Florida Supreme Court Tightens Post-Warrant “Newly Discovered Evidence” Gatekeeping: Social-Media Juror Posts and Post-Warrant IQ Testing Do Not Restart Rule 3.851

Case: Billy Leon Kearse v. State of Florida (Supreme Court of Florida)
Date: February 25, 2026
Posture: Appeal from summary denial of a sixth successive Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 motion; original habeas petition; motions for stay.

I. Introduction

This per curiam decision addresses last-minute, post-warrant litigation by Billy Leon Kearse, a death-sentenced prisoner convicted of the 1991 murder of Fort Pierce police officer Danny Parrish. After a resentencing, a unanimous jury recommended death in 1996, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in 2000.

After the Governor signed a death warrant (execution set for March 3, 2026), Kearse filed a sixth successive postconviction motion asserting: (1) “newly discovered evidence” from a juror’s Facebook comment allegedly showing improper courtroom influence by uniformed law-enforcement presence; (2) “newly discovered evidence” of intellectual disability based on a post-warrant WAIS-5 IQ score of 75; and (3) a due process challenge to Florida’s death-warrant process (not pursued on appeal). He also sought a juror interview, post-warrant public records, and a ruling that the “clear and convincing evidence” burden in section 921.137(4) is unconstitutional.

The key issues were whether these post-warrant claims cleared Florida’s strict timeliness and procedural-bar doctrines for successive capital postconviction litigation, and whether the intellectual-disability claim was adequately pleaded under Florida’s statutory framework.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Affirmed summary denial of Claim 1 (juror Facebook post / uniformed officers): untimely and procedurally barred.
  • Affirmed denial of motion to interview Juror M under Rule 3.575: no good cause for decades-late filing and allegations were insufficient.
  • Affirmed denial of post-warrant public-records requests under Rule 3.852: untimely and amounted to an impermissible fishing expedition.
  • Affirmed summary denial of Claim 2 (intellectual disability based on WAIS-5 score): untimely, procedurally barred, and facially insufficient for failure to plead current adaptive deficits.
  • Declined to reach constitutionality of section 921.137(4)’s “clear and convincing” burden because the underlying intellectual-disability claim failed on threshold grounds.
  • Denied habeas petition (Roper/Atkins “combined category” claim): procedurally barred and foreclosed by Florida’s conformity clause analysis in Barwick v. State.
  • Denied stays; mandate issued immediately; no rehearing entertained.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role

1. Jurisdiction and capital-collateral review

  • State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1997): Used to reiterate the Florida Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over “all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases,” reinforcing why the Court was the forum for both the 3.851 appeal and the habeas petition.

2. Timeliness, “newly discovered evidence,” and due diligence in successive capital litigation

  • Glock v. Moore, 776 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 2001): Anchors the principle that newly discovered evidence claims in death cases must be brought within one year of discovery (or when discoverable with due diligence). The Court applied this to reject the notion that a 2026 Facebook post could transform decades-observable courtroom conditions into “new” facts.
  • Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 2008): Cited for the rule that the clock runs from when the claim was discoverable through due diligence—not when the defendant chooses to obtain supporting material. This was central to the WAIS-5 timing analysis.

3. Procedural bars in active death-warrant cases

  • Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025): Supplies the decisive bar: in an active warrant case, claims that could have been raised earlier are procedurally barred. The Court applied Rogers to both the juror-influence theory and the intellectual-disability claim, emphasizing finality at the warrant stage.

4. Juror interview standard and timing

  • Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501 (Fla. 2009): Establishes abuse-of-discretion review for denial of juror interviews.
  • Bates v. State, 398 So. 3d 406 (Fla. 2024): Provides modern reinforcement of Rule 3.575’s timing premise—juror interviews are contemplated “on the heels of trial,” and failure to show good cause for long delay ends the inquiry.
  • Foster v. State, 132 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2013): Supplies the pleading guardrails: allegations must not be speculative or conclusory and must not concern matters inhering in the verdict.

5. Post-warrant public records and “fishing expeditions”

  • Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 2013): Sets abuse-of-discretion review for public-records denials.
  • Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2019) and Bowles v. State, 276 So. 3d 791 (Fla. 2019): Quoted for the proposition that Rule 3.852 is not a mechanism for “fishing expeditions,” supporting denial where the alleged agency “misconduct” theory was deemed speculative.
  • Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 109 (2024) and Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 2009): Used to dismiss vague, conclusory constitutional assertions tied to denial of records.

