Fourth Circuit: A Trial Court Abuses Its Discretion by Striking a Defendant’s Entire Closing Argument, Thereby Effectively Denying the Constitutional Right to Summation

1. Introduction

United States v. Cristian Ariel Arevalo Arias (No. 24-4308), United States v. Marvin Menjivar Gutierrez (No. 24-4325), and United States v. Carlos Jose Turcios Villatoro (No. 24-4358) arise from a joint federal jury trial in the Eastern District of Virginia involving alleged members of the STLS clique of MS-13. The defendants faced RICO conspiracy and drug-distribution conspiracy charges, as well as VICAR murder-related counts stemming from multiple homicides.

The appeals presented a cluster of trial-management and constitutional issues, but one dominated: after closings, the district court instructed the jury to “completely disregard” Turcios’ entire closing argument because parts of it were improper. The Fourth Circuit held that this instruction cured any potential prejudice to the codefendants (Arevalo and Menjivar) but was a prejudicial abuse of discretion as to Turcios because it effectively denied him the right to closing argument.

Key parties and posture

  • Appellee: United States of America
  • Appellants: Cristian Ariel Arevalo Arias; Marvin Menjivar Gutierrez; Carlos Jose Turcios Villatoro
  • Disposition: Arevalo and Menjivar affirmed; Turcios vacated and remanded

2. Summary of the Opinion

Judge Quattlebaum (joined by Judges Richardson and Berner) held:

  1. Codefendants (Arevalo and Menjivar): Even assuming Turcios’ closing contained improprieties, any prejudice to them was cured by the district court’s targeted curative instruction directing the jury to disregard Turcios’ closing. The court applied the presumption that jurors follow instructions and declined to extend Bruton v. United States to attorney argument.
  2. Turcios: Striking the entire closing—rather than only objectionable portions—was an abuse of discretion because it removed permissible advocacy and, given the presumption that jurors follow instructions, effectively denied Turcios the opportunity for a closing argument protected by Herring v. New York and United States v. King. His convictions were therefore vacated and the case remanded.
  3. Cross-examination limits: The district court did not violate the Confrontation Clause by precluding cross-examination of cooperating witness Guevara about a third party’s sexual-assault allegations; the limitation fell within the “wide latitude” recognized in Delaware v. Van Arsdall.
  4. Due process / dismissal motion: No dismissal was warranted based on (a) deportation of Vasquez (an illegal alien cooperating witness), (b) failure to preserve certain jail-call recordings/notes, or (c) late disclosure concerning a tipster; the court applied United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, California v. Trombetta, Arizona v. Youngblood, and Brady doctrine (as framed by United States v. Sterling).
  5. Special finding: The jury’s RICO special finding that Arevalo aided and abetted Tate’s murder was not legally irreconcilable with his acquittal on VICAR murder counts because VICAR requires a distinct “enterprise purpose” element absent from the RICO predicate finding; the court relied on its reasoning in United States v. Ayala.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The constitutional right to closing argument and trial-court discretion

  • Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)
    The anchor precedent: a total denial of closing summation violates the Sixth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit extended the principle to a functional equivalent: if the court instructs jurors to disregard the entire closing, it can amount to an effective denial. At the same time, Herring’s recognition of “great latitude” to control closings framed the abuse-of-discretion line-drawing.
  • United States v. King, 650 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1981)
    King treated a bench-trial “you can argue but it won’t matter” posture as a denial of a “real opportunity” to argue—and deemed it not harmless. Here, the panel analogized the practical effect: the jury was instructed to ignore the entire defense summation, including non-improper portions.
  • United States v. Wiley, 93 F.4th 619 (4th Cir. 2024), Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), and United States v. Nixon, 130 F.4th 420 (4th Cir. 2025)
    These supported the standard-of-review framework: abuse of discretion generally governs trial management; embedded legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

2) Curative instructions, the presumption jurors follow them, and the limits of Bruton

  • Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023)
    The court leaned heavily on Samia’s reaffirmation that juries are presumed to follow limiting instructions, with only “exceptional” departures.
  • United States v. Ritter, 167 F.4th 677 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887))
    Provided the “exceptional case” formulation: the presumption yields only when the prejudicial impression cannot realistically be erased.
  • Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), and Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
    The codefendants urged a Bruton-like approach (instruction insufficient). The panel refused to extend Bruton because (i) the Supreme Court has resisted expansion (Richardson, Samia), and (ii) the challenged material was attorney argument, not “in evidence,” a distinction emphasized by Bruton itself.
  • Long v. Hooks, 972 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) and United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2020)
    Reinforced that arguments are not evidence and that reversal based on presumed instruction failure requires a record-specific reason to doubt compliance.

