Date: Feb 2, 2026

Forfeiture on Review, Late-Evidence Deadlines, and Due Process Bias Claims in Non-LPR Cancellation Cases

1. Introduction

In David Camargo Gomez v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 2026) (nonprecedential), the Third Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the denial of non–lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Petitioners David Camargo Gomez and Edith Ponce Cordero—married citizens of Mexico— sought cancellation based primarily on alleged hardship to their U.S.-citizen children, particularly their son with multiple medical and psychological conditions.

The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief for failure to prove “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” under § 1229b(b)(1)(D), and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On review, Petitioners asserted: (i) inadequate consideration of hardship factors; (ii) error in excluding untimely supplemental evidence; and (iii) a Fifth Amendment due process violation based on alleged IJ bias and lack of a full and fair hearing.

Although the panel noted aspects of the IJ’s treatment of the son’s evidence were “undoubtedly concerning,” it ultimately denied the petition based on procedural forfeiture of the hardship challenge, deference to the IJ’s deadline enforcement, and failure to show a due process violation or prejudice.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Hardship argument forfeited: Petitioners did not adequately develop their claim that the IJ/BIA failed to consider hardship factors; their briefing largely addressed only the late-evidence ruling. The Third Circuit treated the hardship challenge as forfeited and declined to reach it.
Untimely evidence properly excluded: The IJ acted within her discretion to enforce filing deadlines and exclude supplemental medical evidence submitted months after the set deadline; Petitioners showed no “good cause” for lateness.
No due process violation: The alleged bias inference (from the IJ’s intention to issue an oral decision the same day) rested on an inapplicable EOIR policy premise and, in any event, Petitioners were given a meaningful opportunity to present their case and failed to show “substantial prejudice.”

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Review limits and standards in cancellation/hardship cases

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): The opinion relies on Wilkinson for a two-part framework: (a) the underlying factual findings in cancellation—such as the seriousness of a medical condition—are “unreviewable,” while (b) the court may review whether the established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard. The Third Circuit also cites Wilkinson to confirm jurisdiction over the application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard as a justiciable “question of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Wilkinson v. Att'y Gen., 131 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020)): The court reiterates the “substantial evidence” lens and its high deference: the agency stands unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. This situates hardship determinations within a posture that is difficult for petitioners to overturn even when the record contains competing evidence.
Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004): The panel uses Chen to explain its practice of reviewing both IJ and BIA decisions where the BIA adopts IJ findings and adds some reasoning.

2) Appellate forfeiture for undeveloped arguments

Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005): The court treats Petitioners’ hardship challenge as forfeited because it was effectively only gestured at (a heading) without developed argument; Lie is cited for the principle that an argument alluded to only briefly can be forfeited.
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1993): Reinforces that arguments not developed in the opening brief are considered abandoned absent extraordinary circumstances.

3) IJ discretion to exclude untimely evidence

Dedji v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2008): Although a Second Circuit case, Dedji supplies the articulated “good cause” and “likelihood of substantial prejudice” formulation for relaxing an IJ deadline under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (as referenced by the panel). The Third Circuit applies this logic to uphold the exclusion where Petitioners offered no explanation for missing the deadline and the materials concerned preexisting conditions.

4) Due process standards in immigration proceedings

Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)): The panel applies the “meaningful time and meaningful manner” formulation for procedural due process.
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 2005): Provides the separate requirement of “substantial prejudice,” which the court finds missing given the record’s breadth and the opportunities Petitioners had to present testimony, argument, and documentation.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Hardship: the court signals record concerns but resolves the case on forfeiture

A notable feature is the panel’s candid acknowledgement that parts of the IJ’s characterization of the son’s limitations were “undoubtedly concerning.” The IJ stated there were “no medical, physical, psychological, or developmental reasons” the son could not “adequately care for himself” (A.R. 52), yet the panel points to contrary evidence: Dr. Paula Madrid’s report (unchallenged credibility) and the timely report of therapist Yanela Stephenson.

Even so, the court does not correct or reweigh the hardship determination. Instead, it enforces a strict briefing doctrine: Petitioners’ “hardship factors” argument was not meaningfully developed, because their brief’s relevant sections focused on the late-evidence dispute. Under Lie v. Ashcroft and Kost v. Kozakiewicz, that deficiency is dispositive. The practical lesson is that even potentially serious analytical flaws at the agency level may go unremedied if not properly presented on petition for review.

