Date: Mar 9, 2026

FTCA “Line of Duty” Limits: Personal Meal Trips During Temporary Duty Training Are Outside Scope Despite Authorized Government Vehicle Use

1. Introduction

Conchas Mesraje v. United States (5th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026) arises from a traffic accident in San Antonio, Texas involving Sergeant Avery Humberto Luengo, an active-duty U.S. Marine attending recruiter “refresher” training. The Marine Corps authorized Sgt. Luengo to drive a government vehicle to the training location and permitted use of the vehicle to obtain food during the training period. After being dismissed for the day, Sgt. Luengo changed into civilian clothes and drove toward a Chinese restaurant for his own meal; en route, he ran a stop sign and collided with Karen Monserrat Conchas Mesraje and Staci Sean Smith, who suffered serious injuries.

Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging vicarious liability for Sgt. Luengo’s negligence on the theory that he was acting within the “course and scope” of his employment (i.e., “line of duty” under the FTCA for servicemembers). The central issue was whether a servicemember on temporary duty/training, using a government vehicle with permission to obtain meals, is acting within scope while driving to dinner after being released for the day.

The district court granted summary judgment for the Government, holding Sgt. Luengo was not within the course and scope at the time of the accident. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit applied Texas respondeat superior law (because the accident occurred in Texas) to determine scope/“line of duty.”
It held the undisputed facts showed Sgt. Luengo was on a personal errand (going to eat after dismissal), not acting “in furtherance of the USMC’s business.”
Even assuming the overall trip could be characterized as a “special mission,” the court found a personal deviation at the time of the crash, defeating scope.
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ effort to invoke “special factors characteristic of military activity and discipline,” distinguishing earlier Fifth Circuit military-order cases.
Summary judgment was affirmed because no genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding the nature of the trip at the time of the accident.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. FTCA framework and choice of law

Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021): Cited for the FTCA’s function as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of employment. The opinion uses Brownback to situate the dispute within the FTCA’s scope-of-employment requirement.
Bodin v. Vagshenian, 462 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2006): Cited for the principle that FTCA liability is determined “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred,” prompting application of Texas law.

B. Texas scope-of-employment test

Counts v. Guevara, 328 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995)): Supplies the three-part Texas scope test: (1) within general authority; (2) in furtherance of employer’s business; (3) for accomplishment of the object of employment. The Fifth Circuit treats the “furtherance” element as decisive here.
Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2018): Reinforces that course-and-scope is an objective inquiry and confirms the “coming-and-going rule” applies to vicarious liability. The panel relies on Painter both for the objective nature of the inquiry and for the travel-to/from-work baseline rule.

C. Vehicle-use presumption and its collapse upon contrary proof

Garcia v. United States, 88 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing J & C Drilling Co. v. Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, reh'g denied)): States the procedural presumption that an employee driving the employer’s vehicle is within scope—important because Sgt. Luengo was driving a government vehicle.
EAN Holdings, LLC v. Arce, 636 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied): Clarifies the presumption is not evidence and vanishes when “positive evidence” shows a personal errand or lack of furtherance of employer business. The opinion uses this to explain why government-vehicle use does not create a triable issue once the personal nature of the trip is established.

D. Coming-and-going rule and “special mission” exception

Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 303 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1957): Foundation for the coming-and-going rule and the “special mission” exception (“undertakes a special mission at the direction of his employer…”). The panel uses Coleman through Garcia and Painter to frame Plaintiffs’ exception argument.
Garcia v. United States, 88 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 1996): Also functions as the key “special mission” comparator: even if travel is part of a mission, a personal deviation (restaurants/drinks/pharmacy) defeats scope at the accident moment. The Fifth Circuit treats Garcia as essentially controlling for “temporary duty + per diem + authorized vehicle” facts.
Lutz v. United States, 685 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1982): Cited by Plaintiffs to argue that being in the city for official business defeats the coming-and-going rule. The Fifth Circuit does not adopt Lutz, instead applying Texas scope principles and its own precedent.
Davis v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. 6:20-CV-01178, 2022 WL 18034360 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2022); Vasquez v. United States, No. 23-CV-727, 2024 WL 2331801 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2024): Nonbinding district court authorities invoked by Plaintiffs regarding special mission. The panel distinguishes them (no fact issue here; and Sgt. Luengo was not traveling to work but to dinner after dismissal).

E. Fifth Circuit military “special factors” line-of-duty cases (distinguished)

Weaver v. U.S. Coast Guard, 857 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Tex. 1994): Cited by Plaintiffs for “special factors characteristic of military activity and discipline.” The Fifth Circuit declines to apply that lens here.
Hinson v. United States, 257 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Culp, 346 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Hallberg v. Hilburn, 434 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1970); Craft v. United States, 542 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1976): Plaintiffs’ cited military cases where servicemembers were traveling under specific orders or performing assigned duties. The panel distinguishes them because Sgt. Luengo was not under specific travel orders at the moment and was not performing a specifically assigned duty (unlike Craft).
Weaver v. U.S. Coast Guard, 53 F.3d 1282, *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam): Used affirmatively by the panel to show that when military personnel are “free to do as they pleased” during authorized liberty, their conduct is not within scope. This parallels Sgt. Luengo being “dismissed for the day” and free to do as he wished.

F. Meal travel as personal purpose (even on assignment)

Moye v. United States, 218 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1955): A foundational Fifth Circuit case treating an airman’s choice to drive to meals as serving no Air Force business absent direction. The panel analogizes: no USMC business was furthered by Sgt. Luengo’s decision to drive to a restaurant for himself, even though he was in San Antonio for training.

