Florida State Attorney’s Offices Are Arms of the State When Prosecuting and Issuing Subpoenas, Barring § 1983 Suits Under the Eleventh Amendment

1. Introduction

In Sean T. Wright v. 15th District Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), Sean T. Wright, proceeding pro se, appealed multiple district-court rulings dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and denying emergency injunctive relief.

Wright sued the 15th District Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office, the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office (PBSO), the Sheriff of Palm Beach County (including in an official-capacity posture), and Deputy Frank Di Orsini (individual and official capacities). The pleadings centered on Wright’s asserted harms arising from (i) actions taken in connection with the State’s prosecution of his neighbor, including subpoenas directed at Wright, and (ii) alleged harassment, property intrusions, mailbox search/removal of mail, and related conduct by law-enforcement personnel.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed three core issues: (1) whether the State Attorney’s Office is immune under the Eleventh Amendment for the functions alleged; (2) whether Wright had Article III standing for several claims tied to the neighbor’s prosecution; and (3) whether the amended complaint plausibly stated § 1983 claims against PBSO, the Sheriff (official capacity), and Deputy Di Orsini, including under Monell. The court also reviewed the denial of a TRO.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Eleventh Amendment: The court held the State Attorney’s Office was acting as an arm of the State of Florida when performing the complained-of prosecutorial functions (including prosecuting a case on the State’s behalf and issuing subpoenas), so § 1983 claims against it were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Florida has not waived immunity for § 1983 “constitutional torts.”
  • Preservation after amendment: Wright did not waive appellate review of the State Attorney’s Office dismissal by omitting it from his amended complaint, because repleading would have been futile under the district court’s immunity ruling.
  • Standing: Several claims were properly dismissed for lack of Article III standing where Wright did not allege a concrete injury to himself, or where causation/traceability to the named defendants was not plausibly alleged.
  • Failure to state a claim: Claims against PBSO and the Sheriff in official capacity failed because Wright did not plead a municipal “custom,” “policy,” final policymaker act, or deliberate-indifference failure-to-train theory as required by Monell. Claims against Deputy Di Orsini individually were dismissed as vague/conclusory and not plausibly alleging a violation of a federal right.
  • No evidentiary hearing required: The court rejected Wright’s argument that the district court needed an evidentiary hearing to view audio/video before ruling on a motion to dismiss or on the TRO, emphasizing that Rule 12(b)(6) presents a legal question on the pleadings.
  • TRO: Denial of the TRO was affirmed because Wright failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

A. Standards of review, pleading rules, and pro se limits

  • Barnes v. Zaccari: Used for de novo review of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
  • Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cnty.: Provided de novo review for Rule 12(b)(6), and the baseline rule that well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true with reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
  • Waldman v. Conway and Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC: The court balanced liberal construction for pro se pleadings against the principle that courts cannot rewrite deficient pleadings and that factual support is still required.
  • Reynolds v. Behrman Cap. IV L.P.: Central to the preservation issue; the court applied the “futility” principle to hold Wright did not forfeit appellate review by omitting the already-dismissed State Attorney’s Office claims from his amended complaint.

B. Eleventh Amendment immunity and the “arm of the State” inquiry

  • Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman: Anchored the broad rule that an unconsenting State is immune from suits in federal court, including by its own citizens.
  • Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm'n: Supplied the principle that immunity extends to state agencies/arms of the State but not to counties/municipalities.
  • Manders v. Lee (en banc): Provided the Eleventh Circuit’s multi-factor arm-of-the-state framework and the function-specific approach (“assessed in light of the particular function”). The court used this lens to classify the State Attorney’s Office as an arm of the State for prosecutorial/subpoena activities.
  • Galette v. N.J. Transit Corp. (U.S. Mar. 4, 2026): The opinion treated Galette as the Supreme Court’s instruction to emphasize how the entity is structured, who is liable for judgments, and (with caution) the degree of State control. The Eleventh Circuit integrated that guidance alongside Manders to reinforce the arm-of-the-state conclusion.
  • Gamble v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs.: Used to confirm Florida’s limited waiver under Fla. Stat. 768.28 does not extend to § 1983 claims in federal court, foreclosing waiver arguments.
  • Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police: Reinforced that § 1983 does not override Eleventh Amendment immunity.

C. Ex parte Young and why suing the agency (not an official) matters

  • Ex parte Young and Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor: Provided the doctrine allowing prospective equitable relief to end ongoing federal-law violations, but only against state officers.
  • Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.: The court relied on this to stress that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to States or their agencies; because Wright sued the State Attorney’s Office itself (rather than an official), the exception was unavailable.

D. Prosecutorial immunity noted, but ultimately irrelevant

  • Imbler v. Pachtman and Mikko v. City of Atlanta: Cited for absolute prosecutorial immunity for advocacy functions, including certain out-of-court efforts tied to the judicial phase.
  • How used here: The court said these defenses were “immaterial” once it concluded Eleventh Amendment immunity independently barred the claims against the State Attorney’s Office.

