First Amendment Bars Factfinder Review of Clergy’s Doctrinal “Reasonable and Necessary” Determination Under A.R.S. § 13-3620(A)

I. Introduction

DOE v. THE CORPORATION (Ariz. July 30, 2026) addresses the intersection of Arizona’s child-abuse mandatory reporting statute, A.R.S. § 13-3620, and the First Amendment’s protections for religious autonomy. The plaintiffs—Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, and John Doe (collectively, the “Does”)—sued The Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Church, and two bishops and their spouses (collectively, the “Church Defendants”), alleging tort claims tied in part to an alleged failure to report child sexual abuse after the abuser admitted misconduct to clergy.

The case turned not on the factual merits of the abuse allegations, but on statutory interpretation and constitutional limits on what a judge or jury may evaluate when a clergy member invokes the statute’s clergy accommodation. The core issues were:

  • Whether a factfinder may evaluate whether clergy complied with religious doctrine when deciding not to report abuse under the statute’s clergy exemption.
  • What “confession” and “confidential communication” mean in § 13-3620(A), and how much deference courts owe to a religion’s definitions.
  • Whether a factfinder may decide who qualifies as a “member of the clergy.”
  • Whether the court of appeals erred by centering its analysis on the separate clergy-penitent privilege statute, A.R.S. § 12-2233.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ memorandum decision and affirmed summary judgment for the Church Defendants. It held:

  1. First Amendment limit on factfinding: The First Amendment generally prohibits courts and juries from inquiring into a clergy member’s application of religious doctrine when the clergy member determines that withholding reporting is “reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion,” absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes.
  2. Definitions (with deference):
    • “Confession” means “a confidential acknowledgment or admission of a crime, sin, or fault to a member of the clergy, priest, or Christian Science practitioner for the purpose of absolution.”
    • “Confidential communication” means “speech or correspondence that is treated as private or made in confidence, generally under circumstances that indicate the communication is intended only for the person or persons addressed.”
    But courts must give “substantial deference” to a religious institution’s doctrinal conception of both terms.
  3. Who is “clergy”: The First Amendment protects a religious institution’s right to define who is a “member of the clergy,” and—absent fraud or collusion—bars factfinders from second-guessing that designation.
  4. Privileges vs. reporting duty: The court held the court of appeals misapprehended the relevance of the civil clergy-penitent privilege (A.R.S. § 12-2233) and clarified that the Reporting Statute’s own clergy-related provisions include a separate testimonial “Clergy Privilege” in § 13-3620(N), with distinct privilege holder and scope, and that § 12-2233 is “inapplicable under the Reporting Statute” to the duty-to-report question.
  5. Disavowal of prior appellate reasoning: The Court disavowed Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 159 Ariz. 24 (App. 1988), to the extent it conflated the Clergy-Penitent Privilege with the Reporting Statute’s Clergy Privilege/Exemption.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Court built its constitutional analysis on the U.S. Supreme Court’s religious autonomy line and Arizona appellate applications of “ecclesiastical abstention” and “neutral principles.”

1. Religious autonomy and ecclesiastical abstention

  • Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952): The Court treated Kedroff as foundational for the principle that religious organizations must be free from state interference in “matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine,” including control over religious offices—framing the constitutional basis for deference to clergy designation and doctrinal confidentiality.
  • Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872): Used to anchor the idea that civil courts must accept decisions of church judicatories on ecclesiastical matters and that civil adjudication is permissible only when rights do “in no sense” depend on ecclesiastical questions.
  • Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U. S. of Am. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976): Provided the Court’s key “fraud or collusion” safety valve—permitting only “marginal” civil review where church action is in bad faith for secular purposes—while otherwise requiring abstention on discipline, faith, internal organization, and ecclesiastical rule.
  • Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012) and Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. 732 (2020): These cases informed the Court’s insistence that judges and juries may not decide whether a church “followed its own procedures,” and reinforced the practical reason for deference: courts are not competent to assess the role and function of religious actors across diverse traditions. They supported both the clergy-status holding and the bar on doctrinal compliance inquiries.

2. Establishment Clause concerns and permissible accommodation

  • Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969): Cited for the prohibition on using religious organizations as instruments of civil adjudication for interpreting and applying state standards—supporting the Court’s view that deciding whether nondisclosure was doctrinally “reasonable and necessary” is constitutionally fraught.
  • Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987): Used to justify that government may accommodate religious practice without violating the Establishment Clause—supporting the validity of the statute’s clergy accommodation while still requiring constitutional limits on judicial inquiry.
  • Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wis. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 605 U.S. 238 (2025) and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982): Used to support the Court’s insistence on definitions broad enough not to prefer one denomination over another, while still allowing doctrinal variation through deference.
  • Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507 (2022) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)): Invoked to underscore constitutional concerns with government coercion in religious exercise and to support the Court’s reluctance to narrow the statutory accommodation in ways that would pressure religious practice.

