Florida Attempted Armed Robbery Is Not an ACCA “Violent Felony” After United States v. Taylor (Abrogating United States v. Joyner)

Case: United States v. Jimmy Lightsey Court: Eleventh Circuit Date: 2026-02-26
New precedent distilled: Applying United States v. Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit holds that Florida attempted armed robbery is not categorically a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause and that United States v. Joyner has been abrogated to the point of abrogation. The court nevertheless reaffirms (via United States v. Jackson (Jackson II) and Brown v. United States) that ACCA “serious drug offense” analysis uses the federal schedules in effect at the time of the prior state drug conviction.

1. Introduction

Jimmy Ray Lightsey was convicted after a jury trial of (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e), (2) drug trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 841, and (3) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At sentencing, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Florida convictions: a 1997 conviction for attempted armed robbery with a weapon and two Florida cocaine convictions (2000 and 2009) under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a). ACCA elevated Count One to a 15-year mandatory minimum; combined with the mandatory consecutive 5-year sentence on Count Three, Lightsey received a total of 240 months.

On appeal, Lightsey challenged whether his prior convictions qualified as ACCA predicates. The panel, on rehearing, vacated its prior opinion, held that the drug convictions remain “serious drug offenses,” but concluded that Florida attempted armed robbery is not a “violent felony” after intervening Supreme Court precedent. The sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing without ACCA.

Key issues

  • Serious drug offenses: Do Lightsey’s Florida cocaine convictions qualify when Florida’s definition of cocaine once covered ioflupane and federal schedules later changed?
  • Violent felony: Does Florida attempted armed robbery qualify under ACCA’s elements clause after United States v. Taylor?
  • Stare decisis within the circuit: Has United States v. Joyner (holding Florida attempted robbery is an ACCA violent felony) been abrogated?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit (per Judge Lagoa) held:

  • Drug predicates affirmed: Lightsey’s 2000 and 2009 Florida cocaine convictions are “serious drug offenses” under ACCA, because under United States v. Jackson (Jackson II), affirmed by Brown v. United States, the relevant federal schedules are those in effect at the time of the state drug offenses. Lightsey conceded that, at the time, both Florida and federal law covered ioflupane.
  • Attempted armed robbery rejected as a violent felony: Applying United States v. Taylor’s elements-clause methodology, the court concluded Florida attempted armed robbery does not always require proof of “use, attempted use, or threatened use” of force, because it can be committed by an “attempt to threaten.”
  • United States v. Joyner abrogated: The panel held that Taylor is “clearly on point” and directly conflicts with Joyner, requiring departure from prior panel precedent.

The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement.

Dissent (Judge Luck)

The dissent argued (1) Taylor is not “clearly on point” to ACCA and Florida attempted armed robbery, so Joyner remains binding under the prior-panel-precedent rule; and (2) even on a fresh categorical analysis, Florida attempted armed robbery includes elements (including “use of a firearm” per Franqui v. State) that satisfy ACCA’s elements clause. The dissent criticized the majority for importing federal “substantial step” and Model Penal Code concepts into Florida attempt law.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the decision)

A. ACCA drug predicates and temporal matching of schedules

  • United States v. Jackson (Jackson II), 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024): These cases supply the controlling rule that, for “serious drug offense” analysis under ACCA’s categorical approach, the comparison between the state drug statute and the federal Controlled Substances Act schedules is conducted using the federal schedules “in effect at the time of the prior drug conviction,” not at the time of the later § 922(g) offense. The panel treated this as dispositive of Lightsey’s ioflupane-based overbreadth argument.
  • United States v. Kushmaul, 984 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Donawa v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013)): Cited for the “least culpable conduct” formulation within the categorical approach. The court applied that framework but found Lightsey’s least-culpable-conduct theory immaterial because temporal matching under Jackson II/Brown defeats the ioflupane argument.
  • Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154 (2020): Appears primarily in the sentencing background as authority relied upon by the probation officer and the government. The panel’s actual holding on the drug issue rests instead on Jackson II and Brown.

