear reaffirmation of two decisive limits in protection claims arising from gang activity:

  • Asylum/withholding: Even where threats are serious and an IJ finds past persecution, relief can be denied if the record supports that the persecutor’s motive was economic extortion rather than a protected ground, and the applicant lacks “some evidence” of protected-ground motive as required by INS v. Elias-Zacarias.
  • CAT: Unfulfilled extortion threats, without evidence compelling a likelihood of severe pain or suffering inflicted for a qualifying purpose, typically will not satisfy the stringent definition of “torture,” particularly where the record lacks evidence of government linkage or acquiescence and where family safety evidence undercuts future-risk claims.

While nonprecedential, the opinion functions as a cautionary template: successful claims in gang-extortion contexts usually rise or fall on the applicant’s ability to prove motive (nexus) and to substantiate torture-level severity and likelihood under CAT with concrete, individualized evidence.