Date: Jul 13, 2026

Florida: Discretionary Prejudgment Interest as an Equitable-Distribution Remedy Under § 61.075

I. Introduction

In Scott Aron Stewart v. Mishelle Addys Perdomo Vindel (Fla. July 9, 2026), the Supreme Court of Florida resolved a district conflict over whether a trial court may award prejudgment interest as part of an equitable distribution of marital property under section 61.075, Florida Statutes.

The marriage was dissolved by an uncontested judgment in 2019, but the trial court reserved rulings on equitable distribution, alimony, and fees. The equitable-distribution issues were not fully resolved until 2022. The trial court valued marital property as of the petition date and denied the former wife’s request for prejudgment interest (interest from the petition date to distribution), reasoning it would be inequitable to charge the former husband for pandemic-related delays. The Third District reversed on several issues and held that the trial court’s basis for denying prejudgment interest lacked evidentiary support and conflicted with the purpose of prejudgment interest.

The Supreme Court took the case to resolve direct conflict between the Third District’s approach (allowing prejudgment interest in appropriate circumstances) and the First District’s categorical prohibition in Iarussi v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that a trial court does have statutory authority to award prejudgment interest in equitable distribution because section 61.075 authorizes “all other remedies available to a court to do equity between the parties.” However, prejudgment interest is not an entitlement in dissolution cases; it is a discretionary remedy dependent on the facts.

The Court:

Approved Vindel v. Stewart, 388 So. 3d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024), to the extent consistent with its analysis;
Disapproved Iarussi v. Iarussi to the extent it held prejudgment interest is never permitted in equitable distribution;
Remanded for reconsideration of prejudgment interest consistent with the Third District’s directions and the Supreme Court’s framework.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Dissolution as an equitable proceeding

The Court grounded its statutory interpretation in the longstanding equitable character of dissolution proceedings, citing:

An Act concerning Divorces and Alimony, § 2, Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida, Seventh Session (1828) (divorce proceedings “in Chancery”);
Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1979) and Engebretsen v. Engebretsen, 11 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1942) (equity remains central in divorce jurisprudence);
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (recognizing broad judicial discretion because rigid rules cannot fit every domestic-relations scenario).

These authorities supported the Court’s view that section 61.075 must be read as a statute that embeds equitable flexibility, not as a rigid remedial code.

2. Prejudgment interest doctrine and its equitable dimensions

The Court explained prejudgment interest as a “make-whole” device, relying principally on:

Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985) (the “loss theory”: prejudgment interest makes a party whole from the date of loss once damages and liability are determined; not dependent on certainty of amount or merits of defenses);
Westgate Mia. Beach, LTD. v. Newport Operating Corp., 55 So. 3d 567 (Fla. 2010) (reaffirming “make whole” purpose);
Broward Cnty. v. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990) (prejudgment interest may depend on equitable considerations);
Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42 (Fla. 2010) (distinguishing “loss theory” from penalty rationales).

The Court also acknowledged federal appellate support for classifying prejudgment interest as equitable when attached to equitable relief: Sec. & Exch. Com'n v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2002), citing Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 1999).

3. Statutory-interpretation methodology and canons

On interpretive method, the Court emphasized text-in-context and holistic reading, citing:

Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 365 So. 3d 353 (Fla. 2023) (paramount concern for statutory text);
Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 2021) (text means what it conveys in context);
Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318 (Fla. 2022) (context is critical);
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), citing Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399 (1988) (interpret statute as a whole).

To reject the First District’s negative implication, the Court invoked cautionary guidance:

Alachua Cnty. v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162 (Fla. 2022) (negative-implication canon must be applied with great caution and depends on context);
S. Marion Real Est. Holdings, LLC v. Fla. Gaming Control Comm'n, 387 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (canon applies only if the specified items reasonably appear exhaustive).

4. District court cases allowing prejudgment interest in equitable distribution

The Court aligned its holding with the “majority view” in the DCAs, citing:

Catalfumo v. Catalfumo, 704 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997);
Schuenzel v. Schuenzel, 320 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021);
Mobley v. Mobley, 920 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

The Court treated Iarussi v. Iarussi as the outlier and expressly disapproved it to the extent inconsistent with the new rule.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core holding is statutory: “other remedies” includes prejudgment interest

The Court’s analysis centered on section 61.075(1)’s statement that equitable-distribution rules operate “in addition to all other remedies available to a court to do equity between the parties.” Reading the statute holistically, the Court emphasized multiple equity-laden provisions:

Equal distribution as a starting point, with fact-based adjustment for equity: § 61.075(1);
The “catchall” allowing consideration of “[a]ny other fact[] necessary to do equity and justice between the parties”: § 61.075(1)(j);
Interim distributions to address hardship/access to funds: § 61.075(5);
Equitable selection of valuation date(s): § 61.075(7);
Consideration of dissipation/waste of marital assets: § 61.075(1)(i).

Against that framework, prejudgment interest was characterized as a remedial, equity-inflected tool that can help achieve a fair distribution where time, delay, or deprivation of use/access creates an inequity that the court finds should be corrected.