6. Intellectual disability doctrine: constitutional floor, statutory elements, and pleading requirements

  • Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002): The constitutional baseline: the Eighth Amendment bars execution of the intellectually disabled. The Court treated Atkins as controlling but emphasized Florida’s procedural and statutory requirements for raising the claim.
  • Haliburton v. State, 331 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 2021): Recites Florida’s three-part standard (subaverage intellectual functioning; concurrent adaptive deficits; onset before 18), which the Court used to assess facial sufficiency.
  • Wright v. State, 256 So. 3d 766 (Fla. 2018): Two critical uses: (a) confirms an IQ of 75 sits “squarely” in the potential intellectual-disability range; (b) explains “concurrently” means the adaptive deficits must exist “at the same time” as low intellectual functioning.
  • Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015): Quoted via Wright to contextualize IQ 75 as within potential range, but not treated as dispositive in the face of procedural defaults and missing adaptive-deficits pleading.
  • Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011): Cited for the requirement that all prongs be satisfied and for the meaning of concurrency as referenced in Wright.
  • Williams v. State, 226 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 2017): Reinforces that pleading must address current adaptive behavior; childhood-only deficits are insufficient.
  • State v. Jackson, No. 3D22-1451, 2025 WL 3703628 (Fla. 3d DCA Dec. 22, 2025): Supports the proposition that adaptive impairment must be ongoing (not solely historical).
  • Hampton v. State, 219 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2017): Used to counter the framing of the WAIS-5 as meaningfully “new” such that prior intelligence testing becomes obsolete; revisions do not automatically invalidate earlier results.

7. Habeas relitigation limits and the Florida conformity clause

  • Walls v. State, 423 So. 3d 865 (Fla.); Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619 (Fla.); Knight v. State, 923 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2005): Cited for the rule that habeas cannot be used to relitigate previously decided issues.
  • Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) and Stephens v. State, 975 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2007): Define and enforce the under-18 categorical line for age-based Eighth Amendment exemption.
  • Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023): The doctrinal centerpiece for rejecting any Florida-only expansion of Eighth Amendment categories. The Court quoted Barwick for the proposition that article I, section 17’s conformity clause makes U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment doctrine both “floor and ceiling,” foreclosing state-court extension of Roper or Atkins beyond their federal bounds.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Claim 1 (juror Facebook post; uniformed officers) failed as “newly discovered evidence”

The Court treated the Facebook post as, at most, a late narrative about an old, observable condition: law enforcement officers allegedly filling the back of the courtroom during the 1996 penalty phase. Because such presence would have been “readily observable,” the Court held the factual basis could have been discovered long ago through due diligence, rendering the claim untimely under Rule 3.851(d)(1) and outside the exception in Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A), as informed by Glock v. Moore.

The Court then applied Rogers v. State to impose an additional, warrant-stage procedural bar: a claim that could have been raised in earlier proceedings cannot be resurrected once a warrant is active.

2. Juror interview denied: Rule 3.575 timing and non-speculative allegations

The Court emphasized the structural logic of Rule 3.575: motions must be filed within 10 days of verdict unless good cause is shown. Relying on Bates v. State, the Court treated the decades-long delay as dispositive absent a true “good cause” showing. Because the Facebook post did not supply good cause—given the underlying facts were discoverable earlier—and because the request rested on an external-influence theory that was not properly supported beyond speculation, the denial was affirmed under Anderson v. State and Foster v. State.

3. Public records requests denied: deadline enforcement and anti-fishing principles

The Court affirmed denial because the requests were filed after a court-imposed deadline with no explanation and no request for leave. Substantively, the theory that agencies improperly contacted the juror (based on an alleged AAG Facebook comment and quick deletion of the juror’s post) was deemed speculative. Invoking Dailey v. State and Bowles v. State, the Court held Rule 3.852 does not authorize post-warrant fishing expeditions.

4. Claim 2 (intellectual disability) failed on three independent grounds

  1. Untimeliness: Even if WAIS-5 availability mattered, the Court reasoned that (on Kearse’s own account) the WAIS-5 was released in October 2024; therefore, due diligence would have permitted testing then, requiring filing by October 2025. A February 2026 claim was outside Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A)’s one-year window as interpreted through Jimenez v. State.
  2. Procedural bar under warrant: Under Rogers v. State, the Court held the Atkins-based claim could have been raised earlier (Atkins dates to 2002), especially given extensive postconviction litigation history.
  3. Facial insufficiency (adaptive deficits): Applying Haliburton v. State, Dufour v. State, and Wright v. State, the Court required pleading of concurrent (i.e., current) adaptive deficits. Kearse alleged childhood learning problems and emotional immaturity but did not allege present-day deficits requiring ongoing support in conceptual, social, or practical domains. Under Williams v. State and State v. Jackson, that omission was fatal.

