Florida Workers’ Compensation: Workplace Assault Injuries Are Compensable Upon Proof of Work-Relatedness (Including Increased-Risk Exposure) Without Proving Assailant Motive

I. Introduction

In Mohammed Bouayad v. Normandy Insurance Company (Fla. July 9, 2026), the Supreme Court of Florida addressed a recurring and high-stakes issue in workers’ compensation law: when an employee is assaulted by an unknown third party while admittedly in the course and scope of employment, what satisfies the statutory requirement that the injury “arise out of” the employment?

Petitioner Mohammed Bouayad, a general manager at a car rental business operating from a hotel near Orlando International Airport, was shot at close range around midnight while walking from the hotel atrium kiosk to an outside office as part of end-of-shift duties. Respondent Normandy Insurance Company denied compensability, asserting the shooting did not “arise out of” employment and instead stemmed from personal reasons or unknown motives.

A Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarded benefits, relying in part on Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria, 383 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1980). The First District reversed in Normandy Insurance Co. v. Bouayad, 372 So. 3d 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), interpreting the statutory phrase “work performed” narrowly and concluding Bouayad’s “walking” did not “cause” the shooting.

The First District certified a question of great public importance that framed the issue in tort-like causation terms. The Supreme Court rephrased the question and quashed the First District’s decision, reaffirming that workplace assaults can be compensable when the claimant proves work-relatedness—either through a work-related motive or, independently, through increased-risk exposure created by job duties or the work environment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that injuries inflicted by a third-party assailant while an employee is in the course and scope of employment can be compensable under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law, provided the claimant establishes the “arising out of” element by showing a sufficient work-related nexus.

The Court rejected the First District’s narrow approach that treated the discrete task at the moment of injury (“walking”) as the only relevant “work performed” and that effectively required the task itself to “cause” the injury in a tort sense. The Court reaffirmed longstanding precedent recognizing that, in assault cases, work-relatedness may be established by:

  • evidence of a work-related motive (e.g., robbery), or
  • evidence that the employee’s overall job duties or work environment exposed the employee to an increased risk of the assault.

The Court quashed Normandy Insurance Co. v. Bouayad and remanded for the First District to apply the correct legal standard and conduct a proper competent, substantial evidence review of the JCC’s findings.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria, 383 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1980)

Strother served as the central historical anchor. There, the Court upheld benefits for a cashier assaulted and robbed after being followed home because the assailants believed she carried cash deposits. The First District’s decision below criticized Strother and “the decisions that follow it” for “import[ing] a risk exposure element” into occupational causation.

The Supreme Court rejected that critique and reaffirmed Strother’s compatibility with the statutory “arising out of” requirement. Critically, the Court treated Strother not as an outlier but as part of a continuous doctrinal line recognizing that assaults can be work-related without tort-style “but for” or proximate cause framing.

2. First District workplace-assault cases recognizing increased-risk exposure

  • Lovin Mood, Inc. v. Bush, 687 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997): Benefits were upheld where an employee working alone in an isolated mall store was raped by a customer; the court found a “necessary causal connection” between injuries and employment.
  • Jenkins v. Wilson, 397 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981): An employee abducted and raped while walking from work to the parking lot was compensable even though the assailant’s motive was unknown, because employment created a hazard—she stayed late and was alone, making her more susceptible.
  • Sentry Ins. Co. v. Hamlin, 69 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011): The Court adopted Hamlin’s articulation of the “necessary inquiry”: whether the accident arose out of a risk incidental to work—whether a work risk caused or contributed.
  • Santizo-Perez v. Genaro's Corp., 138 So. 3d 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014): The Supreme Court quoted its warning against “hyper focus” on third-party motive and embraced the principle (via Larson) that either increased-risk environment or work-related motive can supply the causal link.

3. Limits: purely personal animus imported into the workplace

The Court emphasized that not all assaults are compensable and cited: San Marco Co. v. Langford, 391 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), where an employee-on-employee shooting was noncompensable because it clearly resulted from personal animosity and employment contributed nothing.

The Court also cited Silberberg v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd., 335 So. 3d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) for the proposition that there is no compensability where risk comes exclusively from personal factors (citing Hamlin).

4. Textual and contextual interpretive precedents

  • Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004): Quoted for the “work-connected injury” framing and for treating compensability as a work-connection inquiry rather than a tort-causation inquiry.
  • Blish v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 736 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1999) and Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Novak, 453 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1984): Used by analogy to explain that “arising out of” has a broader meaning than “proximately caused by,” requiring only a “nexus.”
  • Parks v. State, 411 So. 3d 414 (Fla. 2025) and Tsuji v. Fleet, 366 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2023): Cited for harmonious-reading methodology when construing related statutory provisions.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Reframing the certified question to remove tort-causation distortion

The First District’s certified question asked whether the “sole cause” act of a third-party tortfeasor can satisfy occupational causation—language that presupposes tort-like causation analysis. The Supreme Court found that framing “out of place” in workers’ compensation and rephrased the question: “When a third-party tortfeasor assaults an employee who is in the course and scope of employment, can the resulting injuries be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law?”

That rephrasing is itself doctrinally significant: it refocuses the inquiry on statutory “work-relatedness” rather than “sole cause” or other tort constructs.

2. Statutory interpretation: “arising out of work performed” means a work nexus, not task-level mechanics

The Court interpreted two key provisions:

  • § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2018): coverage for accidental compensable injury “arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.”
  • § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. (2018): “ ‘Arising out of’ pertains to occupational causation” and exists if “work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death.”

