Florida Building Code “Permit-Vesting” Rule: The Code in Effect on the Permit Application Date Governs for the Life of the Permit (and Later Code Editions Do Not Create Contract or § 553.84 Liability)

1. Introduction

AIG Property Casualty Company v. ECO Marine Solutions, Inc. (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2026) is an insurance-subrogation dispute arising from a yacht fire at a residential dock in Lee County, Florida. After paying its insured, Jeffrey McMillin, approximately $1.8 million for a constructive total loss of the yacht, AIG sued the dock contractor, Eco Marine Solutions, Inc. (“Eco Marine”), and its electrical subcontractor, Custom Electrical, Inc. (“Custom Electrical”).

The core issue was narrow but dispositive: which edition of the National Electrical Code (“NEC”) governed the permitted dock work—the 2014 NEC (incorporated into the Sixth Edition of the Florida Building Code) or the 2017 NEC (incorporated into the Seventh Edition)? Both defendants conceded the installed circuit breaker was not compliant with the 2017 NEC, but asserted it was compliant with the 2014 NEC and that the 2014 NEC controlled because the permit application was submitted before the Seventh Edition’s effective date.

AIG’s theories tracked that same choice-of-code question: (1) breach of contract and warranties (express and implied) premised on failure to comply with applicable codes and to perform in a workmanlike manner; and (2) statutory claims under Florida Statutes section 553.84 for violations of the Florida Building Code.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Eco Marine and Custom Electrical. The court held that, under Florida Statutes section 553.73(7)(d), the edition of the Florida Building Code in effect on the date the permit application is submitted governs the permitted work for the life of the permit. Because Eco Marine applied for the dock permit on December 14, 2020, the controlling code was the Sixth Edition of the Florida Building Code incorporating the 2014 NEC, not the Seventh Edition incorporating the 2017 NEC (effective December 31, 2020).

Consequently, AIG’s contract and warranty claims failed because defendants were not shown to have violated the governing code; and AIG’s section 553.84 claims failed because noncompliance with an inapplicable code edition cannot constitute a “violation” of the Florida Building Code for statutory liability.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Although the opinion turned primarily on Florida statutory text, the court relied on federal appellate standards and principles governing appellate review, waiver/forfeiture, and affirmance on alternative grounds.

  • Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec'y of State for State of Ala., 992 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2021): Cited for the Eleventh Circuit’s standard of review on cross-motions for summary judgment—de novo review, with facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant on each motion. This framing mattered because the dispute was treated as a question of law (which code applied) rather than a disputed factual issue about the installation.
  • ECB USA, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 113 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1431 (2025): Quoted for the proposition that a party cannot “waive or forfeit . . . the words of a statute.” The court used this to reject AIG’s contention that section 553.73(7)(d) should not control because it was not cited below.
  • United States v. Dawson, 64 F.4th 1227 (11th Cir. 2023): Cited for the broader statement that parties cannot waive the application of the correct law.
  • Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018): Appears within the quotation in Dawson, reinforcing the same principle that correct law governs regardless of litigant omission.
  • Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2017): Cited for the rule that an appellate court “may affirm on any ground supported by the record,” even if not relied upon or considered below. This supported affirmance based on section 553.73(7)(d) regardless of the district court’s emphasis on a different subsection.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Statutory structure: adoption by reference and effective dates

The court first summarized Florida’s building-code scheme: the Florida Building Commission adopts the Florida Building Code, which may incorporate external standards “by reference” (including the NEC), and updates it on a three-year cycle. Critically, changes in external standards do not become automatically effective statewide; they become effective only once adopted by the Commission. (See Fla. Stat. § 553.73 generally; the NEC is specifically addressed via §§ 553.73(3), 553.88(1).)

B. The controlling “permit-vesting” rule: § 553.73(7)(d)

The decision’s key move is straightforward textualism: section 553.73(7)(d) states that “the edition of the Florida Building Code which is in effect on the date of application for any permit authorized by the code governs the permitted work for the life of the permit.” Because Eco Marine’s permit application was submitted on December 14, 2020—before the Seventh Edition’s December 31, 2020 effective date—the Sixth Edition (and thus the 2014 NEC) governed.