B. ACCA elements clause, attempt offenses, and the post-Taylor methodology

  • United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022): The fulcrum of the panel’s violent-felony analysis. Taylor held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s elements clause because attempt liability can be satisfied by intent plus a substantial step without any actual, attempted, or threatened use of force. The Lightsey majority treated Taylor as controlling in method (categorical, elements-only) and in principle (attempt to threaten is insufficient).
  • Alvarado-Linares v. United States, 44 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2022): Used to extend Taylor’s logic beyond Hobbs Act robbery: if a completed offense can be committed by threatened force, then an attempt to commit it may be an “attempt to threaten,” which falls outside the elements clause. The majority leveraged this framing to classify Florida attempted armed robbery as potentially an “attempt to threaten,” and thus not categorically within ACCA’s elements clause.
  • United States v. Sharp, 21 F.4th 1282 (11th Cir. 2021): Cited for the general proposition that ACCA violent-felony analysis proceeds via the categorical approach focusing on statutory elements.
  • United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 2019), and United States v. Eason, 953 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2020): These cases are invoked to justify cross-pollination among “elements clauses” across ACCA, § 924(c), and the Guidelines (given their “virtually identical” or “identical” language). This doctrinal bridge is central to the majority’s move from § 924(c) precedent (Taylor) into ACCA analysis.
  • Thompson v. United States, 924 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2019): Cited in a footnote to name § 924(c)’s “elements clause,” reinforcing the analytic parallelism the majority adopts.

C. Florida robbery/attempt elements and state-law gloss

  • Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1), (2)(b) and Fla. Stat. § 777.04(1): The panel treated these statutes as establishing that attempted armed robbery requires intent to rob (by force/assault/putting in fear), an act “toward the commission,” and carrying a weapon during the offense.
  • Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1998): Cited for the proposition that the “force or threat” element distinguishes robbery from theft under Florida law.
  • State v. Baker, 452 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1984): Used to emphasize that Florida “armed robbery” does not require use of the weapon; merely carrying suffices for the enhancement. The majority relied on this to separate weapon-carrying from actual force application.
  • Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1997): Cited for the elements of attempted armed robbery (intent, act in furtherance, “use of a [weapon]” as the opinion phrases it). This case anchors the panel’s element-by-element analysis, while simultaneously providing the dissent a platform to argue that “use” implies more than passive carrying.

D. Prior Eleventh Circuit precedent on Florida robbery and attempts, and abrogation

  • United States v. Joyner, 882 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2018): The displaced precedent. Joyner held “Florida attempted robbery is categorically a violent felony under the ACCA.” The majority held Joyner is now abrogated by Taylor because Joyner relied on reasoning Taylor rejected—namely, inferring attempt-qualification from completed-crime qualification.
  • United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011): Identified as the analytical backbone of Joyner. The majority criticized Lockley’s reliance on Guidelines commentary and noted that United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc), rejected deference to commentary absent genuine ambiguity—undermining an alternative basis in Lockley.
  • United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2006): These cases supported the proposition that completed Florida armed robbery is a violent felony under ACCA. The majority, following Taylor, held that such completed-offense cases no longer establish attempt-offense status.
  • Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. 73 (2019): Appears in the sentencing colloquy background as support for completed Florida armed robbery qualifying as an ACCA predicate. The majority did not dispute completed-robbery qualification; it held only that attempt does not follow categorically.
  • United States v. St. Hubert 909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018): Cited in background for the then-prevailing circuit view that “an attempt to commit a violent felony under ACCA is also a violent felony.” The majority’s holding is a direct retreat from that broad proposition, at least as applied to Florida attempted armed robbery.

