3. Analysis of the Precedents Cited
A. Standard of review: United States v. Harbuck
The court cited United States v. Harbuck, 146 F.4th 1073, 1076 (11th Cir. 2025), for the rule that whether a prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate is reviewed de novo. This required the appellate panel to decide the legal classification independently, without deferring to the district court’s interpretation.
B. The controlling substantive authority: United States v. James
United States v. James, 430 F.3d 1150, 1155 (11th Cir. 2005), supplied the central rule. It interpreted ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” broadly because the statute covers offenses “involving” manufacturing, distributing, or possessing drugs with intent to manufacture or distribute them.
Under James, Florida’s drug-trafficking statute categorically falls within that definition. Its significance here was that Florida’s quantity-based trafficking framework could satisfy the federal definition even though Pollock argued that the state statute did not independently require express proof of intent to distribute.
The panel treated James as controlling, not merely persuasive. Pollock therefore needed to identify a legally sufficient basis for departing from it; disagreement with its interpretation was not enough.
C. The limited effect of Johnson v. United States
The opinion acknowledged that Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), overruled James in an unrelated respect. Johnson invalidated ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague.
That development did not undermine James’s separate interpretation of “serious drug offense.” The panel thus distinguished between the particular holding that had been displaced and the drug-offense holding that remained effective. A decision’s partial overruling does not eliminate every independent proposition it established.
D. Quantity and inferred intent: United States v. Conage (Conage I)
In United States v. Conage (Conage I), 976 F.3d 1244, 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2020), the Eleventh Circuit relied on James to recognize that intent to distribute may be inferred from the quantity of drugs possessed.
That principle was directly relevant because the Florida provision applicable to Pollock treated possession of four grams or more of oxycodone as trafficking. The panel considered the quantity-based inference sufficient under its existing ACCA jurisprudence.
Conage I also certified a separate question to the Florida Supreme Court: whether a completed “purchase” under Florida’s trafficking statute requires actual or constructive possession of the drugs. That unresolved possession issue—not reconsideration of the quantity-based inference—generated the state-court decision on which Pollock relied.
E. The alleged intervening authority: Conage v. United States
Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2022), or Conage II, held that a completed drug purchase under Florida’s trafficking statute necessarily entails possession consistent with the federal understanding of that concept.
Pollock relied on this sentence from the decision:
“Eleventh Circuit precedent says that possession of a trafficking quantity of illegal drugs implies an intent to distribute those drugs.”
He argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s attribution of that proposition to federal precedent, combined with the absence of express adoption by that court or the Florida legislature, amounted to disavowal of the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation.
The panel rejected that reading. In context, the sentence explained why the possession question mattered: if purchasing a trafficking quantity necessarily entails possession, the offense can satisfy the federal definition under existing Eleventh Circuit precedent. The Florida Supreme Court then resolved the possession question affirmatively.
The appellate court did not need to hold that Conage II expressly adopted every aspect of its earlier reasoning. It was enough that the decision contained no rejection, criticism, or other indication that the earlier interpretation had become untenable.
F. Continuing application: United States v. Rowe
The panel cited United States v. Rowe, 143 F.4th 1318, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2025), which relied on James to classify Florida cocaine trafficking as a “controlled substance offense” under the career-offender guideline.
Rowe reinforced the continuing vitality of the quantity-based trafficking analysis. Its guideline setting was distinct from Pollock’s statutory ACCA enhancement, however; the reference did not establish that the two classification systems are interchangeable in every respect.
The opinion also cited Rowe at page 1322 for the obligation to follow prior panel interpretations of state law unless qualifying subsequent authority permits reconsideration.
G. State courts’ authority: LeFrere v. Quezada and Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2009), recognizes that state supreme courts are the final authorities on state law. Its metaphor—that federal courts write on state-law questions in “faint and disappearing ink”—captures the provisional nature of a federal court’s interpretation when the state’s highest court later speaks authoritatively.
Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 1058, 1066 (11th Cir. 1996), supplies the related qualification to circuit precedent: subsequent Florida decisions casting doubt on an earlier federal interpretation may permit a panel to reinterpret state law.
These decisions mattered because the court accepted the legal possibility underlying Pollock’s argument. A later state-court ruling could affect the earlier interpretation. Pollock failed because Conage II did not actually contradict or cast doubt on it.
H. The default rule of adherence: Zucker for BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. and World Harvest Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mut. Ins. Co.
The panel cited Zucker for BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.9 (11th Cir. 2017), and World Harvest Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mut. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 950, 957 (11th Cir. 2009), for the complementary rule: absent intervening authority undermining the earlier interpretation, prior panel precedent on state law remains binding within the circuit.
Together, these authorities reconcile respect for state courts’ interpretive supremacy with consistency among federal appellate panels.
I. The final reference to “Lebarron”
The opinion concludes its legal analysis with a citation to “Lebarron, 178 F.4th at 658.” The supplied text provides neither the full case title nor an explanation of its holding. Its immediate placement supports the conclusion that excluding Pollock’s trafficking conviction was legal error, but the excerpt does not permit a fuller account of that authority.
4. Legal Reasoning
A. Federal classification depended on the state offense’s legal scope
ACCA defines the relevant category of state drug offenses by reference to conduct “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” The appeal focused on whether Florida’s quantity-based trafficking offense met that description.
The distinction between state and federal law is important. Florida law determines what conduct the state offense encompasses; federal law determines whether that offense qualifies under ACCA. The panel resolved the interaction by applying its existing interpretation of Florida trafficking and ACCA’s broad “involving” language.
B. The court applied a categorical rule, not a new factual finding about Pollock
The opinion treated the Florida conviction as categorically qualifying under James. It did not examine whether Pollock personally intended to resell the oxycodone in the underlying case or require a new finding about his conduct.
Although the opinion described its precedent as permitting a finding of intent from quantity, it should not be read as adding a newly worded element to Florida’s statute. Its operative conclusion was that existing circuit law makes the trafficking conviction sufficient for the federal enhancement.
C. A neutral reference did not displace controlling precedent
The court’s central interpretive move was to read the disputed sentence in context. The Florida Supreme Court had identified the federal inference of intent to explain why the certified possession question was consequential. Nothing in that explanation rejected the inference.
Nor did the absence of express state-court or legislative endorsement establish disagreement. Pollock needed intervening authority that actually undermined the earlier interpretation. A neutral description of that interpretation did not satisfy that requirement.
D. The holding was limited to the disputed predicate
The appeal did not independently resolve the classification of Pollock’s aggravated-assault or aggravated-battery convictions. Nor did it revisit his admission that the prior offenses occurred on separate occasions. The disputed issue was the oxycodone-trafficking conviction, and the court’s analysis remained directed to it.