Fourth Circuit Reaffirms: No Fourth Amendment Privacy in a Stolen Vehicle Absent Innocent Acquisition; Broad Appeal Waivers Enforced While Preserved Suppression Issues Remain Reviewable

1. Introduction

In United States v. Austin Gwynn Starner (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Fourth Circuit addressed (1) the enforceability and scope of a plea-agreement appellate waiver and (2) the merits of a preserved Fourth Amendment challenge to evidence obtained after a detention, frisk, and warrantless vehicle search.

Parties: The United States (Appellee) prosecuted Austin Gwynn Starner (Appellant). Starner pleaded guilty to methamphetamine distribution and felon-in-possession charges under a written plea agreement, entered a conditional plea preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 120 months.

Key issues: (a) whether Starner’s appellate waiver barred review of sentencing issues; (b) whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk; (c) whether Starner had a reasonable expectation of privacy (standing) in a stolen vehicle; and (d) if standing existed, whether the warrantless vehicle search was supported by probable cause (with counsel also raising inevitable discovery as an alternative theory).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit:

  • Dismissed in part the appeal—enforcing Starner’s broad appellate waiver to bar sentencing challenges.
  • Affirmed in part—holding that the denial of the suppression motion was correct.

On suppression, the court held that (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk based on the totality of circumstances (unresponsive occupants in a running vehicle for hours and drug paraphernalia in plain view), (2) Starner lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle shown to be stolen with fictitious plates and without proof of innocent acquisition, and (3) even assuming standing, probable cause supported the vehicle search given the paraphernalia, Starner’s impairment, and the discovery of a firearm and methamphetamine during the frisk.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appeal waivers and plea validity

  • United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217 (4th Cir. 2023): The court used Carter’s framework to review enforceability de novo and to ask whether the waiver was knowing/voluntary and whether the issues fell within its scope. Carter also supplies the “totality of the circumstances” factors (experience, conduct, education, knowledge of the agreement).
  • United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2021): Boutcher supported the conclusion that when a district court addresses an appeal waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record shows understanding, the waiver is generally valid.
  • United States v. Taylor-Sanders, 88 F.4th 516 (4th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that the Rule 11 process must ensure the plea is knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis—standards the panel found satisfied here.
  • Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): The Anders posture framed the appellate review: counsel asserted no meritorious issues; the court independently reviewed the record for any potentially meritorious issues outside the waiver’s scope and found none.

2) Standard of review for suppression rulings and credibility

  • United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234 (4th Cir. 2024): Supplied the standard: legal conclusions reviewed de novo, factual findings for clear error, with evidence viewed in the Government’s favor.
  • United States v. Purks, 139 F.4th 388 (4th Cir. 2025): Reinforced “particular” deference to the district court’s credibility determinations at suppression hearings—important here because the district court credited the officer’s testimony as consistent with body-worn camera video.

3) Reasonable suspicion, totality of the circumstances, and frisks

  • Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Cited for the governing principle that officers may briefly detain for investigation on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot.
  • United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002): Anchored the “totality of the circumstances” analysis; the court relied on the combined facts (hours-long unresponsiveness in a running car and paraphernalia in plain view) rather than any single fact in isolation.
  • United States v. Rooks, 596 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2010): Supported the conclusion that once the officer reasonably suspected drug activity associated with the vehicle, removing Starner and conducting a protective frisk for weapons was permissible.

4) Standing / reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen vehicle

  • United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1981): The key standing precedent: where the Government establishes a vehicle is stolen and the defendant does not demonstrate innocent acquisition, the defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacks standing to object to a search. The panel applied Hargrove directly to uphold the district court’s conclusion based on the stolen status and fictitious plates.

5) Probable cause to search a vehicle

  • United States v. Runner, 43 F.4th 417 (4th Cir. 2022): Provided the flexible, common-sense definition of probable cause. The court used Runner to conclude that paraphernalia in plain view, observed impairment, and contraband found during the frisk created a substantial basis to believe the vehicle contained evidence of drug activity.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The appellate waiver barred sentencing review

Applying United States v. Carter and United States v. Boutcher, the panel held the waiver valid and enforceable because the Rule 11 colloquy demonstrated Starner understood the waiver and entered it knowingly and intelligently. Because the waiver broadly covered challenges to the sentence (subject to exceptions not implicated here), the Fourth Circuit dismissed the sentencing issues the Government moved to dismiss.