3. Fraud/collusion boundary and secular enforcement

  • Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940): Cited for the principle that fraud is not immunized “under the cloak of religion,” reinforcing that constitutional deference is not absolute and that secular laws remain enforceable when religious claims are pretextual for secular wrongdoing.

4. Arizona authorities shaping the statutory and doctrinal framework

  • Christakis v. Deitsch, 250 Ariz. 246 (App. 2020) and Ad Hoc Comm. of Parishioners of Our Lady of the Sun Cath. Church v. Reiss, 223 Ariz. 505 (App. 2010): Quoted for the definition of ecclesiastical abstention: courts cannot decide theological controversy, church discipline, or conformity to religious moral standards. These cases supported the Court’s conclusion that assessing “reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion” is an ecclesiastical inquiry.
  • Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 203 Ariz. 320 (App. 2002): Used to confirm that whether someone is qualified as clergy is determined by the faith’s own procedures and dictates—directly supporting the clergy-definition holding.
  • Waters v. O'Connor, 209 Ariz. 380 (App. 2004): Used in two ways: (i) to emphasize that protected religious communications must be “anchored in the ecclesiastical rules, customs and laws” of the religious group, and (ii) to illustrate that the party asserting clergy-based protection bears an evidentiary burden to show applicability (e.g., that the recipient is clergy).
  • State v. Archibeque, 223 Ariz. 231 (App. 2009): Referenced for confidentiality and waiver analysis in the privilege context; the Supreme Court used it as historical support that confidentiality is integral to the concept of “confession,” while also clarifying that privilege waiver doctrines do not control the Reporting Statute’s separate exemption analysis.
  • Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 159 Ariz. 24 (App. 1988): The Supreme Court rejected its reasoning insofar as it treated § 13-3620 as not creating an independent clergy privilege and conflated it with § 12-2233. This is a significant intrastate correction: the Court realigned the statutory structure with constitutional concerns for clergy compelled testimony and doctrinal confidentiality.
  • State v. Zeitner, 246 Ariz. 161 (2019): Cited to support that the Legislature can create and limit privileges through express exceptions—reinforcing the Court’s statutory parsing of § 13-3620(M) and (N).
  • Alulddin v. Alfartousi, 255 Ariz. 436 (App. 2023): Used to restate the “neutral principles of law” pathway: courts may adjudicate disputes in religious settings if they can do so without doctrinal inquiry.
  • State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277 (2014): Cited for dictionary use when statutory terms lack definitions—supporting the Court’s definitions of “confession” and “confidential communication.”
  • Dabush v. Seacret Direct LLC, 250 Ariz. 264 (2021) and Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137 (2024): Provided the standards for de novo review of summary judgment and statutory interpretation.
  • State ex rel. Adel v. Adleman, 252 Ariz. 356 (2022): Mentioned in rejecting plaintiffs’ privilege-based arguments; its framework did not control because the Court held the clergy-penitent privilege irrelevant to the duty-to-report question under § 13-3620(A).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court reframed the dispute around § 13-3620(A), not § 12-2233

A major move in the Opinion was to disentangle three distinct legal mechanisms that the court of appeals had blended:

  • Mandatory reporting duty in § 13-3620(A), imposed on “[a]ny person” with a reasonable belief of abuse, but subject to a clergy-specific accommodation.
  • Clergy Exemption in § 13-3620(A), permitting clergy to withhold reporting of a “confession or confidential communication” if the clergy member determines nondisclosure is “reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion.”
  • Clergy Privilege in § 13-3620(N), a testimonial bar preventing examination of clergy “without his consent” about “any confession,” while expressly stating it “does not discharge” the duty to report (which remains governed by (A) and its exemption).

From this structure, the Court concluded that privilege-waiver debates about § 12-2233 (where the privilege holder is the penitent) were legally orthogonal to the statutory duty-to-report question (where the clergy member’s doctrinal judgment controls the exemption).

2. The five elements of the Clergy Exemption were read through First Amendment constraints

The Court treated the Clergy Exemption as containing five elements and specified what a factfinder may—and may not—do with each:

  1. “Member of the clergy”: courts must defer to religious institutions’ designation of clergy, absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes, because clergy selection is at the core of religious autonomy (Kedroff; Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.; Rashedi).
  2. “Confession” / “confidential communication”: the Court supplied general, non-denominational definitions using contemporary dictionaries and Black’s, but held the First Amendment requires “substantial deference” to the institution’s doctrinal conception of what qualifies (Presbyterian Church; Waters).
  3. Received “in that person’s role as a member of the clergy”: treated as an ecclesiastical characterization; courts cannot second-guess whether counseling/disciplinary meetings are “clergy role” functions when the church asserts they are (Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch.).
  4. Received “in the course of discipline enjoined by the church”: similarly doctrinal; courts defer to whether the communication was anchored in the church’s enjoined discipline and procedures (Waters; Christakis).
  5. Clergy “determines” nondisclosure is “reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion”: the Court held this is precisely the kind of “followed its own procedures” question that Hosanna-Tabor forbids civil adjudicators from deciding. Thus, absent fraud/collusion, the clergy member’s doctrinal determination is not reviewable by a jury.