Notably, the Court treated the WAIS-5 as a routine revision rather than a transformative “new test,” citing Hampton v. State to reject the idea that older WAIS results become invalid as a matter of law.

5. Refusal to reach section 921.137(4) burden-of-proof challenge

Because the intellectual-disability claim was dismissed on threshold procedural and pleading grounds, the Court declined to opine on whether section 921.137(4)’s “clear and convincing evidence” standard is constitutional, characterizing the question as unnecessary to the disposition.

6. Habeas denial: relitigation bar and conformity-clause ceiling

The habeas claim sought a blended Roper/Atkins exemption based on age plus subaverage functioning. The Court held the claim procedurally barred because it had been raised and rejected in earlier litigation (Kearse v. State, 969 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 2007)), and habeas cannot relitigate decided issues (Walls v. State; Jones v. State; Knight v. State).

On the merits in the alternative, the Court relied on Barwick v. State and the article I, section 17 conformity clause to hold Florida courts cannot extend Roper v. Simmons beyond the under-18 line and cannot extend Atkins v. Virginia beyond intellectual disability as defined by controlling law. The conformity clause operates as an explicit doctrinal ceiling on state constitutional expansion in this domain.

C. Impact

  • Social media does not reset postconviction clocks: The decision signals that late-breaking juror social media commentary will rarely qualify as “newly discovered evidence” if it describes conditions that were observable at trial or investigable earlier. Future litigants should expect aggressive application of due diligence and warrant-stage procedural bars.
  • Post-warrant testing is not a substitute for diligence: By pegging discoverability to test availability (October 2024) rather than test administration (February 2026), the Court discourages strategic delay until warrant issuance.
  • Adaptive deficits must be pleaded as current and functional: The opinion reinforces that intellectual-disability pleadings must address present adaptive functioning and the need for ongoing support, not merely childhood school struggles.
  • Rule 3.852 enforcement remains strict at the warrant stage: Requests filed after deadlines and supported by speculative theories risk summary denial as “fishing expeditions,” especially when tethered to procedurally barred underlying claims.
  • Conformity clause continues to foreclose state-level categorical expansions: The Court’s reliance on Barwick v. State confirms the continuing unwillingness (and asserted lack of authority) to create Florida-specific exemptions beyond U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment categories.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Newly discovered evidence” (Rule 3.851(d)(2)(A)): Evidence is not “new” simply because it is newly presented. The defendant must show the underlying facts were unknown and could not have been found earlier with reasonable investigation (“due diligence”).
  • “Due diligence”: The court asks when a reasonably diligent defense could have learned the facts—not when the defense actually learned them.
  • “Procedurally barred” in an active warrant case: Once a death warrant is active, Florida applies heightened finality rules; claims that could have been raised earlier are generally blocked (Rogers v. State).
  • Juror interviews (Rule 3.575): These are tightly time-limited and require specific, non-speculative grounds. Courts resist decades-late efforts because memories fade and because post-verdict inquiries risk intruding on deliberative secrecy.
  • Intellectual disability prongs: Florida requires (1) low intellectual functioning (often shown by IQ testing), (2) adaptive deficits that exist concurrently (i.e., currently), and (3) onset before 18. Failing to allege any one prong defeats the claim.
  • Florida’s Eighth Amendment “conformity clause” (article I, section 17): Florida’s cruel-and-unusual punishment clause must be interpreted in line with U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment decisions—meaning Florida courts cannot broaden categorical exemptions beyond what the Supreme Court recognizes.

V. Conclusion

The Court’s decision is a forceful reaffirmation of finality doctrines in capital cases at the death-warrant stage. It holds that (1) a juror’s late social media recollection does not convert long-observable courtroom circumstances into “newly discovered evidence”; (2) post-warrant IQ testing—especially when the relevant tool was available earlier—does not satisfy Rule 3.851’s diligence and timing requirements; (3) an Atkins claim must be pleaded with current adaptive deficits; and (4) Florida’s conformity clause forecloses any state-court expansion of Roper/Atkins categories. Collectively, the opinion tightens the practical pathway for last-minute successive litigation by insisting on timely investigation, concrete pleading, and adherence to procedural limits.