Financial and Logistical Realities May Be Weighed in Out-of-State Parent-Child Contact—§ 650 “Maximum Contact” Does Not Eliminate Trial-Court Discretion

1. Introduction

Karissa Lashley v. Jacob Lashley (Vt. Sept. 4, 2026) concerns a post-divorce modification of parent-child contact where the parents live in different states (mother in Vermont, father in North Carolina). The parties have two sons (born 2017 and 2019). The final divorce order (January 2022) gave mother legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities and limited father’s in-person contact to supervised visits in Vermont, based on findings of father’s mental-health crises, alcohol use, and suicide attempts (including an attempt while the children were in his care), and his minimal contact history.

Father later sought modification. The family division found a qualifying change in circumstances—father achieved sobriety, reengaged with the children, and had positive supervised visits—then proceeded to craft a staged plan culminating in a permanent schedule that transitioned visits to North Carolina. Father appealed, challenging only the best-interests stage: he argued Vermont’s “maximum contact” policy in 15 V.S.A. § 650 required granting him essentially all available school-vacation time absent a finding of likely harm, and he argued the court improperly considered financial feasibility.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. It held the family division acted within its broad discretion in declining to adopt father’s requested schedule and in implementing a schedule that generally shared school-vacation time (including alternating holidays, a split Christmas break, and a summer schedule leaving the children in Vermont for the first three weeks and returning them at least two weeks before school starts). The Court also upheld the order requiring the parties to split transportation costs and permitting daily phone/video contact.

The Court rejected father’s core legal premise that § 650 removes trial-court discretion unless harm is found. It further concluded it was permissible for the trial court to consider financial and logistical realities, especially in an interstate-travel context, and that the record supported the court’s balancing of children’s relationships in Vermont (including siblings) against expanded contact with father.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• Wright v. Kemp, 2019 VT 11
  Used to frame the governing two-step modification framework: (1) a “real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances” under 15 V.S.A. § 668(a), then (2) whether modification is required by the children’s best interests. Here, the appeal addressed only step two, narrowing the Supreme Court’s review.
• DeSantis v. Pegues, 2011 VT 114
  Supplied the deferential appellate standards: factual findings are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions must be supported by findings; and the family court’s discretion is reversed only if exercised on “unfounded considerations” or to an extent “clearly unreasonable upon the facts presented.” This case underwrote the Court’s reluctance to substitute its judgment for the trial court’s on how to structure interstate contact.
• Rock v. Rock, 2023 VT 42
  Reinforced the principle that trial courts have “wide discretion” in parent-child contact decisions, supporting the affirmance where the schedule reflected reasoned balancing rather than a rigid rule of “maximum time.”
• Lee v. Ogilbee, 2018 VT 96
  Central to the Court’s rejection of father’s statutory argument: although 15 V.S.A. § 650 expresses an important policy, it “does not remove the trial court’s discretion.” The Court also relied on Lee for the proposition that an order stands if it reflects “reasoned judgment” and provides both parents time with the child.
• LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 2014 VT 65
  Cited as an example of rejecting the claim that a contact order contravenes § 650 simply because one parent receives less time; “ample contact” consistent with circumstances is sufficient.
• Bancroft v. Bancroft, 154 Vt. 442 (1990)
  Supported the point that contact allocations substantially below 50% can still be consistent with § 650 when grounded in findings, undermining father’s “maximum available time” position.
• Lane v. Schenck, 158 Vt. 489 (1992)
  Provided the cautionary limitation on the policy of maximizing contact: “§ 650 does not promote visitation at all costs.” This principle allowed the Court to uphold a schedule that shared vacations rather than granting father nearly all of them.
• Sochin v. Sochin, 2005 VT 36 (mem.) and Harris v. Harris, 149 Vt. 410 (1988)
  These cases addressed how a court must show it considered the best-interests factors. The opinion used them to reject any implication that the family division was required to mechanically list each factor in 15 V.S.A. § 665(b); it is enough that the findings “as a whole” reflect consideration of relevant factors.
• Nickerson v. Nickerson, 158 Vt. 85 (1992) and Hansen v. Hansen, 151 Vt. 506 (1989)
  Used to establish that § 665(b) is “nonexhaustive” and that factors beyond those enumerated may be considered in the best-interests analysis—paving the way for considering travel logistics and financial feasibility.
• Quinones v. Bouffard, 2017 VT 103
  Directly supported the proposition that, when travel is required for parent-child contact, the court may consider “challenges” associated with traveling (there, Vermont to New York City; here, Vermont to North Carolina).
• Kasper v. Kasper, 2007 VT 2 (mem.) and Rogers v. Parrish, 2007 VT 35
  These cases constrained the scope of appellate review: the question is not whether other schedules might also have worked, nor whether evidence could be weighed differently, but whether the chosen schedule constitutes an abuse of discretion. They supported affirmance even if father’s proposed schedule was arguably plausible.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked moves:

1. “Maximum contact” is a policy, not a command that overrides discretion. Father argued that absent a finding of likely “direct physical harm or significant emotional harm,” the court had to award him “maximum” time. The Court rejected that interpretation using Lee v. Ogilbee, 2018 VT 96, Lane v. Schenck, and related cases: 15 V.S.A. § 650 informs best interests, but it does not dictate a presumptive schedule, and it does not eliminate judicial discretion to craft a schedule that reflects record-based, child-centered judgment.
2. The family division considered multiple best-interests considerations—not just money. The Court emphasized that the trial court weighed (a) father’s relatively recent reengagement and the need to build a foundation before transitioning fully to North Carolina visits; (b) the children’s relationships in Vermont, including with siblings, which aligns with 15 V.S.A. § 665(b)(1), (7); and (c) the practical and equitable realities of interstate travel.
3. Financial and logistical constraints are permissible best-interests considerations in interstate-contact cases. Father claimed financial feasibility is not a statutory factor. The Court treated § 665(b) as a minimum, nonexclusive list, relying on Nickerson v. Nickerson and Hansen v. Hansen, and observed that travel cases invite attention to logistics (Quinones v. Bouffard). Importantly, the Court also read the record as undercutting father’s “money used against me” theme: father’s own counsel described the monthly-visit approach as not feasible and advocated fewer, longer “chunks” during school breaks to reduce financial pressure—precisely the direction the court took while also splitting transportation costs.

C. Impact

Although issued as an entry order (and thus subject to Vermont’s limitation that three-justice panel decisions are not precedential before any tribunal), the decision is practically significant in three ways:

• Reinforces that § 650 does not create an entitlement to “all available time.” Litigants frequently invoke the “maximum continuing contact” language as if it were a quantitative mandate. This decision reemphasizes that the governing inquiry remains the child’s best interests under § 665(b), assessed with broad discretion.
• Validates consideration of interstate-travel feasibility, including financial realities. The opinion makes clear that where contact depends on long-distance travel, courts may account for logistical and cost constraints when crafting sustainable schedules—especially where the evidence shows those constraints affect whether contact actually occurs.
• Signals approval of “graduated” and “shared vacation” structures for long-distance parenting. The Court accepted a schedule that (a) ramped up, (b) preserved meaningful blocks of time, and (c) ensured the children still had meaningful vacation time in their primary home environment and with siblings—an approach likely to be persuasive in analogous disputes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Real, substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances”: A threshold requirement to reopen a final parent-child contact order under 15 V.S.A. § 668(a). Only after meeting this threshold does the court decide what arrangement is in the child’s best interests.
• Two-step modification process: As described in Wright v. Kemp, 2019 VT 11: (1) change in circumstances; (2) best interests.
• “Best interests” factors are nonexhaustive: 15 V.S.A. § 665(b) lists factors the court must consider “at least,” meaning other relevant considerations (like travel logistics) may also be weighed.
• “Abuse of discretion” appellate review: The Supreme Court does not re-decide which schedule is best. It asks whether the trial court’s choice was based on the evidence and reasonable judgment (DeSantis v. Pegues; Rock v. Rock).
• § 650 “maximum contact”: A legislative policy preference, not an automatic rule that compels equal time or the greatest physically possible time in every case (Lee v. Ogilbee; Lane v. Schenck).

5. Conclusion

Karissa Lashley v. Jacob Lashley affirms a discretionary, evidence-driven approach to modifying parent-child contact in an interstate parenting context. The Court held that 15 V.S.A. § 650 does not require “maximum available” contact absent a harm finding, and it approved the family division’s consideration of practical travel and financial constraints as part of a broader best-interests analysis under 15 V.S.A. § 665(b). The key takeaway is that Vermont courts may design sustainable long-distance contact schedules that balance meaningful time with both parents, the child’s relationships in the primary home (including siblings), and the real-world feasibility of travel—so long as the decision reflects reasoned judgment supported by the record.