G. Per diem/travel allowance not dispositive

Cameron Int'l Corp. v. Martinez, 662 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (citing Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., 653 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981)): Cited for the proposition that payment of a travel allowance is not sufficient to create a fact issue on course-and-scope at a specific point in time. The panel uses this to reject Plaintiffs’ reliance on lodging and per diem as creating a triable inference.

H. Summary judgment standards (procedural framing)

Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Burell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 820 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 2016)): Establishes de novo review and the Rule 56 standard.
Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)): Defines “material” and “genuine” disputes.
Lamb v. Ashford Place Apartments L.L.C., 914 F.3d 940 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam)): Rejects conclusory or scintilla evidence to defeat summary judgment.
Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d 605 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Env't Conservation Org. v. City of Dall., 529 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2008)): Reinforces viewing evidence in the nonmovant’s favor.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

FTCA “scope/line of duty” hinges on state law. The panel treats “scope of employment,” “course and scope,” and “line of duty” as interchangeable labels in this context, but the controlling test is Texas’s objective scope-of-employment standard.
“Furtherance of employer business” is the decisive element. Even though the USMC authorized use of the vehicle and provided lodging and per diem, the question was what Sgt. Luengo was doing at the time of the accident: he had been dismissed, changed into civilian clothes, carried no official materials, had no recruit, and was not conducting recruiting duties.
Government-vehicle presumption is procedural and collapses. The fact that he drove a government vehicle triggers a presumption under Garcia, but EAN Holdings, LLC v. Arce clarifies that positive evidence of a personal errand makes the presumption “vanish.” The undisputed record supplied that contrary evidence.
The “special mission” concept does not rescue a personal deviation. The court adopts the analytic move from Garcia: even if the broader travel to San Antonio for training could be labeled a mission, a personal dinner run after dismissal is a deviation not undertaken in furtherance of USMC business.
Military “special factors” do not apply absent specific orders or assigned tasks. By distinguishing Hinson v. United States, United States v. Culp, Hallberg v. Hilburn, and Craft v. United States, the panel signals that military status alone does not expand “line of duty” where the servicemember is functionally off-duty and free to pursue personal matters— a point reinforced by Weaver v. U.S. Coast Guard (1995).
Per diem and lodging are not enough. Citing Cameron Int'l Corp. v. Martinez and Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., the panel rejects the idea that travel allowances convert personal acts into employer business or create a fact issue by themselves.

3.3. Impact

Clarifies the limits of FTCA vicarious liability for temporary duty/training travel in Texas. The opinion strengthens the practical rule that even when the Government authorizes a vehicle, lodging, and meal per diem, a servicemember’s post-dismissal trip to eat is ordinarily a personal activity unless tied to assigned duties or specific orders.
Reinforces “moment-of-accident” analysis. The panel’s reliance on Garcia emphasizes that courts will isolate the employee’s purpose at the time of the collision; broader business travel does not automatically sweep in all incidental personal movement.
Limits “special mission” and “military special factors” arguments. Litigants seeking FTCA liability for off-duty or liberty-period driving by servicemembers face a higher hurdle absent evidence of directive control (orders), assigned tasks, or direct business furtherance.
Procedural effect on summary judgment practice. The decision illustrates that plaintiffs cannot reach a jury merely by pointing to employer-provided vehicles/per diem; they must produce evidence connecting the specific trip to the employer’s business objectives.
Note on precedential weight. The opinion is “not designated for publication” under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, so its direct precedential force is limited; however, it is built almost entirely on published Fifth Circuit and Texas authority, signaling how those controlling cases are likely to be applied to similar facts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

FTCA (Federal Tort Claims Act): A statute allowing people to sue the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees, but only when the employee was acting within the scope of employment (for servicemembers: “in the line of duty”).
Vicarious liability / respondeat superior: An employer can be responsible for an employee’s negligence if the employee was doing the employer’s work (or something closely connected to it) at the time of the negligent act.
Course and scope / line of duty: The legal boundary between on-the-job conduct (employer may be liable) and personal conduct (employer usually not liable). Texas focuses heavily on whether the employee was acting “in furtherance” of the employer’s business.
Coming-and-going rule: Generally, travel to and from work is not considered within the scope of employment.
Special mission exception: A narrow exception: if the employer directs (expressly or implicitly) the employee to travel for a specific business purpose, the travel may fall within scope. But even then, a personal detour can remove the employee from scope at that time.
Personal deviation: A break from the employer’s business for personal reasons (e.g., social activity, errands, or—here—going to dinner after being released), which defeats scope when the accident occurs during that deviation.
Presumption from driving an employer vehicle: Texas recognizes a procedural presumption that someone driving the employer’s vehicle may be within scope. It is not proof by itself and disappears when evidence shows the trip was personal.
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact requiring a jury; the moving party wins as a matter of law. Here, the court found the key facts about the trip’s personal nature were undisputed.

5. Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit’s decision affirms a tightly bounded view of “line of duty” under the FTCA when Texas law governs: authorization to travel, use of a government vehicle, and receipt of per diem do not, without more, transform personal meal travel into conduct “in furtherance” of the employer’s business. By anchoring its reasoning in Garcia v. United States, Moye v. United States, Weaver v. U.S. Coast Guard, and Texas authorities such as Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., the court underscores a practical rule for future FTCA cases: liability turns on what the servicemember was doing at the moment of the accident—and personal deviations, even during official travel, generally fall outside scope.