Fourth Circuit (Unpublished): Sovereign-Citizen Rhetoric Alone Does Not Trigger a Sua Sponte Competency Evaluation, and Consent Waives Confrontation Objections to Rule 15 Video Depositions

Case: United States of America v. Willie Lamont Hicks; United States of America v. Mary Ann Mendoza (consolidated) (No. 24-4125; No. 24-4127)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (unpublished per curiam)
Decision: Affirmed

I. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arises from a jury conviction of Willie Lamont Hicks and Mary Ann Mendoza for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud stemming from in-person “financial success” workshops that the Government proved were a sham. Hicks delivered the lectures; Mendoza managed the operation’s finances and interacted with students. Victims paid money and provided goods/credit-card access, while following Appellants’ advice led some into bankruptcy or loss of their homes.

The appeal presented four core clusters of issues:

• Self-representation and competency (Hicks): whether the district court properly accepted Hicks’ waiver of counsel under Faretta v. California, and whether it should have ordered a competency evaluation sua sponte under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
• Confrontation Clause and preserved testimony (Mendoza): whether admission of a victim’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 video deposition violated the Confrontation Clause.
• Interstate wire element (Mendoza): whether evidence sufficed to prove the wire transmission occurred “in interstate or foreign commerce” under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
• Sentencing procedure and reasonableness (Mendoza): whether Mendoza’s rights were violated by using victim testimony from Hicks’ earlier sentencing, and whether an upward departure/variance was reasonable and/or harmless.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences. As to Hicks, it held the district court conducted a thorough Faretta colloquy and correctly found Hicks’ waiver of counsel “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” It further held the district court did not plainly err by failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte: Hicks’ sovereign-citizen statements and eccentric legal theories reflected a “frivolous legal strategy,” not “reasonable cause” under § 4241(a).

As to Mendoza, the court held she waived any Confrontation Clause objection to the Rule 15 video deposition by consenting to remote participation and failing to request in-person presence as a non-custodial defendant. It also held the Government introduced sufficient circumstantial evidence that a wire transfer traveled from Georgia to Maryland, satisfying the interstate-commerce element without proving server locations or the wire’s precise route. Finally, it rejected Mendoza’s sentencing arguments: she was present at her own sentencing, hearsay is broadly permitted at sentencing, and any asserted departure error was harmless because the district court stated it would impose the same term as an upward variance supported by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Self-representation, waiver of counsel, and competency

• Faretta v. California: Supplies the constitutional foundation for self-representation and the trial court’s duty to ensure a defendant understands the consequences of waiving counsel. The Fourth Circuit treated the district court’s lengthy colloquy as the paradigm of Faretta compliance.
• United States v. Ductan: Framed the “tension” between the right to counsel and the right of self-representation and reinforced that counsel is the “default position” unless waiver is clear. The opinion uses Ductan to justify close scrutiny of whether waiver was unambiguous.
• United States v. Ziegler; United States v. Bernard: Provide the Fourth Circuit’s operative waiver test—waiver must be “(1) clear and unequivocal; (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (3) timely”—and emphasize there is “no precise formula” for assessing competency to waive counsel. The panel relied on these cases to uphold the district court’s discretion and to treat Hicks’ courtroom performance and ability to strategize as evidence of competence.
• United States v. Frazier-El: Anchored the court’s key doctrinal point: “the standard of competence for waiving counsel is identical to the standard of competence for standing trial.” This foreclosed Hicks’ argument that waiver required a higher competency showing.
• Indiana v. Edwards: The panel addressed Hicks’ reliance on Edwards and clarified (through United States v. Bernard) that it grants discretion to deny self-representation to borderline incompetent defendants; it does not require courts to deny self-representation to competent defendants.
• Dusky v. United States: Provides the competency standard: rational/factual understanding and ability to consult with counsel. The panel used Dusky (via Bernard) to analyze whether Hicks’ behavior suggested inability to understand proceedings or assist his defense.
• United States v. Mason; United States v. Banks: Govern procedural competency claims and the district court’s obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) when “reasonable cause” exists. These cases supply the factors (irrational behavior, demeanor, medical opinions) and emphasize deference to the trial court’s vantage point.
• United States v. Snyder; United States v. Solis-Rodriguez; United States v. Olano: Define standards of review—mixed review for waiver (clear error/de novo), and plain error for unraised competency arguments; Olano supplies the discretionary fourth step.
• United States v. James (7th Cir.): Cited to reinforce that unusual or fringe beliefs do not necessarily imply incompetence.
• Burket v. Angelone; Hall v. United States: Support the proposition that mental illness alone does not equate to incompetence; there must be functional impairment tied to Dusky.

