Forum Non Conveniens in Georgia: Comparative Factor Analysis Required; Plaintiff’s Forum Choice Cannot Eclipse Statutory Factors

Case: SIGNAL MACHINE COMPANY, INC. et al. v. FRIENDLY-ABLE et al. (A25A1902) & CLUB CAR, LLC v. FRIENDLY-ABLE et al. (A25A1924)
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia, Third Division
Date in opinion: December 16, 2025
Core doctrine: OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) (forum non conveniens; intrastate venue transfer)

1. Introduction

These companion interlocutory appeals arise from a wrongful-death lawsuit filed by Chrystal Friendly-Able (administrator and next-of-kin) after Alyssa Drinkard was killed in an industrial accident involving an allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous conveyor belt system at Club Car, LLC’s manufacturing plant in Evans, Columbia County, Georgia.

Friendly-Able filed suit in the State Court of Gwinnett County, relying on the presence there of Club Car’s registered agent for service of process (CT Corporation System). Club Car and the “Signal Appellants” (Signal Machine Company, Inc. and Signal Solutions of Tennessee, LLC) moved to transfer venue to the Superior Court of Columbia County under Georgia’s forum non conveniens statute, OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a), contending that the case’s operative facts, witnesses, evidence, and local interests were overwhelmingly centered in Columbia County. The trial court denied the motions, issued a certificate of immediate review, and the Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review.

The appellate issues were narrow but consequential: whether the trial court properly applied OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)’s “interest of justice” and “convenience of the parties and witnesses” standard, as guided by the statute’s seven enumerated factors, and whether it conducted the required comparative analysis between the chosen forum (Gwinnett) and the proposed transferee forum (Columbia).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s denial of the transfer motions and remanded with direction. It held the trial court’s analysis was “infected by a significant legal error” because it repeatedly failed to compare Gwinnett County and Columbia County under the seven OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) factors and, instead, applied incorrect standards (e.g., asking whether evidence could be accessed “with relative ease” in Gwinnett, or whether a premises view was “likely”).

Most importantly, the Court held that the plaintiff’s choice of forum—particularly where the only connection to the chosen county is a corporate registered agent—cannot be used to discount or supersede the statutory factors favoring transfer. The case was remanded for reconsideration under the “proper framework” required by OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is anchored in a line of Georgia cases emphasizing (i) trial-court discretion in forum non conveniens rulings, (ii) the necessity of a reasoned statutory-factor analysis, and (iii) meaningful appellate review when legal error distorts that analysis.