E. Standing doctrine (injury, traceability, redressability)

  • Mack v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.: Identified standing as a threshold jurisdictional issue reviewed de novo.
  • Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: Supplied the three elements of standing and the concreteness/particularization requirements.
  • Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Fla. State Athletic Comm'n: Used for the principle that, absent exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff cannot sue for injuries to another (supporting dismissal of claims premised on alleged wrongs in the neighbor’s prosecution without a pleaded personal injury).
  • McGee v. Solic. Gen. of Richmond Cnty.: Used for the “typically without prejudice” dismissal rule when standing is lacking.

F. Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility and the “four corners” of the complaint

  • Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Provided the plausibility standard and the rule that legal conclusions are not assumed true without factual support.
  • Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc. and Baker v. City of Madison: Defined the materials a court may consider at the motion-to-dismiss stage (complaint, exhibits, and properly incorporated-by-reference materials, including video).
  • Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.: Key to rejecting Wright’s demand for an evidentiary hearing; a motion to dismiss is a “purely legal question” with no fact issues because allegations are presumed true.

G. Municipal/official-capacity liability under § 1983

  • Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown: Recognized municipalities as “persons” under § 1983 but subject to limits on liability.
  • Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.: The controlling framework—no vicarious liability; plaintiff must plead a policy/custom (or equivalent theory) that caused the constitutional violation.
  • Smothers v. Childers, McDowell v. Brown, and Depew v. City of St. Marys: Supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of what constitutes a sufficiently well-settled and pervasive policy/custom, and why isolated incidents usually do not suffice.
  • City of Canton v. Harris: Supported the failure-to-train pathway, requiring deliberate indifference.
  • Barnett v. MacArthur: Treated an official-capacity suit against the Sheriff as a suit against the county, triggering Monell.

H. Substantive due process, custodial relationships, and deliberate indifference

  • Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc. and White v. Lemacks: Provided the rule that a constitutional duty to provide medical care may arise from custody/involuntary confinement.
  • Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff's Off., Waldron v. Spicher, and L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson: Framed the narrowness (and doubtful availability) of non-custodial deliberate-indifference substantive due process claims, requiring conscience-shocking arbitrariness and at least deliberate indifference to an “extremely great risk.”
  • How used here: Even if Wright’s allegations about being prevented from leaving could suggest custody as to the deputy involved, the court dismissed because Wright sued PBSO and the Sheriff (official capacity) without pleading a Monell policy/custom or failure-to-train.

I. Fourth Amendment “knock and talk” entry and property-right limits under § 1983

  • United States v. Taylor: The court relied on this to conclude the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by entry onto private land to knock on a door for legitimate police purposes—here, service of subpoenas.
  • The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth and Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City: Used to distinguish state-created property interests (like quiet enjoyment) from federal constitutional rights; denial of a state-defined property right does not, by itself, create a substantive due process claim under § 1983.

J. Amendment opportunities for pro se litigants

  • Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit: Supported the conclusion that Wright received at least one chance to amend before dismissal with prejudice of certain claims, and that further amendment could be futile where the legal defects persisted.

K. Temporary restraining order standards

  • Long v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.: Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
  • Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo: Provided the four-factor TRO test and the rule that injunctive relief may not issue without a substantial likelihood of success on the merits—dispositive here.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The State Attorney’s Office: arm-of-the-state + no waiver + no Ex parte Young

The court treated the challenged actions—prosecuting a criminal case on behalf of Florida and issuing subpoenas—as quintessential state prosecutorial functions under Fla. Stat. § 27.02(1). Applying the function-specific arm-of-the-state approach from Manders v. Lee, and reinforcing that analysis with the Supreme Court’s then-recent direction in Galette v. N.J. Transit Corp., the Eleventh Circuit concluded the State Attorney’s Office acted as an arm of the State. Because Florida has not consented to § 1983 suits in federal court (Gamble v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs.), the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims.

The court also closed two common escape routes. First, it explained that even if Wright had sought prospective injunctive relief against the State Attorney’s Office, the Ex parte Young exception would not apply because Wright sued the agency rather than a state official (Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.). Second, it observed that any attempt to hold the Office liable merely for alleged misconduct of employees would run into § 1983’s bar on vicarious liability (City of Canton v. Harris (no respondeat superior under § 1983)).

B. Standing: personal injury and causation could not be inferred from allegations about someone else’s prosecution

For multiple counts, Wright’s allegations arose from alleged irregularities in the prosecution of his neighbor (failure to request his video evidence, a purported fraudulent affidavit, evidence tampering) and from subpoenas issued in that prosecution. Applying Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the court concluded Wright failed to plead a concrete injury to himself or failed to plead traceability to the defendants he actually sued (notably PBSO), because the amended complaint attributed subpoena issuance to a judge and an assistant state attorney rather than PBSO. These deficiencies required dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (typically without prejudice under McGee v. Solic. Gen. of Richmond Cnty.).