2) Late evidence: deadlines matter, and “good cause” requires an explanation tied to the timing

The court emphasizes the IJ’s authority to set and enforce deadlines for filings (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c)). Petitioners were notified in June 2018 that all evidence was due March 11, 2019, ahead of the April 11, 2019 merits hearing. Yet the supplemental evidence was not filed until May 24, 2019 (the continued hearing date), more than two months late.

Critically, Petitioners offered “no excuse” for delay, and the court found none apparent because the late materials concerned existing conditions—suggesting earlier availability. On those facts, the court holds the exclusion “well within the IJ’s discretion,” reflecting an institutional priority: orderly docket management in immigration courts and predictability in evidentiary submissions.

3) Due process and alleged bias: policy-based inferences require a correct legal predicate and proof of prejudice

Petitioners argued that the IJ’s statement—“I intend on issuing an oral decision today” (A.R. 208)—showed prejudgment because, in their view, EOIR rules purportedly preclude oral grants of cancellation when the numerical cap is implicated (citing EOIR OPPM 17-04 and related regulations).

The panel rejects the argument on two levels:

Incorrect predicate: The cited EOIR policy is triggered only when the annual statutory cap on cancellation grants is about to be reached (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.21(c)), and Petitioners did not show that condition applied.
No deprivation and no prejudice: The record showed meaningful participation: legal arguments, testimony from both Petitioners and the children’s psychotherapist, and admission of “over 600 pages” of documents (including tax returns, country conditions, and medical evaluations). The IJ decided the case based on “credible testimony” and “Exhibits 1 through 11” (A.R. 49). Without showing exclusion of essential evidence or outcome-affecting prejudice, the due process claim fails under Abdulai v. Ashcroft and Bonhometre v. Gonzales.

C. Impact

Procedural rigor on petition for review: The decision underscores that cancellation cases can turn on appellate presentation. Even where the panel flags troubling aspects of the agency’s hardship discussion, failure to develop the argument can end the case.
Evidence management in immigration court: By affirming exclusion of late-filed medical materials without a showing of good cause, the opinion reinforces that counsel must treat IJ filing deadlines as enforceable rules, not aspirational targets.
Bias claims require more than speculation: The court signals skepticism toward bias theories built on internal policy assumptions without proving the policy applies, and reiterates that due process claims in removal proceedings typically rise or fall on demonstrable prejudice.
Nonprecedential but instructive: While expressly “not binding precedent,” the opinion offers a clear cautionary model of how the Third Circuit approaches briefing forfeiture, evidentiary discretion, and due process prejudice in cancellation litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Cancellation of removal (non-LPR) — 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1): A discretionary form of relief that allows certain noncitizens to remain in the United States if they meet threshold requirements, including continuous presence, good moral character, and—most contested—proof that removal would cause a qualifying U.S.-citizen or LPR family member “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: A demanding hardship threshold. Ordinary disruptions from removal (financial strain, family separation, reduced opportunities) usually do not suffice; applicants must show hardship substantially beyond what typically accompanies removal.
“Substantial evidence” review: A deferential appellate standard: the agency’s view stands unless the record compels the opposite conclusion. It is not enough that the record could support a different result.
Forfeiture/abandonment on appeal: A reviewing court may refuse to consider an issue if the opening brief does not develop it with argumentation and supporting authority. Headings or passing references are often insufficient.
Good cause for late evidence: A concrete, credible explanation for why the evidence could not be timely filed (e.g., new diagnosis, delayed records despite diligence), typically paired with a showing that enforcing the deadline would materially harm the case.
Due process in removal proceedings: Noncitizens are entitled to a fundamentally fair hearing. But to win a due process challenge, they usually must show both a procedural defect (lack of meaningful opportunity to be heard) and that the defect likely affected the outcome (substantial prejudice).

5. Conclusion

David Camargo Gomez v. Attorney General United States of America illustrates three practical rules that can be case-dispositive in cancellation-of-removal litigation: (1) hardship challenges must be clearly and fully briefed on petition for review or they may be forfeited, even when the record contains evidence that could support criticism of the IJ’s analysis; (2) IJs have broad discretion to enforce evidentiary deadlines, and late submissions without good cause are vulnerable to exclusion; and (3) due process and bias claims require a correct legal foundation and a showing of substantial prejudice, not inferential speculation.