Fourth Circuit: Long-Present, Uninspected Entrants Are Detained Under § 1226(a), Not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and Must Receive Bond Hearings

I. Introduction

In a published decision issued September 10, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed habeas relief for two longtime U.S. residents—Oscar Enrique Lopez Garcia (from Guatemala) and Juan Jose Rivera (from El Salvador)—who entered the United States “without inspection and authorization” decades earlier and were detained by ICE in October 2025.

The central question was statutory: which IIRIRA detention provision governs noncitizens who (1) have not been “admitted” (lawfully entered after inspection) but (2) are arrested and detained inside the United States after years of residence? If detention is under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), they are entitled to an immigration judge bond hearing; if under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), detention is mandatory without bond.

The dispute arose from a July 2025 shift in Executive Branch interpretation (ICE “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission”), later adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), under which DHS began treating essentially all “entered without inspection” noncitizens as detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). The district court (E.D. Va.) rejected that construction and ordered § 1226(a) bond hearings. The Government appealed; the Fourth Circuit expedited review.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Holding: For noncitizens like Lopez Garcia and Rivera—long present in the United States, detained within the country, and not covered by crime-based mandatory detention—§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs detention, requiring a bond hearing.
  • Disposition: The court affirmed the district court’s grants of habeas relief.
  • Key interpretive move: The phrase “an alien seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) is not synonymous with “applicant for admission,” and the Government’s reading would create significant surplusage and structural conflict across the INA.
  • Clarification: The district court “improperly inverted the burden of proof” at bond hearings; under Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338 (4th Cir. 2022), the noncitizen bears the burden to show he is not a danger or flight risk.
  • Context: The Fourth Circuit joined the “overwhelming majority” of circuits to reject the Government’s July 2025 interpretation, acknowledging a deep circuit split (majority vs. Fifth and Eighth Circuits).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is notable for grounding its statutory interpretation in both immigration-specific Supreme Court doctrine and general interpretive method, especially after Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which the Fourth Circuit cited for the proposition that courts must “use every tool” of statutory interpretation rather than reflexively deferring to agency readings.

1. Detention, Due Process, and the “entry/presence” distinction

  • Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953): used to describe the traditional distinction between those “on the threshold” and those who have “passed through our gates,” framing why bondless mandatory detention for longtime residents raises constitutional sensitivities.
  • Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001): relied upon to underscore that immigration law “runs throughout” an entry/presence distinction and that due process constraints attach to “persons” within the United States.
  • Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886): invoked for the general proposition that constitutional protections apply to “all persons” within U.S. territorial jurisdiction.
  • Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020): cited to explain parole as a “legal fiction” treating a paroled person “as if stopped at the border.”
  • Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003): cited in the due-process discussion about detention as part of removal processes (the majority uses it as part of the constitutional backdrop).

2. Statutory interpretation canons and methodology

  • Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): the court treated this as a directive to apply the full toolkit of interpretation. It also used Loper Bright to treat consistent government practice as an interpretive aid, not a binding rule of deference.
  • Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997): cited for reading text in context and the statute as a whole.
  • Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) and Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009): cited for the canon against surplusage (give effect to every word).
  • Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010): used for the inference that enumerated exceptions imply a general rule applies otherwise.
  • Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) and Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014): used for the “elephants in mouseholes” skepticism toward discovering vast powers in ambiguous text.
  • INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) and Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936): used to support constitutional avoidance where statutory ambiguity exists.
  • Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28 (2019): cited in the discussion of “deeming” provisions and legal fictions.

3. Immigration-structure and federalism

  • Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012): cited for Congress’s plenary authority in immigration and the national government’s primacy.
  • Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018): used to describe how detention categories operate, including that § 1226(c) “carves out” a mandatory-detention subset.
  • Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019): invoked on the structure of § 1226(c) as a limit on § 1226(a).

4. Circuit-split authorities (peer influence, not binding)

The majority explicitly positioned the Fourth Circuit within the post-2025 circuit split. It aligned with: Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz; Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden; Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC; Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft; Cirrus Rojas v. Olson; Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock; Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin; Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami. It rejected the approach taken in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi (5th Cir.) and Avila v. Bondi (8th Cir.).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core ambiguity: “applicant for admission” vs. “seeking admission”

The Government argued that because § 1225(a)(1) “deems” a noncitizen present without admission to be an “applicant for admission,” the person necessarily is “seeking admission” within § 1225(b)(2)(A), making detention mandatory.

The Petitioners argued that “seeking admission” is a limiting modifier capturing those actively pursuing lawful entry (typically at/near the border), not those long inside the country.

The Fourth Circuit found that, while Petitioners are indeed “applicants for admission” as a statutory label, the phrase “seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) does additional work and cannot be collapsed into the same meaning without violating fundamental canons.

2. Textual anchors: why § 1226(a) straightforwardly fits

The court read § 1226(a) as broadly authorizing arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed,” applying to both “inadmissible” and “deportable” noncitizens. It emphasized that Congress knew how to distinguish categories when it wanted to, and that § 1226(c) and the Laken Riley Act amendments expressly address inadmissible noncitizens “present ... without being admitted or paroled,” reinforcing that § 1226 is not limited to previously admitted individuals.

3. Surplusage and meaningful-variation: the Government’s reading breaks the sentence

The court’s most direct critique was linguistic: § 1225(b)(2)(A) references both “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission.” If these were synonymous, “seeking admission” becomes surplusage. The Fourth Circuit preferred the reading that gives independent force to both phrases: “applicant for admission” is the broader statutory category; “seeking admission” captures a subset for mandatory detention.