3) Severance, mistrial, and trial-management discretion

  • United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2010), United States v. Odom, 888 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 2002)
    Used to reject any suggestion that a late-emerging antagonistic defense in closing automatically required severance; antagonism must be “stark” in a way that makes belief in one defense logically require disbelief in the other.
  • United States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008) and Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 2019)
    Supported abuse-of-discretion review for mistrial decisions and curative instructions.

4) Confrontation Clause limits on cross-examination

  • Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)
    Provided the foundational principle that cross-examination is central to testing credibility and exploring motive/bias.
  • Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985))
    Supplied the governing limitation: the Constitution guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination “to whatever extent” the defense wishes; trial courts retain “wide latitude” to limit marginally relevant or confusing inquiries.
  • Hoover v. Maryland, 714 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1983) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 578 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1978)
    Hoover supported the idea that perceived benefits can show bias, but the panel found no non-speculative basis that Guevara believed he was receiving forbearance on unrelated sexual-assault allegations. Rabinowitz supported limiting inquiry where there are no pending/anticipated charges motivating favor-currying.
  • Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 2000)
    Used to underscore that the Confrontation Clause does not override reasonable applications of evidence rules.

5) Due process challenges: deported witnesses, destroyed evidence, and late disclosure

  • United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)
    Controlled the deported-witness issue: the defense must make a “plausible showing” that the deported witness’s testimony would be material and favorable, not merely cumulative, and that it could reasonably affect the factfinder’s judgment.
  • United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) and citing United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2011))
    Guided the “material impeachment” analysis: impeachment is material when the witness supplies the only link or an essential element; it is not material when cumulative.
  • United States v. Kaixiang Zhu, 854 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004)
    Noted (but did not resolve) whether bad faith is an additional requirement under Valenzuela-Bernal; the panel again avoided resolving the circuit question because defendants failed on materiality (and would fail on bad faith if required).
  • California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)
    Controlled the destroyed-evidence claim: Trombetta requires apparent exculpatory value plus inability to obtain comparable evidence; otherwise Youngblood requires bad faith for merely “potentially useful” evidence.
  • United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 2011)
    Supported the conclusion that routine destruction pursuant to retention policies is not bad faith.
  • United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013), United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408 (1st Cir. 1986), and United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2005)
    Framed the late disclosure analysis: the question becomes whether delay prevented effective use; continuance is generally preferred; dismissal is typically not an appropriate remedy for late disclosure where other measures suffice.

6) Inconsistent verdicts and special findings

  • United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984)
    Powell’s general rule tolerates inconsistent verdicts; the panel found no legal contradiction because the VICAR counts contain an element not required for the RICO predicate special finding.
  • United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995)
    Addressed the constitutional concern with “yes/no” fact-finding in lieu of “guilty/not guilty”; the panel distinguished this case because the jury first returned a guilty verdict and was instructed on beyond-a-reasonable-doubt for special findings.
  • United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010)
    Provided the key element-difference rationale between VICAR and RICO conspiracy, supporting the “not irreconcilable” conclusion.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The new rule-like holding: striking the entire summation can be an effective denial of closing

The opinion’s central doctrinal move is practical rather than formal: although Turcios was “given the opportunity” to argue, the instruction to “completely disregard the entire closing argument” meant the jury was required to treat the defense as if no summation had been delivered. Because courts presume jurors follow instructions (Samia v. United States), the appellate court also presumed the jury disregarded not only the improper remarks but the permissible ones—thereby stripping the defendant of constitutionally significant advocacy.

The court drew a line between (a) permissible regulation of closing argument and (b) an overbroad remedy that nullifies the whole closing, including proper arguments. Even when a judge identifies vouching or facts not in evidence, the remedy must be proportionate to the impropriety if the alternative is functional abolition of the closing.

2) Why the same instruction cures codefendant prejudice but violates the speaker’s rights

For Arevalo and Menjivar, the curative instruction was targeted: it removed Turcios’ closing from their cases entirely. Their request required the court to assume the jury would disobey that instruction (and to extend Bruton’s skepticism about limiting instructions from confessions in evidence to attorney argument). The panel refused, emphasizing (i) Bruton’s narrow context and (ii) “arguments, not evidence.”

