Future Medical Expenses Within PIP Limits Are “Collectible” and Inadmissible Under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 (Including UCJF PIP)

I. Introduction

In Lakita D. Murray v. Christopher B. Punina (with defendant-respondent Anthony Marrone, II), the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed a recurring no-fault damages question: may an auto-accident plaintiff present evidence of future medical expenses to a jury in a tort action when those expenses fall within the plaintiff’s remaining personal injury protection (PIP) limits?

The case arose from a 2016 collision in which plaintiff Lakita Murray was injured as a passenger. Because the vehicle she occupied was uninsured and she lacked household auto coverage, she obtained PIP benefits through the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF), administered by the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (NJPLIGA), up to $250,000. Her pretrial medical treatment did not exhaust those limits. At trial against the drivers, the jury awarded non-economic damages and $100,000 for future medical expenses based on expert testimony estimating future treatment costs.

The core issues were (1) whether N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to PIP benefits available through the UCJF, and (2) whether future medical expenses not exceeding PIP limits are “collectible” and therefore inadmissible in the tort trial. A consequential remedial issue followed: whether the inclusion of inadmissible future-medical damages improperly triggered enhanced awards under the offer of judgment rule.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court unanimously held that future medical expense benefits that do not exceed a claimant’s PIP coverage limits are “collectible” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 and are therefore inadmissible in a plaintiff’s personal injury trial against a tortfeasor. The Court further held that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF-provided PIP.

Applying those rules, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s partial reversal: the future medical expense award should not have gone to the jury and had to be removed from the judgment, and the removal also eliminated the basis for the additional award of costs/fees under Rule 4:58.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Statutory-interpretation framework

  • Wiggins v. Hackensack Meridian Health: cited for de novo review of statutory interpretation and the primacy of text in discerning legislative intent.
  • DiProspero v. Penn (and Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno): used to underscore that courts begin with ordinary meaning and context, turning to extrinsic sources only if ambiguity persists.
  • Savage v. Township of Neptune: invoked for the principle that clear statutory text ends the interpretive inquiry.

2. UCJF and “PIP” equivalence across statutory schemes

  • Sanders v. Langemeier: the key harmonization precedent. The Court relied on Sanders to reaffirm that “personal injury protection” in the UCJF statute is a general reference encompassing PIP benefits across standard, basic, and special policies, and that the UCJF statute’s use of “benefits under the [No-Fault Act] would be payable” signals incorporation of the no-fault PIP framework.
  • Jimenez v. Baglieri (quoting Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.): cited for the UCJF’s purpose—providing the kind of protection a liability policy would provide—supporting “no more, no less” equivalence rather than enhanced recovery.
  • Caballero v. Martinez: cited to confirm that the UCJF provides for recovery of PIP benefits, reinforcing that UCJF PIP is part of the same benefits universe the no-fault scheme addresses.
  • Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.: further cited for the proposition that UCJF PIP provisions “track” the No-Fault Law in virtually all respects—supporting consistent treatment of “PIP” across both statutes.

3. No-fault purpose, double recovery, and the evidentiary bar

  • Gambino v. Royal Globe Ins. Cos.: used to situate the No-Fault Act’s goals (prompt payment regardless of fault; reduced litigation; manageable costs).
  • Adams v. Cooper Hosp.: cited for reading N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 as reflecting legislative awareness of preventing double recovery by PIP-eligible plaintiffs.
  • Haines v. Taft: provided historical context. The Court recounted that Haines upheld the exclusion of medical expenses above PIP limits under the pre-2019 statutory text, and noted the Legislature’s subsequent amendment overturning Haines while retaining the “collectible or paid” evidentiary bar.
  • Bardis v. First Trenton Ins. Co.: relied upon for the principle that the core purpose of the scheme is avoiding double recovery.
  • Lambert v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am.: used to reinforce the policy against allowing plaintiffs to recover from tortfeasors medical expenses payable under PIP coverage.

4. Defining “collectible” and addressing limitations concerns

  • Amaru v. Stratton; Tullis v. Teial; Mokienko v. Greenan (quoting Wagner v. Transam. Ins. Co.): cited for the settled understanding that “collectible” means amounts “legally due” as PIP benefits.
  • Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co. (and the Supreme Court affirmance), plus Rahnefeld v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford (quoting Lind v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.): used to reject the amicus concern that barring tort-trial proof of future medicals forces piecemeal litigation due to a PIP statute of limitations; these cases recognize a “future treatment exception” where future care is contemplated.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 applies to UCJF PIP

The Court rejected the argument that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 is limited to enumerated policy types and does not reach UCJF PIP. Instead, it read the UCJF statute’s express trigger— “when [PIP] benefits under the [No-Fault Act] would be payable,” N.J.S.A. 39:6-86.1—as importing the No-Fault Act’s PIP concept wholesale. Relying heavily on Sanders v. Langemeier and the UCJF’s remedial purpose described in Jimenez v. Baglieri, the Court reasoned that excluding UCJF claimants from N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12 would create a perverse superiority: UCJF recipients could potentially obtain both PIP payment and tort recovery for the same medical loss, while standard no-fault insureds could not—contradicting the “no more, no less” design of UCJF coverage.