4. Structural coherence: four detention categories and a “graduated” scheme

The majority located § 1225 and § 1226 within a broader INA design that differentiates: expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1), mandatory detention for those “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), discretionary detention/bond under § 1226(a), and crime-based mandatory detention under § 1226(c). It treated the Government’s view as collapsing this graduated framework into a sweeping bondless regime for millions, including people with long community ties.

5. Legislative and statutory history: “seeking admission” echoes historic border detention

The court traced the “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” language to the Immigration Act of 1893 and the longstanding practice of applying such inspection/detention concepts to border arrivals. It rejected the Government’s attempt to use IIRIRA’s shift from “presence” to “lawful entry” (admission) as proof that Congress also intended to eliminate bond eligibility for long-present noncitizens.

6. Longstanding practice and “unheralded power” skepticism

Relying on the continuity of pre- and post-IIRIRA practice—reinforced by 1997 implementing regulations and five presidential administrations— the court treated the Government’s 2025 reinterpretation as the sort of “unheralded power” claim that triggers interpretive skepticism (Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA). The court emphasized that the statute is ambiguous; in that posture, a uniform 30-year practice is a powerful signal.

7. Elephants-in-mouseholes and logistical/moral scale

The court found it implausible that Congress silently mandated what would be “the single largest mass detention of human beings in our nation’s history.” Invoking Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., Inc., it refused to read such sweeping consequences into ambiguous wording.

8. Constitutional avoidance

Without deciding the constitutional merits of mandatory detention as applied to long-present noncitizens, the majority found that the Government’s reading would raise “grave constitutional implications” under Fifth Amendment due process, while the alternative reading was not only “fairly possible” but also the longstanding one. That posture, in its view, compelled adoption of the § 1226(a) reading under INS v. St. Cyr.

9. The dissent’s competing textual theory

Judge Rushing dissented, framing the case as a straightforward consequence of deeming language: if § 1225(a)(1) deems certain individuals “applicant[s] for admission,” then they are necessarily “seeking admission” for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A). The dissent rejected surplusage concerns as tolerable redundancy, relied on contextual cues in § 1225 (including § 1225(a)(3) and § 1225(a)(5)), and argued that the majority improperly used policy scale and constitutional concerns to override text. The dissent’s approach would place long-present, unadmitted noncitizens into mandatory detention (with possible parole but not bond).

C. Impact

  • Fourth Circuit rule: In the Fourth Circuit, long-present noncitizens detained inside the United States after entry without inspection generally fall under § 1226(a) and must receive bond hearings, unless a specific mandatory detention provision applies (e.g., § 1226(c)).
  • Deepening a national circuit split: The decision entrenches a high-stakes split (majority of circuits vs. Fifth and Eighth), increasing the likelihood of Supreme Court review given uniform federal interests in detention authority and removal-process administration.
  • Constraints on executive reinterpretation: Post-Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, the decision exemplifies aggressive judicial insistence on structural/statutory-canons analysis rather than agency-driven constructions—especially when an agency claims to “discover” sweeping new authority in an old statute.
  • Practical detention consequences: The ruling preserves bond-hearing eligibility for large classes of detainees in the Fourth Circuit, affecting detention levels, habeas litigation volume, and how DHS allocates detention resources while removal proceedings are pending.
  • Bond-hearing procedure clarity: The court reaffirmed, via Miranda v. Garland, that the detained noncitizen bears the burden at the bond hearing under existing processes.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Admission” vs. “lawful status”: “Admission” is a statutory term meaning lawful entry “after inspection and authorization.” A person may obtain certain protections or statuses without having been “admitted,” and the opinion emphasizes that these are distinct concepts.
  • “Applicant for admission”: Under § 1225(a)(1), even some people already inside the U.S. without lawful entry are “deemed” applicants for admission— a statutory label that can operate like a legal fiction.
  • “Seeking admission”: The key interpretive battleground. The majority treated it as meaning actively pursuing lawful entry (a limiting modifier); the dissent treated it as inherent in being deemed an “applicant for admission.”
  • Bond hearing (under § 1226(a)): A proceeding before an immigration judge to decide whether a detainee may be released on bond/conditions while removal proceedings continue. Under Miranda v. Garland, the detainee bears the burden to show he is not dangerous and not a flight risk.
  • Mandatory detention (under § 1225(b)(2)(A)): No bond hearing; release typically only through discretionary “parole” for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.
  • Canons of statutory interpretation: Standard tools courts use to choose among plausible readings—e.g., avoid surplusage (don’t make words meaningless), read the statute as a whole (structure), avoid “elephants in mouseholes” (don’t infer vast powers from vague text), and constitutional avoidance (choose a reading that avoids serious constitutional problems when the statute is ambiguous).

V. Conclusion

This decision establishes, as Fourth Circuit precedent, that the Government’s post-July 2025 attempt to detain long-present “entered without inspection” noncitizens under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is inconsistent with the best reading of IIRIRA and the INA’s structure. Instead, such individuals fall under § 1226(a) and must be afforded bond hearings, absent a specific mandatory-detention trigger like § 1226(c).

Methodologically, the opinion is also a post-Loper Bright showcase: it resolves ambiguity through layered textual, structural, historical, and constitutional-avoidance analysis, while treating longstanding practice as persuasive evidence rather than as administrative supremacy. Substantively, it reinforces a rights-significant line between border-centered detention rules and the detention of people with longstanding presence and community ties—while acknowledging that Congress retains the power to redraw that line explicitly.