Florida Robbery by Sudden Snatching Categorically Qualifies as an INA “Theft Offense” Aggravated Felony

1. Introduction

In Rishi Ramdial v. U.S. Attorney General (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2026), the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision holding that a Florida conviction for robbery by sudden snatching, FLA. STAT. § 812.131, is an “aggravated felony” because it is a “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The designation mattered because an aggravated felony conviction renders a lawful permanent resident ineligible for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).

The key issue was categorical: whether the least culpable conduct criminalized by § 812.131(1) matches the generic federal definition of “theft offense.” Ramdial argued the Florida statute is broader than generic theft because (i) it covers intent to deprive a “victim” rather than only an “owner,” (ii) it reaches temporary or de minimis takings, and (iii) it does not expressly require a lack of consent.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that Florida robbery by sudden snatching under FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1) categorically matches generic “theft” for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), and thus is an aggravated felony where (as here) the sentence is at least one year. The court further held:

  • Generic theft does not require intent to deprive the title owner; it requires intent to take from a person with a superior possessory interest.
  • Temporary deprivation does not defeat generic theft; generic theft includes deprivation “less than total or permanent.”
  • Lack of consent need not be express in the statutory text; Florida law treats nonconsent as inherent in § 812.131(1).
  • § 812.131(1) is not divisible as to “permanently or temporarily” or “victim or owner,” so the modified categorical approach is unavailable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Generic “theft offense” definition and “realistic probability”

  • Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007): Central for two propositions. First, the court reaffirmed that generic theft covers intent to deprive “even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.” Second, it supplied the “realistic probability” requirement: overbreadth arguments typically must show the state actually applies the statute to nongeneric conduct.
  • Vassell v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 839 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2016): The controlling Eleventh Circuit articulation of generic theft: “taking … property without consent” plus criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights/benefits “even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.” The court used Vassell as the benchmark for comparison.
  • Ramos v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2013): Cited to reinforce that generic theft in this circuit does not require permanent deprivation.

Categorical approach framework

  • Donawa v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013): Reiterated that the court generally applies the categorical approach to aggravated felony comparisons.
  • Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), and Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013): Provided the canonical formulation: compare statutory elements (not facts) and ask whether they are the same as or narrower than the generic definition.
  • Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016): Governed divisibility. The court used Mathis to reject the premise that disjunctive wording alone creates divisibility; the question is whether alternatives are elements requiring unanimity.

Divisibility and the evidentiary role of jury instructions

  • Guillen v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 910 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2018): Treated standard jury instructions as “authoritative sources of state law” for divisibility analysis, echoing Mathis.
  • In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2008-08, 6 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 2009): The Florida instruction supported the court’s conclusion that “permanently or temporarily” and “victim or owner” are alternative means satisfying a single intent element, not separate elements requiring unanimity.

“Owner” versus “victim” and possessory interest

  • United States v. Orozco-Orozco, 94 F.4th 1118 (9th Cir. 2024): Used by the Eleventh Circuit for the proposition that generic theft focuses on taking from someone with a superior possessory interest, not necessarily the title owner. The court distinguished Orozco-Orozco on the facts of California carjacking, which (as interpreted by California courts) could reach taking from someone with an inferior or no possessory interest.
  • United States v. Howey, 427 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1970), and Chiaramonte v. INS, 626 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980): Cited as persuasive common-law/larceny background that identity of the owner is not typically an element; theft can be from a possessor whose interest is superior to the taker.
  • Barrie v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 167 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2026), and Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114 (2025): Framed the interpretive move: when Congress uses common-law terms (here, “theft”), courts presume Congress imported their common-law content.

Florida law on possessory interest and nonconsent

  • D.S.S. v. State, 850 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2003), and Parker v. State, 78 So. 980 (Fla. 1918): Supported the conclusion that Florida treats “ownership” in criminal law as including special/temporary ownership, possession, or control superior to the defendant’s—aligning Florida’s concept with generic theft’s possessory-interest focus.
  • C.A. v. State, 255 So. 3d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018): Demonstrated Florida courts treat nonconsent as integral to § 812.131(1) prosecutions; the appellate court upheld a conviction because the evidence supported that the victim did not consent.
  • Kemokai v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 83 F.4th 886 (11th Cir. 2023): Cited for the proposition that “without consent” need not appear verbatim in a statute if the elements effectively require a nonconsensual taking.

Temporary/de minimis taking arguments and distinguishing other circuits

  • Jaggernauth v. U.S. Attorney General, 432 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2005): Distinguished. There, Florida’s general theft statute, FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1), was divisible (intent to “deprive” versus intent to “appropriate”), with only one alternative qualifying. The court emphasized that § 812.131(1) is not divisible and its least culpable conduct matches generic theft.
  • Da Graca v. Garland, 23 F.4th 106 (1st Cir. 2022), and Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2015): Distinguished as unauthorized-use-of-vehicle cases reaching “glorified borrowing,” including statutes expressly covering conduct without “intent to steal” or trivial deviations from consent. The Eleventh Circuit found § 812.131(1) materially different because it requires intent to deprive rights to the property and Florida has not applied it to consensual/minimal-overreach scenarios.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Jurisdiction and posture

Although the petitioner was removable on controlled-substance grounds (limiting review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)), the court retained jurisdiction over “questions of law” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), including whether a conviction constitutes an aggravated felony. The aggravated-felony determination mattered primarily to eligibility for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).

