FLSA Overtime Remedies Are Exclusive: NCWHA Payday Claims Cannot Repackage FLSA Overtime, and Signed Piece-Rate Terms Control

Case: Osvaldo Figueroa v. Butterball, LLC (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2026) (published)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Disposition: Affirmed (NCWHA claims dismissed; FLSA claim resolved for employer on summary judgment)

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from a wage dispute brought by Osvaldo Figueroa, a night-shift “turkey loader,” against Butterball, LLC, a major turkey producer. Figueroa alleged that Butterball underpaid him and similarly situated workers in violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The wage controversy turned on a core characterization question—whether Figueroa was paid hourly or by piece-rate—and on whether state-law wage theories could be used to recover (or enhance recovery for) federal overtime claims.

The district court dismissed Figueroa’s NCWHA claims at the pleading stage and later granted summary judgment to Butterball on the FLSA claim after discovery. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) overtime remedies for FLSA violations must be pursued under the FLSA rather than “rerouted” through the NCWHA payday provision, (2) the record established that Figueroa was a piece-rate worker, and (3) Butterball’s time and pay records supported lawful overtime calculations under the FLSA’s piece-rate framework.

II. Summary of the Opinion

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is anchored in a set of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court authorities on (i) pleading and appellate standards, (ii) FLSA remedial exclusivity and preemption principles, (iii) FLSA recordkeeping and evidentiary burdens, and (iv) compensability concepts under the Portal-to-Portal Act and “principal activities.”

• Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, 174 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999))
  Role in the Opinion: Provided the controlling Fourth Circuit rule that “Congress prescribed exclusive remedies in the FLSA for violations of its mandates.” The court used this to reject Figueroa’s attempt to pursue FLSA overtime through the NCWHA payday provision for the purpose of obtaining a different remedial package (e.g., prejudgment interest).
• Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Skyline Restoration, Inc. v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 825 (4th Cir. 2021))
  Role: Supplied the de novo standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, framing how the court evaluated the NCWHA pleadings.
• Sea "B" Mining Company v. Addison, 831 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 2016) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 61
  Role: Supported harmless-error analysis. Even if the district court erred in dismissing the hourly-wage payday theory at the pleading stage, reversal was not warranted absent prejudice.
• E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 301 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2002))
  Role: Authorized affirmance “on any basis fairly supported by the record,” enabling the court to uphold dismissal based on the developed discovery record demonstrating piece-rate employment.
• Emmons v. City of Chesapeake, 982 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2020)
  Role: Provided the de novo standard for reviewing summary judgment on the FLSA claim.
• Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) and Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442 (2016)
  Role: Established and reiterated the FLSA recordkeeping principle: employers bear a statutory duty to keep accurate time and pay records; when they fail, a burden-shifting framework may allow employees to prove time worked through reasonable estimates. The Fourth Circuit referenced these authorities to describe the framework, but found Butterball’s records adequate and thus did not apply the burden-shifting to rescue Figueroa’s claim.
• Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014) (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005))
  Role: Defined “principal activities” and the “integral and indispensable” test for compensable work. The court acknowledged that certain pre-shift tasks (fueling/sanitizing) could be integral to turkey-loading, but held the evidence did not show that Figueroa himself regularly performed such uncompensated pre-shift work.
• Lockhart v. Republic Services, Inc., 2021 WL 4955241 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2021) and Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 2011 WL 10069108 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2011)
  Role: In addressing 29 C.F.R. § 778.318(c)’s “mutual understanding” concept (piece-rate intended to compensate for productive and nonproductive time), the court relied on Lockhart’s discussion of interpretive guidance and distinguished Espenscheid’s facts (where there was evidence of differentiated pay for certain nonproductive tasks and worker complaints).
• Avarado v. Corp. Cleaning Servs., Inc., 782 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2015)
  Role: Supplied a plain-language definition of “piece-rate,” reinforcing that pay may be determined by units/loads rather than hours.
• Figueroa v. Butterball, LLC, 2021 WL 4203652 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (“Figueroa I”); Figueroa v. Butterball, LLC, 2022 WL 2980749 (E.D.N.C. July 27, 2022) (“Figueroa II”); Figueroa v. Butterball, LLC, 2024 WL 3933859 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 23, 2024) (“Figueroa III”)
  Role: The appellate opinion treated the district court’s trilogy of decisions as the procedural backbone: repeated NCWHA dismissals, a narrowly surviving FLSA pleading, and ultimately a merits resolution after discovery confirming piece-rate employment and lawful overtime calculations.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Why the NCWHA payday claim could not recover FLSA overtime

The court drew a clean remedial boundary: if the overtime wages sought are those “mandated by the FLSA,” the plaintiff’s recourse is the FLSA itself. Even if the NCWHA payday provision is not listed among the NCWHA sections exempted for FLSA-covered workers, the court treated Figueroa’s theory as an impermissible attempt to plead “FLSA rights” with “state-law remedies.” That is exactly what Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp. forbids.

The practical effect is that plaintiffs cannot use a state wage-payment statute as a vehicle to obtain an additional or different remedy (here, prejudgment interest) for an alleged FLSA overtime shortfall. The Fourth Circuit framed the question functionally: regardless of the label, the “underlying overtime wages” arose from the same alleged overtime violations, so the claim belongs exclusively under the FLSA.

2) The hourly-wage payday theory failed because the record showed piece-rate employment

The opinion separated two concepts: (i) a state payday claim that is truly “separate and distinct” from FLSA overtime/minimum wage can exist in principle, but (ii) it collapses on the facts if the compensation agreement is piece-rate.