2. “Collectible” includes future medical expenses within remaining PIP limits

The opinion’s doctrinal centerpiece is its interpretation of “amounts collectible or paid” in the post-2019 version of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12. The Legislature amended the statute to ensure plaintiffs can claim, against tortfeasors, uncompensated medical expenses not covered by PIP limits (i.e., amounts exceeding or outside coverage), but it did not alter the front-end evidentiary exclusion for amounts “collectible or paid.”

The Court drew a sharp line:

  • Inadmissible: medical expenses that are covered by PIP and thus collectible (legally due once incurred), even if not yet incurred (future) or not yet paid.
  • Admissible: medical expenses that are uncompensated and not covered by PIP limits (expenses exceeding limits or otherwise uncovered).

Crucially, the Court refused to equate “unpaid” with “not collectible.” It reasoned that a plaintiff could otherwise inflate tort damages simply by postponing treatment until after trial, shifting costs from the PIP payer (here, the UCJF/NJPLIGA mechanism) to the defendant, undermining the no-fault tradeoff and encouraging double recovery.

3. Application and the offer-of-judgment consequence

Because the plaintiff’s projected future medical expenses ($42,000–$160,000) would not exhaust her remaining $250,000 PIP limits, they were “collectible” and should never have been presented to the jury. Once removed, the judgment against Marrone was correspondingly reduced, which also eliminated the predicate for the additional costs/fees awarded under Rule 4:58 (the offer-of-judgment mechanism).

4. Addressing statute-of-limitations/piecemeal litigation concerns

Responding to the NJAJ’s policy argument, the Court relied on Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co. and Rahnefeld v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford to explain that the PIP limitations period is flexible when future care is reasonably anticipated and the payer is chargeable with knowledge of future treatment. The Court thereby positioned PIP (including arbitration) as a viable, timely avenue for future-medical claims.

C. Impact

  • Trial practice shift: Plaintiffs may not use expert future-medical projections as tort damages when those costs are within remaining PIP limits. This will narrow damages presentations and likely reduce jury confusion over economic components in auto personal-injury trials.
  • Incentive realignment: The decision removes any litigation advantage from delaying recommended treatment to convert PIP-covered expenses into tort-trial “unpaid” losses.
  • Greater reliance on PIP processes: Future-medical disputes are pushed toward PIP claim channels (including arbitration). The opinion’s reference to Forthright procedures—raised by NJDA—signals judicial comfort with that forum for future-treatment issues.
  • Offer-of-judgment ramifications: Because Rule 4:58 consequences hinge on the judgment amount, litigants should expect more frequent post-verdict challenges where any component of damages was statutorily inadmissible.
  • UCJF parity: UCJF PIP recipients are firmly aligned with mainstream no-fault insureds on evidentiary treatment of PIP-covered losses, reinforcing uniformity and limiting UCJF recoveries to equivalent—not enhanced—protection.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • PIP (Personal Injury Protection): “No-fault” medical coverage that pays accident-related medical expenses regardless of who caused the crash, up to policy limits (often $250,000).
  • UCJF (Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund): A statutory backstop that can provide PIP-type benefits when an injured person lacks access to an auto policy (e.g., struck while in an uninsured car and no household coverage applies).
  • “Collectible” (in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12): Not “already paid,” but “legally due/eligible to be paid” under PIP once the expense is incurred. Future expenses can be “collectible” even though they have not happened yet.
  • Why the jury can’t hear “collectible” medical losses: The no-fault system channels covered medical costs to PIP payers, while tort suits generally focus on non-economic damages and economic losses not covered by PIP. Letting juries award PIP-covered medicals risks double recovery.
  • Offer of judgment (Rule 4:58): A settlement tool that can shift fees/costs if a party rejects an offer and the eventual judgment crosses a threshold. If a damages component was wrongly included, the threshold analysis can change.
  • PIP statute of limitations and “future treatment exception”: Although PIP claims generally must be brought within two years, cases like Zupo and Rahnefeld recognize flexibility where future care was reasonably expected.

V. Conclusion

This decision establishes a clear evidentiary rule: future medical expenses within remaining PIP limits are “collectible” and therefore inadmissible in tort trials under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12, and that rule applies equally when PIP is provided through the UCJF. The Court’s approach reinforces the no-fault tradeoff, prevents double recovery, and channels covered medical-loss disputes—present and future—into the PIP system rather than the jury box.