Florida Aggravated Assault (§ 784.021(1)(a)) Categorically Qualifies as an INA “Crime of Violence” Under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (Somers Controls in Immigration Cases)

I. Introduction

In Woff Senatus v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings filed by Woff Senatus, a Haitian national and former lawful permanent resident. Senatus had been removed after a Florida conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm under Florida Statute § 784.021(1)(a), for which he received a 14-month sentence (plus probation).

The legal dispute centered on whether that Florida offense is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, which—when paired with a sentence of at least one year—constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and therefore a removal ground under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

Senatus’s theory was doctrinally familiar after recent Supreme Court and circuit case law: if the Florida statute could be violated with a mens rea of mere recklessness, it would fall outside the generic federal definition (which requires more than recklessness). The Eleventh Circuit held that its own precedent—particularly the Somers line of cases—foreclosed Senatus’s position and therefore required denial of the petition.

Notably, the government also moved to dismiss the petition as untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (30-day filing deadline). The court carried that motion with the merits, but ultimately denied it as moot after rejecting Senatus’s arguments on the merits, expressly declining to decide whether equitable tolling is available for that deadline.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • The court reaffirmed that removal may be predicated on a state conviction that is an aggravated felony, including a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 with a sentence of at least one year.
  • Applying the categorical approach, the court held that Florida aggravated assault under § 784.021(1)(a) requires at least knowing conduct, not mere recklessness.
  • The court treated ACCA “violent felony” decisions and INA “crime of violence” decisions as analytically interchangeable, relying heavily on: Somers v. United States (Somers I, Somers II, Somers III) and Lukaj v. U.S. Att’y Gen..
  • The court rejected Senatus’s efforts to avoid Somers III, including arguments about (a) a supposedly different “realistic probability” analysis in immigration cases and (b) the timing of Somers II (Florida Supreme Court) relative to his 2021 conviction.
  • The petition for review was DENIED; the government’s motion to dismiss for untimeliness was DENIED AS MOOT.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Motion-to-reopen review framework: Rosales-Mendez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.

The panel began with the standard of review: “We review the denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings for abuse of discretion,” and “legal conclusions underlying the denial de novo.” That formulation comes from Rosales-Mendez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 104 F.4th 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2024). This framing mattered because Senatus was challenging a denial of reopening (procedurally discretionary) but based on a pure legal question (categorical “crime of violence” status).

2. The categorical approach baseline: Moncrieffe v. Holder and Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez

The court relied on Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), to restate the categorical approach: the analysis looks to the elements of the offense of conviction, not the individual’s real-world conduct, and a state offense matches a generic federal offense only if the state conviction necessarily involved facts equating to the generic definition.

The panel also invoked Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007), for the “realistic probability” principle: it is not enough to posit hypothetical overbreadth; the noncitizen must show a realistic probability the state actually applies its statute to conduct outside the generic offense.

3. Mens rea and “crime of violence”: Borden v. United States and Leocal v. Ashcroft

Senatus’s argument tracked modern mens rea limitations on “violent” predicates. The court cited Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), where the Supreme Court held that an offense committed with mere recklessness does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA. The panel also cited Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), which held negligence is insufficient for 18 U.S.C. § 16 and reserved whether recklessness suffices.

The court treated the combined takeaway as settling the “generic” side of the categorical comparison for this case: for removability under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (as imported into the INA aggravated felony definition), the predicate must involve more than recklessness.

4. Interchangeability across ACCA and immigration: Lukaj v. U.S. Att’y Gen., Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., and United States v. White

The central move of the opinion was treating ACCA and INA categorical analyses as functionally parallel. Lukaj v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 953 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2020), supplied the key proposition: 18 U.S.C. § 16’s “crime of violence” definition is “virtually identical” to the ACCA’s “violent felony” force clause, so interpretive decisions “apply interchangeably.” The panel noted that Lukaj was “overruled in part on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023),” but not on the interchangeability point used here.

The court reinforced this cross-pollination with Donawa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1275, 1280 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013), recognizing that the “general analytical framework and principles” are analogous and holdings are routinely imported across contexts.

Finally, to rebut Senatus’s attempt to cabin “realistic probability” to the INA, the panel cited United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir. 2016), as an ACCA case applying the Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez “realistic probability” formulation.