2. Rejecting the First District’s “expressio unius” / negative implication approach

The First District relied on section 61.075(10)(b), which authorizes interest/time-value recognition for installment payments after judgment, to infer the Legislature intentionally excluded prejudgment interest.

The Supreme Court rejected that inference as contextually unsound: subsection (10)(b) addresses a narrow, postjudgment scenario—installment payments after the court has distributed property—and therefore is not a plausible “exhaustive” statement of all interest-related authority in the statute. Under Alachua Cnty. v. Watson, negative implication is used “with great caution,” and here the statutory design did not support treating (10)(b) as silently prohibiting other equitable remedies already preserved by section 61.075(1).

3. Reconciling prejudgment interest (“loss theory”) with equitable distribution

The Court also rejected Iarussi’s doctrinal claim that the “loss theory” of Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co. is incompatible with dissolution because marital property is jointly owned.

Two moves were decisive:

Conceptual compatibility: “Make whole” relief can fit dissolution equity. Section 61.075 is expressly about equity and justice between the parties; prejudgment interest can be one method to achieve that end.
Practical reality: Joint ownership does not mean equal access or use during litigation. As the Third District noted in Vindel v. Stewart, one spouse may practically control marital assets to the exclusion of the other, creating a real deprivation of use that a trial court may equitably address.

4. The limiting principle: discretion, not automatic entitlement

The Court was explicit that recognizing authority does not create a right. A spouse must show facts or circumstances justifying prejudgment interest; even then, the trial court retains discretion to decide whether it is the appropriate equitable tool. The Court offered an illustrative example: prejudgment interest may be appropriate where a spouse is deprived of significant marital property during the pendency of the proceeding (citing Catalfumo v. Catalfumo).

On remand, the trial court must reassess the prejudgment-interest question under this fact-sensitive, discretionary framework—rather than denying solely based on generalized delay rationales not supported by the evidentiary record.

C. Impact

Resolves statewide conflict: The categorical bar announced by Iarussi v. Iarussi is no longer good law to the extent it prohibits prejudgment interest in equitable distribution.
Expands remedial toolkit under § 61.075: Trial courts may treat prejudgment interest as one of the “other remedies” available “to do equity,” particularly where delay and unequal access to assets create a measurable inequity.
Raises the importance of fact-finding: Because prejudgment interest is discretionary, litigants should expect heightened attention to evidence regarding (a) control and use of marital assets during the case, (b) who benefitted from or caused delays, (c) whether interim distributions were sought or available, and (d) whether valuation-date choices already addressed appreciation/depreciation.
Potential settlement leverage and litigation strategy: Where one spouse retains practical control of significant marital assets during a long case, the prospect of prejudgment interest may influence temporary relief motions, interim distributions (§ 61.075(5)), and negotiations over timing and liquidity.
Appellate review posture: Expect appeals to focus less on “authority” and more on whether the trial court abused its discretion or failed to make findings consistent with equitable principles and the record.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Prejudgment interest: Interest added to an award to account for the time between when a loss/deprivation effectively occurred and when judgment (or distribution) is entered. It aims to compensate for the time value of money or loss of use during the case.
Postjudgment interest: Interest that accrues after judgment. In section 61.075(10)(b), it is tied to installment payments and the court’s ability to recognize time value after the distribution order is entered.
“Loss theory” (from Argonaut): The idea that once liability and amount are determined, the injured party should be made whole from the date of loss; the defendant’s litigation posture or uncertainty about the amount does not bar prejudgment interest.
Negative-implication canon (expressio unius): A rule of interpretation suggesting that listing one item implies exclusion of others. The Court emphasized this canon applies only when the statutory list reasonably appears exhaustive; otherwise it can misread legislative design.
Equitable distribution: The process of dividing marital assets and liabilities fairly (often equally, unless factors justify otherwise) under section 61.075, guided by listed factors and a broad equity-and-justice catchall.

V. Conclusion

Scott Aron Stewart v. Mishelle Addys Perdomo Vindel establishes that Florida trial courts possess discretionary statutory authority under section 61.075 to award prejudgment interest as an equitable-distribution remedy, because the statute preserves “all other remedies” needed to “do equity between the parties.” The Court simultaneously limits the doctrine by rejecting any notion of automatic entitlement: prejudgment interest must be justified by the circumstances and remains subject to trial-court discretion.

The decision meaningfully reorients Florida dissolution practice away from categorical prohibitions and toward a fact-driven equity inquiry, while disapproving Iarussi v. Iarussi insofar as it barred prejudgment interest in all equitable-distribution cases.

Appendix: The Dissent’s Statutory Warning

Justice Labarga, dissenting, relied on Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 157 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1963), and Dade County v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984), to argue courts should not “supply missing words” where the Legislature expressly provided for postjudgment interest in section 61.075(10)(b) but did not mention prejudgment interest. The dissent would have accepted the First District’s inference in Iarussi v. Iarussi that the express authorization in one circumstance implies exclusion in others.