3. Application to the record: doctrinal classification ended the material-fact dispute

The Church Defendants produced doctrinal assertions (including references to the Church’s General Handbook) that bishops act as confessors, that serious sins are confessed to bishops, and that confidentiality binds not only bishops but also participants in disciplinary councils. Given those assertions:

  • Paul’s admissions to Bishop Herrod—alone and in the presence of Leizza—qualified as “confessions” and “confidential communications” under the Church’s doctrine.
  • Paul’s admissions during the disciplinary council qualified at least as “confidential communications.”
  • Communications among authorized ecclesiastical leaders (Bishop Herrod to Bishop Mauzy, and within the council) remained confidential under Church doctrine.

The court of appeals’ focus on whether the Clergy-Penitent Privilege was “waived” by the presence of others was therefore beside the point for § 13-3620(A).

4. “Personal observations” limitation was narrowed to observations “of the minor”

The Court corrected the court of appeals’ reliance on the statute’s statement that the exemption does not apply to “personal observations,” emphasizing the statutory phrase “personal observations the member of the clergy . . . may otherwise make of the minor.” Because the Does were not alleged to be present at the confession to Leizza in the bishop’s presence, the “personal observation” carveout did not apply.

C. Impact

1. Litigation posture: fewer jury questions, more front-loaded constitutional/statutory gatekeeping

The Opinion makes the “reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion” element largely nonjusticiable in ordinary civil litigation, meaning plaintiffs will face a higher barrier to surviving summary judgment where clergy can show the communication fits within doctrinal confidentiality and the clergy asserts the statutory determination was made.

2. Statutory clarity: § 13-3620 contains its own clergy-related privilege/exemption scheme

By disavowing Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court on conflation grounds, the Court recalibrates Arizona law:

  • § 13-3620(N) is a testimonial privilege held by clergy (“without his consent”).
  • § 12-2233 is a separate civil privilege held by the penitent (requires the penitent’s consent).
  • Neither privilege analysis controls the duty-to-report question, which turns on § 13-3620(A) and the Clergy Exemption’s constitutional boundaries.

3. Doctrinal deference and the fraud/collusion pathway

The Court’s repeated “absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes” qualification is the principal remaining channel for plaintiffs. Future cases likely will test what constitutes “collusion for secular purposes” (e.g., evidence manipulation, coordinated pretext to avoid liability) without requiring courts to interpret doctrine itself.

4. Practical effect on mandatory reporting controversies involving clergy

The decision strengthens a religious-autonomy shield around clergy handling of abuse admissions when those admissions are framed as confession/confidential communication under church discipline. At the same time, the Court emphasized there is no “general immunity from secular laws” and reaffirmed neutral-principles adjudication for claims that can be proved without doctrinal inquiry.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandatory reporting statute (§ 13-3620(A)): A law requiring people to report suspected child abuse—unless a specific exemption applies.
  • Clergy Exemption (in § 13-3620(A)): A carveout letting clergy withhold reporting of certain religious communications if nondisclosure is “reasonable and necessary” within the religion’s concepts.
  • Clergy Privilege (§ 13-3620(N)): A rule about testimony in court: clergy cannot be forced to testify about confessions without their own consent. It does not itself remove the reporting duty; the exemption analysis does.
  • Clergy-Penitent Privilege (§ 12-2233): A separate civil evidence privilege held by the person who confessed; it governs whether the clergyperson may be examined “without the consent of the person making a confession.”
  • Ecclesiastical abstention: A First Amendment doctrine requiring courts to stay out of disputes that require interpreting church doctrine, discipline, or governance.
  • Neutral principles of law: Courts may decide disputes involving religious parties if they can do so using ordinary legal rules (contracts, tort elements, statutory text) without deciding religious questions.
  • Fraud or collusion for secular purposes: The narrow exception allowing courts to scrutinize whether religious claims were used as a pretext for secular wrongdoing, without interpreting religious meaning.

V. Conclusion

The Arizona Supreme Court’s central contribution in DOE v. THE CORPORATION is a constitutional rule of decision for applying A.R.S. § 13-3620(A): absent fraud or collusion for secular purposes, courts and juries may not evaluate whether clergy “correctly” applied religious doctrine in determining that nondisclosure of an abuse admission was “reasonable and necessary within the concepts of the religion.”

The Court also clarified statutory architecture by separating the Reporting Statute’s Clergy Exemption and Clergy Privilege from the civil clergy-penitent privilege in § 12-2233, and it supplied baseline definitions of “confession” and “confidential communication” while mandating substantial doctrinal deference. The result is a precedent that shifts many clergy-reporting disputes from fact-intensive jury questions to threshold constitutional and statutory determinations, with the fraud/collusion exception serving as the principal remaining route for civil-court scrutiny.