5. The Florida aggravated assault mens rea question: Somers v. United States (Somers I, Somers II, Somers III)

The dispositive precedent was the trilogy:

  • Somers v. United States, 15 F.4th 1049 (11th Cir. 2021) (Somers I): the Eleventh Circuit identified an apparent split in Florida intermediate appellate decisions on whether aggravated assault requires specific intent and certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court. The panel acknowledged cases like Kelly v. State, 552 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), suggesting “culpable negligence” / “willful and reckless disregard” could suffice.
  • Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887 (Fla. 2022) (Somers II): the Florida Supreme Court answered that aggravated assault cannot “be accomplished via a reckless act”; it requires “at least knowing conduct.”
  • Somers v. United States, 66 F.4th 890 (11th Cir. 2023) (Somers III): relying on Somers II, the Eleventh Circuit held Florida aggravated assault categorically qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA and, crucially, declared that when the Florida Supreme Court interprets a statute, it tells what the statute “always meant.”

In Senatus’s case, the panel treated Somers III as controlling not only for ACCA enhancements but also for INA removability because of the interchangeability principle from Lukaj and the shared categorical methodology.

6. Exhaustion and “core issue” presentation: Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen. and Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen.

The government argued Senatus failed to exhaust a particular argument before the BIA. The panel rejected that contention using Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015), which characterizes exhaustion as “not a stringent requirement”: the petitioner must raise the “core issue” but need not use precise legal terminology or a fully developed argument. The court also cited Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023), as an example of sufficient exhaustion where the petitioner raised the same “core argument” of overbreadth.

7. Applying Somers to pre-Somers convictions: United States v. Gary

To reinforce that Somers applies even to older convictions, the panel cited United States v. Gary, 74 F.4th 1332, 1334–36 (11th Cir. 2023), applying Somers II and Somers III to a pre-Somers 2016 conviction for ACCA purposes. This supported rejecting Senatus’s timing/retroactivity argument.

8. Acknowledged circuit disagreement but bound by circuit law: United States v. Anderson and Morrison v. Amway Corp.

Senatus urged adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s approach in United States v. Anderson, 99 F.4th 1106 (7th Cir. 2024), which (on similar Florida aggravated assault questions) looked to state law “at the time of the offense” and declined to treat Somers II as controlling absent explicit retroactivity. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that invitation as foreclosed by its own binding precedent rule, citing Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 929 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A prior panel decision … is binding … and can be overturned only by the Court sitting en banc.”).

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Statutory removability framework. The court began with the INA’s aggravated felony removal ground: any alien convicted of an aggravated felony after admission is deportable, and “aggravated felony” includes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 with at least a one-year term of imprisonment.
  2. Elemental comparison under the categorical approach. Using Moncrieffe, the court focused on the statutory elements of Florida aggravated assault, not Senatus’s conduct. The key overbreadth question was whether Florida permits conviction for aggravated assault with only recklessness.
  3. Generic federal mens rea requires more than recklessness. Leveraging Borden and Leocal, and treating ACCA and § 16 as interchangeable through Lukaj, the panel accepted that an INA “crime of violence” (here, § 16(a) force clause analysis) cannot be satisfied by mere recklessness.
  4. Florida aggravated assault requires at least knowing conduct. Although Senatus cited older intermediate Florida authority—especially Kelly v. State—that appeared to allow less-than-intentional mental states, the Eleventh Circuit held that Somers II authoritatively settled Florida law: aggravated assault cannot be committed recklessly and requires at least knowing conduct.
  5. Somers III’s “always meant” principle defeats the timing argument. The panel applied Somers III’s statement that when the Florida Supreme Court interprets a statute, it tells what the statute “always meant.” Thus, the fact that Somers II post-dated Senatus’s conviction did not help him under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach; earlier intermediate appellate cases cannot override the state supreme court’s construction as understood by the federal court applying the categorical approach.
  6. No escape via “realistic probability” distinctions. Senatus argued Somers (an ACCA case) should not control because the INA uses Gonzales “realistic probability.” The panel rejected the premise: (a) the categorical approach operates similarly in both contexts; (b) the Eleventh Circuit has applied Gonzales’s “realistic probability” in the ACCA setting (White); and (c) therefore Somers’s holding carries over.
  7. Binding precedent over circuit splits. Even if the Seventh Circuit in Anderson took a different view about temporality and retroactivity, the Eleventh Circuit held that Somers governs within the circuit under Morrison.
  8. Disposition. Because Florida aggravated assault is a “crime of violence” under § 16 as applied in this circuit, Senatus could not show prejudice from prior counsel’s alleged failure to contest removability. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening, and the petition was denied.