2. Confrontation Clause and Rule 15 depositions

• United States v. Smith; United States v. Dargan: State the Confrontation Clause test for testimonial statements (unavailability + prior opportunity for cross-examination). These cases frame the legal baseline before the court turns to waiver.
• Maryland v. Craig: Used (via Smith) for the proposition that Rule 15 can comport with Confrontation Clause purposes—supporting the general constitutionality of preserved testimony procedures.
• United States v. Boyd: Defines waiver as “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” The panel uses Boyd to conclude Mendoza waived confrontation objections by consenting to the remote deposition and failing to object to its admission.

3. Wire fraud’s interstate element

• United States v. Taylor; United States v. Elbaz: Provide the three wire-fraud elements and isolate the third as “jurisdictional”: the wire must be in interstate or foreign commerce. The panel relies on these to reject Mendoza’s argument that the Government had to prove the wire’s “actual path” or server locations.
• United States v. Fall: Supplies the “substantial evidence” standard and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.

4. Sentencing: presence, hearsay, variances/departures, and harmless error

• United States v. Lawrence: Cited for the rule that “present” in Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 means physical presence, which Mendoza indisputably had at her own sentencing.
• United States v. Muslim: Supports plain-error review for unpreserved sentencing objections.
• United States v. Powell: Supplies the decisive point that “the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing,” undermining Mendoza’s attempt to constitutionalize a right to live victim testimony at her sentencing.
• United States v. Oliver; United States v. Fowler; United States v. Provance; United States v. Huskey: Provide the framework for procedural/substantive reasonableness and deference to district courts on § 3553(a) balancing.
• United States v. Mills; United States v. Savillon-Matute; United States v. Simmons: Provide harmless-error doctrine for procedural sentencing error and allocate the burden to the Government.
• United States v. Evans: Clarifies that a district court may reach an above-Guidelines sentence by variance even if a departure is disputed; this supports affirmance where the district court announces an alternative variance rationale.
• United States v. Legins; United States v. Brown (3d Cir.): Used to distinguish departures (Guidelines-based) from variances (§ 3553(a)-based).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Hicks: Valid waiver of counsel despite sovereign-citizen assertions

The court’s core move is to separate substance (Hicks’ choice of fringe theories and unusual beliefs) from capacity (his ability to understand the proceedings and make an informed choice). Applying United States v. Ziegler and Herrington v. Dotson (via United States v. Roof), the panel held the district court did what it had to do: ensure Hicks understood charges, penalties, and the disadvantages of self-representation, and confirm the decision was voluntary.

The opinion treats the record as overwhelming: Hicks repeatedly confirmed his desire to proceed pro se (at least ten times), articulated practical reasons (discovery dissatisfaction; avoiding delay; resentment at the “sovereign citizen” label), and consulted standby counsel multiple times during the colloquy. The court also rejected the argument that one “going back and forth” phrase made the waiver equivocal, reading the transcript contextually as thoughtful deliberation culminating in a clear choice.

2. Hicks: No plain error in failing to order a competency evaluation sua sponte

On competency, the court uses 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) and the Dusky v. United States standard to focus on functional impairment. It emphasizes what the district judge saw: Hicks navigated trial tasks (opening, cross, objections, testimony, closing), advanced a legally cognizable “good faith” theory (citing S. Atl. Ltd. P'ship of Tenn., L.P. v. Riese), and consulted standby counsel. Under United States v. Banks and United States v. Bernard, odd beliefs are not enough; there must be “reasonable cause” to think the defendant cannot understand proceedings or assist in defense.

The panel directly rejects an implicit per se rule that sovereign-citizen rhetoric equals incompetence, citing United States v. Ziegler (no hearing required merely for a “frivolous legal strategy”) and United States v. James (unusual beliefs do not necessarily signal incompetence). The post-trial psychological report did not change the analysis: it was retrospective, geared toward mitigation, and—consistent with Burket v. Angelone and Hall v. United States—mental illness does not equate to incompetence absent showing of trial-time functional inability.

3. Mendoza: Confrontation Clause challenge waived by consent to video Rule 15 deposition

The court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: (1) Rule 15 provides a mechanism to preserve testimony of an unavailable witness, and (2) Mendoza’s own choices foreclosed her complaint. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(c)(2), a defendant “who is not in custody has the right upon request to be present.” The court characterizes this as “opt-in.” Mendoza did not request in-person attendance; she agreed (through counsel) to remote appearance; and she did not object at trial to admission of the deposition. Under United States v. Boyd, that is waiver.