This resolves the case because AIG’s claims were built on alleged noncompliance with the 2017 NEC, and AIG did not contend the installation violated the 2014 NEC.

C. Addressing AIG’s three arguments

  1. Section 553.73(6) vs. 553.73(7)(d): AIG argued the district court relied on § 553.73(6) (a provision about “initial adoption”) and that it did not apply. The Eleventh Circuit essentially assumed arguendo AIG might be right about (6), but held it was irrelevant because § 553.73(7)(d) independently and expressly extends the same “application date controls” concept to subsequent code editions. The appellate court then invoked ECB USA, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., United States v. Dawson, and Waldman v. Conway to justify applying the correct statutory subsection and affirming on that basis.
  2. Contract clause requiring compliance with “all local codes”: AIG contended that even if the permit framework used the earlier code, the contract obligated Eco Marine to comply with whatever code was effective “during the pendency of the project.” The court rejected this reading, holding the contract could not reasonably be construed to require compliance with inapplicable codes. Because the Seventh Edition/2017 NEC did not govern work under the permit due to § 553.73(7)(d), failure to comply with it could not breach a promise to comply with “all local codes, laws, ordinances and regulations.”
  3. Section 553.84 statutory cause of action: AIG argued that § 553.84 broadly provides a claim for a “violation” of the Florida Building Code and should reach conduct occurring after the 2017 NEC became “effective statewide.” The court again tied “violation” to the code edition that legally governed the permitted work. Under § 553.73(7)(d), the 2017 NEC did not govern this permitted project, so noncompliance with it could not constitute a statutory “violation” under § 553.84.

3.3. Impact

  • Clarifies code applicability in Florida construction disputes in federal court: The opinion reinforces that Florida’s statutory “permit-vesting” rule in § 553.73(7)(d) is outcome-determinative where code editions change mid-project. Plaintiffs must plead and prove a violation of the code edition that governed as of the permit application date, not merely the edition effective at completion.
  • Constrains “moving target” contract theories: Contract language requiring compliance with “all codes” will be read to mean applicable codes—i.e., those that legally govern the permitted work—absent clearer language imposing an affirmative obligation to upgrade to later-adopted standards.
  • Limits § 553.84 claims to legally applicable code requirements: The decision effectively pairs § 553.84 with § 553.73(7)(d): a plaintiff cannot bootstrap statutory liability by pointing to later code editions that did not govern the permitted work.
  • Appellate practice: correct law applies regardless of citation below: The court’s reliance on ECB USA, Inc. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., United States v. Dawson, and Waldman v. Conway underscores that statutory text can control even if overlooked in the district court record, and affirmance may rest on any record-supported legal ground.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subrogation: After AIG paid its insured for the loss, it stepped into the insured’s shoes to pursue the insured’s rights against third parties allegedly responsible for the damage.
  • Constructive total loss: An insurance concept where the property is not necessarily destroyed beyond recognition, but the cost to repair exceeds thresholds that make it economically a “total loss.”
  • Incorporation by reference (building codes): Florida’s Building Code often does not reproduce technical standards verbatim; it legally adopts external standards (like the NEC) by referring to them.
  • Permit-vesting / “life of the permit” rule: Under Fla. Stat. § 553.73(7)(d), once a permit application is submitted, the code edition then in effect governs the project for the permit’s duration (including extensions), even if a new code edition becomes effective later.
  • Summary judgment: A procedural mechanism allowing judgment as a matter of law when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Here, the operative question was legal—what code applied—not factual.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision establishes a clear, practical rule for Florida code-based construction litigation: the Florida Building Code edition in effect on the permit application date governs the permitted work for the life of the permit under Fla. Stat. § 553.73(7)(d). As applied here, that rule foreclosed contract and § 553.84 claims premised on later-adopted NEC requirements, because noncompliance with an inapplicable code edition is not a breach of an “all codes” clause and is not a statutory “violation” of the Florida Building Code.