C. Impact

  • Immigration consequences in the Eleventh Circuit. The decision cements (and operationalizes) that a conviction under Florida Statute § 784.021(1)(a) is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 for INA aggravated felony purposes, at least where the sentence threshold is met. For noncitizens, this significantly narrows the viability of post-conviction or reopening strategies premised on recklessness overbreadth.
  • Procedural leverage in reopening litigation. Because the court treated the removability issue as foreclosed, it also made it harder for petitioners to establish prejudice in ineffective-assistance-based motions to reopen when the alleged deficiency is failure to contest that Florida aggravated assault is a “crime of violence.”
  • Cross-context doctrinal consolidation. The opinion reinforces a methodological pipeline: ACCA categorical decisions (including mens rea limitations and state-law element determinations) will often be imported into immigration removability analyses within the Eleventh Circuit.
  • Intra-/inter-circuit tensions. By expressly refusing to follow United States v. Anderson, the decision highlights a live interpretive divergence over how federal courts should treat later state-supreme-court decisions for purposes of the categorical approach (especially when earlier intermediate appellate decisions appear conflicting). That divergence could matter for forum-dependent outcomes and may invite further appellate attention.
  • Timeliness and equitable tolling left unresolved. The panel’s choice not to decide whether equitable tolling applies to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) preserves uncertainty for future litigants. Practically, it underscores that even potentially difficult jurisdictional/timeliness issues may be bypassed when the merits are clearly foreclosed by binding precedent.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Motion to reopen”
A request to restart immigration proceedings after a final decision, usually based on new evidence, changed circumstances, or procedural defects (including ineffective assistance of counsel). It is discretionary, and denials are reviewed for abuse of discretion, though embedded legal questions are reviewed de novo.
“Categorical approach”
A legal method that compares the elements of the statute of conviction to the elements of a generic federal definition (here, “crime of violence”). Courts do not examine the individual’s actual conduct; they examine what the statute necessarily requires for a conviction.
“Crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)
An offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another’s person or property. The Eleventh Circuit treated this definition as essentially parallel to the ACCA force clause for interpretive purposes.
“Mens rea” (recklessness vs. knowing/intentional)
Mens rea is the mental state required for a crime. Recklessness generally means conscious disregard of a substantial risk; knowing means awareness that one’s conduct is of a particular nature or will cause a particular result; intentional typically means acting with purpose. After Borden, mere recklessness is insufficient for certain “violent” predicate definitions, which is why Senatus focused on whether Florida aggravated assault could be committed recklessly.
“Realistic probability” test
A limitation on purely hypothetical overbreadth arguments. A challenger generally must show that the state actually applies the statute in the broader way claimed, not just that the statute could theoretically be read that way.
State supreme court interpretations and “always meant”
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach (as stated in Somers III), when a state supreme court interprets a statute, that interpretation is treated as declaring what the statute has meant all along. That principle is central to why Senatus could not rely on older intermediate appellate cases to claim that recklessness was sufficient at the time of his conviction.

V. Conclusion

Woff Senatus v. U.S. Attorney General is best understood as a precedent-consolidation decision: it squarely applies the Eleventh Circuit’s Somers holdings to the immigration “crime of violence” context and rejects attempts to distinguish ACCA and INA categorical analyses or to avoid later state-supreme-court statutory interpretations based on timing.

The key takeaway is clear within the Eleventh Circuit: a conviction for Florida aggravated assault under § 784.021(1)(a) is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (and thus an aggravated felony when the sentence threshold is met), supporting removability. The decision simultaneously underscores the binding force of circuit precedent even in the face of contrary reasoning from other circuits, while leaving open for another day the question of equitable tolling under the INA’s 30-day petition-for-review deadline.