The court acknowledged that the district court’s second dismissal rationale (treating the pay stub “Rate: 18.54” mismatch as fatal) was mistaken at the pleading stage. Still, the error was harmless because discovery made the outcome inevitable: a signed offer letter stated a “load rate of $10.80,” corroborated by testimony and years of pay stubs using “LoadTrip” as the base-pay line item. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 and Sea "B" Mining Company v. Addison, the court declined to reverse without prejudice to a substantial right.

The analysis underscores an evidentiary hierarchy the court implicitly accepted: individualized, signed compensation terms (offer letter) and consistent payroll practice outweighed generalized materials like an online job posting or handbook language.

3) The NCWHA notice claim failed because Butterball provided adequate notice

On the NCWHA notice statute, the court affirmed dismissal on the ground that Butterball satisfied the notice requirements through (a) oral notice (accepting even Figueroa’s later allegation of hourly notice as sufficient for the first prong) and (b) written accessibility of wage practices through pay stubs (supported by the administrative code that treats payroll records/check stubs as an acceptable means).

Any arguable pleading-stage error was again rendered non-prejudicial because the developed record showed piece-rate notice via the offer letter and payroll practice.

4) The FLSA claim failed because Butterball properly calculated piece-rate overtime and used the correct workweek

Once the court affirmed piece-rate status, overtime turned on 29 C.F.R. § 778.111(a): compute the “regular rate” by dividing total weekly earnings by total weekly hours, then pay an additional half-time premium for hours over 40.

The opinion walked through an example workweek and endorsed Butterball’s computations, rejecting Figueroa’s contention that Butterball applied the wrong workweek definition or shifted hours between weeks. The court found the workweek ran Sunday-to-Saturday and refused Figueroa’s attempt to “stuff an extra day” into the workweek to manufacture an hours discrepancy.

5) Pre-shift work and the “integral and indispensable” test did not help this appellant

Applying Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk and IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, the court accepted the legal premise that fueling and sanitizing could be integral to turkey-loading. But it held the evidentiary showing was personal to Figueroa on appeal: he represented only himself, and the record did not show that he regularly performed uncompensated integral pre-shift tasks, even if opt-in plaintiffs described such practices.

The court also noted a procedural constraint: the notice of appeal identified only Figueroa as appellant, preventing reliance on opt-in plaintiffs’ claims to defeat summary judgment for him.

6) “Mutual understanding” under 29 C.F.R. § 778.318(c) could be inferred; time-and-a-half was not triggered

Figueroa argued that absent a clear explanation that piece-rate covers both productive and nonproductive time, overtime must be paid at time-and-a-half rather than half-time. The court rejected this as a misunderstanding of the regulations.

It reasoned that, consistent with Lockhart v. Republic Services, Inc. and the cited Department of Labor letter discussed there, the “mutual understanding” need not be written and may be inferred from conduct. Unlike Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, there was no record of (i) differentiated compensation for certain nonproductive tasks, (ii) changes in compensation structure, or (iii) complaints evidencing a dispute about what piece-rate covered. And because 29 C.F.R. § 778.318(b) (time-and-a-half for overtime) is tied to an agreement to pay nonproductive time at a lower rate than productive time, and no such arrangement was shown, half-time premium under the piece-rate method remained proper.

C. Impact

1) Reinforced limits on state-law “remedy shopping” for federal overtime claims

The opinion strengthens a practical litigation rule in the Fourth Circuit: where the wage shortfall is framed as unpaid FLSA overtime, plaintiffs cannot repackage that dispute under a state payday statute to pursue additional remedies. This provides employers and courts with a clear basis to narrow duplicative state claims that are remedially parasitic on the FLSA.

2) Piece-rate classification: signed offers and payroll practice may decisively control

For industries using unit/load-based pay, the decision signals that courts may treat a signed offer letter specifying a piece rate as powerful evidence of the compensation agreement—especially when consistent payroll descriptors (here, “LoadTrip”) persist over time. Generalized documents (handbooks, job postings) are less likely to create a material fact dispute absent evidence the worker actually understood them to override the signed pay terms.

3) Harmless error as an appellate stabilizer in wage cases

The court’s willingness to affirm despite a pleading-stage analytical misstep (because discovery made the claim untenable) encourages defendants to develop a clear factual record on compensation structure and workweek definitions. It also cautions plaintiffs that early pleading victories may not matter if documentary employment terms and payroll practice are inconsistent with the theory.

4) Workweek definition disputes: “extra day” theories face skepticism

The opinion rejects attempts to create FLSA liability by redefining a workweek in a way that effectively counts an additional day in the same workweek. Employers should still ensure handbook language aligns with actual workweek practice, but plaintiffs must show actual shifting/averaging in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 778.104.

5) Individual appellant limitation: opt-in evidence may not carry the appeal

The court’s attention to the notice of appeal underscores a procedural point: in collective actions, the evidentiary record may include broader practices, but on appeal an individual appellant may not be able to rely on opt-in plaintiffs’ circumstances to salvage his own claim if he did not appeal on their behalf.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

V. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in Figueroa v. Butterball, LLC clarifies two recurring wage-and-hour fault lines: (1) when overtime liability is grounded in the FLSA, plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit cannot use state wage-payment provisions merely to obtain alternative remedies for the same alleged federal violation; and (2) where the employment documents and payroll practice establish a piece-rate system, courts will apply the FLSA’s piece-rate overtime method and will not infer hourly-pay promises from ambiguous payroll labels or generalized materials.

The opinion’s broader significance lies in its combined doctrinal and practical guidance: it reinforces FLSA remedial exclusivity, elevates the evidentiary weight of signed compensation terms, and demonstrates how harmless-error review can preserve judgments when the developed record forecloses the plaintiff’s theory.