(b) Categorical approach, not modified categorical approach

A major move in the opinion is its rejection of divisibility for § 812.131(1). The statute’s “permanently or temporarily” and “victim or owner” disjunctions might suggest alternatives, but under Mathis v. United States the question is whether Florida requires jury unanimity on those alternatives. Relying heavily on In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2008-08 (and the principle in Guillen v. U.S. Att'y Gen.), the court held Florida treats these as alternative means satisfying a single intent element. That foreclosed the modified categorical approach and prevented consulting conviction records to narrow the offense.

(c) Generic theft does not require intent to deprive only the title owner

Ramdial’s principal overbreadth claim was that § 812.131(1) permits conviction based on intent to deprive a “victim” (who might not be the owner), whereas generic theft requires intent to deprive the owner. The court rejected the premise: generic theft is satisfied where the property is taken from a person with a superior possessory interest. The opinion grounded this in common-law larceny understandings, supported by United States v. Orozco-Orozco, United States v. Howey, and Chiaramonte v. INS, and the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretive approach in Barrie v. U.S. Att'y Gen. (drawing from Kousisis v. United States).

The court then aligned Florida law with that generic standard: Florida’s criminal “ownership” concept includes special/temporary possession superior to the defendant (D.S.S. v. State; Parker v. State), and the Florida standard instruction for § 812.131 states the robbed person need not be the actual owner if the victim possessed the property. The upshot is parity, not overbreadth.

(d) Temporary deprivation and “de minimis” scenarios

The court treated the “temporary taking” argument as a loser on the law: generic theft already includes deprivation that is not permanent (Vassell v. U.S. Att'y Gen.; Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez; Ramos v. U.S. Att'y Gen.). It also rejected the hypothesized “de minimis” scenario as inconsistent with Florida’s own elements as reflected in the standard jury instruction, which requires intent to deprive the victim/owner of the right to the property.

Distinguishing Da Graca v. Garland and Castillo v. Holder, the court emphasized that those cases dealt with unauthorized-use statutes designed to capture joyriding or minor deviations from consent and, critically, statutes construed to apply without intent to steal. By contrast, § 812.131(1) is a taking-from-the-person offense that requires intent to deprive rights to the property.

(e) “Without consent” can be inherent

Ramdial argued § 812.131(1) is broader because it does not explicitly say “without consent.” The court, applying Kemokai v. U.S. Att'y Gen., held that the absence of magic words is not dispositive if state law makes nonconsent inherent. C.A. v. State served as the Florida-law demonstration that consent is litigated and the offense is treated as requiring nonconsent. This also defeated the “realistic probability” claim under Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez.

3.3 Impact

  • Immigration consequences in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision cements that FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1) is categorically a “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). For noncitizens sentenced to at least one year, this makes the conviction an aggravated felony, foreclosing cancellation of removal for permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) and increasing mandatory-removal pressure.
  • Divisibility guidance for Florida statutes: The opinion is also a divisibility precedent: disjunctions in Florida statutes do not trigger the modified categorical approach unless Florida law demands unanimity, and Florida standard jury instructions can be decisive evidence of “means” versus “elements.”
  • Clarification of “owner” in generic theft analyses: By squarely embracing the “superior possessory interest” framing, the court reduces the force of challenges premised on “victim” versus “owner” wording—at least where state law restricts victims to those with possession superior to the defendant.
  • Nonconsent inference: The court’s approach (that nonconsent can be inherent and established through state decisional law) may influence future categorical matches where statutory text is silent on consent but state courts treat consent as a defense-negating feature of the offense.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Aggravated felony: A federal immigration label for certain crimes (including some “theft offenses” with a sentence of at least one year). It triggers severe immigration consequences, including ineligibility for cancellation of removal.
  • Generic offense: A federal “idealized” definition of a crime category (here, “theft”) used to compare state statutes for immigration and sentencing purposes.
  • Categorical approach: The court compares the elements of the state statute to the generic definition, assuming the least culpable conduct covered by the statute—without looking at what the defendant actually did.
  • Divisible statute & modified categorical approach: If a statute lists alternative elements that create multiple distinct crimes, a court may consult limited conviction documents to see which element-set was the basis of conviction. If the alternatives are merely different ways (“means”) to commit the same crime, the statute is not divisible and documents cannot be consulted.
  • Realistic probability test: To show a statute is broader than the generic offense, it is typically not enough to imagine a hypothetical; the challenger must show the state actually applies the statute to nongeneric conduct.
  • Superior possessory interest: Theft can be “from” someone who is not the title owner, so long as that person had a better right to possess the property than the thief at the time (e.g., a borrower, bailee, or even a thief from whom another thief steals).

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision establishes a clear rule for Florida immigration cases: robbery by sudden snatching under FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1) is categorically a “theft offense” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), and therefore (with a sentence of at least one year) an aggravated felony barring cancellation of removal. The court reached that result by (i) treating the statute as indivisible under Mathis v. United States, (ii) reaffirming that generic theft includes temporary deprivation, (iii) clarifying that generic theft protects superior possessory interests rather than only title ownership, and (iv) holding that lack of consent can be inherent in the offense as interpreted by state law.