Date: Jun 14, 2026

FOIA Adequate-Search Review: Dissimilar Search Locations Across Requests Are Not Per Se Unreasonable, and New Search-Term/Good-Faith Challenges Are Forfeited on Appeal

I. Introduction

In Jacqueline Stevens v. DOJ (7th Cir. June 12, 2026) (nonprecedential disposition), Professor Jacqueline Stevens sued multiple federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, after submitting fourteen FOIA requests (many seeking expedited processing) to support her research. She alleged that agencies missed statutory deadlines, failed to expedite, and unlawfully withheld records, and she sought an order compelling prompt and reasonable searches.

On appeal, Stevens narrowed the dispute to one issue: the adequacy of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) searches for records relating to three individuals (Manuel Valdez Soto, Juan Hurtado Valencia, and Nathan Anfinson). Her appellate theory emphasized the lack of “uniformity”—ICE searched different locations (databases/filesystems) for different requests and did not explain the differences.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government. It held:

Stevens forfeited two appellate arguments—(1) that ICE used improper or inconsistent search terms and (2) that courts should not apply the presumption of good faith to ICE’s FOIA declarations—because she did not raise them in the district court.
Her challenge to search locations was preserved, but failed on the merits. The court rejected any notion that varying search locations across separate requests is per se unreasonable and found no “countervailing evidence” showing ICE’s searches were inadequate given the requests’ differing detail and scope.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Issue preservation and forfeiture

United States v. Sheth, 924 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 2019): The court used Sheth to enforce the basic appellate rule that arguments not presented below are forfeited. This provided the doctrinal basis for refusing to consider Stevens’ new attacks on ICE’s search terms and the presumption of good faith.
Dalton v. Teva N. Am., 891 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2012)): These cases supported the further point that arguments raised only perfunctorily or inadequately are forfeited. They reinforced that preservation requires meaningful presentation, not passing reference.
Bew v. City of Chicago, 252 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001): Bew supplied the court’s framework for deciding whether Stevens’ “search location” contention was a new claim or a permissible refinement. Because her appellate argument “grew out of” the facts and theory presented below (inadequate declarations / inadequate search explanation), the court treated it as preserved.

2. FOIA adequate-search standard and evidentiary burdens

Rubman v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 800 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2015): The opinion took from Rubman the Seventh Circuit’s core test: a FOIA search is adequate if it reflects a “good faith effort” and is “reasonable in light of the request.” Rubman also provided the key procedural mechanism: a requester may rebut agency affidavits with “countervailing evidence.”
Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2014): Quoted through Rubman, Iturralde contributed the widely used FOIA principle that agency declarations can be overcome with concrete rebuttal evidence—placing pressure on requesters to do more than speculate.
Patterson v. IRS, 56 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1993)): The court used Patterson/Maynard to frame the requester’s burden: show that the agency might have found responsive documents had it conducted a reasonable search. This burden, as applied, requires more than dissatisfaction with outcomes; it requires a grounded argument tied to likely record locations.

3. “Four corners” of the request and agency discretion about where to search

Stevens v. United States Dep't of State, 20 F.4th 337 (7th Cir. 2021): This earlier dispute involving the same requester became the opinion’s most important analog. There, the court rejected similar critiques that declarations lacked “crucial details” about database selection. The 2026 panel relied on that reasoning to underscore agency “considerable discretion” in choosing search locations and to reject speculative attacks premised on “why not search more places?”
Kowalczyk v. Dep't of Just., 73 F.3d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1996): The court adopted Kowalczyk’s limiting principle: an agency need not “speculate about potential leads” or look beyond the “four corners” of a FOIA request to identify additional places to search. This principle drove the holding that differences among Stevens’ three requests justified different search footprints.

4. Presumption of good faith in government submissions

Matter of Wade, 969 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1992): The court cited Wade for the proposition that, absent evidence of bad faith, the government’s submissions should not be treated as inherently suspect. Although Stevens’ direct “no good-faith presumption” argument was forfeited, Wade still supported the court’s decision to “credit the affidavit” describing ICE’s search approach.

