FOIL § 87(2)(f) Permits Withholding a Statewide Certified-Officer Registry Where Cross-Referencing Public Payroll Data Could Identify Undercover Officers

1. Introduction

Matter of Munson v New York State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs. (2026 NY Slip Op 02017 [248 AD3d 1379] [3d Dept Apr. 2, 2026]) addresses whether the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) must disclose, under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), the statewide registry of all certified police and peace officers maintained under Executive Law § 845.

Petitioners—reporter Emilie Munson and related respondents (including The Hearst Corporation)—sought bulk records for all certified and decertified officers, including names, residence city/zip, employers, ranks, and training history. DCJS pointed petitioners to its public decertification list, but denied disclosure of the certified-officer registry under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f) (the “life or safety” exemption), asserting that the registry necessarily includes undercover officers and DCJS cannot identify or segregate them.

The key legal issue became whether DCJS demonstrated a sufficient possibility of endangerment to justify withholding the certified-officer registry, and whether redactions ordered by Supreme Court would adequately mitigate risk.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department reversed Supreme Court and dismissed the petition, holding that DCJS met its burden under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f) because disclosure of the statewide certified-officer registry could:

  • enable identification of undercover or sensitive-assignment officers by comparing the state registry to local agencies’ publicly available payroll databases that omit or mask such officers; and
  • reveal (even with extensive redactions) aggregate information—such as employer staffing totals—allowing estimation of undercover staffing levels and changes, creating a possibility of endangerment and operational harm.

The court also held that petitioners were not entitled to counsel fees because they did not “substantially prevail” under Public Officers Law § 89(4)(c).

Dissent (Powers, J.). The dissent would have affirmed Supreme Court, concluding DCJS’s in camera submissions remained speculative and did not show how the registry would be used to identify undercover officers. The dissent further argued the majority improperly relied on a new rationale (aggregate/public-safety staffing inferences) not invoked during the administrative denial, citing limits on judicial review of agency rationales.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The decision synthesizes multiple FOIL lines of authority: (i) FOIL’s broad presumption of access and narrow construction of exemptions; (ii) the “possibility of endangerment” threshold under § 87(2)(f); and (iii) the “mosaic” concept that otherwise innocuous records may be withheld if, combined with other readily available information, they reveal protected facts.

Foundational FOIL framework (presumption of access; narrow exemptions)

  • Matter of Capital Newspapers Div. of Hearst Corp. v Burns, 67 NY2d 562 (1986): Cited for the proposition that FOIL exemptions are narrowly construed and the agency bears the burden to show an exemption “falls squarely” within the statute.
  • Matter of Hutchinson v Annucci, 189 AD3d 1850 (3d Dept 2020): Used for interpretive balance—exemptions are narrowly construed, but given their “natural and obvious meaning” consistent with FOIL’s purposes. The majority also relied on Hutchinson to justify considering certain arguments where third-party confidentiality is implicated.
  • Matter of Whitfield v FOIL Appeals Officer, Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 221 AD3d 1341 (3d Dept 2023): Quoted for FOIL’s broad duty of disclosure, the presumption of access, and the agency’s ability to withhold/redact upon meeting an exemption.

The “life or safety” exemption and its evidentiary threshold

  • Matter of Prisoners' Legal Servs. of N.Y. v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 209 AD3d 1208 (3d Dept 2022), affd 42 NY3d 936 (2024): Central authority that the agency need only demonstrate a possibility of endangerment to invoke § 87(2)(f). The majority applied this low threshold to DCJS’s showing that cross-referencing the registry with payroll databases could expose undercover officers.

“Mosaic”/combination theory: withholding where records can be combined with readily available information

  • Matter of Spence v New York State Dept. of Civ. Serv., 223 AD3d 1019 (3d Dept 2024), quoting Matter of Suhr v New York State Dept. of Civ. Serv., 193 AD3d 129 (3d Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 907 (2021): Cited for the rule that withholding may be proper where records, “when combined with other readily available information,” could identify information protected by an exemption. This “combination” principle is the doctrinal hinge for the majority’s reasoning.