For Turcios, however, the presumption cuts the other way: if jurors followed the instruction, they necessarily ignored every legitimate credibility and corroboration argument Turcios made about the government’s key witness (Guevara). That is why the instruction was not merely “error-correcting,” but case-altering.

3) Institutional critique: a categorical ban on contemporaneous objections contributed to the constitutional problem

The panel’s reasoning also contains a clear trial-management admonition: the district court signaled “Don’t object” during closing and later found it difficult to surgically separate proper from improper remarks. The opinion links these two choices—no contemporaneous objections and a later overbroad remedy—invoking the purpose of objection rules (citing Puckett v. United States and Wainwright v. Sykes) and emphasizing that targeted correction is most feasible in real time.

4) Other holdings as applications of established doctrine

  • Confrontation: excluding cross-examination about uncharged sexual-assault allegations was within “wide latitude” (Delaware v. Van Arsdall) given marginal relevance, risk of a “trial within a trial,” and substantial other impeachment already presented.
  • Deported witness: no due process dismissal under United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal because the defense did not show the lost testimony was noncumulative and reasonably likely to affect the verdict, especially where the jury heard recordings and agent testimony that captured the core impeachment point.
  • Destroyed evidence: no Trombetta/Youngblood violation because comparable evidence existed (interview recording and testimony; ability to call witnesses) and no bad faith shown; routine deletion policies weighed against bad faith (United States v. Montieth).
  • Late disclosure: even assuming a Brady issue, dismissal was not the remedy; sanctions short of dismissal (including excluding Molina as a government witness) cured any harm, consistent with United States v. Collins and United States v. Sterling.
  • Special finding: not irreconcilable with acquittals because VICAR contains an extra “purpose” element; the special finding required no such purpose (United States v. Ayala).

C. Impact

The decision’s practical impact is concentrated in trial practice:

  • Remedies for improper closing argument: Striking an entire closing is now clearly disfavored in the Fourth Circuit when it eliminates substantial permissible advocacy; courts should prefer contemporaneous objections, targeted rulings, excision of discrete statements, and tailored instructions.
  • Symmetry of limiting instructions: The same curative instruction can be constitutionally protective for some defendants (codefendants) yet unconstitutional for the speaker—because it erases a core defense right rather than cabining prejudice.
  • Litigation incentives: The opinion discourages blanket “no objections during closing” approaches, signaling that such management choices may generate appellate risk if they later force blunt remedial measures.
  • Co-defendant prejudice claims: The court’s refusal to analogize attorney argument to Bruton-type evidence further cements a high bar to mistrials/severance based on a co-defendant’s improper summation where a specific limiting instruction is given.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962): An agreement to participate in an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering acts (e.g., drug trafficking, murder). The government need not prove every element required by other statutes like VICAR for a predicate-act finding.
  • VICAR (18 U.S.C. § 1959): Violent crimes committed to gain or maintain position in a racketeering enterprise (or for payment). It has an extra “purpose” element tied to the enterprise.
  • Vouching: When a lawyer suggests a witness is credible based on the lawyer’s personal belief or special knowledge (e.g., “her tears were real” as a personal assessment), rather than arguing from evidence.
  • Curative/limiting instruction: A judge’s direction telling jurors to disregard specified material. Appellate courts generally presume jurors follow it (Samia v. United States).
  • Bruton problem: In some joint trials, one defendant’s confession implicating another is so powerfully incriminating that an instruction may not cure the prejudice. The Fourth Circuit held that rationale does not readily transfer to attorney argument.
  • Trombetta/Youngblood (lost evidence): Destroying evidence violates due process if it was obviously exculpatory and irreplaceable (Trombetta); if only “potentially useful,” the defense must show bad faith (Youngblood).
  • Brady (late disclosure): Suppressing material exculpatory/impeachment evidence violates due process; when disclosure is delayed, the question is whether the defense was prevented from using it effectively (United States v. Sterling).

5. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s most significant contribution in this opinion is its clear warning that a post hoc instruction directing jurors to disregard a defendant’s entire closing argument—especially where objections were discouraged—can cross the constitutional line identified in Herring v. New York and United States v. King by effectively depriving the defendant of summation. At the same time, the court reaffirmed the strength of curative instructions for codefendant-prejudice claims, declined to expand Bruton v. United States to attorney argument, and applied established doctrine to reject Confrontation Clause and due process dismissal challenges.

The net result is a split disposition reflecting two complementary principles: (1) limiting instructions usually work as to others, but (2) a remedy that nullifies a defendant’s closing altogether is too blunt when it also erases proper advocacy—requiring vacatur and remand.