B. Legal Reasoning

Appellate narrowing + gatekeeping (forfeiture). The court first defined what it would and would not review. By applying United States v. Sheth and Dalton v. Teva N. Am., it excluded two theories (search-term adequacy and good-faith presumption) that were not litigated below. This step mattered because FOIA appeals often turn on the precise critiques leveled at agency declarations; new critiques can require factual development not present in the record.
Preservation through “growth out of the facts.” Using Bew v. City of Chicago, the court treated Stevens’ “variable search locations” point as a refinement of her earlier claim that ICE’s declarations failed to explain how it chose databases. That allowed merits review of the location-variation contention.
Merits: no per se rule requiring uniform search locations across requests. The court declined to create (or recognize) a doctrine that overlapping requests must receive identical search footprints. It emphasized the governing standard from Rubman v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.: reasonableness “in light of the request,” not uniformity across requests.
“Four corners” constraint makes request detail decisive. Applying Kowalczyk v. Dep't of Just., the court treated the text of each request as the principal driver of where ICE was obliged to look. It identified material differences: the Hurtado Valencia request included a U.S.-citizenship narrative and a link to a blog post; the Anfinson request sought commissary and grievance records and “assertions or findings of U.S. citizenship”; Valdez Soto’s request (as described in the opinion) lacked comparable detail. From that, the court found it unsurprising—and legally permissible—that ICE searched four locations for Hurtado Valencia, two for Anfinson, and one for Valdez Soto.
No rebuttal evidence; speculation is not enough. The court stressed that Stevens offered no “countervailing evidence” under Rubman/Iturralde. Without concrete proof that additional systems were likely to contain responsive documents (or that ICE ignored obvious record repositories identified by the requests), Stevens could not meet the burden articulated in Patterson v. IRS (quoting Maynard v. CIA).
Deference to sworn FOIA declarations absent bad faith. Crediting ICE’s affidavit (and invoking Matter of Wade), the court accepted the declarant’s representation that employees searched the file systems that, in their judgment based on routine recordkeeping practices, were reasonably likely to contain responsive records.

C. Impact

Although designated NONPRECEDENTIAL, the disposition signals several practical lessons likely to influence FOIA litigation in the Seventh Circuit:

Appellate FOIA challenges are tightly policed for forfeiture. Requesters must raise specific attacks (e.g., search terms, bad faith, database selection methodology) in the district court to preserve them.
Uniformity is not the yardstick; “reasonableness in light of the request” is. Agencies can justify different search locations across different requests—especially when the requests differ in specificity, context, or requested record types.
Request drafting matters. Because agencies need not look beyond the request’s “four corners,” providing concrete leads, context, and likely record systems in the request itself can shape the legally required search.
Rebuttal requires evidence, not suspicion. To overcome agency declarations, requesters should develop record-based “countervailing evidence” (e.g., prior productions, manuals describing systems of records, testimony, or internal agency guidance) indicating that additional repositories are likely to contain responsive materials.
Institutional note to agencies. The panel observed that more “uniform, consistent” search processes might reduce litigation—an implicit operational recommendation even while affirming.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adequacy of a FOIA search: FOIA does not require an agency to find every responsive document; it requires a search reasonably calculated to uncover responsive documents, judged by what the agency did (process), not merely by what it found (results).
Presumption of good faith (in FOIA declarations): Courts typically accept sworn agency FOIA declarations as truthful unless the requester shows evidence of bad faith or internal inconsistency. Mere dissatisfaction or conjecture usually does not suffice.
Countervailing evidence: Evidence offered by the requester that calls into question the agency’s account—such as proof a database exists and routinely stores the requested record type, or prior productions showing records were kept elsewhere.
“Four corners” of the request: The agency generally is not required to infer additional leads outside what the requester actually asked for and described. The request’s text guides the search.
Forfeiture: Losing the ability to argue an issue on appeal because it was not properly raised in the trial court.
Summary judgment in FOIA cases: Courts often decide FOIA cases without a trial based on agency declarations. The dispute becomes whether the declarations establish a reasonable search and lawful withholding.

V. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision affirms that FOIA “adequate search” litigation turns on a pragmatic reasonableness inquiry tied to the text of the request, not on a generalized demand for uniformity across different requests. It also underscores two recurring constraints on FOIA appellants: (1) arguments not raised in the district court—such as challenges to search terms or the good-faith presumption—will be forfeited; and (2) speculation about what the agency “should have searched” will not substitute for countervailing evidence showing likely repositories were ignored.