Protection of undercover officers and sensitive staffing information

  • Matter of Grajales v Lungen, 15 AD3d 789 (3d Dept 2005), lv denied 5 NY3d 704 (2005): Recognizes § 87(2)(f) can protect information that would identify undercover officers. The majority used Grajales to frame undercover-identity protection as squarely within § 87(2)(f).
  • Matter of Digital Forensics Unit v Records Access Officer, 214 AD3d 532 (1st Dept 2023): Supports invoking § 87(2)(f) to withhold information that could be used to estimate undercover numbers or staffing levels—harmful even without naming undercover officers.
  • Matter of Empire Ctr. for Pub. Policy v New York City Off. of Payroll Admin., 2019 NY Slip Op 30643[U] (Sup Ct, NY County 2019), mod 187 AD3d 435 (1st Dept 2020), lv denied 36 NY3d 906 (2021): A key comparator. The First Department accepted that anonymous/aggregate payroll data, when compared against a public payroll database, could reveal changes in undercover staffing, triggering § 87(2)(f). The Third Department treated Munson as an even clearer case because the registry-to-payroll comparison could reveal names missing from local payroll publications.
  • Matter of Ruberti, Girvin & Ferlazzo v New York State Div. of State Police, 218 AD2d 494 (3d Dept 1996): Cited (alongside Digital Forensics and Empire Center) to support that staffing-level or operational information can implicate safety under § 87(2)(f).

Attorney’s fees

  • Matter of Prisoners' Legal Servs. of N.Y. v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 209 AD3d 1208 (3d Dept 2022), affd 42 NY3d 936 (2024), and Matter of Empire Ctr. for Pub. Policy v New York City Off. of Payroll Admin., 187 AD3d 435 (1st Dept 2020): Cited to deny fees because petitioners did not “substantially prevail” (Public Officers Law § 89[4][c]).

The dissent’s “agency-grounds-only” review and “particularized justification” emphasis

  • Matter of Reclaim the Records v New York State Dept. of Health, 45 NY3d 1 (2025): The dissent relied on this for the principle that judicial review is limited to the grounds invoked by the agency; courts should not uphold by substituting new rationales.
  • Matter of Rose v Albany County Dist. Attorney's Off., 111 AD3d 1123 (3d Dept 2013): Cited in the dissent to argue courts may not replace the agency’s stated grounds with another.
  • Matter of Russell v Town of Mt. Pleasant, N.Y., — NY3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 00966 (2026): Quoted for narrow construction of FOIL exemptions and the agency’s burden.
  • Matter of Wagner v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 246 AD3d 751 (2d Dept 2026): Cited by the dissent for the rule that conclusory/speculative assertions are insufficient.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The registry’s statutory role vs. bulk public disclosure

Executive Law § 845 requires DCJS to maintain a central registry including each officer’s name, date of birth, social security number, rank/title, employer, and training completion. The court accepted that this registry supports verification of lawful appointment and certification but emphasized that FOIL access to the registry depends on whether an exemption applies.

(b) The controlling standard: “possibility of endangerment”

The majority applied the Prisoners' Legal Servs. standard: DCJS did not need to show certain harm—only a possibility. The crucial move was to treat the risk as arising not solely from the registry in isolation, but from foreseeable comparison with “other readily available information.”

(c) The “comparison attack”: registry + local payroll disclosures

The majority found DCJS’s in camera submissions demonstrated that at least one local law enforcement agency publicly omits or masks certain officers in its payroll database to protect undercover/sensitive roles, while still submitting those officers’ information to the state registry. Because DCJS cannot identify undercover officers from the registry itself, it cannot safely produce a bulk list without risking that:

  • a requester compares a department’s public payroll list to the state registry’s roster attributed to that department; and
  • names appearing on the registry but missing from the payroll publication become presumptively “undercover or sensitive,” exposing officers to threats.

This is a textbook application of Matter of Spence v New York State Dept. of Civ. Serv. and Matter of Suhr v New York State Dept. of Civ. Serv.: disclosure is improper where the requested record, combined with other available records, would reveal protected information.