The First District treated “work performed” as the single physical activity at the time of injury (“walking”) and demanded the walking “itself” “cause” the shooting. The Supreme Court rejected this for multiple reasons:

  • Plain meaning and breadth: “occupational causation” and “pertains” signal a broad “occupation/job” focus, not a discrete-task focus.
  • “Arising out of” is broader than “caused by”: the Court relied on Blish and Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Novak to explain “arising out of” requires a “nexus,” not proximate cause.
  • Context and harmony with third-party-liability provisions: § 440.39, Fla. Stat. (2018) expressly addresses injuries “by the negligence or wrongful act of a third-party tortfeasor.” The First District’s approach would make third-party assaults categorically noncompensable because the tortfeasor would always be the “cause,” creating statutory disharmony contrary to Parks v. State and Tsuji v. Fleet.
  • System design: relying on § 440.015, Fla. Stat. (2018), the Court reiterated workers’ compensation is a no-fault system, not tort litigation, and should not import tort causation as the controlling concept.

3. The controlling standard: work-relatedness may be shown by motive or increased-risk exposure

The Court reaffirmed that the “necessary inquiry” is whether the accident arose out of a work-incidental risk—“whether a work risk somehow caused or contributed to the injury,” quoting Sentry Ins. Co. v. Hamlin.

In assault cases, a claimant may establish work-relatedness in at least two independent ways:

  1. Work-related motive: e.g., robbery scenarios like Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria.
  2. Increased-risk / hazard / exposure: the work environment or job duties elevate susceptibility to assault (as in Jenkins v. Wilson and Lovin Mood, Inc. v. Bush).

The Court adopted Santizo-Perez v. Genaro's Corp.’s correction of a common analytical mistake: requiring both motive and increased-risk evidence. The correct rule is either is sufficient to establish the causal link (work nexus).

4. Application to Bouayad: the error was categorical refusal to consider risk-exposure evidence

Bouayad introduced evidence that his work involved late-night duties, moving between locations on hotel premises, carrying rental agreements and cash (if any), operating in a higher-crime area near an airport hotel, and having fired employees (potential retaliation risk). The JCC found he was alone in an unsecured, dark area and concluded employment substantially contributed to the risk and exposed him to risks not normally encountered.

The First District dismissed this as irrelevant because it did not show the act of walking “caused” the shooting. The Supreme Court held this was legal error because it “categorically refus[ed] to consider” whether risk exposure satisfied occupational causation.

The Court also rejected Normandy’s argument that a “targeted” attack with unknown reason is noncompensable. That argument, the Court explained, effectively reimposes a motive requirement the law does not demand.

C. Impact

1. Restoring doctrinal continuity in assault compensability

The decision reasserts continuity with Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria and subsequent First District precedent. It prevents a narrowing turn that would have made assault compensability hinge on identifying the assailant and proving motive—often impossible in unsolved crimes.

2. Clarifying post-1994 statutory interpretation

The Court rejected the notion that the 1994 amendments (adding “work performed” and defining “arising out of” in § 440.02(36)) displaced increased-risk analysis. Instead, it treated the amendments as consistent with longstanding “work-connectedness” doctrine.

3. Practical effects on litigation and evidentiary development

The ruling is likely to shape how workplace assault cases are tried:

  • Claimants can more effectively rely on workplace security conditions, late hours, isolation, cash-handling, and retaliation risks as work-nexus proof.
  • Carriers will focus on demonstrating the risk was distinctly personal (imported from private life) under the logic reflected in San Marco Co. v. Langford and Hamlin.
  • Appellate review should return to evaluating whether the JCC’s work-relatedness findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, rather than applying a categorical legal rule that excludes risk evidence.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Arising out of” (occupational causation)
This is not tort “proximate cause.” It asks whether the injury has a meaningful connection to the job—whether the job or workplace created, contributed to, or elevated the risk that produced the injury.
Course and scope vs. arising out of
“Course and scope” concerns time, place, and activity (were you working, where you were supposed to be, doing work-related things?). “Arising out of” concerns why this injury is work-connected (did the job create or contribute to the risk?).
Increased-risk / hazard exposure
Even if the attacker’s identity and motive are unknown, an injury can be compensable if the job environment or duties made the worker more vulnerable—such as working alone late, walking through unsecured/dark areas, handling money, or working in a location with elevated crime exposure.
Personal risk imported into the workplace
If the assault stems from a purely personal dispute (domestic, private grudge) and employment neither caused nor exacerbated it, the injury generally does not “arise out of” employment (illustrated by San Marco Co. v. Langford).
Competent, substantial evidence review
On appeal, the district court does not reweigh the evidence; it determines whether the JCC’s factual findings are supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept as adequate.

V. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision establishes (and reaffirms) a clear rule for workplace assault claims: when an employee is assaulted in the course and scope of employment, the injury may be compensable if the claimant proves work-relatedness—either through evidence of a work-related motive or through evidence that the job duties or work environment increased the risk or hazard of such an assault.

By rejecting the First District’s task-level, tort-causation approach and restoring the “nexus/work-connectedness” framework consistent with Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria and related precedent, the Court preserves workers’ compensation as a no-fault system focused on work-related risk rather than on solving crimes or proving a tortfeasor’s motive.