4. Mendoza: Interstate-commerce element proven without tracing server locations

The panel treats Mendoza’s argument as an attempt to raise the Government’s burden above what 18 U.S.C. § 1343, United States v. Taylor, and United States v. Elbaz require. The Government only had to prove the wire crossed a state line, not the wire’s technical routing. Evidence of origin (Georgia resident; Georgia address and phone on wire request; testimony she “would assume” she sent it from Georgia) plus destination (wire to Rockville, Maryland; subsequent ATM withdrawals in Maryland) allowed a reasonable jury to find an interstate transmission.

5. Mendoza: Sentencing—presence satisfied; hearsay permitted; upward variance moots departure issues

The court rejects Mendoza’s “right to be present” argument as a mismatch between claim and record. Mendoza was physically present at her own sentencing, satisfying Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a) and United States v. Lawrence. Her real objection was to the court’s reliance on victim testimony from Hicks’ sentencing, but (a) she agreed to that procedure (waiver under United States v. Boyd), (b) confrontation rights do not apply at sentencing (United States v. Powell), and (c) 18 U.S.C. § 3661 broadly permits sentencing courts to consider relevant information, including hearsay.

On the upward departure, the court applies harmless-error analysis (United States v. Mills; United States v. Savillon-Matute). Even assuming a departure mistake, the district court announced an alternative upward variance for the same reasons under § 3553(a). Citing United States v. Evans, the panel treats that alternative as independently sufficient and concludes the upward sentence was substantively reasonable given Mendoza’s personal, in-person targeting and severe victim harm.

C. Impact

• Competency practice in “sovereign citizen” cases: The opinion reinforces that eccentric ideology and fringe legal arguments—standing alone—do not compel a sua sponte competency evaluation. The practical implication is that district courts in the Fourth Circuit may focus on functional trial capacity (communication, strategic choices, courtroom behavior) and treat sovereign-citizen rhetoric as potentially obstreperous or misguided rather than presumptively pathological.
• Faretta colloquies and record-building: The court’s approval of a 50-page colloquy underscores that meticulous, topic-by-topic advisements (charges, penalties, rules of evidence, disadvantages, voluntariness) can insulate waiver determinations on appeal—even when the defendant’s statements are strange or conspiratorial.
• Rule 15 logistics and waiver: For non-custodial defendants, the “upon request” language of Rule 15(c)(2) is outcome-determinative: consenting to remote deposition and failing to request in-person attendance can waive later confrontation objections to the deposition format.
• Wire fraud jurisdictional proof: The decision is a practical reminder that interstate transmission may be proven by circumstantial evidence of origin/destination; the Government need not litigate bank-server geography or technical routing unless the evidence otherwise fails to show state-line crossing.
• Sentencing efficiency: The court approves (at least where consent is given and transcripts are provided) the use of victim testimony from a co-defendant’s sentencing to avoid retraumatizing victims and duplicative proceedings—consistent with the permissive evidentiary regime at federal sentencing.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Faretta waiver”: A defendant may choose to represent themselves, but the judge must ensure the choice is clear, informed, and voluntary.
• Competency (Dusky): The question is not whether the defendant has odd beliefs; it is whether they can understand what is happening in court and participate meaningfully in their defense.
• Procedural competency claim: On appeal, the defendant can argue the judge should have held a competency hearing, even without proving actual incompetence—but must show the record gave the judge “reasonable cause” to doubt competency.
• Rule 15 deposition: A pretrial deposition used to preserve testimony when a witness will be unavailable at trial. If the defendant is not in custody, they must request to attend in person.
• Interstate wire element: For wire fraud, the Government must prove the wire transmission crossed state lines; it need not prove the detailed network route.
• Departure vs. variance: A departure changes the sentence under specific Guidelines rules; a variance changes the sentence based on the judge’s balancing of the § 3553(a) factors.
• Harmless sentencing error: Even if the judge used the wrong “departure” tool, the sentence can stand if the judge would impose the same sentence as a variance and that sentence is reasonable.

V. Conclusion

This unpublished Fourth Circuit decision affirms convictions and sentences arising from an in-person fraud scheme and, in doing so, crystallizes several practical appellate lessons: (1) sovereign-citizen rhetoric does not itself create “reasonable cause” for a sua sponte competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); (2) a carefully developed Faretta record will sustain a waiver of counsel despite unusual beliefs; (3) Confrontation Clause objections to a Rule 15 video deposition can be waived by consent and failure to request in-person attendance; (4) interstate wire transmission may be proved circumstantially without tracing server routes; and (5) at sentencing, hearsay is broadly admissible, and an alternative upward variance can render any departure error harmless.