E. The prior-panel-precedent rule (mechanics for declaring abrogation)

  • United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited to articulate the binding nature of prior panel precedent unless “overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation” by the Supreme Court or en banc court. The majority used Archer to justify treating Taylor as sufficiently disruptive to the analytical method underlying Joyner.
  • United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003)): Quoted for the requirement that the intervening Supreme Court decision be “clearly on point” and “directly conflict” rather than merely weaken prior panel precedent. The majority found those requirements satisfied; the dissent found them unmet.
  • Begay v. United States, 5 5 3 U.S. 137 (2008); United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1998): Discussed by the majority as an example (via Archer) of how a new Supreme Court method can abrogate older circuit precedent even across different legal instruments.

F. Additional background precedents referenced at sentencing

  • United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited by the probation officer for the proposition that Florida armed robbery qualifies as an ACCA violent felony (completed offense).
  • United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005): Cited for the proposition that juvenile offenses may qualify as ACCA predicates (though this became largely peripheral once the attempt predicate failed).

G. Dissent’s cited authorities (highlighting the doctrinal fault lines)

Although not necessary to the majority’s holding, the dissent’s citations illuminate the litigation risk and future trajectory of this precedent: United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019) (prior-panel-precedent rule); United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019) (distinguishing § 924(c) offense vs enhancement); United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025); United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008); Somers v. United States, 15 F.4th 1049 (11th Cir. 2021); Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, 709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2013); Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021); and Florida attempt-law decisions State v. Coker, 452 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Hudson v. State, 745 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), plus illustrative factual comparisons from Cooper v. Wainright, 308 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The drug predicates: categorical approach + time-of-conviction schedules

The court’s drug analysis is intentionally narrow. Once it identified Jackson II and Brown as controlling, the case became a straightforward application of the temporal-matching rule: a Florida drug conviction qualifies as an ACCA “serious drug offense” if the state schedule and federal schedule matched at the time of the state conviction. Lightsey’s argument hinged on later federal schedule changes (ioflupane’s removal). He conceded that at the relevant earlier time both sovereigns included ioflupane. That concession, under Brown/Jackson II, ended the inquiry.

Practical takeaway: In ACCA drug cases post-Brown, litigants must focus on historical schedule comparisons keyed to the time of the state offense/conviction, not the federal firearm offense.

B. The violent-felony predicate: importing Taylor’s attempt logic into ACCA

The panel’s core move is methodological: it treats ACCA’s elements clause and § 924(c)’s elements clause as sufficiently similar to justify importing Taylor’s “attempt does not necessarily entail force” principle into ACCA. From there, the majority focuses on what Florida attempted armed robbery requires the prosecution to prove, as elements, in every case.

Using Florida’s robbery and attempt statutes (Fla. Stat. §§ 812.13 and 777.04(1)) and the Florida Supreme Court’s articulation in Franqui v. State, the majority concludes a conviction can rest on intent to take property “by force or threat” plus an overt act toward that goal while armed—without proving that the defendant actually used force, attempted to use force, or threatened to use force. The majority analogizes this to Taylor’s reasoning that intent to threaten plus a step toward doing so is still only “an intention,” and that an “attempt to threaten” falls outside the elements clause (as characterized in Alvarado-Linares v. United States).

C. Abrogation analysis: why the panel felt free to depart from Joyner

The majority treats Joyner as abrogated because (1) Taylor rejects the syllogism that attempt inherits the completed crime’s elements-clause status, and (2) Joyner relied on prior reasoning (including Lockley and completed-robbery cases) that does not ask the post-Taylor question: whether the attempt statute always requires proof of actual, attempted, or threatened force as an element.

The abrogation holding turns the case into a circuit-level doctrinal shift: the panel is not simply distinguishing Joyner; it declares it no longer binding. The majority further undermines the older analytical ecosystem by pointing out that United States v. Dupree (en banc) rejects the deference to Guidelines commentary that had supported an alternative rationale in Lockley.

D. The dissent’s competing reasoning: “not clearly on point” + Florida attempt law

Judge Luck’s dissent frames the dispute as one about the limits of the “intervening Supreme Court decision” exception. The dissent argues Taylor is not “clearly on point” because it involved § 924(c), attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and federal attempt doctrine, whereas this case involves ACCA, Florida attempted armed robbery, and Florida attempt doctrine. In the dissent’s view, those differences mean Joyner remains binding.