2) The suppression appeal remained reviewable because it was expressly preserved

Although the waiver was broad, the plea agreement preserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The panel therefore reached the Fourth Amendment issues under the standard in United States v. Sanders, deferring to credibility findings per United States v. Purks.

3) Reasonable suspicion supported detention and frisk

The court emphasized the officer responded to a report of two individuals unresponsive in a running vehicle in a store parking lot for hours, including failed attempts by store employees to wake them; the officer also could not rouse Starner initially and observed drug paraphernalia (a bong and pipe) in plain view. Under Illinois v. Wardlow and the totality approach of United States v. Arvizu, these facts supported reasonable suspicion of impairment or drug activity. The court then relied on United States v. Rooks to uphold the protective frisk, which yielded a concealed firearm and methamphetamine.

4) No standing to challenge the vehicle search because the vehicle was stolen

The panel treated standing as dispositive: the Government established the car was stolen and had fictitious plates, and Starner did not carry the burden to show he innocently acquired it. Under United States v. Hargrove, that meant no reasonable expectation of privacy and no Fourth Amendment standing to contest the vehicle search.

5) Probable cause supported the search even assuming standing

As an alternative holding, the court concluded that the drug paraphernalia in plain view, Starner’s visible impairment, and the firearm and methamphetamine found during the frisk together created probable cause to search for further evidence of drug activity, consistent with United States v. Runner. Because probable cause existed, the court did not need to rely on the inevitable discovery doctrine (which counsel raised as an alternative theory).

C. Impact

  • Stolen-vehicle standing: The decision reinforces (via United States v. Hargrove) that once the Government establishes a vehicle is stolen, the defendant must affirmatively show innocent acquisition to claim Fourth Amendment protection in the vehicle. Practically, this channels suppression litigation toward standing disputes and the evidentiary burden on the defendant to establish lawful possession or innocence.
  • Reasonable suspicion from welfare-check facts plus paraphernalia: The court’s reliance on prolonged unresponsiveness in a running car and visible paraphernalia underscores how “community caretaking”-adjacent circumstances can quickly evolve into an investigative detention supported by reasonable suspicion when objective indicators of drug activity appear.
  • Plea practice: The opinion illustrates the Fourth Circuit’s continued readiness to enforce broad appellate waivers when Rule 11 is properly conducted, while still honoring explicit carve-outs (here, a preserved suppression issue).
  • Persuasive (not binding) value: Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not binding precedent in the circuit, but it provides a current roadmap of how the Fourth Circuit applies established waiver and Fourth Amendment doctrines to common fact patterns.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Appeal waiver: A promise in a plea agreement that limits what the defendant can appeal. If knowing and voluntary, courts typically enforce it, preventing appellate review of covered issues.
  • Conditional plea: A guilty plea that preserves the right to appeal a specified pretrial ruling (here, the suppression denial). Without this, a guilty plea usually forecloses suppression appeals.
  • Reasonable suspicion: A lower standard than probable cause; it requires specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity may be occurring, permitting a brief investigative detention.
  • Protective frisk: A limited pat-down for weapons during a lawful detention when safety concerns justify it.
  • Standing / reasonable expectation of privacy: A defendant can challenge a search only if the defendant had a legitimate privacy interest in the place searched. Under United States v. Hargrove, a person in a stolen vehicle generally lacks that interest absent proof of innocent acquisition.
  • Probable cause: A common-sense, practical probability that evidence or contraband will be found in a particular place, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Inevitable discovery doctrine: An exception that can allow evidence even if obtained unlawfully, if the Government shows it would have been discovered lawfully anyway. The panel did not need to decide this because it found no standing and, alternatively, probable cause.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Austin Gwynn Starner provides a clear application of two recurring federal criminal appellate themes: appellate waivers are enforced when entered knowingly and voluntarily, and suppression claims rise or fall on well-settled Fourth Amendment frameworks. On the merits, the court reaffirmed that a defendant ordinarily has no Fourth Amendment standing in a stolen vehicle absent a showing of innocent acquisition (United States v. Hargrove) and that, in any event, probable cause supported the vehicle search under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. The opinion, though unpublished, consolidates existing doctrine into a fact pattern likely to recur in drug-and-firearm roadside and parking-lot encounters.