  • McInerney v. McInerney, 313 Ga. 462 (870 SE2d 721) (2022)
    The Court relied on McInerney for two controlling propositions: (1) the movant bears the burden to show the OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) factors support transfer; and (2) appellate review asks whether the trial court’s decision was “reasoned and reasonable” under the statute. Critically, McInerney also supplies the standard for reversal where discretion is “infected by a significant legal error,” which the Court found occurred here. The opinion further draws from McInerney the point that “witness convenience and efficient access to other evidence” belong within factor (1), not as an afterthought.
  • Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568 (740 SE2d 136) (2013)
    Wang is cited for the “reasoned and reasonable” review lens and as authority that trial-court discretion has limits. The Court also cites Wang in connection with Federal Ins .Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co. being “overruled in part on other grounds,” signaling that while Chicago Ins.’s comparative-analysis requirement remains useful, portions not pertinent to this appeal were superseded.
  • Federal Ins .Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 281 Ga. App. 152 (635 SE2d 411) (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. at 571(1)
    The opinion uses Chicago Ins. to reiterate a structural mandate: the trial court must compare the two venues, guided by the seven statutory factors, to decide which is “more proper.” This directly undercut the trial court’s repeated “record fails to show Gwinnett has difficulty” approach, which treated Gwinnett in isolation rather than as one side of a required comparison.
  • Hawthorn Suites Golf Resorts v. Feneck, 282 Ga. 554 (651 SE2d 664) (2007)
    Hawthorn Suites is invoked multiple times for two ideas: (1) when operative events occurred and “most of the likely witnesses” are located in the proposed forum, the ease-of-proof factor supports transfer; and (2) a plaintiff’s choice of a Georgia forum “could not override the clear implication of the preceding factors” favoring another forum. The Court analogized that principle here, where plaintiff chose a distant county with a thin connection.
  • Gowdy v. Schley, 317 Ga. App. 693 (732 SE2d 774) (2012)
    Cited for the practical proposition that convenience is “necessarily a function of proximity,” illustrating why distance between forums matters to witness and party burden. The Court used this to underscore that the approximately 130-mile separation between Gwinnett and Columbia is not trivial for live trial attendance.
  • AT&T v. Sigala, 274 Ga. 137 (549 SE2d 373) (2001), superseded by statute as stated in LaFontaine v. Signature Research, 305 Ga. 107 (823 SE2d 791) (2019)
    Sigala provides the classic local-interest rationale—“localized controversies decided at home” and “jury duty is a burden” not to impose on a community with no relation to the litigation. Even though Sigala’s broader doctrinal setting was later “superseded by statute” (as noted in LaFontaine), its quoted principles remain persuasive for the sixth factor’s “local interest” analysis.
  • Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 US 501 (67 SCt 839, 91 LEd 1055) (1947)
    Quoted through Sigala for the foundational forum non conveniens principle that local controversies should be decided locally, reinforcing why the site of the accident, the resident parties, and community witnesses matter.
  • Hawkins v. Blair, 334 Ga. App. 898 (780 SE2d 515) (2015)
    Used to show that a forum can lack meaningful “local interest” even where some alleged conduct touched it, and that plaintiff’s forum choice can be insufficient “in light of the totality of the circumstances.” The Court found Hawkins consistent with rejecting Gwinnett’s asserted “local interest” based solely on a registered agent’s location.
  • Woodard Events v. Coffee House Indus., 341 Ga. App. 526 (801 SE2d 322) (2017)
    Cited to reject the notion that the sixth and seventh factors (local interest; plaintiff’s forum choice) must be weighted more heavily than the others.
  • Collier v. Wehmeier, 313 Ga. App. 421 (721 SE2d 919) (2011)
    Reinforces that “traditional deference” to plaintiff’s forum choice does not “trump the other factors,” nor does it require a “clear showing of inconvenience” before transfer can be granted under the statutory balancing test.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds factor-by-factor, repeatedly returning to a single corrective theme: OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) demands a comparative analysis between the current venue and the proposed venue, guided by the seven enumerated factors and the overarching standard—whether the case would be “more properly heard” elsewhere “in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses.”

1) Relative ease of access to sources of proof (OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(1))

The trial court asked whether proof could be accessed “with relative ease” in Gwinnett, emphasizing electronic discovery. The Court held this was the wrong question. The factor requires comparing relative ease between venues, and it encompasses trial realities (not just discovery), including witness convenience and efficient access to physical evidence.

On the undisputed record, Columbia County housed the accident site, the conveyor belt system, relevant maintenance/inspection materials, and the bulk of likely nonparty witnesses (co-workers, maintenance personnel, first responders, and medical personnel). The record showed no corresponding concentration of evidence or witnesses in Gwinnett County.

2) Availability and cost of compulsory process (OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(2))

The trial court emphasized the absence of “unwilling witnesses” and suggested transfer would require a heightened showing that Gwinnett’s compulsory-process costs were “so much greater.” The Court held the analysis must instead consider the expected costs associated with each forum and fold that comparative assessment into the overall balancing—even if unwillingness cannot yet be known at the outset.

The opinion highlighted that costs can be evaluated as a matter of law (citing OCGA § 24-13-25’s per diem and mileage structure), and that the presence of many likely witnesses in/near Columbia makes Gwinnett comparatively more expensive if subpoenas and travel reimbursements become necessary.

3) Possibility of viewing the premises (OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(3))

The trial court conceded Columbia County would be more convenient for a premises view but discounted the factor because a view was not shown “likely.” The Court held “likely” is not the statutory standard; the statute asks about the possibility of viewing the premises, if appropriate to the action. In a premises/product-liability workplace accident, the achievability and practicality of a view (including the conveyor system, safety features, and warnings) matters—especially early, when trial logistics remain uncertain.

4) Unnecessary expense or trouble to defendant (OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(4))

The trial court found additional costs for witness appearances in Gwinnett but discounted them, reasoning that witnesses “often appear at trial via video deposition” and the costs were not “so expensive or troublesome” in light of plaintiff’s chosen forum. The Court identified multiple legal missteps:

  • OCGA § 9-11-43(a) directs that trial testimony be taken orally in open court, making live attendance the baseline rather than an exception.
  • The court must weigh additional costs and “trouble” comparatively and cumulatively with the other factors, not dismiss them because plaintiff chose the forum.
  • The analysis must include whether the added expense/trouble is unnecessary to plaintiff’s right to pursue the remedy; here, substantive law would be the same in both counties, and plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief would remain intact in Columbia County.