C. Failure to state a claim: Monell defects were the core problem for PBSO and official-capacity claims

The court treated the claims against PBSO and the Sheriff (official capacity) as municipal-liability claims governed by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.. Even where an underlying constitutional theory might be imagined (for example, a custodial deliberate-indifference scenario described in Count Two), Wright did not plead facts indicating the alleged wrong resulted from a policy/custom, an act of a final policymaker, or deliberate-indifference failure-to-train (Smothers v. Childers; McDowell v. Brown; City of Canton v. Harris).

The opinion repeatedly emphasized that Wright described, at most, isolated events (e.g., a single mailbox incident on December 9, 2021), which ordinarily cannot establish a persistent and widespread custom with the force of law (Depew v. City of St. Marys).

D. Claims against Deputy Di Orsini individually: conclusory allegations and lack of a clearly pleaded federal right

As to Deputy Di Orsini, the court did not decide qualified immunity on the merits; rather, it held Wright’s allegations were too vague and conclusory under Twombly and Iqbal to plausibly allege a federal-rights violation. It also reasoned that entering property to serve subpoenas is not a Fourth Amendment search under United States v. Taylor, and that interference with “quiet enjoyment” is a state-law property concept that does not itself amount to a federal § 1983 claim (The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth; Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City).

E. No evidentiary hearing at the motion-to-dismiss or TRO stage

Invoking Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., the court explained that Rule 12(b)(6) requires deciding a legal sufficiency question based on the pleadings, assuming factual allegations true. Thus, the district court did not need an evidentiary hearing to view audio/video evidence to determine whether the complaint stated a claim. For the TRO, the absence of a plausible underlying § 1983 claim meant Wright could not show a substantial likelihood of success—a prerequisite under Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo.

3.3. Impact

  • Eleventh Amendment clarity for Florida prosecutors’ offices: Even though unpublished, the opinion reinforces that Florida State Attorney’s Offices are treated as arms of the State when performing core prosecutorial functions (including subpoena practice), making § 1983 suits in federal court non-starters absent a proper Ex parte Young suit against an official for prospective relief.
  • Post-Galette arm-of-the-state analysis: The opinion is an early example of the Eleventh Circuit integrating Galette v. N.J. Transit Corp. into immunity analysis, potentially signaling greater emphasis on how an entity is structured and who pays judgments, with “control” treated cautiously.
  • Standing as a gatekeeping tool in “collateral-to-criminal-case” civil suits: Plaintiffs attempting to frame grievances about someone else’s prosecution as personal constitutional injuries must plead concrete personal injury and traceability to the defendants sued; generalized dissatisfaction with prosecutorial decisions is unlikely to clear Article III thresholds.
  • Monell pleading discipline: The decision underscores that naming an agency or an official in an official capacity without pleading a plausible policy/custom (or failure-to-train deliberate indifference) will lead to dismissal, even when the plaintiff alleges troubling acts by individual officers.
  • Procedural takeaway: Litigants cannot compel evidentiary hearings to cure pleading deficiencies at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage; the remedy is factual pleading (and, where appropriate, amendment), not evidentiary presentation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Eleventh Amendment immunity: A State (and its “arms,” like certain state agencies) generally cannot be sued in federal court for money damages without its consent.
  • “Arm of the State” test: Courts look at whether the entity is essentially part of the State—how it is structured, who is responsible for judgments, and how much control the State has (with caution, because States ultimately control state-created entities).
  • Ex parte Young: A narrow pathway to sue for prospective (forward-looking) injunctive relief to stop an ongoing federal-law violation—but you must sue a state official, not the state agency itself.
  • Article III standing: You must show (1) you personally suffered a concrete injury, (2) caused by the defendant you sued, and (3) a court ruling can likely fix it.
  • Monell liability: You cannot sue a county/police agency under § 1983 just because it employs someone who allegedly violated rights. You must tie the violation to an official policy, widespread custom, a final policymaker’s decision, or deliberately indifferent failure to train.
  • Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility: Courts dismiss claims that are only labels and conclusions; you must plead specific facts that, if true, make a legal violation plausible.
  • TRO likelihood of success: Emergency injunctions require, above all, a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will ultimately win on the merits.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision affirms a layered set of constraints on § 1983 litigation arising from criminal-case disputes: sovereign immunity blocks damages suits against Florida State Attorney’s Offices performing prosecutorial functions; Ex parte Young cannot be invoked by suing the agency rather than an officer; standing demands a concrete personal injury traceable to the named defendant; and claims against PBSO and the Sheriff in official capacity must satisfy Monell, not respondeat superior. Procedurally, the court reiterates that evidentiary hearings are not a substitute for plausible pleading, and that a TRO cannot issue without a substantial likelihood of success.