On the merits, the dissent reads Franqui v. State’s “use of a firearm” component as implying actual force/threat conduct, and criticizes the majority for relying on Taylor’s Model Penal Code “substantial step” hypothetical rather than Florida decisional law on attempt (citing, among others, Hudson v. State to argue Florida has not adopted the MPC approach).

3.3. Impact

A. Immediate sentencing consequences in the Eleventh Circuit

  • ACCA exposure reduced: Defendants whose ACCA status depends on Florida attempted armed robbery (or Florida attempted robbery more broadly, by the logic of the case) have a powerful basis to contest ACCA enhancements and seek resentencing.
  • Guidelines knock-on effects: Because the opinion stresses the interchangeability of “elements clauses” across ACCA, § 924(c), and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), it may influence “crime of violence” determinations under the career-offender guideline—especially given the opinion’s discussion of United States v. Dupree.
  • Preservation posture shifts: Lightsey’s case shows why defense counsel should preserve categorical challenges even when “foreclosed” at sentencing: intervening Supreme Court decisions can transform foreclosed claims into winning ones on appeal or collateral review.

B. Litigation forecasts: en banc or Supreme Court attention

The dissent squarely challenges the majority’s abrogation logic and its reading of Florida attempt law. That combination (a declared abrogation of a published circuit precedent plus a robust dissent) is the typical profile for future en banc review or Supreme Court interest—particularly because it affects a high-volume predicate category (Florida robbery/attempt) in a high-stakes sentencing regime (ACCA).

C. The drug side: stability after Brown

By contrast, the drug holding reinforces a now-stabilized national rule after Brown v. United States: litigants should expect ioflupane-style arguments based on later federal descheduling to fail, unless they can show mismatch at the time of the state conviction.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical approach

Courts do not look at what the defendant actually did in the prior case. They look at the statutory elements of the prior offense and ask whether the least culpable conduct criminalized by that statute still fits within ACCA’s definitions.

ACCA “elements clause”

A prior conviction is a “violent felony” only if the offense has, as an element, the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” The question is element-based: must the government prove force (or attempted/threatened force) in every case?

Attempt liability vs completed crimes

A completed robbery typically requires force or threat as part of the taking. Attempted robbery can sometimes be proven by intent plus steps toward the robbery that stop short of any actual threat or force. After United States v. Taylor, courts are more skeptical of treating attempt offenses as automatic “force” predicates.

Prior-panel-precedent rule (Eleventh Circuit)

A later panel must follow earlier published panel decisions unless a Supreme Court decision (or en banc Eleventh Circuit decision) overrules them or undermines them “to the point of abrogation.” The majority and dissent disagree sharply about whether Taylor meets that standard for United States v. Joyner.

Drug schedule “time-of-conviction” rule

Under United States v. Jackson (Jackson II) and Brown v. United States, whether a state drug conviction counts for ACCA depends on whether the state and federal controlled-substance schedules matched when the state offense was committed/convicted—not whether federal law later removed the substance.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Jimmy Lightsey establishes (for the Eleventh Circuit) a consequential post-Taylor rule: Florida attempted armed robbery is not categorically a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause, and United States v. Joyner is deemed abrogated. The decision narrows ACCA’s reach over Florida attempt predicates and signals a broader recalibration in how attempt offenses are tested under “elements clauses.”

At the same time, the opinion reflects a settled trajectory on ACCA drug predicates after Brown v. United States: defendants cannot defeat ACCA “serious drug offense” status by pointing to later federal descheduling if the schedules matched at the time of the state conviction.

The sharp dissent underscores that the opinion’s long-term durability may turn on higher-court review—particularly regarding whether Taylor is sufficiently “on point” to displace binding circuit precedent and how Florida attempt law should be integrated into the categorical analysis.