5) Administrative difficulties for the forum courts (OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(5))

The trial court again treated the factor as a one-forum inquiry, stating the record did not show Gwinnett would have administrative difficulty. The Court held the statute requires comparing the “forum courts”—Gwinnett and Columbia—and assessing whether administrative burdens (calendar congestion, enforcement of process, logistics for views, etc.) are greater in one than the other.

6) Local interests (OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(6))

The trial court found both counties had an “interest”: Columbia because the incident occurred there; Gwinnett because Club Car’s registered agent was there. The Court rejected the equivalence. Columbia’s ties were extensive—resident decedent and plaintiff, defendant’s plant and principal place of business, location of the product and premises, and local public responders and witnesses. Gwinnett’s tie was essentially non-substantive and administrative (registered agent location). The opinion framed this as inconsistent with forum non conveniens principles reflected in AT&T v. Sigala and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, including the idea that jury duty should not be imposed on a community with no meaningful relation to the dispute.

7) Traditional deference to plaintiff’s choice (OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a)(7))

The Court found the trial court’s central methodological error here: it invoked “some deference” to plaintiff’s choice, but then used that choice repeatedly to dilute other factors that favored Columbia County. The Court held “traditional deference” is a consideration, not a trump card, and it does not carry presumptively greater weight than the first six factors.

The Court’s most pointed rule statement is fact-specific but clear in direction: where the chosen forum is distant from plaintiff’s home county, and the only connection is a defendant’s registered agent, plaintiff’s choice “in and of itself, is insufficient to warrant retention of venue,” especially when the operative events, witnesses, premises, product, and parties are located in or much nearer to the proposed transferee county.

C. Impact

The opinion’s immediate effect is procedural: it vacates and remands for a redo under the proper statutory framework. Its broader impact is doctrinal and practical:

  • Enforcement of comparative analysis: Trial courts are reminded they must compare the current and proposed fora under each factor, rather than asking whether the chosen forum is merely “capable” of handling the case.
  • Trial-centric realism: The Court reorients the analysis toward trial necessities (live witnesses, physical evidence, premises view) rather than treating e-discovery as a cure-all.
  • Registered-agent venue as a weak “local interest”: The decision signals skepticism toward retaining a case in a county whose only tie is a registered agent—particularly when all substantive connections point elsewhere and when registered-agent venue is used as the “sole, non-substantive hook” to anchor other defendants.
  • Limits on factor (7): “Traditional deference” cannot be used to negate the statute’s balancing test, strengthening predictability for defendants seeking transfer where operative facts and witnesses are concentrated in another county.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Forum non conveniens: A doctrine allowing a court to transfer (or decline) a case even when venue is technically proper, if another forum is “more proper” considering fairness (“interest of justice”) and practicalities (“convenience of parties and witnesses”).
  • “More properly heard” vs. “proper venue”: A case can be filed in a legally proper venue, yet still be transferred if another county is better suited under OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a).
  • Compulsory process: Subpoenas and other court mechanisms used to compel a witness to appear. Costs can include statutory mileage and per diem payments when witnesses travel from outside the county.
  • Premises view: A jury (or court) viewing the physical location or item at issue. The statute asks whether such a view is feasible and appropriate—not whether it is already shown to be “likely” at the outset.
  • Traditional deference to plaintiff’s forum choice: Courts typically respect the plaintiff’s selection, but under the statute it is only one factor and cannot override the overall balancing when other factors strongly point to transfer.

5. Conclusion

The Court of Appeals’ decision functions as a corrective guide for OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a): trial courts must conduct a venue-to-venue comparison under the seven statutory factors, with an emphasis on witnesses, trial logistics, premises-view practicality, and genuine local interests. The plaintiff’s forum choice remains relevant, but it cannot be deployed to discount the other factors—especially where the chosen county’s only connection is a corporate registered agent and the controversy is overwhelmingly localized elsewhere. The remand directs the trial court to reweigh transfer to Columbia County under this proper framework, preserving the statute’s intended role and preventing it from becoming “meaningless.”