(d) Why redaction did not cure the risk

Supreme Court attempted to manage risk by redacting residence city/zip and undercover training entries. The Third Department rejected this as inadequate because:

  • Even if many personal identifiers are removed, the remaining fields (notably current employer) enable staffing-level inference and roster comparison.
  • Redacting only “undercover training” can itself become a signal—“highlight[ing] the very fact sought to be concealed”—as noted in Footnote *.

In other words, the court treated the problem as structural: once bulk roster disclosure occurs, the redaction strategy cannot reliably prevent identification or inference.

(e) Aggregate public-safety/operational harms as independently sufficient

The majority further held that revealing employer information for all certified officers could allow estimation of the number of undercover officers and changes over time, thereby undermining deterrence and hampering operations—expressly relying on Matter of Digital Forensics Unit v Records Access Officer and Matter of Empire Ctr. for Pub. Policy v New York City Off. of Payroll Admin.. This treated staffing-level inference as itself a § 87(2)(f) danger, even absent identification of particular undercover officers.

(f) Addressing the dissent’s “new rationale” concern

The majority anticipated an argument that DCJS did not articulate every aspect of its reasoning at the administrative stage. It nonetheless considered the staffing-inference rationale because, in its view, third-party confidentiality and safety interests were implicated (Matter of Hutchinson v Annucci; Matter of Whitfield v FOIL Appeals Officer, Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision). The dissent saw this as conflicting with Matter of Reclaim the Records v New York State Dept. of Health, which cautions against courts substituting grounds not invoked by the agency.

3.3. Impact

  • Bulk certified-officer rosters face a higher safety bar. The decision materially strengthens agencies’ ability to deny FOIL requests seeking comprehensive lists of certified officers, where disclosure could be “mosaicked” with payroll or other public databases to identify undercover officers or staffing patterns.
  • Redaction may be deemed illusory when it becomes a “signal.” The court’s reasoning (including Footnote *) underscores that selective redaction can backfire if it highlights the sensitive fact (e.g., undercover training) it aims to conceal.
  • FOIL requesters may be pushed toward officer-specific verification. The opinion emphasizes that individual officer certification can still be checked through targeted FOIL requests and the public decertification list, suggesting a practical channel for transparency without bulk roster release.
  • Broader litigation over “agency grounds” is likely. The dissent frames a significant administrative-law fault line—how strictly courts should confine review to the agency’s stated rationale in FOIL cases, particularly where third-party safety is at stake.
  • Potential regulatory/legislative response. The court noted that existing regulations (9 NYCRR part 6056) do not address FOIL handling for undercover-sensitive fields. Agencies or the Legislature may respond with clearer protocols for segregation, anonymization, or safe public reporting.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

FOIL presumption of access
Government records are presumed public unless an agency proves a specific statutory exemption applies.
Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f): “could endanger”
The agency need only show a possibility (not certainty) that disclosure could endanger life or safety.
“Mosaic” / combination risk
Even if a record is not dangerous alone, it may be withheld if it can be combined with other readily available information to reveal protected facts—here, undercover identities or undercover staffing levels.
In camera review
A judge reviews sensitive evidence privately (not on the public docket) to evaluate an exemption claim without publicly exposing the very information at issue.
“Substantially prevailed” (attorney’s fees)
FOIL allows fees in certain cases, but generally only when the requester meaningfully wins disclosure; losing on appeal eliminates that basis.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Munson v New York State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs. establishes a consequential FOIL principle for law-enforcement transparency disputes: a statewide registry of certified officers may be withheld under Public Officers Law § 87(2)(f) where bulk disclosure—even with substantial redactions—could, through comparison with other public datasets, reveal undercover officers or permit measurement of undercover staffing levels, creating a “possibility of endangerment.”

The decision extends the practical reach of the “life or safety” exemption from direct identification risks to modern, data-driven inference risks, while the dissent highlights an important constraint question: whether courts may uphold nondisclosure on rationales not clearly invoked during administrative review. Together, the opinions map the next frontier of FOIL litigation—how to reconcile open-government norms with the realities of cross-referencable public databases and operational security.